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ABSTRACT
The study focuses on the everyday problem solving processes of a group of community
activists in a rural setting in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa. It aims to uncover:
first, the local knowledge of the participants of the study with reference to the concepts
problem and problem solving; second, the participants' group problem solving procedure; and
third, the dialectical interrelation between the participants' knowledge and practice with
reference to everyday group problem solving. It is contended that the mainstream cognitive
approach and the cross-cultural tradition are inappropriate for the study of everyday cognitive
processes. A ‘situated cognition’ approach, based on the notions of activity and cultural
mediation, is proposed as a theoretical framework for the study. The ontological and
epistemological assumptions underpinning the empirical study were derived from a scientific
realist and a hermeneutical paradigm. Data for the inquiry into the local knowledge of the
participants was collected through individual interviews. The data was interpreted, using the
grounded theory techniques of constant comparison, coding and compiling theoretical
diagrams. Data for the inquiry into the participants' group problem solving practice consisted
of video-taped group problem solving processes. This data was analysed, using a multi layered
process of progressively deeper interpretation, employing a reading guide technique. Analysis
of the research data revealed that the participants perceived a problem as an impediment to
satisfactory participation in society. Problem solving was considered as an emotive, cognitive
and inter-active process, involving particular role players. This process had a certain structure,
involved attitudes and actions and relied on particular resources. Successful problem solving
was perceived to result in restoration of social equilibrium. The group problem solving
procedure used by the participants consisted of a process of developing a common
understanding and group consensus. The strategies employed in the process, the roles played
by the participants, the rules adhered to by the participants and the structure underlying the
process were all congruent with these aims. There was a mutually reinforcing interrelation
between knowledge and practice with reference to the participants’ problem solving.
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“When people come to us for their research, they go to the best looking house, make
themselves comfortable there and ask their questions. They go away and write big books
and get degrees. They never make the effort to go around the village to see and to hear
how things really are. We never get a chance to show the outside world how things
really are.”
(Old man in Rwantsana village, 1992, Eastern Cape, South Africa)
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GROUP PROBLEM SOLVING AMONG COMMUNITY ACTIVISTS IN
A SOUTH AFRICAN SETTING: AN EVERYDAY COGNITION
APPROACH.
VOLUME 1: TEXT AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
1CHAPTER 1.
INTRODUCTION
While psychology has the potential to contribute to national development in Third World
countries, it is a potential that has hardly been met (Gilbert, 1996; MacLachlan & Carr, 1994;
Moghaddam, 1990; Nsamenang, 1993; Sloan, 1990). Several reasons have been suggested for
this shortcoming. Psychological research has been dominated by First World researchers and
issues of interest rarely involve everyday problems of Third World communities. Psychological
theory and concepts, which are generated in First World contexts, are not necessarily
appropriate for use in developing societies (Ardilla, 1992; MacLachlan & Carr, 1994;
Nsamenang, 1993; Van Vlaenderen, 1993). Most research conducted in developing countries
is embedded in a cross-cultural approach and aims to establish universal s regarding the state of
the environment or the person rather than to focus on explaining the processes of rapid social
change characteristic of most developing countries (Ardilla, 1992; Van Vlaenderen, 1993).
Most research aims to enrich the pool of scientific knowledge rather than to influence the
condition of the lives of the poor (Moghaddam, 1990; Sloan, 1990; Sloan & Monterro, 1990).
This study is an attempt to address some of the shortcomings of psychological practice and
research in developing countries. It focuses on uncovering indigenous knowledge and practice
of people in a developing context. More specifically, it aims at gaining insight into the notions
of problem and problem solving as these are perceived by local people and at gaining an
understanding of problem solving,, as it is  practiced by people in their everyday lives.
1. Motivations for the study
The research was initiated in an important socio-political era in the history of South Africa. It
took place during the time in which the Apartheid regime was finally dismantled and was
characterised by a whirlwind of changes which attempted to prepare the people of South
Africa for a democratic regime.
Motivation for the study emerged from the researcher's practical experiences in grassroots
development work in rural South African communities. This work consisted of a training
programme run by a local development organisation for young Africans from different rural
communities. The programme aimed at preparing them to provide leadership in development
ventures in their communities.
During the training sessions of the programme, incongruencies between the cognitive
processes of the trainers (who used a Western style of training) and those of the local people
2became apparent. It was hypothesised that these incongruencies resulted from different
conceptions and practices of problem solving. This stimulated the researcher to develop a
research project to investigate the dynamics of local problem solving processes.
In an attempt to develop a research design for the study, the inadequacy of the dominant
cognitive paradigm and its corresponding meta-theory became apparent. An additional aim,
therefore, emerged, namely to develop a suitable methodology, based on a meta-theory and a
cognitive theory congruent with the research topic and with each other.
2. Conceptual framework for the study
The framework for the study was built on an ‘everyday cognition’ approach and a
hermeneutical paradigm.
2.1. An ‘everyday cognition’ framework
Scrutiny of the mainstream cognitive theories revealed several shortcomings with respect to
the intended study of everyday group problem solving processes. The mainstream emphasis on
cognition as an internal psychological process, on an experimental design and on the use of
models of artificial intelligence, were deemed ineffective for the inquiry into everyday problem
solving processes. They did not allow for a contextualised insight into the research
participants’ knowledge and practice.
A ‘situated cognition’ approach was chosen as the theoretical foundation for the study.
Vygotsky's (1978) tenets, that higher mental functions (amongst which is problem solving)
emerge when mind and action join together in purposeful activity and that this activity is
informed by a social-cultural-historical context, were seminal to this foundation. Inspired by
Vygotsky's ideas, everyday problem solving was defined as a goal-directed activity involving
affective, cognitive and conative aspects. This activity was assumed to embody an intricate
dialectical interface between individual and environment. This interface was defined as cultural
mediation (Wertsch, 1995). It was further accepted that mediation comes about through joint
interaction between individuals with the help of mediational means (Wertsch, 1995). Those
means were identified as cultural values (Baron, 1985), cultural goals (Gauvain, 1995) and
models (D’Andrade, 1990).
32.2. An interpretive research paradigm
The meta-theory underpinning the research design was based on aspects of the hermeneutical
and the realist paradigms. Hermeneutics maintains that human behaviour is purposive, active
and goal-directed (Schwandt, 1994) and that interpretive inquiry takes place in a context
delineated by our everyday participatory understanding of people and events. It implies that
this understanding is perspectival and does not consist of a correspondence between a theory
and the way things really are, but is a matter of uncovering, determined by the access
developed towards the object of inquiry. The scientific realist approach regards the objects of
knowledge as the structures and mechanisms that generate phenomena. These objects are real
structures, which operate independently of our knowledge or experience (Bhaskar, 1979).
The paradigm developed for the study drew from the above two philosophies. It accepted the
principle of an independent reality while simultaneously acknowledging that access to such
reality is possible only through a participatory, perspectival interpretation. The study aimed to
uncover underlying structures of the problem solving processes of the participants in the study,
employing principles of the interpretive approach in an attempt to uncover those structures.
The ideas of Ricoeur (1976) on the structural analysis of texts and the notion of ‘hermeneutical
circle’ underpinned the interpretive method for the study. The structural analysis according to
Ricoeur (1976) involves a dialectical combination of interpretation and analysis of texts,
alternately evoking moments of creativity and imposing moments of rigorous validation. The
hermeneutical circle refers to the circularity and dialectical nature of interpretations. It implies
that interpretation of a whole can only occur as a result of interpretation of its constituent parts
and that these parts only make sense in the context of the whole (Taylor, 1994).
2.3. The research question
In order to gain an understanding of the local group problem solving processes, a three-fold
aim was identified. The study intended: first, to uncover indigenous knowledge of the concepts
problem and problem solving of the participants; second, to uncover patterns, structures and
strategies of indigenous group problem solving practice; and third, to uncover the inter-relation
between the participants’ knowledge and practice.
42.4. The method
The study did not make use of an established psychological method. Instead, the everyday
cognition approach and the interpretive paradigm, developed for the study, provided the
principles for a methodological framework on which certain data analysis techniques were
anchored. These techniques were chosen for their compatibility with the theoretical and meta-
theoretical tenets of the study. The study made use of the constant comparison and coding
techniques of the grounded theory approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) and the reading guide
technique (Mergendollar, 1989).
3. The study process
The study starts with an analysis of the different paradigms of development and the possible
role of psychology in Third World countries, congruent with the different paradigms. A
people-centered approach is advocated as an appropriate paradigm for psychological practice
in developing countries. This approach is built on principles of participation and reliance on
people's local knowledge for the building of their individual and communal capacity to master
change and to take control of development.
Subsequently, the researcher's personal context, which contributed to the instigation of the
study, is described. The conflicting experiences of the researcher in her dual role of academic
and grassroots development worker are portrayed in order to explain the motives behind the
specific choice of theory, meta-theory and research design.
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 deal respectively with the theory, the meta-theory and the research design
for the empirical component of the study.
The discussion on the theoretical background of the study commences with a delineation of the
characteristics of the mainstream cognitive approach and the cross-cultural research approach.
Subsequently, the shortcomings of these two approaches for the study of everyday cognition
are demonstrated. Characteristics of everyday problem solving are then described and a
theoretical framework for the study of everyday problem solving constructed, based on a
survey of ‘everyday cognition’ literature. The chapter ends with a presentation of the
framework.
The chapter on the meta-theoretical background for the study includes a discussion of the
hermeneutical paradigm and the scientific realist philosophy. A paradigm for the study is
subsequently developed, based on aspects of both philosophies. The ontological,
5epistemological and teleological components of the paradigm with regards to the study are
identified.
The research design is firmly embedded in the theoretical and meta-theoretical grounding of
the research. These are reflected in the framing assumption presented in Chapter 6, which deals
with the empirical study. In this chapter the sample of participants is described. The research
design contains three components, respectively dealing with the three aspects of the research
question. He first component relates to the inquiry into the participants' local knowledge of the
concepts problem and problem solving. A description is provided: first, of the data gathering
process, which involved individual interviews and group discussions; and second, of the
interpretive analysis, which consisted of a multi-layered process of progressively deeper
interpretations, using the grounded theory techniques of coding, constant comparison and
theoretical diagrams. The second component relates to the inquiry into the participants' group
problem solving practice. A description of the data collection process is provided. This
involved video-taping problem solving events. The interpretive analysis consisted of a multi-
layered process of progressively deeper interpretations, using the reading guide technique. The
third component of the research question involved the integration of the interpretive results of
the first and the second components.
Chapters 7, 8 and 9 present the results of respectively components one, two and three of the
inquiry process. Chapter 7 presents the results of the inquiry into the participants' local
knowledge of the concepts problem and problem solving. Five levels of interpretive data,
congruent with the five progressive stages of the interpretative process, are discussed. Each
level represents an integrative interpretive summary of the previous stage. The last two stages
involve a contextualisation of the interpretive data in the ‘everyday cognition’ literature.
Chapter 8 presents the results of the inquiry into the participants' everyday group problem
solving procedure. Four levels of interpretive data, congruent with the four progressive stages
of the interpretative process, are discussed. Each level represents an integrative interpretive
summary of the previous stage. The last two stages involve a contextualisation of the
interpretive data in the everyday cognition literature. Chapter 9 presents a synthesis of the
results of the interpretive processes of Components one and two of the research design. This
provides an integrative picture of the research participants' local knowledge and practice of
problem solving embedded in an ‘everyday cognition’ framework.
In the concluding chapter of the study the various aims that were set for the study are revisited
in an attempt to evaluate the achievements and shortcomings of the study.
6CHAPTER 2.
PSYCHOLOGY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: PEOPLE-CENTERED
DEVELOPMENT AND LOCAL KNOWLEDGE
1. Introduction
Despite a general recognition that developing countries have been, and still are, grappling with
a morass of socio-psychological problems related to rapid social change, psychology has
largely remained outside the orbit of national development in Third World countries
(Moghaddam, 1990; Nsamenang, 1993; Sloan, 1990). However, during the last thirty-five
years, some debate has been generated around the role and relevance of psychology in
developing countries (Ardilla, 1992; Blackler, 1983; Jahoda, 1973; Korten, 1980; Sinha, 1984,
1990; Triandis, 1972; Van Vlaenderen, 1993). In these debates it is acknowledged that in
Third World countries, where resources are scarce, psychologists are faced with the challenge
of providing knowledge and services that contribute to national development. However,
opinions on how psychology can play a role in processes of rapid social change vary between
psychologists of different persuasions.
The aim in this chapter is to provide a short overview of the various possible roles of
psychology in national development, congruent with different development paradigms. A
modernisation approach, a dependency approach and a people-centered approach are
discussed. The people-centered paradigm is suggested as the preferred paradigm and
implications of this approach for psychological research and practice are addressed.
2. The role of psychology in developing countries: A matter of development paradigm
2.1. The modernisation approach
Traditionally, modernisation theories have provided the main development paradigm for
psychological practice in developing countries. According to modernisation theories the lack of
development of Third World countries is caused by the absence of certain conditions which are
present in technologically advanced Western societies (Kindervatter, 1979). Development is
defined in terms of a linear progression towards a particular situation, which can be assessed
according to certain objective measures, such as Gross National Product (GNP) (Coetzee,
1987). Development is regarded as a process of rapid economic growth through
industrialisation, and the adoption of modern scientific approaches to agriculture (Sinha,
1983). “Development strategies based on this traditional modernisation approach emphasise
centralised planning and control over the distribution of resources. The focus is on providing
7infrastructure and institutions to facilitate the progression towards a Western model and to
tackle obstacles on the way” (Oakley & Marsden, 1985, p. 5). It is assumed that capital inputs
from outside the Third World will result in a ‘take off’ and the eventual trickle-down of
benefits throughout the system (Oakley & Marsden, 1985).
The earlier writings of Durganand Sinha (1973, 1984) and Harry Triandis (1972, 1984) are
examples of psychological practice contextualised in a modernisation approach. In these texts,
the change towards a Western model is valued and it is argued that people in the developing
countries are impatient to catch up with the developed world during the span of a generation
(Sinha, 1984, p. 19). It is further argued that this involves telescoping change processes in
traditional social institutions such as the existing patterns of social stratification and power
mechanisms. In fact a radical transformation in the entire way of life. It is acknowledged that
this rapid social change can have both desirable and undesirable consequences. Sinha (1984)
argues that the temporal compression and often chaotic nature of changes have caused
conditions of instability that led to many socio-psychological problems. Alienation, changing
levels of aspiration and increasing discrepancy between aspiration and achievement lead to job
dissatisfaction, higher incidence of psychosomatic ailments, marginality and identity diffusion.
Triandis (1972) lists commonly observed ill effects of rapid socio-economic development, such
as increasing incidence of suicide, violence, riots, alcoholism, crime rate and delinquency, as
well as a greater incidence of psycho-somatic ailments and problems of mental health.
Sinha (1983) argues that the psychologist's task in national development is three-fold: to
analyse the factors conducive to desirable changes (facilitators); to analyse the factors that act
as impediments to change (inhibitors); and to determine ways of avoiding or cushioning the
psychological costs of rapid development.
A large body of psychological research in the context of national development focuses
particularly on attitudes as impediments to change. Modernisation psychologists tend to look
at how local attitudes and values do not fit with those required in 'modern' society. Surveys on
the presence or absence of 'modern' attitudes amongst people in developing countries still is a
major aspect of the role of psychology in national development. The result of such studies then
are used as a basis for educational programmes intended to prepare people for the ‘take off’
stage towards modernisation (Kagitcibasi, 1973; Sinha, 1986; Williamson, 1982).
Modernisation psychologists emphasise that social change and developmental processes are
large and complex human problems. Therefore, the parameters of their studies are not only
concerned with microcosmic individual processes but at the same time encompass larger social,
structural and cultural influences. Sinha (1984, p. 24) argues that if it is to have significant
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macrocosmic perspective.
Several limitations can be identified in this ‘modernisation psychology’ approach. First, there is
an adherence to the hegemony of Western psychological views as well as Western world views
in general. Second, there is a total lack of consideration of power issues, which are an
inevitable part of any development process involving a developer and a developing partner.
Third, modernisation psychologists concentrate on the socio-psychological consequences of
change rather than on the involvement of local people in the development process. People are
considered as passive receptors of an imposed development process.
2.2. Dependency theories
During the past three decades, development programmes worldwide have been evaluated. It
was shown that they have failed to reduce poverty and underdevelopment. Large numbers of
people in Third World countries are still living in absolute poverty, deprived of the most basic
resources (Korten, 1990; Oakley & Marsden, 1985; World Bank, 1992).
Recognition of the failure of development programmes, based on the modernisation approach,
inspired the emergence of alternative development paradigms such as the dependency theory.
Dependency theorists criticise the top-down process of the modernisation approach and its
accompanying presumption that people in developing countries are unable to meet their own
needs. An historical analysis of the Third World situation, which emerged from the school of
dependency theorists during the 1970's, asserts a causal relationship between the development
of some countries and the parallel ‘underdevelopment’ of others. According to dependency
theorists, the underdevelopment problem can be attributed to the unequal power relationship
between technologically advanced and Third World countries, rather than to Third World
countries themselves (Frank, 1975; Harrison, 1982; Hoogvelt, 1976). Underdevelopment
should be seen as a direct function of the development of the Western World, which relies
heavily on large scale exploitation of the Third World. The unequal relationships of
international trade and investment are beneficial to the technologically advanced countries and
detrimental to the Third World, and this creates a weak bargaining position for Third World
countries, leading to dependency (Frank, 1975; Hoogvelt, 1976).
According to the dependency paradigm, the modernisation approach does not attack the real
causes of poverty, which are the economic, social and political world systems and power
relations and it does not focus on real solutions, namely increasing the capacity of the deprived
to meet their own needs (Harrison, 1982; Hoogvelt, 1976). Oakley & Marsden (1985) go one
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part of the problem and, through their development style, positively contribute to
underdevelopment.
Goulet (quoted in Kindervatter, 1979) eloquently describes what he calls the total trauma that
results from dependency:
The trauma is total because the desire mechanisms of an entire population are altered
before it possesses control over the social institutions which would enable it to gain
effective use of resources needed to meet these new desires. Those who do not possess
the resources or enjoy access to them understandably assist the development efforts of
others only to the degree that such an activity enhances their own objectives. Since they
are technologically and economically more powerful, transfers of resources, information
and personnel consolidate the dominant position of the strong and further accentuate the
dependency of the weak (l.c. p. 29).
Concurrent with this alternative analysis of development in developing countries, the concept
of development obtained a different meaning. Dependency theorists argue that different
countries may pursue different goals, depending on their own individual values (Hoogvelt,
1976). According to Goulet (quoted in Kindervatter 1979, p.37) development is not a cluster
of benefits given to people in need, but rather a process by which a nation acquires a greater
mastery over its own destiny. Development involves overcoming internal and external
dependency, caused by relationships with technologically advanced countries.
This ‘alternative approach’ was well captured in the definition of development provided by the
Dag Hammerskjold Foundation in 1975 (Dag Hammerskjold Foundation, 1977). The
Foundation describes what it calls ‘Another development’ in the light of five general attributes.
First, appropriate development is need oriented. It is geared at meeting human needs of those
that are dominated and exploited. Second, it is endogenous. It stems from the heart of each
society and is informed by its own history. Third, it aims at self reliance, implying that each
society relies primarily on its own strengths and resources. Local knowledge and survival skills
are considered to be the building blocks for community development. Fourth, it is ecologically
sound; and fifth, it is based on structural transformations, which are necessary to realise the
conditions of self management and participation in decision making by all those affected.
2.3. The people-centered development approach
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During the eighties, the ‘people/human-centered’ development approach, which takes
cognisance of the dependency theories, gained popularity. This approach is not built on one
central theory and so its principles cannot be found in any one document and no single person,
group or organisation can be considered the spokesperson. Two sets of authors, who come
from different parts of the world, provide insights into this approach.
David Korten (1990), who worked extensively in the Philippines, employs the word ‘people-
centered development’ to capture his view on equity-led sustainable development. He argues
that ‘growth-centered’ development, which is characteristic of the modernisation and, to a
certain extent, also of the dependency approach, puts economic growth ahead of people and
the ecology on which their well-being depends. He proposes an alternative development vision
in which the well-being of people and the living systems of the planet, that is their home, come
first. He defines development as ‘a process by which the members of society increase their
personal and institutional capacities to mobilise and manage resources to produce sustainable
and justly distributed improvements in their quality of life, consistent with their own
aspirations’ (Korten, 1990, p. 67). The above definition emphasises the process of
development and its essential focus on personal and institutional capacity. It encompasses the
principles of sustainability, justice and inclusiveness. It acknowledges that only the people
themselves can define what they consider to be improvements in the quality of their lives.
The ‘people-centered’ development vision is grounded in several explicit values (Korten,
1990). First, priority in the use of the earth's resources should be to allow all people an
opportunity to produce a basic livelihood for themselves and their families. Second, current
generations have no right to engage in levels of non-essential consumption that deprive future
generations of the possibility of sustaining decent human living standards. Third, every
individual has the right to be a productive contributing member of a family, community and
society. Fourth, control of productive assets should be broadly distributed within society. Fifth,
sovereignty resides in the people. The authority of the state is granted by the people and,
therefore, may be withdrawn by them. Sixth, local economies should be diversified and
reasonably self reliant in producing basic needs. Seventh, people have a right to a voice in
making decisions that influence their lives and decision making should be as close to the level
of individual, family and community as possible. Eight, local decision making should reflect a
global perspective and an acceptance of the rights and responsibilities of global citizenship.
Korten further argues that ‘people's power’ is the key for development, though its expression
must be more than a short-lived mass demonstration. He believes that the expression of
‘people’s power’, as a force for reform, can be sustained and channeled through a combination
of mass organisations, individual voluntary initiatives and voluntary organisations (VO's). He
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further argues that the widespread belief that development is primarily a task of government
has legitimated authoritarianism and created a major barrier to true development progress in
developing countries. The belief that the governments can deliver development is based upon a
false assessment of the capacity of government and the nature of development. Korten urges
for a strong civil society in the form of non governmental organisations (NGO)'s and voluntary
people's organisations (VO's). He purports that VO's in their political role supplement political
parties as varied and flexible mechanisms through which citizens define and articulate a broad
range of interests, meet local needs and make demands on government. In their educational
roles they provide training grounds for democratic citizenship, develop the political skills of
their members and educate the people on a wide variety of public interest issues. In their
watchdog roles they serve as checks on the government.
Max-Neef, Elizalde & Hopenhayn (1989), who have a collaborative endeavour, linking
researchers across Latin America, use the term ‘human scale development’. Human scale
development is based on the satisfaction of fundamental human needs and on the generation of
growing levels of self reliance. Adherents of the human scale development emphasise the
construction of an organic articulation of people with nature and technology. They argue for a
symbiosis of global processes with local activity and for combining personal with social needs.
They further promote a balance between central planning and autonomy and between powers
of civil society with the state.
The above overview of the main development paradigms provides a framework against which
the different possible roles for psychology in service of national development can be cast.
Whereas adherence to a modernisation paradigm demands an alliance of the psychologist with
the state organs of the developing country and with the foreign developer, the dependency
approach and the ensuing people-centered approach are interested in a human-centered process
with the focus on the local people. The modernisation approach presumes an acceptance of the
superiority of Western values and an undertaking to assist people in obtaining a Western
lifestyle and world view. In striving to adjust people to a foreign imposed change, the
psychologist's task is remedial rather than pro-active. Modernisation psychology is based on a
consensus model rather than a conflict model. The people-centered approach in contrast
recognises the power differentials involved in the development process and openly chooses
sides for the local people of the developing countries. It sees its main role in assisting local
people to fulfill their human needs by building their capacity to do so.
Gilbert & Van Vlaenderen (1995) provide a more detailed list of the role of psychologists in a
people-centered development approach. The list follows.
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- Focusing on the ‘local’ (which has traditionally been the periphery) for development
activity.
- Strengthening and building from what exists at the local level, rather than attempting to
replace this with transplanted ideas and technology.
- Ensuring that development processes are sustainable, i.e. guaranteeing, at the human
level, that the processes of change do not create dependency and, at the environmental
level, that finite resources are not over-exploited.
- Building infrastructure to manage and maintain development at the individual and
organisational level..
- Addressing people's needs, particularly those of the poor.
3. Key concepts for an appropriate development paradigm
It is argued that for the ‘people-centered’ development approach to succeed, local people need
to be empowered to participate in their development process. This requires a capacity building
process based on their local knowledge and resources. What follows is a discussion of the
concepts participation, empowerment, capacity building and local knowledge, and how these
impact on psychological practice and research.
3.1. Participation
There is an abundance of literature on the notion of participation in development (Kelly & Van
Vlaenderen, 1996). A full treatise of the different interpretations of participation and their
importance for development lies beyond the scope of this study. However, analysis of several
authoritative definitions of participation reveals that the core component of participation is
decision making (Cohen and Uphoff, 1977; Mathur, 1986; Oakley and Marsden, 1985;
Rajakutty, 1991). People participate to the extent that they choose cognitively, affectively and
physically to engage in identifying, planning, establishing, implementing and evaluating national
and local development programmes. As such, participation can be regarded as a decision
making process occurring at the individual and social level.. According to Shaeffer (1994)
participation involves the assumption of responsibility in considering the rationale, implications
and potential outcomes of development endeavours.
In order for people to make the necessary decisions with regards to their own development
they need to be empowered to do so.
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3.2. Empowerment
Swift and Levin (1987, p. 72) believe that empowerment refers simultaneously to the
phenomenological development of a certain state of mind (feeling powerful, competent, worthy
of esteem) and to the modification of structural conditions in order to re-allocate power (e.g.
modifying the society's opportunity structure). In other words, empowerment refers to a
subjective experience and the objective reality and is both a process and a goal (Yeich &
Levine, 1992).
At the macro-level and the meso-level, empowerment can be defined in terms of group
possession of actual social influence, political power and legal rights (Swift and Levin, 1987, p.
72). It relates to people's power with respect to access and control of the national resources
necessary to protect their livelihood (Mathur, 1986; Yeich & Levine, 1992). According
Shaeffer (1994) empowerment means that communities become more explicit in asserting
rights and responsibilities in determining the direction of their own development. This power is
real, formal and legitimate.
At the individual level empowerment conveys a psychological sense of personal control or
influence (Zimmerman, 1990). For empowerment to take place two interrelated changes are
required. First, people, individually or in groups, must develop a greater sense of self worth,
self confidence, self reliance and a recognition of the value of their own skills and resources.
This implies less dependence on external inputs and wisdom and greater pride in the
significance and validity of personal and collective knowledge and experience. Second, there
must be a change in people's perceptions of their relations with other people and with the
institutions that define their social world. This change involves both an understanding of how
the broad social world has defined their lives and the potential they have for more actively
influencing their own environment. Together these changes make people feel they can
determine their own needs and have the right and ability to change their world so that it is
more responsive to these needs (Vanderslice, 1984, p. 2).
There is a dialectical relationship between empowerment and participation. People need to
have the capacity and the power to participate in decision making, at the same time they need
opportunities to participate in decision making in order to build capacity and to empower
themselves (Prestby, Wandersman, Florin, Rich & Chavis, 1990). Van Vlaenderen & Gilbert
(1993) argue that through involvement in a variety of development activities, people can gain
more knowledge, learn better practice and end with a greater awareness of the problems that
exist, the causes behind these problems and in some cases their possible solutions.
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It is clear from the above discussion that empowerment is not a condition which can be
bestowed by one group on another, but is, rather, an ongoing process by which the
disempowered seek to fulfill their own needs and preserve their own rights (Swift & Levin,
1987). True empowerment needs to be facilitated rather than imposed on people. This involves
building individual and group capacity in local people, so that they can empower themselves to
fully participate in decision making processes that influence their lives. Van Vlaenderen &
Gilbert (1993) argue that a capacity building process for empowerment involves the following
aspects:
- facilitating a process in which people can articulate their needs;
- providing people with a holistic picture of the development situation. This requires
mediation between different role players in the development process;
- lobbying, with the people, for their right to participation in all stages and aspects of
development;
- providing human resource skills and an enabling environment for the acquisition of skills
and the practice of the newly acquired skills. Enabling is defined here as an environment
which allows for errors to be made without disastrous effects and for continued
evaluation;
- strengthening local groups' sense of community and assisting with the establishment of
local community networks;
- facilitating the emergence and strengthening of local leadership, who can take
responsibility for development issues;
- acknowledging and accessing local knowledge, skills and resources.
It is with reference to the issue of local knowledge that psychologists have a particular
contribution to make to development in Third World countries. In the following section the
concept of local knowledge is defined and its importance for empowerment identified. The role
of psychologists in accessing local knowledge is elaborated on..
3.3. Local knowledge
In the context of development, people's knowledge has at times been referred to as indigenous
knowledge (Brokensha, Warren & Werner, 1980), rural people's knowledge and local
knowledge (Chambers, 1985). In the cognitive psychology literature the term everyday
cognition has been most popular. The characteristics of everyday cognition and everyday
problem solving will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. For purpose of the current chapter the
term local knowledge is used as a general term for the knowledge of ordinary people. This
includes the concepts indigenous knowledge and rural people's knowledge.
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Local knowledge is the common sense wisdom that comes from everyday life rather than
formal learning. It arises from practical activity and is tacit i.e. it is not normally consciously
reflected upon. It contains knowledge on what is, or exists, as well as on how things are done
(Gilbert & Van Vlaenderen, 1995, p.5). It is located in people and only rarely written down. It
refers to the whole system of knowledge, including concepts, beliefs and perceptions, the stock
of knowledge and the process whereby it is acquired, augmented, stored and transmitted
(Gengaje & Setty, 1991).
Local knowledge is of great value for empowerment in a people-centered development
approach because it represents successful ways in which people have dealt with their
environment in the past and provides a basis to build on. Korten (1980) argues that local
people have well established systems and carefully developed methods, which over many years
allowed them to survive in very harsh conditions. Local knowledge thus can serve as a guiding
force for the local community's behaviour and help in shaping their mental maps. Building on
local knowledge and resources reduces the likelihood that a development intervention will ‘de-
skill’ the local people and increase their dependency on external experts (Korten, 1980). On
the contrary it empowers local people by increasing their self reliance.
Psychologists can facilitate the empowerment process by building on local knowledge. This
involves several tasks:
- accessing and explicating the local knowledge of the people, together with the people.
This activity needs to go hand-in-hand with re-building people's confidence in the value
of their own knowledge and cognitive abilities. Carmen (1991) emphasises the
importance of knowledge empowerment and argues that it is based on a belief that
nobody is absolutely ignorant and that all human beings have the innate ability to create
knowledge through dialogue. With this newly created knowledge people can influence
the course of events to liberate themselves from oppressive situations and determine their
own destiny;
- exposing the prejudices of development professionals about the cognitive and other
capacities (or rather their perceptions of the lack of capacities) of local people;
- Mediating between local and expert knowledge in order to bridge the gap that usually
exists between these two cognitive frameworks. Local knowledge is highly
contextualised and specific, while expert knowledge is de-contextualised, formalised,
abstracted and refers to general laws and principles. The psychologist needs to create an
environment in which both types of knowledge can merge. This involves the facilitation
of initial communication channels between expert and local groups, based on equality
and mutual respect. Gilbert (1995) argues that it also involves the facilitation of joint
activities for developer and local community which will allow for the emergence of
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shared goals, the construction of a shared knowledge base and which will lead to further
joint practice.
4. A first motivation for the study
Despite the emergence of the people-centered development approach, the majority of
psychologists in Third World countries have largely ignored the importance of people's local
knowledge.
In Fuglesang's (1982, p.17) harsh, but insightful words, “a significant feature of European
culture (and by implication the Western dominated study of psychology) is its disrespect for
other cultures and its insensitivity to the miraculous multiplicity of life and human behaviour”.
He criticises Westerners for being oblivious to the fact that all other cultures are described and
interpreted in the concepts of their own culture, for an ethnocentrism close to total, and for a
lack of ability to sense how they express their arrogance in their own language. This negation
is a thought tool and a thought trap. Whilst Westerners are educated others are uneducated.
People in developing countries are described as illiterate, irrational, pre-logical, ineffective,
unproductive.
Considering the above, it is not surprising that well established meta-theories, which can guide
research designs appropriate to investigate local knowledge, are currently hardly available.
Traditional methods of cognitive and developmental assessment are generally culturally biased,
and therefore, relate to ‘our’ knowledge rather than ‘theirs’. They assess the community's level
of development in terms of the expert knowledge and ignore or neglect the rich local
knowledge. This hampers the psychologist in constructing a mediation process that builds on
indigenous knowledge and resources. As a result, development attempts have largely been
impositions of information and strategies, alien to the cognitive world of the local community.
This misfit between the nature of the cognitive resources and strategies available in local
communities and the nature of mediation (based on expert cognitive strategies) has contributed
to the failure of numerous development attempts. (Van Vlaenderen & Nkwinti, 1993).
Taking cognisance of the above critique of psychological practice in developing countries, the
study aims to explicate local knowledge of group problem solving of a group of young
community activists in a rural South African context. It is important to stress that the research
focuses not only on the content of people's local knowledge but also on the local processes
used in problem solving. The latter has been an even more neglected aspect of people's local
resources.
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It is hoped that the methodology developed in the study and the study findings will prove
useful for local people (especially those involved in the study). It is believed, firstly, that having
their tacit knowledge made explicit to them can be an empowering experience in itself and
secondly, that they may use that knowledge to further their own development, by strengthening
their position vis-à-vis the development agents.
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CHAPTER 3.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE STUDY: A PERSONAL
MOTIVATION
1. Introduction
Every research process is directed by a variety of motives. The roots of these motives lie in
diverse areas. In the previous chapter, one of the roots of this study was traced back through
an analysis of the paradigms of development. A people-centered approach, built on concepts of
participation, human empowerment and the building of individual and communal capacity to
master change, was presented as a useful and appropriate orientation for a psychology for
development. In the two chapters which follow this current chapter, attention is given to the
theoretical motives linked to a contextually sensitive understanding of cognition and the meta-
theoretical assumptions that lie behind an interpretive paradigm to the scientific study of such
phenomena. This thesis, however, has its origins beyond such motives.
The questions which initially prompted the study did not arise from a theoretical or a
methodological frame. They emerged out of practical involvement in development work in
South Africa during a period of rapid and turbulent socio-political change. In other words, the
conceptual, methodological and theoretical components of this study were constructed in order
to answer questions arising from direct involvement in community development work at a
significant point in South Africa's history.
To fully understand the research question, it is necessary then to have some understanding of
the personal history that led to the thesis. This is described in this chapter. Locating this
discussion at this particular stage in the thesis is necessary because knowledge of these
historical and practical motives provides the backdrop for the need for a contextually sensitive
understanding of everyday cognition and problem solving (which is examined in Chapter 4) and
for an interpretive approach to method (which is examined in Chapter 5).
2. The personal context
I arrived in Grahamstown, a small town in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa, in 1989.
As a result of the prevailing social and political climate (which is described in Section 3 of this
chapter) I became rapidly drawn into two different spheres of life: working as an academic and
professional psychologist and being a political activist, working to bring about political change
with people at grassroots level. The involvement in both spheres provided me with interesting
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opportunities. Working in a community-based organisation provided a ‘comradeship’
atmosphere in which to debate and reflect on grassroots socio-political issues. It placed me in a
privileged position of being able to interact and to work together with political activists in rural
towns and communities. It also provided me with access to numerous group gatherings in
which local political and development issues were debated, plans made and evaluated.
On the other hand, being an academic gave me moments to distance myself from the
immediacy of action and reflect on the promises and limitations of the local knowledge and
underlying processes. Being an academic provided me with theories, methods and tools to
make a deeper analysis of the local processes. As such, I had the potential to make a special
contribution to the grassroots political movement.
Several tensions existed between these two spheres of involvement which I needed to resolve.
This thesis can be regarded as my attempt to address those tensions. The tensions follow.
The cognitive-psychological theories I was familiar with proved inappropriate as a framework
for capturing the everyday cognitive processes that I experienced in my grassroots work.
Working with grassroots communities exposed me to the African way of being, thinking and
interacting, with its emphasis on collectiveness, communal responsibility, flexibility,
‘contextualness’ and the absence of clear cut and mutually exclusive categories (Markus &
Kitayama, 1991; Verster, 1986). My theoretical tools were still grounded in positivism,
focused on the individual and applied rigid classifications. There was a need to develop an
appropriate framework for reflecting on the everyday cognitive processes of the grassroots
people I was working with. Appropriate in the sense that it would capture the meaning of their
thoughts and actions within their framework rather than in mine. It needed to capture their
local knowledge. In order to succeed in such an attempt there was also a need to develop an
appropriate meta-theory to guide such framework.
Secondly, the respect for academics and the work of academics was very low in the ‘political
activist’ world in South Africa. At best, academics were considered harmless, but useless (Van
Vlaenderen, 1993). At worst, they were regarded as instruments of the repressive regime, who
produced research documents that were used to provide support for repressive State policies.
As a result of this wariness of academic research, grassroots communities were very reluctant
to engage with researchers and to volunteer any local knowledge. The challenge was to show
my colleagues at grassroots that reflection on their cognitive thoughts and actions could be a
useful and empowering experience for them and that research can have an emancipatory goal
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for the research participants. Also, I wanted to prove that psychology had a contribution to
make to the daily issues of grassroots people in their process of development.
Lastly, the standard ways of collecting and analysing research data and the standard measures
of validity and reliability also proved inappropriate for the study of everyday cognitive
processes in the grassroots local communities (Van Vlaenderen, 1993). Traditional data
collection and analysis tools rely on predetermined variables for the research and rigour in the
research is obtained by controlling or eliminating extraneous variables. This is inappropriate for
the discovery of local knowledge. Further, traditional data collection and analysis are geared at
investigating states rather than processes, which was the aim of my research. Therefore there
was a need to develop different ways of collecting and analysing data that would fit the local
‘ways of doing’ and that would enable me to capture the local knowledge and the collective
cognitive processes.
3. Historical context: The emergence of the Eastern Cape Development and Funding
Forum
In order to understand the context in which the study took place it is important to provide a
short overview of the South African situation at the time of the data collection.
During the decade 1980-1989 South Africa was characterised by severe State repression, lack
of freedom of speech, industrial unrest and demonstrations. Numerous political activists and
many ordinary people in cities as well as in the rural areas were detained without trail, tortured
and killed. The racial divides were very strong: White and black residential areas were
segregated, as were most social and educational services. The majority of black people lived in
deplorable conditions. They either resided in what is called ‘townships’, which are separated
residential areas attached to a ‘white’ town; or they lived on the farms where they were
employed, without any property- nor other rights; or they resided in rural villages in what was
called ‘homelands’, which were designated rural areas for black people. In all of these locations
they often lacked sewerage systems, refuse services, water and electricity as well as proper
roads. Despite a general atmosphere of fear and secrecy, the majority of poor black people
were highly politicised and many worked underground or from outside the country for the
broad liberation movement.
During the period 1980-1989 the first seeds were sown for the dismantling of South Africa's
Apartheid regime. However, the obvious signs of its imminent break down came during the
period 1990 -1993 (Sparks, 1994). This was the result of long term pressures from the local
United Democratic Front (a broad populist movement), the banned liberation movement
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located outside the country, and the economic and other embargo's of the international
community. Political prisoners were released, the most important of them being Nelson
Mandela. Political parties were unbanned. Apartheid laws were scrapped or replaced with
democratic laws. Talks between the Apartheid regime and the black liberation movement about
a peaceful solution for a democratic South Africa were gaining momentum and this was
publicised in the media. The liberation movement gradually transformed itself into political
parties and started to campaign for the upliftment of the poor black majority of South Africa.
Nelson Mandela was earmarked to become the new president. All this raised very high
expectations amongst the poor. They hoped for better housing, employment, better education,
health facilities and other services.
It is within this general atmosphere of high political activity and rapid change that the
grassroots work, I became involved, in was situated. As the emerging political leaders
approached the moment of entering the new government the enormity of the developmental
needs of the majority of the population dawned on them. They acknowledged the need to
engage the people in this developmental endeavour as participants rather than as mere
recipients of services. This was not an easy task, considering that the majority of people had
not enjoyed adequate education, nor had they been allowed to build their capacity as full
citizens in South Africa's Apartheid society. Also, most of the grassroots leaders, who would
be the main link between the new government and the grassroots, were oriented towards an
anti-establishment activism and had not been exposed to development work. The liberation
movement, therefore, encouraged various initiatives in different parts of the country. These
aimed at: first organising grassroots people around development issues; and second, building
capacity for development at grassroots level. My involvement was confined to the processes
that unfolded in the Eastern Cape region.
As was mentioned before, during the second half of the decade 1980 -1989, the country had a
strong populist movement called the United Democratic Front (UDF). This movement
consisted of well-structured civic groupings, with specialised women and youth sections
throughout the various communities of the country. It was the Eastern Cape UDF that gave
the impetus for the development of the Eastern Cape Development And Funding Forum
(ECDAFF), the grassroots development organisation that I worked with. The regional Eastern
Cape UDF and several co-opted volunteers, one of whom was myself, organised a series of
regional workshops for community based organisations (CBO's), who represented black
disadvantaged communities and service and resource organisations (SARO's) in the Eastern
Cape region. The idea was to start a process that would lead to the integration of the skills and
expertise of the SARO's on the one hand and the organisational experience and the local
knowledge and legitimacy of the CBO's on the other. To this end the strategic objective was
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the establishment of a Regional Development and Funding Forum, committed to grassroots
development, that would serve as a platform for identifying development needs, sharing
experiences and jointly setting up of development programmes.
With this commitment to managing development at grassroots level in mind, ECDAFF
embarked on the establishment of Local Development and Funding Forums (LODAFFs) in all
black communities in the Eastern Cape region. These LODAFFs were to become the focus of
intense capacity building for development. The ECDAFF became a regional secretariat with an
office, personnel and a democratically elected executive committee, whose task was to assist in
co-ordinating regional activities, training and networking between the 36 communities
throughout the vast, rural Eastern Cape region.
Initially the focus was on obtaining a profile of the socio-economic conditions of each
township in which a LODAFF was active. This involved workshops to strategise what
information was needed and regional training sessions for all LODAFFs on how to conduct
surveys, how to analyse them and how to compile reports. Concurrently, seminars were held
with LODAFFs that dealt with formulating a grassroots participatory development philosophy.
Some of the pertinent features that emerged from these discussions was: that development is
both a political liberatory as well as a socio-economic empowerment process; that community
organisation is an essential underpinning of a development process; that development must
affect existing social power relations; that power has to shift away from the elite towards the
people; and, that development is about a progressive qualitative movement from one life
condition to a better one.
During the period between 1991 and 1993 various LODAFF's became involved in local
development projects and initiatives and connected with local service organisations, which
assisted them in their local ventures. A newsletter was produced regularly, which was
circulated between all LODAFFs and which reported on regional events as well as on local
successes and problems. The newsletter was important in providing the necessary network
between the isolated rural towns.
After the first democratic elections in April 1994, the executive committee reviewed the role of
ECDAFF. Cognisance was taken of the fact that the new government would take time in
settling down and that it would need support during its period of transition. It was also
considered important that, during the transitional period and beyond, civil society continued to
build its capacity in order to keep government in check. Therefore, ECDAFF decided to focus
on three areas. First, to build basic organisational management and administrative skills within
the LODAFFs. Second, to embark on a socio-economic survey of local subsistence economic
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enterprises, with the aim of developing programmes to enhance the capacity of these
enterprises. This initiative was considered very important since unemployment, lack of
employment facilities as well as training facilities for local business people was, and continues
to be, one of the main problems in the Eastern Cape region. Third, to assist in building capacity
in the new transitional local government structures. Many of the transitional councilors,
appointed after the national election, were recruited from the original LODAFFs. Most of the
LODAFF people had never had any exposure to local government structures and their way of
functioning. At the time of writing up this thesis, ECDAFF continues to work in this direction.
4. Problem identification and data collection for the thesis as part of the ECDAFF
process
Reflection on my interactions with grassroots communities during the various capacity building
workshops, meetings and discussions, led to the specific problem identification for this
doctoral study. During my involvement over time, I noticed that community members who had
attended our courses and training sessions rarely seemed to be applying the knowledge, skills
and experiences gained from these training sessions to their own local development contexts.
Another important observation was, that the LODAFF participants considered the ECDAFF
training as a process in which the trainer was the expert, who provided expert knowledge to
the ignorant participant. Even during the training ‘working sessions’, which aimed at active
and equal participation of all, participants attempted to create an ‘expert - novice’ atmosphere,
in which the facilitator was pushed into the role of expert and knowledge provider and where
the participants remained passive recipients.
Several questions kept nagging me. Was there something wrong with the training
methodologies (which were predominantly gleaned from the current progressive adult
education literature)? Was there a difference in perception between participants and trainers on
the essence and purpose of training courses? Were the participants unable, unwilling or simply
failing to transfer what happened in the training session to the local everyday situation? And if
so, why?
After more reflection I came to hypothesise that there was a fundamental gap between the
community and the trainers as far as their perception of the notion problem solving and their
application of problem solving strategies was concerned.
This realisation led to the problem identification for the current thesis. There was a need to
investigate the problem solving strategies employed by the local communities involved in the
ECDAFF process. In order to do this effectively, there was a need to investigate what problem
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solving meant to the local people. In other words what was their local knowledge of problem
solving. There was also a need to investigate the communal problem solving process as it
typically occurred in the local communities. I believed that, if insight could be obtained on
these issues, a bridge could be built between the local knowledge and the expert knowledge,
resulting in an enriching experience for local people as well as for trainers.
I subsequently communicated my thoughts and intentions to conduct a study into local problem
solving strategies to my colleagues at ECDAFF. They showed enthusiasm and we decided to
run the investigation jointly. Several discussions took place with all the staff on how we could
best go about the data collection for the study. It was decided to include several problem
solving workshops in the ECDAFF training course, which would provide the data I needed to
answer my questions.
The data collection took place during one five week training course for local people in 1993.
The course participants were informed about the research and a discussion took place on the
aims, reasons and possible benefits of the study. All participants indicated an eagerness to
collaborate. A detailed account of the data collection process is provided in Chapter 6.
As I started the practical process of collecting data I simultaneously focused on developing a
theoretical and a meta-theoretical framework which would allow me to interpret the data in a
meaningful way. Meaningful in the sense that it would allow the emergence of the local
knowledge and group process. These frameworks subsequently inspired the interpretative
methodology used to analyse the data.
The following chapters elaborate on the theoretical frameworks and methodology I
constructed as an interpretive frame for the empirical study. In the next chapter an everyday
cognition paradigm is presented as the theoretical framework for the study. In Chapter 5 an
interpretive paradigm is proposed as a meta- theoretical foundation for the methodology. In
Chapter 6 the data collection and the interpretation methodology is described.
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CHAPTER 4.
TOWARDS A COGNITIVE-THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR
UNDERSTANDING EVERYDAY PROBLEM SOLVING
1. Introduction
As indicated in Chapter 1, this study is primarily concerned with everyday problem solving.
This should be distinguished from the term problem solving as it is generally used. Problem
solving commonly refers to an internal psychological process that follows the rules of logical
reasoning and that is measured under experimental conditions. Everyday problem solving, in
contrast, refers to a cognitive, affective activity by which people deal with problems they
encounter in everyday life.
The intention in this chapter is to construct a cognitive-theoretical framework for the
understanding of everyday problem solving, based on the existing literature. This literature
developed out of a critique of two bodies of literature, namely mainstream problem solving
theory and cross-cultural problem solving research.
The current chapter provides: first, a brief elaboration on the principal characteristics of
mainstream problem solving theory and its critiques; second, findings of cross-cultural problem
solving research and its critiques; and third, results of empirical problem solving research.
Finally a theoretical framework of everyday problem solving is constructed. The role of activity
and cultural mediation in problem solving and the importance of meta-cognition are key
components of the everyday problem solving framework, proposed for this study.
2. Mainstream theories of problem solving
Problem solving is an aspect of mainstream cognitive psychology that has attracted
considerable attention and has generated a substantial amount of experimental research. The
mainstream, traditional approach includes behaviourist, gestalt but most importantly,
information processing theories. Some key features of the mainstream approach, common to
the different theories can be identified. An overview of these features is provided, followed by
some critiques leveled against the assumptions and practices of this approach.
26
2.1. Key features of mainstream problem solving theories
In mainstream cognitive psychology problem solving is considered an internal cognitive
process that follows the rules of logical reasoning and that can be studied using an
experimental approach.
2.1.1. Problem solving is an internal process
All mainstream problem solving theories have in common the assumption that cognition, and
by implication problem solving, is an internal psychological process that needs to be studied as
such. They focus on what goes on in a person's mind rather than on the interaction between the
person and her environment. Problem solving is typically defined as a process involving:
making observations, developing inferences and hypotheses and testing hypotheses (Strohmer
& Blustein, 1990). All these are internal psychological processes that can be studied separate
from the context in which they occur. Furthermore, memory, perception and individual
heuristics employed by the problem solver, all of which are internal psychological processes,
are core components of the mainstream problem solving paradigm.
2.1.2. Focus on the description of strategies and stages
Mainstream theories describe strategies and stages of problem solving as generally applied
procedures, disconnected from the particular problem solving situation in which they take
place. The behaviourist, the gestalt and the information processing approach each have
developed more or less detailed descriptions of these general strategies.
Behaviourists characterise problem solving as a process of trial and error or the reproduction
of previously learned responses. They assert that new problems are initially solved by trail and
error behaviour and that solutions are accidentally amalgamated into responses that are
reproduced when the appropriate stimulus is presented (Eysenck & Keane, 1990). Trial and
error assumes that a person has no knowledge except knowing how to make moves and
whether or not the goal has been reached. One makes moves, or sequences of moves, one after
the other until reaching the goal or until giving up (Baron, 1988).
Gestalt theorists (Baron, 1988) view problem solving as a kind of perceptual process in which
the problem solver ultimately perceives the relationship between means and end. Problem
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solving is defined in terms of having insight into a structure and subsequent productive
restructuring of the problem. This insight into the problem often occurs suddenly and is
accompanied by an ‘Aha’ experience. A problem thus is like a gap that needs to be filled and
the solution is ‘that thing’ which fills up the gap. Once the person pays attention to the solution
and the problem simultaneously, the relevance of the solution is perceived and insight can
occur. It is as if the solution makes the problem into a coherent whole. One of the early
attempts to analyse the stages of problem solving was made by Wallas in 1926 (Reynolds &
Flagg, 1977). In the tradition of Gestalt theory he distinguished the following stages. First,
preparation during which the problem solver chooses a problem, gathers background
information and makes initial solution attempts; second, incubation during which the problem
solver turns attention aside to other activities including sleep and recreation; third, illumination
which involves the ‘Aha!’ phenomenon; and fourth, verification during which the solution is
validated.
Information processing theorists (Chi & Glaser, 1985; Newell & Simon, 1972) define problem
solving as a search process in a problem space. Problem solving is seen as trying to reach some
goal and finding the means for getting there. All problems have an initial state and they all have
some goal. To solve a problem one must perform certain operations on the initial state to
achieve the goal and there are rules that specify allowable operations. However, for any given
problem there are a large number of alternative paths from the initial state to the goal state.
People use their knowledge and various heuristic methods, such as means-end analysis, to
search through this problem space and to find a short route from the initial state to the goal
state.
Bransford and Stein (1984) assert, based on the information provided by hundreds of pieces of
research on cognition, that effective problem solving consist of the following steps: identifying
a problem, defining a problem, exploring possible strategies, looking back and evaluating the
effects of one's activities.
2.1.3. Experimental research design
The above definitions have in common that they are mainly derived from experimental data. In
these experiments, the goal and the premises are provided, the problems are self-contained,
only one possibility is counted as achieving the goal and the main difficulty is finding that
possibility. Problem solving is defined as involving two clearly distinct states, an initial state
and a well defined end state or goal.
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The experimental design requires a high degree of control by the researcher over the research
process. It is the researcher who identifies the type of problem to be solved. This has lead to
the adoption of logical reasoning tasks as the prototype problems in problem solving research.
Laboratory tasks involving logical reasoning - including propositional and syllogistic reasoning,
solving analogies and series completion problems, assessing probabilities and rank ordering
expected values of outcomes - have become popular problem solving experiments.
2.1.4. Use of models of artificial intelligence
Underpinning the information processing approach is the view of a top-down process of
planning, with plans being successfully refined at progressively lower levels of abstraction.
Newell and Simon (1972) embodied this successive refinement, or ‘problem de-composition
approach’ to problem solving in a computer programme called the General Problem Solver
(GPS).
The GPS attends to the nature and organisation of component processes that interpret
information, set goals, and select among available actions in the process of problem solving. A
solution is seen as a successful achievement of a search. The person who attempts to solve the
problem (problem solver) has a set of operators that can be used to make changes in the
situation.
The GPS contains a programme with general heuristic methods such as means-end analysis. In
a means-end analysis the problem solver compares the current situation with the goal situation
to identify the differences between them. These differences become the focus of work on the
problem and the problem solver is further organised by a priority system that provides a basis
for deciding which sub goal to work on first. In means-end analysis the number of possible
actions to be considered is reduced by knowledge of which operators are relevant for each of
the various sub goals that occur in the problem situation. According to Newell & Simon
(1972) the major feature of problem solving is to simplify the search for a problem solution
through a complex problem space. This planning-by-simplification process involves omitting
the details surrounding the original problem, forming a more general, abstract problem and
using the solution to provide a plan for solving the more restricted problem. In the original
GPS system, this planning process is rigidly proceeding by solving the most general problem
first and then more specific and detailed sub problems. In later versions, tree structures of
alternative goals and operators were built into the programme that flexibly allowed for
increases in plan complexity while adhering to the overall top down direction.
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Where the original GPS was characterised by a top-down process of planning, later computer
models and theories within the information processing approach more and more took into
account the need for some form of planning-in-action (Rebok, 1989).
Sacerdoti (1977) developed a computer model, called Nets of Action Hierarchies (NOAH),
which constructs an abstract problem solving plan that can be revised or improved during its
execution, depending on the consequences of various actions. However, like GPS, NOAH is
still basically a top-down model, with high level plans guiding and constraining the formulation
and execution of lower-level plans (Rebok, 1989).
Barbara and Frederick Hayes-Roth (1979) developed the Opportunistic Planning Model
(OPM), which conceptualised problem solving as a multi directional, opportunistic process that
includes both top-down and bottom-up abstractions. As the problem solver works down the
hierarchy of abstraction, low-level concrete plans may suggest abandonment, revision, or
updating of high-level plans into successively more detailed sub-plans.
The above computer models all have in common that they use artificial intelligence as a model
for the study of human problem solving.
2.1.5. Focus on the study of expert-novice differences
Studies on expert versus novice problem solving are frequently used by the information
processing approach to shed light on problem solving strategies. A major finding is that expert
problem solving is confined to certain problem domains and that nobody can be considered a
universal expert (Chi & Glaser, 1985). Research data reveals several differences between
novice and expert problem solving. These are listed below.
- Novices in solving particular domain problems are limited to direct representations of
problems, based on data explicitly given in the problems. The novice problem solver is
acting in a knowledge-poor situation where he/she has little useful past experiences.
Experts, on the other hand, have an elaborate network of conceptual knowledge and are
able to construct sophisticated representations of the problem that include relations not
specified explicitly in the problem (Carpenter, 1986), such as contextually relevant
information (Davidson & Freebody, 1986). They represent problems by using underlying
structures and conceptual features of the problem context.
- Problem solving experts in a particular domain tend to work forward and novices tend to
work backward from the goal. Hatano & Inagaki (1986) contend that experts have
learned how to classify problems with respect to the type of solution required. In the
absence of such learning, novices do better by working backward than they would do by
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trying to blunder blindly ahead. People learn to work forward through experience in
solving related groups of problems.
- Novices in a specific problem domain tend to use universal, weak methods, such as
means-end analysis. Experts have more highly developed executive cognitive strategies
and can choose task-appropriate strategies (Hiebert 1986).
- Experts in a specific problem domain are able to deal with information in a re-
contextualised, more abstract fashion and they become less dependent on concrete
situational information.
2.2. Critique of the mainstream problem solving approach
The mainstream problem solving paradigm, in particular the information processing approach,
has made an important contribution to the field of cognitive psychology. However, mainstream
problem solving theories have recently been criticised for their shortcomings for the study of
everyday problem solving. Some of these shortcomings follow.
2.2.1. The experimental design lacks relevance to everyday problems
As indicated in Section 2.1.3., the information processing approach bases its theory almost
exclusively on experimental research. Experiments usually employ a specific type of problem
which shows little relevance to the problems people encounter in everyday life. First,
'experiment problems' are usually well-structured. The problem solver is provided with: explicit
premises (all the knowledge necessary to solve the problem is present in the problem
statement); guidelines for solving the problem; and a particular goal that needs to be achieved.
Reaching that goal amounts to solving the problem. Everyday problems, in contrast, are ill-
structured (Jodelet, 1993). They are ill-defined to the extent that the information available, the
permitted strategies, and the desired end states are left relatively unspecified (Strohm
Kitchener, 1983). Second, problem solving in everyday life, unlike problem solving in
experiments, usually involves a fair amount of background knowledge in that particular
problem domain. Research has revealed that use of domain specific knowledge of the problem
area has a profound impact on the problem solving strategies (Chi & Glaser, 1985). Third, in
the experimental approach, the problem is imposed by the researcher as an arbitrary exercise
and the boundaries of the exercise are provided by the researcher. This leaves very little
initiative and responsibility to the problem solver. In everyday problem solving the problem is
identified by the problem solver herself as an integral part of her daily experiences and she
usually takes the initiative to attempt to solve it. Fourth, the content of ‘experiment problems’
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are usually irrelevant to people's everyday life. Puzzle problems such as the ‘Tower of Hanoi
puzzle’ (Eysenck & Keane, 1990) and the ‘Missionaries and cannibals puzzle’ (Eysenck &
Keane, 1990) have very little significance to people's life. The lack of significance of the
problem content and the lack of personal involvement in the problem have implications for the
motivation, attitude and cognitive strategy of the problem solver.
2.2.2. Task independent problem solving strategies are a fallacy
The mainstream problem solving theories are predominantly concerned with the discovery of a
universal description of problem solving and assume that those internal mental structures
manifest themselves in a uniform performance across a broad spectrum of tasks regardless of
task content. In other words, they assume that a person will apply the same problem solving
strategies to a variety of problems, ranging from the typically ‘Hanoi puzzle’ problem to a
problem of how to budget one's household money. Findings of ‘everyday cognition’ studies
(D'Andrade, 1981; Jodelet, 1993; Lave, 1988), show, however, that the type of problem has an
important bearing on the choice of problem solving strategies. Everyday cognition theorists
consider problem solving not as an internal mental structure that is applied to a problem, but as
an interaction within a specific context. The problem content is a part of that context and its
specific nature will evoke particular assumptions, interpretations and knowledge, which will
influence the person's choice of problem solving strategy (Berg & Calderone, 1994).
2.2.3. Problem solving strategies in everyday life rarely follow formal reasoning rules
Information processing theorists define problem solving in normative terms as formal
reasoning, rather than being based on general conceptual capabilities that people may have as a
result of their everyday experience. Information processing theorists neglect the social
relationship and context within which cognition is embedded. They ignore the collectively
created and shared symbolic meaning systems that control this type of cognition (D'Andrade,
1981; Jodelet, 1993).
Lave (1988) also criticises a definition of problem solving strategies in terms of logical
reasoning. She examined how people carry out everyday arithmetical operations while grocery
shopping or beginning a diet programme, comparing their problem solving in these
commonplace situations with that discovered in the formal confines of the laboratory. Her data
reveal such striking differences between the kind of cognitive activity that occurs in different
settings that she formulated a situation specific anthropologically sensitive understanding of
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human concepts in which the culture of the setting plays a significant part in shaping the nature
of the problem solving processes that are likely to occur. Lave (1988) insists that the problem
solving operations that occur in everyday life follow different rules of practice from those
typically discovered in the laboratory.
2.2.4. Superficial study of the differences between novices and experts
Mainstream problem solving research does not attempt to explain the dynamics responsible for
the expert versus novice problem solving behaviour. It focuses on the differences in capacity
of, and on the process and heuristics used by, experts and novices but it does not contextualise
these within the broader environment of the problem solver. It does not make inquiries into the
reasons for the contrast between the problem solving strategies of experts and novices.
Furthermore, mainstream theories have dedicated insufficient effort to the study of the process
by which novices become experts. Their rather ‘static’ approach has focused on the existing
differences between novice and expert and these differences are located at an intra-
psychological level. However all experts in a particular domain started off as novices and went
through a process of ‘becoming expert’. It is argued that this process is of an inter-personal
nature. Lave's (1990) studies on the craft apprenticeship among Vai and Gola tailors in Liberia
are a prime example of research on the social process by which novices become experts.
3. Cross-cultural studies of problem solving
Cross-cultural studies of problem solving and the critiques leveled against them form another
informative body of literature for the development of a framework for everyday problem
solving.
Cross-cultural studies on problem solving are mainly method driven and focus on testing
problem solving theory across cultures and sub-cultures. Cross-cultural researchers are
interested in establishing quantitative and qualitative differences in cognitive processes among
cultural groups and link these to the differences in socio-cultural context.
Berry's (1976) major study of human ecology and cognitive style is a typical example of the
cross-cultural approach. In this study he collected data from 18 cultural groups, who varied in
their settlement patterns, community sizes, political and social stratification and other such
cultural variables. He then constructed an acculturation index, composed of: years of
schooling; involvement in the wage economy and urbanisation. These two clustered
independent variables (cultural group and acculturation index) were then used to test
performance on cognitive tasks, such as the Koh's block test and Raven's matrices. Berry found
33
a strong relationship between the eco-cultural index and performance on these problem solving
tasks.
3.1. Critique of cross-cultural studies
The cross-cultural approach suffers from some of the same shortcomings as the mainstream
problem solving approach. It employs predominantly an experimental design and it often relies
on logical reasoning as the norm for problem solving. This has led to a Western ethnocentrism
in problem solving research.
3.1.1. Ethnocentrism in conceptualisation
Cole & Scribner (1974) argue that many of the earlier cross-cultural researchers showed a
modernisation prejudice and introduced highly ethnocentric assertions regarding animistic,
primitive and pre-logical thought of non-Western societies. Although later work is more
moderate, ethnocentrism is still a major problem. For the most part the (Western) investigator
either explicitly or, more typically, implicitly begins research from within her own cultural
framework and turns to other cultures in order to increase the generalisability of the underlying
principles that have been located ‘at home’ (Bornstein, 1995; Goodnow & Warton, 1992).
3.1.2. Ethnocentrism in method
Cross-cultural researchers have also been criticised for importing inappropriate Western
methods and techniques in their research in other cultures.
Verster (1986) argues that cross-cultural research on the cognitive capabilities of the peoples
of Africa has predominantly made uncritical use of standard European IQ testing technology
and merely succeeded in replicating ethnocentric prejudices about the nature of ‘primitive
mentality’.
Some of the problems of applying Western standards in other cultures are expressed by Cole &
Scribner (1974) and Luria (1979). They argue that to people who have been socialised outside
the Western world, psychological experiments often do not have the same meaning as for those
populations for whom doing experiments are culturally accepted practices. They argue that
people in traditional societies refuse to remain within the boundaries of the problem presented
by an experimenter. The terms of the problem are often not accepted and modified and
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additional information is supplied in order to bring the statements and their implications into
closer conformity with the factual world of experience.
Cole (1995) further contends that the difficulty with experimental paradigms is that the
problem solving tasks used to assess cognitive processing derive from the structure and
content of (Western) formal schooling. They are really mute with respect to cognitive
processes in systems of activity organised for different purposes. His research revealed that
Kpelle farmers are better in classifying varieties of rice than geometrical figures. The
commonsense explanation for this is that one is good at what one is used to doing. The very
fact that Liberian rice farmers undergo such different experiences than, for instance, American
office workers is the source of barriers to the use of the familiar apparatus of experimental
research (Cole, 1995). Lave (1977) came to the same conclusion. In her research on Liberian
tailors she found that years of tailoring was the best predictor of performance of tailoring
mathematics; years of formal schooling the best predictor for school mathematics and that
there was little correlation between them.
Goodnow (1980) concurs with the above criticism and provides a tentative list of the kinds of
information processing tactics called for in formal education which transfer to problems and
tests devised by cross-cultural psychologists. These include: placing a high value on the search
for universals; finding pairs, sets, things that go together and that are ‘the same’; the demand
for complete answers - answers that take all the available information into account; the belief
that more inclusive solutions or descriptions are better than narrow, specific ones; the belief
that guessing and trail and error are better than not making an attempt; the belief that getting
to a solution quickly and efficiently is better than deliberation and meandering. Those values
may not be held by adults in everyday problem solving across different cultures.
3.1.3. Culture as an independent variable
Congruent with the experimental approach of most cross-cultural research, culture is
considered as an independent variable and cognitive processes as a dependent variable (Berry,
1993). Dichotomising culture and cognition as independent, separable entities constrains an
understanding of their interface. The manifold ways in which culture and cognition may
potentially interact are all precluded. Moreover, the cross-cultural approach does not make
allowance for the role of the person. Culture and cognition are defined independently of the
person who interprets and acts creatively within that cultural reality. Lucariello (1995) argues,
however, that persons are not simply participants in cultural activity, nor constrained only to
form mental reproductions of this activity. They interpret reality through socially and culturally
shared categories.
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4. Empirical studies on everyday problem solving
The two previous sections identified shortcomings of respectively the mainstream cognitive
approach and the cross-cultural approach with reference to the study of everyday problem
solving. The current section aims to identify the characteristics of everyday problems and
problem solving strategies. It provides a short overview of the literature on the results of
everyday problem solving research.
4.1. Everyday problems
It has been argued earlier in this chapter that everyday problem solving relates to everyday
problems rather than to artificially designed experiments. In order to study everyday problem
solving there is a need to identify what qualifies as an everyday problem.
Hartley's (1989) research on people's perception of everyday problems provides some
important insight into the nature of everyday problems. The participants in his study identified
problems as referring to difficulties in human relationships, but also comprising difficulties at
school at work or in professional activities. A problem was most often a difficult interpersonal
relation or a personal choice, less often it was a difficulty in managing the routine or special
demands of school, home or the workplace. Rarely was it a challenge of mathematics, science
or formalised games or puzzles. He concluded that it seems that the lay person makes a
distinction between problem solving and exercising cognitive skill. Exercising cognitive skill
happens in a field of expertise. There is a problem to be solved rather than a skill to be applied
only when the individual does not know what the sequence of operations is or how to find that
sequence.
According to Sinnott (1989) the most important differences between formal and everyday
problem solving is that the latter deals with ill-structured problems. Ill-structured problems are
complex problems with the following characteristics.
- The information provided is often incomplete (Strohm Kitchener,1983).
- The premises may only be implicit in the information provided (Galotti, 1989).
- The permitted operations are left relatively unspecified (Strohm Kitchener, 1983).
Established procedures of problem solving rarely exist (Galotti, 1989).
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- The desired end states are left relatively unspecified. Problems are usually not self
contained. Several possible answers may exist, and those answers may vary in quality. It
is often unclear when a given solution, even if it is recognised as the best available, is
sufficient for one's purposes (Galotti, 1989; Strohm Kitchener, 1983).
- A considerable amount of domain specific knowledge is required (Eysenck & Keane,
1990).
- Due to the lack of ‘self-containedness’ of ill-structured problems, epistemic
considerations and personal values are very important. The strategy that a person will
develop to deal with an ill-structured problem will depend highly on her epistemic
cognition (Meacham & Emont, 1989; Strohm Kitchener, 1983).
Strohm Kitchener' (1983, p. 224-225) borrows Churchman's model (Churchman, 1971) of
inquiry systems (IS), which can be defined as decision making procedures required to solve
problems, in order to describe the characteristics of ill-structured problems. She explains that
ill-structured problems are typical for the Kantian and the dialectical IS. The problems
characteristic of a Kantian IS are those for which there are two or more complementary
conceptualisations or potentially valid solutions. The dilemma is to decide which set of
theoretical assumptions best fit the problem and the evidence at hand and how to integrate
them into a single solution. In dialectical IS different and opposing assumptions underlie each
side. Individuals on opposing sides define the problem in different ways and marshal the same
evidence in support of their perspective. A solution or synthesis lies in re-framing both or
several perspectives into a more general model of the problem.
4.2. Everyday problem solving strategies for everyday problems
It has been argued in Section 2.2.3 of this chapter that everyday problem solving does not
follow formal reasoning rules. Everyday problems, as described in Section 4.1., require a
different type of problem solving strategy from those typically encountered in experiments.
Some studies have focused on everyday problem solving strategies and the skills involved in
employing such strategies. A summary of the main findings follows.
- Everyday problem solving involves cognitive, affective and conative elements (Willis and
Shaie, 1986). To solve problems one must be motivated (Meacham & Emont, 1989).
- In everyday problem solving the problem is contextualised within a specific physical and
interpersonal context (Willis and Shaie, 1986).
- Everyday problem solving often involves redefining the problem (Meacham and Emont,
1989; Scribner, 1986).
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- Analogies and metaphors are frequently used in everyday problem solving (Rogoff,
1984). It is argued that they permit the use of auxiliary structures that can be used as
supplementary models in everyday reasoning. They provide ways in which new
structures are introduced into problems to aid in reaching a solution.
- Everyday problem solvers apply schemata based on domain specific knowledge (Cole &
Cole, 1989; Johnson-Laird 1983; Lave, 1988; Willis & Schaie, 1986). D'Andrade (1981)
argues that these models consist of ordinary representations of the world and are used to
assess whether certain things could or could not happen. He further argues that these
representations are often surprisingly concrete and particular.
- Everyday problem solving makes use of hunches (Scribner, 1986).
- Everyday problem solving involves listening to expert opinion (Strohm Kitchener, 1983).
- Everyday problem solvers use others through interpersonal problem solving conversation
(Hartley, 1989; Meacham and Emont, 1989; Scribner, 1986). Meacham & Emont (1989)
argue that it is in dialogue with others that one's mental sets are broken., as friends
suggest new ways of thinking about situations, point to inconsistencies in one's logic,
provide a counterbalance to one's emotional attachments in a situation and suggest new
means for solving problems.
- Everyday problem solving involves arguing, integrating or synthesising diverse data and
opposing opinions (Strohm-Kitchener, 1983). Chapman (1993) argues that since
everyday problem solving involves interpersonal argumentation, the inferential structure
of everyday problem solving is influenced by the structure of argumentation (pragmatic
rules of language) and this structure differs substantially from formal reasoning.
According to Chapman (1993), argumentation is an activity by which an attempt is made
to convince other persons of a particular point of view by providing them with reasons
for doing so. Argumentation deserves to be considered as an example of reasoning, both
because it is based on an appeal to reason and because it involves inferential processes.
For example inference is involved in the effort to maintain consistency among one's
assertions in the course of a discussion. A common move in argumentation is to show
that some of one's opponents statements have implications which conflict with other
propositions that the opponent accepts. The avoidance of inconsistency among one's
commitments in argumentative discourse corresponds to the logical principle of non
contradiction The identification of the unstated commitments, implied by a stated
proposition, follows inferential processes that have close structural parallels in deductive
logic. However, the context of inference in interpersonal argumentation differs from that
of deductive logic in some fundamental ways. For example, persons engaging in
argumentation may make inferences based on assumptions about a speaker's intentions in
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affirming a given proposition. In contrast, such interpretative assumptions do not have a
place in logical deduction, and psychologists studying reasoning as intra-psychic
inference accordingly consider them as irrelevant and misleading. If in contrast the
concept of reasoning is expanded to include the interpersonal argumentation, then such
interpretive processes become part of the phenomena to be studied. In argumentation,
arguments are often based on forms of justification that are weaker than deductive
inference, this is called presumptive evidence, which is justifying a conclusion by
appealing to what is known to be normally or typically the case, under the assumption
that one is not dealing with an atypical case.
 
Grice (1975) elaborates on the idea that everyday reasoning may retain more of its
discursive origins than does formal reasoning. He provides a list of discursive norms.
These norms include what he calls ‘The maxim of quantity’, which means ‘provide as
much information as is required to communicate your meaning but not more than is
necessary’; ‘The maxim of quality’, which means ‘be truthful and avoid statements that
are either false or unfounded’; ‘The maxim of reality’, which implies ‘be relevant’ and
‘The maxim of manner’, which implies ‘avoid ambiguity and obscurity’. Grice further
argues that the underlying assumption is that successful communication depends on, at
least, general adherence to these maxims. Accordingly, competent speakers acquire an
expectation that those norms will be adhered to by anyone seriously intending to engage
in communicative interaction. Most of the common errors of formal reasoning may be
explained in terms of the conflict between the syntactic rules of logic and pragmatic rules
of discourse such as Grice's maxims.
The review of research data on everyday problems and everyday problem solving strategies
confirms the arguments made earlier in this study, namely that there are important differences
between the mainstream and everyday cognition approaches to problem solving. In the latter,
problems are perceived to relate to human relationships and are often ill-structured. In
contrast, the mainstream approach identified problems as logical reasoning tasks. In the
mainstream approach problem solving was mainly identified as an internal cognitive process
whereby the individual made a search in a problem space. Everyday problem solving is defined
as a socially contextualised process involving cognitive, affective and conative elements.
5. Towards a framework for understanding everyday problem solving
The realisation of the shortcomings of the dominant problem solving research paradigm for the
study of everyday cognition has obviated the need for a paradigm for problem solving research
that focuses on people's everyday lives. In this section the background theories and concepts
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for a framework for everyday problem solving are discussed. Two overlapping areas of
psychology are drawn upon: the emerging field of situated cognition, which has its roots in a
Vygotskian perspective and, recent developments in theory on meta-cognition. With regard to
the former, particular attention is given to the centrality of activity as a unit of analysis for
understanding cognition and the idea of mediated action. Under meta-cognition three elements
are considered: epistemic, conceptual and procedural cognition.. In Section 5.3 a framework,
based on these elements, is presented.
5.1. Situated cognition
Several studies have emphasised the need for the study of situated cognition or cognition
embedded in an everyday socio-cultural setting. (Goodnow, 1980; Lave & Wenger, 1991;
Rogoff, 1984; Rogoff, 1990; Scribner 1984; Sternberg and Wagner, 1986). This approach has
been called either a socio-cultural approach (Wertsch, 1991), a socio-genetic approach
(Valsiner & Leung, 1994) or a cultural psychology (Shweder, 1989). Some studies focused
specifically on problem solving in everyday situations. Such studies are: Cole and Bruner's
(1971) study of the mathematical problem solving of the Kpelle rice farmers of central Liberia;
Scribner's (1986) study of dairy workers' strategies for loading crates; Saxe's (1991)
mathematics of candy selling by Brazilian children; De la Rocha's (1985) weight watchers
dieters and Lave's work on tailors' strategies for measurement (1990) and Southern Californian
housewives' strategies for finding best buys in supermarkets (1988).
Vygotsky (1978) pioneered the ‘situated cognition’ approach by emphasising the importance
of doing research in practical situations. He contends that since all cognitive activity is
embedded in the socio-historical contexts of the day, effective interpretations must be offered,
not from within the controlled conditions of a laboratory setting, specifically isolated from the
confounding influences of everyday affairs, but specifically from within actual everyday social
life.
Lave (1988), based on the outcome of her research, argues strongly against the use of the
laboratory culture in which experimenters call all the shots, not only by structuring problems in
their own terms but also by establishing a normative definition of the correct solution to these
problems, thereby confirming a narrowly elitist definition of human thinking - the Western
positivist model. She argues for the need to study and value the everyday world of human
problem solving in cultural context, in which people actually engage in cognitive activity
involving problems they define in situations of immediate relevance to them and in which there
are no expertly defined normative standards of correctness. She believes that a person's point
of view is essential if one's interest lies in understanding cognitive processes. Cole (1995),
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based on his work with school children in Liberia, came to a similar conclusion to Lave and
argues that an explication of the cultural foundations of thinking needs to begin from an
analysis of what people do in their everyday lives.
5.1.1. Activity as the focus for everyday problem solving research
The notion of activity is central to the study of problem solving in a ‘situated cognition’
approach. One of the important premises of activity theory is that human behaviour and
thinking, and by implication problem solving, occur within meaningful contexts as people
conduct goal-directed activities (Gauvain, 1995; Leont'ev, 1981; Wertsch, 1985).
Vygotsky's (1978) ideas on activity and cognition are central to the tenets of this study. For
Vygotsky (1962) higher mental functions - amongst which is problem solving - emerge when
mind and action join together in purposeful activity. He argues that in order to understand the
intellectual processes involved, it is critical to examine activity as a whole and not its
component parts which alone cannot account for the psychological structure of a person's
performance. He further argues that actions have both operational and intentional aspects that
derive structure and meaning from the goal or purpose of the activity.
Vygotsky 's notion of activity is influenced by Marx's theory, which poses that people come to
know the world through activity (Thorlindsson, 1983). Cognition is not a passive but an active
way of approaching reality. Cognition involves and rests on human practical activity. How
people perceive and understand reality depends on what kind of activity they are engaged in
and what kind of social relations they enter into. Knowledge is produced and reproduced in
relation to the material aspects of one's life, which are tied to the structure of people's
relationships with each other, manifest in human practical activity.
Leont'ev's (1981) elaboration on the notion of activity adds to the understanding of the
concept. According to Leont'ev, activities are composed of actions, which are systems of co-
ordination in the service of goals, which represent intermediate steps in satisfying the motive.
Actions in turn are composed of operations, the means whereby an action is carried out under
specified constraints.
Vygotsky (1978) emphasises that activity is informed or structured by a social-cultural-
historical context. He argues that people's actions are conducted in the context of the activities
of the other people with whom they share their lives. In other words, even the apparently most
individual and autonomous actions are situated in a context which must itself be viewed as an
active component in the structuring of their activities.
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5.1.2. The dialectical interface between the individual and the socio-cultural: cultural
mediation
The social nature of goal-directed action, which is central to a situated view of cognition,
necessitates a rejection of the strict separation between the individual and her social and
cultural environment. The individual and the social cannot be seen respectively as dependent
and independent variable but need to be defined as mutually constitutive elements of a single,
interacting system. Eckensberger (1979) suggests that the action itself can be regarded as the
interface between the individual and the situational context. Several other authors emphasise
that the activity, which forms the unit of analysis for study, should reflect its social origins
(Downs & Liben, 1993; Newman, Griffin & Cole, 1989; Rogoff, 1984; Scribner, 1986;
Wertsch, 1985).
It is argued, in accordance with other authors, that the relation between individual and
environment is of a dialectical nature. Neisser (1968) contends that properties of the
environment do not enter the problem solving process deterministically or automatically, but
assume a function only through the initiative and constructive actions of the problem solver.
Valsiner & Leung (1994) and Wertsch (1995) also emphasises the active contribution of social
and individual. They contend that although human beings learn to think and solve problems in
their daily lives through the appropriation, use and adaptation of social practices and material
and symbolic tools developed by their culture over time, this does not mean that the organism
has no contribution. Culture is a shared system of meaning that humans create and sustain.
Bhaskar's (1979) model of the human - society dialectic adds a useful dimension to the
framework proposed in the study. He argues that people in their conscious, purposeful activity,
for the most part unconsciously reproduce and occasionally transform society. He contends
that people do not marry to reproduce the nuclear family or work to sustain the capitalist
economy. Yet it is nevertheless the unintended consequence of, as it is also a necessary
condition for, their activity. Moreover, when social forms change, the explanation will not
necessary lie in the desires of agents to change them that way, though as a very important
theoretical and political limit it may do so. Bhaskar (1975) emphasises the need to distinguish
then between the genesis of human activity, lying in the reasons, intentions and plans for
people, on the one hand and the structures governing the reproduction and transformation of
social activities on the other. It should be noted that engagement in a social activity is itself a
conscious human action which may, in general, be described either in terms of the agent's
reason for engaging in it or in terms of its social function or role. When praxis is seen as
process, human choice becomes functional necessity. The model of the society/person
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connection proposed by Bhaskar then can be summarised as follows. People do not create
society, for it always pre-exists them and is a necessary condition for their activity. Rather
society must be regarded as an ensemble of structures, practices and conventions which
individuals reproduce or transform, but which would not exist unless they did so. Society does
not exist independently of human activity. But it is not the product of it. On the other hand
actors are usually capable of reflecting on their action, but actions also have a tacit component.
The knowledgeability of humans is always bounded by the unacknowledged conditions of
action on one side and by its unintended consequences on the other.
In arguing for an individual-environment dialectic it is important to acknowledge the complex
nature of the environment component. The cultural environment consists of a social and a
spatial component (Downs & Liben, 1993). These interact with each other. The individual's
access to the social aspects of the environment may be mediated by the physical aspects of the
environment and vice versa. Places in different physical environments (for example low density
rural areas versus medium density suburban areas) offer people very different patterns of
spatial access and hence social interaction with peers, family members and other adults. In turn,
the person’s opportunity to interact, to explore and experience places in the physical
environment may itself be mediated by the social environment. There is an inseparability and
reciprocity between the shape of society and space.
In order to build an effective framework for everyday problem solving research the notion of
‘socio-cultural embedded action’ is operationalised using the concept of mediation. It is argued
that the dialectical process between individual and society involves two levels of mediation.
One level relates to cultural tools that individuals employ in their social activities, the other
level relates to mediation by others in the process of the individual's internalisation of these
cultural tools. These two levels of mediation are discussed in the following two sections.
5.1.2.1. Mediational means
Wertsch (1995, p.89) defines mediational means as the societal things people employ when
acting in order to achieve some goal. In defining the nature of mediational means, Wertsch
makes some points akin to those of Bhaskar (1979). He argues that mediational means embody
a tension between the potential they have to shape action in accordance with convention on the
one hand and the unique use of these cultural means with all the accompanying unpredictability
and creativity on the other (p.91). He further argues that mediational means both empower and
constrain the individual (p.93) and that they come into being for reasons other than to facilitate
many of the kind of actions they in fact end up shaping (p.94).
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Within the proposed framework it is argued that mediational means of different orders can be
distinguished. First, there are cultural tools that structure the world for people and enable them
to see things in a certain way. These come in the form of sign systems or in more complex
groupings, such as cultural models. Second, there are values and beliefs which are mediational
means in the sense that they provide the boundary conditions for actions and activity. They
determine whether an activity is worthwhile and if certain ways of acting are acceptable. Third,
there are cultural goals which shape the cognitive processes of the individual. A description of
the different mediational means follows:
(i) Sign systems and cultural models
Vygotsky (1962) emphasises the importance of socio-culturally defined sign systems as tools in
the interface between social and psychological. He contends that what fundamentally
determines the socio-genesis of the higher psychological functions is the use of semiotic
systems (sign systems) as a set of tools which have evolved historically. These typify the given
culture and a child learns these via the other and internalises them, first as a means of
communication and later as a means of her own behaviour. As Vygotsky (1962, p. 56) states,
all the higher psychological functions are mediated processes and signs are the basic means
used to master and direct them. Vygotsky argued that language is the most important
mediational tool. He believes that the primary function of speech is social, namely
communication. It is that social speech that is subsequently internalised in an inner self-
regulatory speech. Valsiner & Leung (1994) concur with Vygotsky. They argue that human
beings are sign-constructing and sign-using organisms. The signs that are constructed by active
human beings are bound by the kind of signs that are afforded by the phylogenetic history of
the species.
D'Andrade (1990) focuses on the development of cultural models as the link between social
and individual. According to d'Andrade (1990, p.99) cultural models are cognitive schemata
that are inter-subjectively shared by a social group. Cognitive schemata can be defined as
conceptual abstractions that mediate between stimuli received by the sense organs and
behaviour responses. They are abstractions that serve as the basis for all human information
processing (Casson, 1983). Because cultural models are inter-subjectively shared,
interpretations made about the world on the basis of cultural models are experienced as
obvious facts of the world. As a result, cultural models need not be made explicit, since what is
obvious need not be stated. In other words, cultural models consist mainly of tacit knowledge.
The role of cultural models in problem solving will be further elaborated on in Section 5.2.2.
on conceptual and procedural knowledge.
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(ii) Values and beliefs
Baron (1985) emphasises the importance of culture for providing beliefs and values as a
framework for cognitive development and performance. He proposes that problem solving
fundamentally addresses decisions and beliefs including decisions about what beliefs to believe.
Good thinking yields beliefs that are functional in the world as the person encounters it,
decisions that advance the person's general goals.
Gauvain (1995) also emphasises the importance of a value system for the shaping of problem
solving activity. Values such as co-operation and competition, individualism, sex roles and
traditionalism have been extensively studied in their relation to cognition. She further argues
that cultural context helps to determine human activity by prescribing appropriate ways of
participating in and managing cognitive activity (Gauvain, 1995, p.31). Goodnow and Warton
(1992) add that cultures do not necessarily provide a single message or provide a single
explanation of an event or a single correct solution for a problem, they motivate for what they
call a ‘pluralist’ view to context, which allows for co-existing alternative beliefs and social
representations of problems.
The role of values and beliefs in the shaping of problem solving strategies will be re-visited in
Section 5.2.1. on epistemic knowledge.
(iii) Goals
Guberman & Greenfield (1991) argue that a major way in which the socio-cultural context
comes to be internalised in individual cognitive processes is in the form of goal representation.
Recent research demonstrates how an individual's daily activities are goal-directed and reflect
the culture within which the individuals participate (Gauvain, 1995). The work of Saxe (1991),
for instance, shows that mathematical problem solving is handled differently and more
successfully when the goal of the mathematical exercise is culturally meaningful. These goals
are, however, not passively accepted and are not always completely formulated in advance and
unchangeable. Gauvain (1995, p. 32) argues that some goals may be purposefully left
unspecified, enabling a person to take advantage of opportunities in the context in the course
of refining the goal.
5.1.2.2. Mediated action
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Goals, beliefs and schemata become psychologically significant to the individual through an
ongoing process of mediated action. This is a process by which the individual's action is shaped
by her environment, while simultaneously shaping that environment. Craig (1990) aptly argues
that knowing is transformative, the being which acts and the tasks acted upon are transformed
through this transaction, and this constitutes the continuous spiral of individual-social
development.
Vygotsky's socio-historical perspective is again critical for the understanding of the notion of
mediated activity. Vygotsky (1978) focuses on higher psychological functions, that is complex
human behaviour that combine tools or instrumental materials with symbolic processes to
accomplish psychological activity. For Vygotsky (1962), higher mental functions can only be
understood as dynamic processes that embody their own individual and social history as well as
their potential. It is through social mediation that the higher psychological functions evolve
historically in humans. Higher psychological functions appear twice, or on two planes.: first,
they appear on the social plane (between people) and then on a psychological plane (intra-
psychological). According to Vygotsky (1978) the internalisation of the social into the
psychological occurs through a process of mediated activity in a zone of proximal
development, which he defines as ‘the distance between the actual developmental level as
determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential development as
determined through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with more
capable peers’ (Vygotsky, 1978, p.86). The zone of proximal development can also be
regarded in its general conception as the structure for joint activity in any context where there
are participants who exercise differential responsibility by virtue of different expertise. For
Vygotsky (1962) ideal partners are not equal, but the inequality is in skills and understanding
rather than in power. For this reason either adults or peers can bring about cognitive growth,
but for cognitive development to occur in the course of interacting with a peer, the partner
should be more capable.
This mediation process has also been defined as a process of enculturation. Perkins, Jay &
Tishman (1993) list four dimensions of enculturation: cultural exemplars, which are artifacts
and people modeling or otherwise exemplifying cultural knowledge; direct transmission of key
informants, which is the straight forward teaching of concepts, vocabularies and information
related to cultural knowledge; involvement in cultural activities, which entails ‘hands on’
practice, using aspects of cultural knowledge; and, involvement in cultural interactions, which
refers to learner/learner and mentor/learner interpersonal exchange, using and embodying
cultural knowledge.
46
The mediation process is considered as socio-culturally specific. Craig (1990) contends that
universal (human) capacities for problem solving find particular expressions which are space
and time dependent. The individual-social development, over time and space, produces
problem solving situations which essentially define and constrain that development and the
tasks which are part of it. Rogoff (in Cole & Cole, 1989) similarly argues that culture
influences the child's development, by arranging the occurrence of specific contexts and the
relative frequency with which particular contexts are encountered and which will foster
different skills.
5.2. The role of meta-cognition in problem solving
The information processing approach has revealed a deeper understanding of cognition
through the introduction of the notion of meta-cognition. Meta-cognition is a form of
cognition that encompasses an awareness of the goals of cognitive activity as well as the plans
and procedures for reaching them. According to Flavell (1976) meta-cognition concerns the
monitoring of one's cognitive processes. A distinction can be made between knowing about
one's own individual cognitive processes - what they are, how they work and when to apply
them - and knowing about knowledge and the validity of truth claims in general. In recent
years, through the work of Craig (1990), Greeno (1989) and Strohm Kitchener (1983), meta-
cognitive studies have been linked to the ‘situated cognition’ view.
Meta-cognition is examined in this study with the purpose of enriching the proposed
framework for the study of everyday problem solving. Two components of the everyday
cognition framework, namely cultural models, and cultural beliefs will be revisited in terms of
their meta-cognitive nature.
Three meta-cognitive processes can be distinguished, namely epistemic, conceptual and
procedural processes.
5.2.1. The importance of epistemic knowledge in problem solving
According to Strohm Kitchener (1983), epistemic cognition involves the processes an
individual invokes to monitor the epistemic nature of problems and the truth value of
alternative solutions.
Epistemic knowledge includes:
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- the individual's knowledge about the limits of knowing, the certainty of knowing and the
criteria for knowing;
- the knowledge used to identify and choose between the forms of solution required for
different problem types;
- rules about what may count as evidence for specific knowledge claims;
- criteria by which knowledge or claims of knowledge can be evaluated.
It is argued, that in order to understand how people solve everyday problems, there is a need
to study their epistemic assumptions. According to Strohm Kitchener (1983) epistemic
assumptions provide a framework through which individuals understand the nature of problems
and define and choose acceptable strategies and solutions. Research has shown that individuals
have implicit theories of intelligence, abilities, knowing and learning that influence the
fundamental nature of the activities of knowing, problem solving and learning (Belenky,
Clinchy, Goldberger & Tarule, 1986; Dweck, 1983; Goodnow, 1980).
Epistemic cognition may take different forms depending on different underlying epistemic
assumptions, such as the assumption that there is an objective reality that is absolutely
knowable and known, or alternatively that objective knowledge does not exist in any sense, or
that knowledge is the outcome of ongoing critical inquiry (Strohm Kitchener, 1983). Strohm
Kitchener (1983) adds that differences in epistemic assumptions are particularly critical when
individuals are engaged in identifying appropriate solutions for ill-structured problems.
In accordance with the argument put forward in Section 5.1.2.1.(ii) epistemic beliefs are
shaped by the intricate interplay between individual and environment. According to Greeno
(1989) thinking is situated in contexts of beliefs and understandings about cognition that differ
between individuals and social groups, and fundamental properties of thinking and learning are
determined by these contexts. Arce and Long (1992) argue that contexts provide different
grounds for the belief in and different procedures for validation of knowledge claims, in other
words distinct epistemic values.
Markus and Kitayama (1991) have provided interesting data on epistemic consequences of the
psycho-social construal of the self. Their work is cited here as an in-depth example of cultural
influence on epistemic knowledge.
Markus and Kitayama argue that people in different cultures have strikingly different construals
of the self, of others and of the inter-dependence of the two. These construals influence, and in
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many cases determine, the very nature of problem solving. They distinguish between an
independent (mostly associated with western people) and an inter-dependent (mostly
associated with non-western people) view of the self. Since this study deals with problem
solving in a non-Western context the example of the inter-dependent view of the self will be
used to exemplify the epistemic consequences of culture.
For those with inter-dependent selves some aspects of knowledge representation and some of
the processes involved in social and non-social thinking alike are influenced by a pervasive
attentiveness to the relevant others in the social context. Thus one's actions are more likely to
be seen as ‘situationally bound’, and characterisations of the individual will include this
context. In the inter-dependent self there is a fundamental bond of human beings to each other.
An imperative of these cultures is to maintain this inter-dependence among individuals.
Experiencing inter-dependence entails seeing oneself as part of an encompassing social
relationship and recognising that one's behaviour is determined, contingent on, and to a large
extent organised by, what the actor perceives to be the thoughts, feelings and actions of others
in the relationship. Within such construal, the self becomes most meaningful and complete
when it is cast in the appropriate social relationship. The inter-dependent self possesses and
expresses a set of internal attributes, such as abilities, opinions, judgments and personality
characteristics. However these internal attributes are understood as situation specific and thus
as sometimes elusive and unreliable. As such they are unlikely to assume a powerful role in
regulating overt behaviour. In many domains of social life one's abilities and opinions are
assigned only secondary roles - they must instead be constantly controlled to come to terms
with the primary task of inter-dependence. Such voluntary control of the inner attributes
constitute the core of the cultural ideal of becoming mature. An inter-dependent self cannot be
properly characterised as a bounded whole, for it changes structure with the nature of the
particular social situation. The reciprocal inter-dependence with others, that is the sign of the
inter-dependent self esteem, seems to require constant engagement of what Mead (1934)
meant by taking the role of the other. It involves the willingness and ability to feel and think
what others are feeling and thinking to absorb this information without being told and then to
help others satisfy their wishes and realise their goals.
Some consequences of the idea of an inter-dependent self for problem solving can be derived.
- Inter dependent selves will engage in greater cognitive elaboration of the other or the
self-in-relation-to-other during problem identification and problem solving.
- The unit of representation of a problem will include the self and the other in a relatively
specific social context in which the self and the other are embedded.
- The problem solving process is inseparable from the content. Global inferences about
persons and contexts are regarded as not meaningful or informative.
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- Problem solving involves establishing a connection or an inter-dependence among the
elements rather than deriving abstraction and analysing common features.
Irvine's (1969a, 1970) analysis of beliefs of the people of Mashonaland (Zimbabwe) is another
example of how culture influences epistemic values. Irvine concludes that intelligent acts for
the Mashona are to be understood in the context of a world-view that is entirely different to
that in the West. Important cognitive abilities defined by the Mashona are alertness,
observation and vigilance and correct inference from environmental cues. Decision making,
according to the Mashona, demand carefulness and foresight on the one hand and opportunism
on the other hand. Conformity, both in personal relationships and in relation to the spirit-world
serves as a criterion for judging the goodness (intelligence) of behaviour. The emphasis on
relationships, both with the spiritual forces of the living and with the ancestral spirits of dead
kin, implies that cognitive acts have no meaning outside of the affective climate.
The examples discussed in this section demonstrate the importance of epistemic values for
people's actions. It is, therefore, considered necessary to include an inquiry into the epistemic
values underpinning problem solving in everyday problem solving research.
5.2.2. Conceptual and procedural knowledge in problem solving
Conceptual knowledge of a problem can be defined as a mental representation of that problem,
a ‘knowing that’. According to Hiebert (1986) conceptual knowledge can be thought of as a
connected web of knowledge - a network in which the linking relationships are as prominent as
the discrete pieces of information. Relationships pervade the individual facts and propositions
so that all pieces of information are linked to some network. In fact a unit of conceptual
knowledge cannot be an isolated piece of information, by definition it is part of conceptual
knowledge only if the holder recognises its relationship to other pieces of information. Sub-
types of concepts include taxonomic categories, causal models, spatial representation and
temporal representation.
Procedural knowledge is ‘knowing how’, or the knowledge of the steps required to attain a
specific goal. Procedures are mental representations that detail the actions that one should
perform to attain a goal and the order in which these actions need to be performed. Procedures
have been characterised using constructs such as skills, strategies and rules (Byrnes, 1992;
Hatano, 1982).
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It is argued, that an insight into conceptual and procedural knowledge of individuals and
groups involved in problem solving activities is important for the understanding of everyday
problem solving.
In accordance with section 5.1.2.1.(i) on cultural models, conceptual and procedural
knowledge of individuals and groups need to be regarded as the result of an intricate interplay
between culture and individual. D'Andrade (1981) argues that procedural and conceptual
knowledge are inter-subjectively shared within a particular culture. As a result conceptual and
procedural knowledge are often tacit within a particular culture and cannot easily be described
by the members of that culture. Individuals apply the conceptual and procedural knowledge
common to their social setting but cannot produce a good description of them.
Wearne and Hiebert (1989) assume that there are separate conceptual and procedural
knowledge systems, but indicate that there are important inter-linkages between them. Several
studies emphasise the interplay between conceptual and procedural knowledge.
Some studies have shown that a high level of conceptual knowledge facilitates the execution of
procedures (Byrnes & Wasik 1991; Haselhorn and Korkel, 1986; Pinker, 1984). Hiebert
(1986) provides various arguments for the importance of the influence of conceptual
knowledge on procedural knowledge. He contends that conceptual knowledge provides tools
for the development of procedures; it helps with recalling procedures and it enhances problem
representation. Problems are solved by building mental representations of the problems and
then dealing with the representations to select appropriate procedures. Relevant conceptual
knowledge can be brought to bear on the task by elaborating the problem context. Related
conceptual knowledge is accessed and the problem representation is enriched. Problem
representations, drawing on conceptual knowledge to place the problem in a meaningful
context, influence the selection of procedures and raise the accuracy and efficiency of the
applied procedure. Conceptual knowledge can be of use as an executive control in the use of
procedures. It can monitor the choice of appropriate procedure, discourage the selection of
inappropriate procedures and monitor procedural outcomes. As has been mentioned before,
the amount of available conceptual knowledge in a specific problem domain differentiates
between novice and expert problem solver.
Glaser and Bassok (1989, p. 636) and Hatano (1982) emphasise the dialectical interplay
between conceptual and procedural knowledge. They argue that conditionalised knowledge of
procedures can be acquired only through actual use of declarative knowledge in solving
problems. The initial solution is generated by applying the available declarative knowledge,
using general problem solving heuristics or weak methods such as means-end search, or
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analogy to an example. This knowledge compilation occurs through a process of
proceduralisation (comparing the problem states before and after generating the solution and
creating production rules and composition, collapsing a sequence of productions into a single
production). Through practice people may gain new insights into the corresponding conceptual
knowledge underlying a skill. This new knowledge in turn provides additional understanding of
the utility of the skill. Through this process, the skill gains meaning and becomes available for
use in new domains. It is assumed that people can form the conceptual knowledge through
performing the procedural skill and through that conceptual knowledge they can invent other
procedural knowledge. This process is useful for explaining the process by which a novice
becomes an expert problem solver.
Hatano (1982) makes a point of particular interest to this study, which deals with problem
solving strategies in a context of rapid social change. He argues that the elaboration of
conceptual knowledge through variation in the use of practical skills (procedures) is most
likely to occur in times of rapid cultural change. The studies of Brenner (1985) and Saxe
(1985) illustrate this. They documented the elaboration of indigenous knowledge by children
upon their introduction to Western style schooling. They believe that new experiences, such as
entering a novel educational system provide children with a context to modify their existing
procedural knowledge in the service of novel goals, resulting in the construction of new
conceptual knowledge.
5.3. The framework
Taking into account the various arguments made in favour of a ‘situated cognition’ approach,
a framework for the study of everyday problem solving can be put forward. This framework
intends to be practical in the sense that it provides a tool for research, rather than being a mere
theoretical exposition. With particular reference to this doctoral thesis it provides a framework
for selecting the unit of analysis for the empirical component of the study as well as a tool for
the analysis and interpretation of the empirical data. The framework is presented in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Framework for the study of everyday problem solving
The tenets of the framework follow.
- Everyday problem solving is a goal-directed activity by an individual (or group) that
involves affective, cognitive and conative aspects. It is a meaningful activity in the sense
that the individual identifies a goal and makes an intentional attempt to reach that goal.
That intentionality is influenced by the person's cognitive and affective interpretation of
the problem context and her values and beliefs.
- Problem solving activity embodies an intricate dialectical interface between individual
and environment. This interrelationship can be operationalised by the notion of cultural
mediation. This mediation has two levels. The first level consists of mediational means
and the second of joint activity.
- Mediational means are the societal things people employ when acting in order to achieve
some goal (Wertsch,1995 p.89). Three different types of mediational means can be
identified, cultural values and beliefs, cultural goals and cultural models. These can be
accessed through the study of their meta-cognitive underpinnings. Cultural models in
problem solving can be accessed through people's conceptual and procedural knowledge.
Cultural beliefs and values can be accessed through people's epistemic knowledge. The
cultural goals can be derived directly from the identification of people's goal-directed-
everyday activities.
53
- Joint activity is the process by which the individual, through interaction with others,
internalises the mediational means.
5.3.1. Some methodological implications of the framework
The everyday problem solving framework, suggested for the study, differs considerably from
the mainstream problem solving paradigm. This needs to be reflected in the methodology used
in the study. Some important methodological implications of the framework follow.
- In order to capture the dialectical interplay between individual and environment, the
research needs to focus on activity between people.
- There is a need to identify everyday problems. To find appropriate tasks in which to
study everyday problem solving actions, it is necessary to take cognisance of the
everyday, culturally defined activities of the members of a society (Cole, Gay, Glick &
Sharp, 1971; Cole & Scribner, 1974; Goodnow, 1980). Cole (1995) states that
appropriate research should therefore begin with an analysis of the way in which human
thinking occurs within culturally organised forms of activity. This involves the analysis of
local discourse and the use of field notes and videotapes to document thinking in-situ,
and attention to the way in which individuals' responses fit into the activity that they help
to constitute.
- There is a need to develop indigenous concepts of problem solving. The contention that
everyday problem solving research needs to be situated within particular societal or eco-
cultural contexts, implies that it needs to uncover indigenous conceptions of notions such
as problem and problem solving strategy as part of the research. Kim & Berry (1989)
concur with the need to access indigenous interpretations of problem solving and add
that this requires a collective approach. They argue that it is accepted within the field of
everyday cognitive research that there is a need for obtaining of subjective data in which
the person's cognitive interpretation and construction of events themselves are important.
However, since cognitive life is not merely an individual phenomenon, but is influenced
by the cultural norms and practices with which one grows up, collective views need to be
studied and drawn into the interpretation of the obtained data.
6. A third motivation for the study
In Chapter 2, a motivation for the current study was provided from within a people-centered
development paradigm. In Chapter 3, an impetus for the study was traced back to a personal
history in development work. A third motivation comes from the realisation that, while
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everyday cognition research has an important contribution to make, relatively few researchers
have conducted research within an ‘everyday cognition’ approach (Wertsch, 1995).
The lack of support for this approach seems to be particularly evident in Africa. Several
reasons for the scarcity of everyday problem solving research can be identified. There is a lack
of established appropriate methodology; there is a lack of theoretical models; there is a lack of
appreciation from the mainstream scientific community and lastly the pragmatic issues raised
by the study of this type of reasoning seem overwhelming, especially in contrast to the
relatively few practical difficulties of studying formal reasoning. In the latter the experimenter
supplies the premises and can manipulate the situation by changing the content of the problem
while keeping the structure constant.
Sinnott (1993) argues for the importance of everyday cognition research. According to Sinnott
the study of everyday cognition allows us to ask better questions. It gives us a whole different
set of questions related to process and dialogue. This is very important because in the everyday
cognitive world nothing lasts for long and process is our most important product. She further
argues that because everyday cognitive research is very complicated, it pulls our attention to
narrowing that complexity to a meaningful but tolerable level, to choosing a truth..
This study aims to provide a framework for the study of everyday cognition that contributes to
the theory of everyday cognition and that provides cognitive psychologist with a
methodological tool to conduct everyday cognition research.
55
CHAPTER 5.
AN INTERPRETIVE PARADIGM FOR THE STUDY OF EVERYDAY
PROBLEM SOLVING
1. Introduction
In this chapter the aim is to provide the philosophical framework that underpins this study
congruent with the arguments made in both Chapters 2 and 4. The methodological
considerations introduced in the previous chapter, which derive from an everyday cognition
approach, are further substantiated by this framework. What follows is a substantial
elaboration on the philosophical framework that underpins the study.
2. Paradigms
A general paradigm may be regarded as a set of basic beliefs (or metaphysics) that deals with
first principles. It represents a world view that defines, for its holder, the nature of the world,
the nature of individuals and their possible relations to the world or parts of it. The beliefs are
basic in the sense that they have to be accepted simply on faith. There is no way to establish
their ultimate truthfulness (Guba & Lincoln, 1994).
Research paradigms, which are paradigms specifically developed for the purpose of research
endeavours, define for inquirers what it is they are about and what falls within and outside
legitimate inquiry (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). The basic beliefs that define research paradigms
can be summarised by the responses given by proponents of any given paradigm to four
fundamental questions. These are interconnected in such a way that the answer given to one
question, constrains the answers to the others. The ontological question refers to the form and
nature of reality and what it is that can be known about it. The epistemological question refers
to the nature of the relationship between the knower or would-be-knower and what can be
known. This includes what is considered as valid knowledge. The teleological question relates
to the aim of the inquiry. Finally, the methodological question refers to how the researcher can
go about finding out whatever she believes can be known (Guba & Lincoln, 1994).
This chapter deals with answering three of the four paradigmatic questions from the
researcher's perspective. The ontological, the epistemological and the teleological issues will be
addressed in the following sections of this chapter. The methodological issue is addressed in
the next chapter. Before turning to those questions, interpretivism and realism, the two
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philosophical paradigms underpinning this research, will be outlined. Only those elements of
relevance for the current study will be dealt with.
3. The interpretive paradigm
Hermeneutics, social constructionism and interpretivism are terms that routinely appear in the
lexicon of social science methodologists and philosophers. Yet their particular meanings are
shaped by the intent of their users. As general descriptors of a loosely coupled family the above
strands of interpretive inquiry can be defined as a philosophy of the interpretation of meaning.
Interpretivists, in general, focus on the processes by which meanings are created, negotiated,
sustained and modified within a specific context of human action (Schwandt, 1994).
The world of lived reality, and situation-specific meanings, constitute the general object of
interpretivists' investigations. This world is considered to be constructed by social actors. That
is, particular actors, in particular places, at particular times, fashion meaning out of events and
phenomena through prolonged, complex processes of social interaction involving history,
language and action (Schwandt, 1994). Hermeneutics holds that human behaviour is purposive.
Social agents are considered autonomous, intentional, active and goal-directed. They construe,
construct and interpret their own behaviour and that of their fellow agents.
According to Packer & Addison (1989a, p. 23) interpretive inquiry begins not from an absolute
origin of unquestionable data or totally consistent logic, but at a place delineated by our
everyday participatory understanding of people and events. It begins there in full awareness
that this understanding is corrigible, and that it is partial in the sense of being incomplete and
perspectival. Truth is not a matter of correspondence between a theory or account and the way
things really are, it is a matter of uncovering. What is uncovered in an interpretation depends
on the access we have developed. What is uncovered in the course of a true interpretation is a
solution to the problem, the confusion, the question, the concern and the breakdown in
understanding that motivated the inquiry in the first place.
Packer & Addison (1989a, p.34) argue that the circularity of understanding and interpretation
is not vicious. If inquiry is shaped and motivated by a practical concern or difficulty, and if, as
a consequence of interpretation, a solution to that difficulty is uncovered, one should not
consider this as finding only what one reads into things. The truth of an account will be suited
to the perspective adopted in the inquiry, but this is not vicious circularity. It is precisely what
is wanted. It does imply that one has to be careful to adopt an appropriate perspective and
become aware of what one's practical concern is. A true interpretive account then, is one that
helps the researcher and the people studied - one that furthers people's concerns. Interpretive
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inquiry must not be misunderstood as just an effort to describe, or even just understand, human
phenomena. Interpretation always begins from concerned engagement. There is no pure truth
that lies outside human engagement in the world.
The social constructionists, as part of the overall interpretivist approach, emphasise that to
understand the world of meaning one must interpret it. The inquirer must elucidate the process
of meaning construction and clarify what and how meanings are embodied in the language and
actions of social actors. According to the social constructionist, ‘to prepare an interpretation is
itself to construct a reading of these meanings. It is to offer the inquirer's construction of the
constructions of the actors one studies’ (Schwandt, 1994, p.118).
3.1. Core metaphysics of an interpretive paradigm
This chapter does not provide scope for a detailed discussion of all the subtle differences
between the various sub-approaches of the broad interpretivist approach. It intends to outline
only those metaphysics which are of particular relevance for the paradigm of this study.
3.1.1. The text as discourse
The importance of ‘the text’ as the focus for interpretation is particularly emphasised by
Ricoeur. Ricoeur (1976) argues for the necessity to consider language as an event (parole) in
addition to language as a system of signs (language). In case of the former, language is usually
considered as speech or discourse and distinguished from the latter by a number of traits: it is
realised temporally, it is self referential, it is about something, i.e. it refers to a world outside it,
it is aimed at an addressee.
He elaborates on the referential relation of discourse and explains that it means that when the
subject of discourse in addressing herself to another speaker, says ‘something’ about
‘something’, that about which she speaks is the referent of the discourse. This referential
function is supported by the sentence, which is the first and the simplest unit of discourse.
Ricoeur (1976) believes that the referential function is so important that it compensates for
another characteristic of language, namely the separation of signs from things. By means of
referential function language brings back into the world those signs which the symbolic
function separated it from things. As a result, all discourse is, to some extent, thereby
connected to the world.
Ricoeur (1976) points out the difference in speech between spoken and written discourse. He
sees text as a discourse fixed by written language. He argues that when the text takes the place
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of speech, something important occurs. In speech, the int rlocutors are present not only to one
another, but also to the situation. The surroundings and the circumstantial milieu of discourse
is fully meaningful. In living speech, the ideal sense of what is, relates to the real reference, to
that about which is spoken. Ricoeur believes that this is no longer the case when the text takes
the place of speech. The reference is intercepted at the same time as dialogue is interrupted by
the text. Written words become words for themselves (Ricoeur, 1981).
A seminal argument, put forward by Ricoeur (1981), is that the disconnection between the
written text and its world, as explained above, affects the relation of the text to the
subjectivities of the author and the reader. Ricoeur (1981) constructs a paradigm of text,
containing the following principles. First, writing represents the fixation of meaning in which
the said assumes greater importance than the act of speaking. Second, with written discourse
the author's intention and the meaning of the text cease to coincide. The meaning of an
utterance is different from the intention of the utterer. The surpassing of the intention by the
meaning signifies precisely that understanding takes place in a non-psychological and properly
semantic space which the text has created by disconnecting itself from the mental intention of
its author. Third, a text surpasses the ostensive references of spoken discourse by opening up
possible modes of being, potential horizons, over and above the restricted situation in which
the partners of a dialogue find themselves. Through its display of non-ostensive references the
text, in a way, frees the meaning of discourse from the situation (Ricoeur, 1981).
Ricoeur (1981) purports that, in analogy to texts, meaningful actions can assume a fixed form
in which the meaning becomes detached from the event and the intention from the
consequences of action. Flowing from this autonomy is the ability for the meaning of an action
to transcend the social context in which it originated so that it may be re-appointed differently
in new social conditions (Bleicher, 1980).
3.1.2. Interpretation
The main focus of interpretivist researchers is interpretation, a process of constructing
meaning. This process may take a variety of forms, depending on the researcher's specific sub-
paradigm. Some of these interpretive processes, relevant to the study, are discussed below.
3.1.2.1. Ricoeur's structural analysis: Integrating interpretation and explanation
Congruent with his paradigm of text, Ricoeur proposes a structural analysis as an interpretive
tool, which, he argues, integrates explanation and interpretation. His structural analysis aims at
querying the surface semantics of the text in order to unveil a depth semantics. He argues that
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if structural analysis is seen as a necessary stage between naive and critical interpretation,
between surface and depth interpretation, then it seems possible to integrate the opposed
attitudes of explanation and interpretation within an overall conception of reading as the
recovery of meaning (Ricoeur, 1981).
Ricoeur (1981, p.162 -163) argues that to explain is to bring out the structure, that is, the
internal relations of dependence which constitute the statics of the text. To interpret is to
follow the path of thought opened up by the text. Ricoeur explains how, during a structural
analysis, the attitudes of explanation and interpretation confront one another in the act of
reading. As a reader, he says (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 152), one can remain in the suspense of text,
treating it as a world-less and author-less object. In this case, the text is explained in terms of
its internal relations, its structure. On the other hand one can lift the suspense and fulfill the
text in speech, restoring it to living communication. In this case the text is interpreted. These
two possibilities both belong to the reading, and reading is the dialectic of these two attitudes.
We can undertake a first type of reading which formally records as it were the text's
interception of all the relations to a world that can be pointed out and to subjectivities that can
converse. On the basis of this choice the text has no outside but only an inside, it has no
transcendent aim, unlike a speech which is addressed to someone about something. This
reading allows the possibility of an explanatory attitude with regard to the text.
He further explains how a complementary and reciprocal relation between explanation and
interpretation can be established (Ricoeur, 1981, p.158). He argues that to fulfill the text in the
present speech is the real aim of reading in a structural analysis. For this attitude reveals the
true nature of the suspense which intercepts the movement of the text towards meaning. To
read is to conjoin a new discourse to the discourse of a text. This conjunction of discourses
reveals, in the very constitution of the text, an original capacity for renewal which is its open
character. Interpretation is the concrete outcome of conjunction and renewal. Initially the text
had only one sense, that is, internal relations or a structure, now it has meaning, that is a
realisation in the discourse of the reading subject.
Thus, according to Ricoeur (1976), to interpret is to appropriate here and now the intention of
the text. As was established above, the meaning of the text is not essentially the presumed
intention of the author, the lived experience of the writer, but rather what the text means for
whoever complies with its injunction. If the intention is that of the text, and if this intention is
the direction which it opens up for thought, then depth semantics must be understood in a
fundamentally dynamic way.
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It is the kind of world opened up by the depths semantics of a text, a discovery, which has
immense consequences regarding what is usually called the sense of text. The sense of a text is
not behind the text, it is in front of it. What has to be understood is not the initial situation of
discourse, but what points towards a possible world thanks to the non-ostensive reference of
the text. It seeks to grasp the world-propositions opened up by the reference of the text. The
reference born by the depth semantics. The text speaks of a possible world and of possible
ways of orienting oneself within it. The dimensions of this world are properly opened up by
and disclosed by the text.
According to Ricoeur (1976) the process of analysis is one of guessing and validating. There is
a need for an initial guess. There are no good rules for guessing, but there are rules for
validating guesses. Validation, according to Ricoeur (1976), follows a logic of probability
rather than a logic of empirical verification. To show that an interpretation is more probable in
the light of what is known is different from showing that a conclusion is true. Validation is not
verification. It is an argumentative discipline comparable to the juridical procedures used in
legal interpretation - a logic of uncertainty and qualitative probability.
Ricoeur (1976) argues that guess and validation are in a sense circularly related as subjective
and objective approaches to the text. This circle is not vicious because there are procedures of
invalidation similar in criteria to falsifiability. The role of falsification is played by the conflict
between competing interpretation, in the sense that an interpretation must not only be
probable, but more probable than another interpretation. Although there is always more than
one way of construing a text, it is not true however, that all interpretations are equal. The logic
of validation allows us to move between the two limits of dogmatism and skepticism, it creates
a dialectic between understanding and guessing and explanation and validation (Ricoeur,
1976).
3.1.2.2. The hermeneutic circle
For many interpretivists the concept of hermeneutical circle is central to the concept of
meaning. What the hermeneutical circle does, is connect a certain reading of a text, expression
or action with other readings. These other readings serve as an interpretive framework for the
interpretation of that text. The circle can also be put in terms of part-whole relations. When
interpretivists are trying to establish a reading for the whole text or act, they appeal to readings
of its partial expression or actions, and yet because expressions only make sense or not in
relation to other expressions, the readings of partial expressions depend on those of others and
ultimately of the whole (Taylor, 1994). Because understanding inevitably involves reference to
what is already known, it operates in a circular, dialectical fashion (Palmer, 1969). Woolfolk,
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Sass & Messer (1988, p.3) provide an example of the meaning of a sentence to clarify the
concept. The sentence derives its meaning from the individual words it comprises, but the
interpretation of the meaning of the words within a sentence is also governed by their relations
within the sentence and the meaning of a sentence as a whole. Thus, interpretation occurs
within a circle in which parts are always interpreted within some understanding of a whole,
which in turn is understood by coming to understand constituent parts. The hermeneutical
circle describes the contextual nature of knowledge. A fact does not stand on its own,
independent from its context or its interpreter, but rather is partially constituted by them. A
fact can be evaluated only in relation to the larger structure of theory or argument of which it
is part. At the same time, this larger structure is dependent on its individual parts, as well as
other related information. In explicating the circle of understanding, we move back and forth
between part and whole. (Woolfolk et al., 1988).
To interpretivists, the meaning of a given predicament has the following articulation: it is a
meaning for a subject, it is not the meaning of the situation in a vacuum, but for a specific
subject, a group of subjects, or for the human subject in general. As such, meaning is of
something. One can distinguish between a given element, situation or action and its meaning.
But this is not to say that they are physically separable. Rather we are dealing with two
descriptions of the element, one of which is characterised in terms of its meaning for the
subject. But the relations between the two descriptions are not symmetrical. For, on the one
hand, the description in terms of meaning cannot be unless descriptions of the other kind apply
as well, or put differently, there can be no meaning without a substrate. On the other hand, it
may be that the same meaning is borne by another substrate e.g. a situation with the same
meaning may be realised in different social conditions. Lastly, things only have a meaning in a
field, that is in relation to the meanings of other things. This means that there is no such thing
as a single, unrelated meaningful element, and it means that changes in the other meanings in
the field can involve changes in the given element (Taylor, 1994, p.186).
Meaning requires a sense of coherence. If one applies the requirements of meaning, as set out
above, to behaviour as an action, then behaviour must make sense. This is not to say that all
behaviour must make sense, in the way of avoiding contradiction, confusion of purpose and the
like. Plainly a great deal of our action falls short of this goal. But in another sense, even
contradictory, irrational action, is made sense of when we understand why it was engaged in.
We make sense of action when there is a coherence between the actions of the agent and the
meaning of the situation for her. We find her action puzzling until we find such a coherence.
This coherence in no way implies that the action is rational. The meaning of a situation for an
agent may be full of confusion and contradiction, but the adequate depiction of her
contradiction makes sense of it. Making sense in this way through coherence of meaning and
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action, the meanings of action and situation, cannot but move in a hermeneutical circle. Our
conviction that the account makes sense is contingent on our reading of action and situation.
But these readings cannot be explained or justified except by reference to other such readings
and their relation to the whole (Taylor, 1994).
It is important to emphasise that the hermeneutical circle is ontological rather than simply
epistemological or methodological. Projection is, first of all a structure of our way of being in
the world, our living, our actions and interactions, before it characterises our knowledge and
our sciences (Packer & Addison, 1989a, p. 34).
3.1.3. The fore-structure
The circularity of understanding can be further explained with Heidegger's notion of fore-
structure. According to Heidegger (1962) when studying a new phenomenon one is always
projected into it. Unless it is totally alien one will have some preliminary understanding of what
kind of phenomenon it is, and of what possible things might happen to it. This means that one
both understands it and at the same time misunderstands it. The researcher inevitably shapes
the phenomenon to fit a fore-structure that has been shaped by expectations and
preconceptions and by her lifestyle, culture and tradition. Understanding always takes place
within a horizon or framework that is projected by human beings and which Heidegger (1962)
calls ‘Dasein’.
Packer & Addison (1989a) provide an elaboration of the concept of interpretation based on
Heidegger's ‘Dasein’. They argue that it must be seen as the working out of possibilities that
have become apparent in a preliminary, dim understanding of events. This pre-understanding
embodies a particular concern, a kind of caring. It provides a way of reading a preliminary
initial accessibility, a stance or a perspective (a fore-structure) that opens up the field that is
being investigated. Packer & Addison (1989,a) further argue that this does not mean that
interpretive accounts are undisciplined guesses. They are ordered, organised and guided by the
fore-structure or projection. The guidance is, however, not automatic. The researcher has a
responsibility to prepare so that she ‘enters the circle’ with an appropriate fore-structure in
order to conduct her interpretation in a proper manner.
It has become increasingly clear to interpretation theorists, that the manner in which a text is
interpreted is not only dependent on a fore-structure of the research field, but also vitally
dependent on historically located conventions of interpretation among researchers. These
interpretive dispositions determine, in an important way, how a text is interpreted. People exist
within a contemporary ‘horizon of understandings’ and these understandings inevitably fashion
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their interpretation of text (Gergen, 1989). Gergen (1989) points out that the chief limitation of
interpretation in the psychological sciences lies within these conventions of discourse, shared
by the psychological community of interpreters. That is, various interpretations of data relevant
to psychological processes and mechanisms, may be sustained to the extent that conventions of
language use within the relevant community of interlocutors are shared. Gergen (1989)
believes that as new forms of discourse are developed, or as one moves to other interpretive
communities, alternative interpretations may be favoured (Gergen, 1989).
3.1.4. Validity of interpretive accounts
The central notions of the interpretivist approach obviate the need to define validation in a
radically different fashion from its meaning within a positivist approach. Validation in the
hermeneutical paradigm is not concerned with empirical verification, with an assessment of the
fit between explanation, reality and truth. It is, however, concerned with usefulness, the extent
to which a problem has been solved, with qualitative negotiated probability- in other words
with reasonability.
Packer & Addison (1989b) aptly use the word evaluation rather than validation and argue for
the criteria of reasonability in evaluating interpretivist accounts. They propose that the
following approaches to evaluation in interpretive inquiry are reasonable: consistency; relation
to other material; response of research participants; communicability to peer; response of these
peers; relations to alternative perspectives; and practical implications. They emphasise,
however, that neither together nor separate do these approaches indicate whether an
interpretation corresponds to the way things really are. They are not ways of validating. They
are, rather, ways to consider whether what has been uncovered in an interpretive inquiry
answers the practical question that was of concern for the researcher.
Packer & Addison (1989b) argue that their approach to evaluation is satisfactory even though
it cannot provide interpretation-free validation, because of the following two reasons. First,
interpretation is not a matter of conjecture and guess. The notions of fore-structure and
hermeneutical circle make this obvious. As a result, stringent validation refutation in the
positivist sense is unnecessary. Second, true interpretation is one that uncovers an answer to
the concern motivating the inquiry, not one that seeks absolute truth.
3.2. Different approaches to hermeneutics
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Within the broad hermeneutical tradition there is an abundance of theorists and sub-paradigms,
each with its own specific convictions and concerns. Those with specific relevance for the
construction of the researcher's paradigm are briefly outlined below.
3.2.1. Methodological hermeneutics
Methodological hermeneutics refers to those approaches whose specific aim is to reform,
broaden and humanise the social sciences. Writers in this tradition, amongst whom we can
situate Ricoeur (1981), assume that appropriate methods for the human sciences will diverge
from those of the natural sciences (Woolfolk et al., 1988). The methodological hermeneutic
endeavour consists of approaching meaningful interpretations with a set of canons which have
been formulated in order to facilitate the correct interpretation of human expression (Bleicher,
1980).
3.2.2. Hermeneutic philosophy
It is precisely the hope of finding a basis for the scientific investigation of meaning, the
endeavour of the methodological hermeneutics, that hermeneutic philosophy - also labeled
ontological hermeneutics- rejects (Bleicher, 1980).
Hermeneutic philosophy views understanding as a fundamental mode of being in the world and
through an exploration of the nature of interpretation seeks truths that are foundational for and
clarifying of the nature of all inquiry, including science. Writers in this group also aim at the
recovery of a kind of philosophic and cultural sensibility that has been nullified by those forms
of philosophy that make epistemology and methodology their primary concern (Woolfolk et
al., 1988).
Gadamer (1975), a proponent of the ontological hermeneutic approach, analyses the social
sciences extensively but his aim is not the reformation of scientific understanding, but rather
the elucidation of the ontological relation of methodical (method-driven) knowledge to the
Heideggerian pre-understanding. Gadamer states that his hermeneutics is not a methodology of
the human sciences, but the quest for an understanding of what the human sciences are in truth,
beyond their methodical self-consciousness and what connects them with the whole of our
experience of the world.
Heidegger's fore-structure, which was introduced above, is central to the understanding of
hermeneutic philosophy. In the course of his existential analytic of ‘Dasein’, Heidegger (1962)
advanced the thesis that scientific activity takes place within a context of pre-understanding
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that derives from a certain ‘situatedness’ in the life world and from participation in various
activities that include practical dealing with tools and implements. Such practical dealings and
understandings are achieved in the course of various customary, everyday transactions with the
environment. These occur within a taken-for-granted cultural and historical background that
consists of practices, habits, and skills, but cannot be spelled out explicitly and
comprehensively because it is so pervasive that we cannot make it an object of inquiry. This is
the lived-world of what Heidegger called ‘everydayness’. In the Heideggerian view, the
conscious experience of another person or culture cannot be ascertained in any objective sense.
He criticised the efficacy of phenomenological as well as other, more positivistic methods of
inquiry, in the hermeneutic venture.
According to Heidegger (1962), the horizontal character of Dasein makes it impossible to
retain faith in the transparency and certitude of phenomenological description. ‘Dasein’ can
know its own being only in an approximate, tentative and indirect way - not by taking its own
ordinary self-understanding at face value, nor through some quasi-scientific method of direct
intuition with access to certain and foundational data. Heidegger (1962) also emphasises the
shared and public nature of the contexts of significance that mediate human awareness. To a
great extent, it is the customs, institutions and language of a given culture, not the idiosyncratic
perspectives of isolated individuals that channel and constitute human experience. Thus, even
the nature of one's own self-interpretations or self-understandings are largely determined by the
possibilities laid open by a shared world of social practices and institutions. In the view of
ontological hermeneutics, humans are constituted by their self interpretations, but for the most
part these interpretations are not freely chosen or consciously recognised, since they are so
deeply embedded in culture, history and bodily being, and since they are so pervasive as to be
nearly invisible. One implication of this is that self-understanding cannot be obtained by
studying individual subjectivity alone, it requires understanding of a culture, of language and of
history (Woolfolk et al., 1988).
Gadamer (Woolfolk et al, 1988, p.16) offers a vision of knowing based on the phenomenology
of game-playing which clarifies some of Heidegger's doctrine. According to Gadamer, the
players of a game play the game, but do not completely determine or create the game. One's
play and, hence one's actual existence as a player are, in part, constituted by all the various
features of the game. In some sense the player is also played by the game.
This bring us to a central insight of hermeneutic philosophy, which asserts that the social
scientist or interpreter and the object are linked by a context of tradition which implies that she
already has a pre-understanding of her object as she approaches it, thereby being unable to
start with a neutral mind. Hermeneutic philosophy does not aim at objective knowledge
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through the use of methodical procedures but at the explication and phenomenological
description of human ‘Dasein’ in its temporality and historicality (Bleicher, 1980).
3.2.3. Critical hermeneutics
Authors within the critical hermeneutic approach seek to expose and criticise ideological
underpinnings of all social practices, including political and scientific activity. They attempt, in
particular, to reveal sources of domination and coercion that prevent open discourse, the free
exercise of reason and the enhancement of possibilities for human self determination (Woolfolk
et al., 1988).
Critical perspectives, which originated with the Frankfurt School (Horkheimer, 1972), maintain
a dual conception of criticism: To examine critically the valuation underpinnings and normative
dictates underlying existing theories and to develop alternative conceptualisations. A general
preference is expressed for theories that do not mirror commonsense conceptions but
transform them. It is hoped through criticism and the generation of new alternatives, people
may be emancipated from their present interpretations of reality and may realise more fulfilling
life patterns. Critical theorists often share with dialectic theorists an interests in praxis. Critical
theory entails inquiry into the conditions affecting the character of knowledge and the
development of alternatives for purposes of social action. In other words, the aim of critical
hermeneutics is not exclusively to understand the world but also to change it so as to further
human emancipation (Gergen, 1982).
Habermas, as a core representative of critical hermeneutics, challenges the idealist assumptions
underlying a hermeneutical philosophy. His critical hermeneutics combines a methodical and
objective approach with the striving for practically relevant knowledge. Critical should here be
taken to mean mainly the appraisal of existing states of affairs in view of standards that derive
from the knowledge of something better than already exists as a potential or a tendency in the
present (Bleicher, 1980).
Much of the work within the critical perspective also argues for alternative conceptions of
human behaviour and of science. For example Sampson (1977) counters the dominant thesis of
self-contained individualism with that of communal inter-dependence. Theories of inter-
dependence would locate the responsibility for social actions in the larger community rather
than with the individual. This emphasis on inter-dependence as the desired end to be served by
social theory is shared by others (Gergen,1982). Along similar lines, others have argued for a
perspective that treats humans as active, responsible and changing agents (Harre & Secord,
1972).
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3.2.4. Interpretive anthropology
Interpretive anthropology is an interpretive theory of culture. Because of its focus on culture,
and by implication its relevance for the current study, it is deemed necessary to briefly outline
Geertz's interpretive anthropological ideas. Geertz (1994), as the leading theorist in this field,
regards culture as a complicated, ideational, and fundamentally an irreducibly interactive,
hermeneutical phenomena that requires interpretation, not causal explanation. Culture is a
context, something within which behaviour, institutions and processes can be intelligibly -
‘thickly-described’ (Geertz, 1994, p. 214). The language and other symbols in a culture do not
simply refer to objects but are constitutive of them, hence Geertz claims that people are
animals suspended in webs of significance that they themselves have spun. The actions of the
members of a culture (and the actions and writings of the anthropologist) are both constructed
and signify meaning. Following Ricoeur, Geertz argues that the ways in which meanings are
constituted in a culture must be read or interpreted by the anthropologist in much the same
manner as one would read or interpret a complex text. For Geertz (1973) there is no world of
social facts out there waiting to be observed, recorded and described and analysed. Rather the
inquirer constructs a reading of the ‘meaning making process’ of the people she studies. What
the activity of writing fixes is ‘the said of an event’ the anthropologist observes the meaning,
the gist, the thought of a speech event - not the event itself. In doing so, the inquirer rescues
the activity of participants' meaning making, changing it from a passing event, which exists
only in its own moment of occurrence, into an account, which exists in its inscription and can
be consulted. According to Geertz (1973), access to the meaning of an event is not to be had
through some process of emphatic identification with an informant or respondent. Rather, the
activity of understanding unfolds as one looks over one's respondents' shoulders at what they
are doing. The task of anthropology is not observation and description, but the inscription of
‘thick description’ of these meanings of human action. The anthropologist inscribes a text that
is itself a second-or third order interpretation of the respondent's interpretation. This text offers
a theoretical formulation or interpretation, a statement of what meaning particular social
actions have for the actors whose actions they are. It demonstrates meaning about the society
in which it is found and, beyond that, about social life as such. Yet, Geertz (1973) understands
theory (interpretation) to be always grounded and local - not speculative and abstract
4. Realism
Aspects of the realist philosophy provide further grounding for the paradigm of this study. The
general philosophical thesis of realism is an ontological doctrine to the effect that objects in the
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physical, social and psychological world exist and have properties independently of our
concepts of them and theoretical discourse about them (Manicas & Secord, 1983, p. 135).
Scientific realism regards the objects of knowledge as the structures and mechanisms that
generate phenomena. These objects are neither phenomena, nor human constructs imposed
upon the phenomena, but real structures which endure and operate independently of our
knowledge, our experience and the conditions which allow us access to them. According to
this view, both knowledge and the world are structured, both are differentiated and changing,
the latter exists independently of the former. In this view, science is not an epiphenomenon of
nature, nor is nature a product of man. It is argued that if there were no science, there would
be still a nature and it is this nature which is investigated by science. Whatever is discovered in
nature must be expressed in thought, but the structures and constitutions and causal laws
discovered in nature do not depend upon thought (Bhaskar, 1979). Consequently realists talk
about two dimensions and two kinds of objects of knowledge: a transitive dimension, in which
the object is the material cause or antecedently established knowledge which is used to
generate the new knowledge, and an intransitive dimension in which the object is the real
structure or mechanism that exists and acts quite independently of people and the conditions
which allow people access to it (Bhaskar, 1979).
According to Bhaskar (1979) scientific realism must be distinguished from naive realism. He
argues that to base one's analysis on the constant conjunction of events is to conflate three
domains, namely: the empirical, which consists of experience and sense impressions; the actual,
which consists of events; and the real, which consists of entities and structures that produce
events. That is, events themselves are not the ultimate focus of scientific analysis. Rather
events are to be explained by examining the causal structures that produce events and events
are produced by complex interactions of a multitude of underlying causal entities. In other
words, reality consists not only of what we can see but also of the underlying causal entities
that are not always directly discernible. Reality then is stratified, events are explained by
underlying structures, which may eventually be explained by other structures at still deeper
levels. The process of scientific discovery is, therefore, continuous. According to Manicas &
Secord (1983) the real world is complex and stratified so that one is always discovering more
complex layers of reality to explain other levels.
Bhaskar (1979) argues that scientific explanation of a phenomenon typically consists of the
construction of a model. This involves utilising cognitive materials and operating under the
control of something like a logic of analogy and metaphor, or a mechanism which, if it were to
exist and act in the postulated way, would account for the phenomenon in question. The reality
of the postulated explanation must then be subjected to empirical scrutiny. For in general, more
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than one explanation will be consistent with the phenomenon concerned. Once this is done the
explanation must then in principle itself be explained.
5. Proposed paradigm for the study
It is argued that, since researchers have pre-conceptions about the nature of the phenomena
they study and of the nature of research, metaphysics enter the theories and methods
researchers apply from the very onset of their investigation processes. It is, therefore,
important for a study to explicate its underlying philosophical framework.
The paradigm adopted in the current study can be situated within what is broadly referred to as
‘new paradigm’ research (Reason & Rowan, 1981). As indicated above, it has been inspired by
aspects of interpretivist and realist philosophy. What follows are the adopted paradigm's
ontological, epistemological and teleological assumptions. It is argued that the specific
combination of these metaphysics contribute, in an important way, to the uniqueness of this
study.
5.1. Ontology
The ontological position of the study can be situated between the extreme constructionist
approach and the realist approach. The constructionist argues that knowledge about social life
is not to be viewed as a reflection of what there is, but as a transformation of experience into a
linguistic ontology. Therefore the constraints on knowledge as a language are not furnished by
reality but by a social process (Gergen, 1982). The realist on the other hand argues that
knowledge exists totally separate from reality and that it is not dependent on social discourse
for its existence (Manicas & Secord, 1983, p. 135).
In the current study the apparent contradiction between these two views is circumvented by
integrating them with respect to the scientific endeavour. It is argued that there is a reality,
separate from any specific interpretation of that reality. However scientific research is
concerned with investigating that reality and the only tools to do so are people's, and in
particular the researcher's, constructions of that reality. Therefore, knowledge of reality can
only be considered as socially constructed. The fact that an independent reality exist does not
alter this. Here, the interpretivist assumptions hold. The investigator creates through her
theoretical lens what facts there are to be studied and the way to study them.
Accepting the realist's ontological principle of an ‘independent or transcendental reality
principle’ (Bhaskar, 1979) has epistemological and methodological implications for the study.
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It implies that there are better and worse interpretations of reality, or, that there are more or
less realistic constructions of reality. This postulate forces methodological rigour and allows
for a measure of validation or evaluation of the theory and model used in the study.
5.2. Epistemology
Epistemology deals with accepted ways of obtaining knowledge about what is assumed to be
reality. It deals with the relationship between the researcher and the research topic and the
justification for the methods used to collect, describe and interpret knowledge. An important
aspect of epistemology of scientific research are the issues validity.
The epistemology underpinning the current study is significantly influenced by the metaphysics
of Ricoeur (1976) and Geertz (1994), both of whom are considered to provide a convenient
bridge between realist and interpretivist approaches. Both authors rely on the discovery of
underlying structures to explain reality and both authors acknowledge the importance of the
analysis of discourse to move from a ‘thin to thick description’ of reality. This can easily be
reconciled with the attempt to develop models, or theories, proposed by the realist approach.
Both realism and interpretivism provide a dialectical reasoning concerning the dichotomy of
explanation and interpretation, in that they do not see them as two irreconcilable processes but
rather as mutually dependent on each other. Ricoeur is especially explicit about this. The
current study concurs with Ricoeur's explanation-interpretation dialectic.
A further epistemic underpinning this study is the belief that the reality of an event, act or
process can only be approached through the discovery of its meaning. This meaning can only
be discovered by the inquirer through a methodologically sound process, involving the
manipulation of pre-constructed ideas, a dialectic process of subjective immersion in the data
and distanciation from the data. The meanings resulting from this process subsequently need to
be socially negotiated with colleagues and research participants. This epistemic can again be
traced back to the metaphysics of the realist and the interpretivist approach. Both paradigms
purport the existence of a fore-structure (interpretivists) or theoretical lens (realists) and the
application of certain procedures to interpret and explain data (at least methodological
hermeneutics). The paradigms differ, however, in their respective emphasis on methodology
(realists) or negotiated interpretation (interpretivists) as measures of validity. The current study
attempts to balance both aspects of validity equally. This will be clarified in the following
section.
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5.2.1. Criteria of validity
It is believed that, as argued within the hermeneutic approach, all actions are subject to
multiple interpretations and that interpretations favoured during any given epoch may be
replaced in the next. Historically situated conventions thus govern what is taken to be true and
valid (Gergen, 1982). However, the acceptance of an independent reality, prevents the
researcher from surrendering totally to social and historical determinants of validity.
In agreement with Reason & Rowan (1981) it is accepted that developing an idea of validity in
new paradigm research must be based on an interactive, dialectical logic. There is a need to
develop some notion of reality which gets away from the subject-object split reality as either all
out there, objective and therefore discoverable, or all in the mind, subjective and ineffable.
Swartz and Ogilvy (1980, p. 35) argue that we can move away from notions of objectivity and
subjectivity by developing the notion of perspective. This defines a personal view from some
distance and suggests neither the universality of objectivity nor the personal bias of
subjectivity. There is a need to learn to think dialectically, to view reality as a process, always
emerging through a self contradictory development, always becoming. Any notion of validity
must concern itself both with the knower and with what is to be known. Valid knowledge is a
matter of relationship.
Reason and Rowan (1981) argue that validity is threatened when the dialectical process of
emerging truth gets stuck. The basic way in which this happens is that one ceases to pay
attention to that part which one creates: one blocks the dialectic by working one-sidedly.
Paradoxically, such one-sidedness occurs in both subjectivism and objectivism. In the former,
one looks only inwards, so all one can learn about is one's pre-conceptions. In the latter one
looks only outwards at the phenomenon one is trying to understand, and in doing so one
forgets the part that one plays as knower, and therefore fails to see how one is unknowingly
contributing.
The study is based on the belief that validity is personal and interpersonal, as well as
methodological. One cannot understand any psychological state without the capacity to
experience it, nor any social situation unless one can get into the world-taken-for-granted
perspective of those involved. Yet at the same time the researcher needs to be able to maintain
a perspective on it and needs a sound interpretive method. Explicating method and measures of
rigour applied by the researcher in the interpretation process are important for providing inter-
subjective validity. The study relies on multiple cycles of data analysis as a methodological
criteria to enhance validity. In these cycles, theory and concepts are progressively extended and
refined, differentiated and integrated, reaching towards a theoretical saturation. This provides a
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rigour of clarity, accuracy and precision in the interpretation process which enhances
communicability of the end interpretation and consequently the possibility of real inter-
subjectivity and self knowledge by the researcher.
Bateson (1979) focuses on another aspect of inter-subjective validity. He points out that an
increment of knowledge may result from multiple versions of the world. Accordingly, the study
relies on the enhancement of validity through involvement of co-researchers, who attempt
actively and consciously to deny, contradict, disprove, the data which are available and the
propositions about that data which has been developed.
5.3. Teleology
According to Greenwood (1992) human action is a matter of following rules and the aim of
social sciences is to uncover these rules. Rules are facts about communities. Only a few of the
rules that people follow are consciously before their minds, when they are following them and
there are others that are so evident that they may never have formed themselves into words in
people's minds. Nevertheless those that explain people's behaviour must somehow be
represented in them. Greenwood (1992) further argues that to the extent that actions are the
result of following rules, they must involve other people. For rules come with enforcement
clauses and enforcement requires others.
The current study aims to render the actions of a group of people involved in problem solving
tasks intelligible by uncovering the rules of action (interaction) of the event, through
interpretation and explanation, resulting in the construction of an underlying structure or model
of rules that guides their behaviour.
6. A fourth motivation for the study
Meta-theoretical frameworks, appropriate for everyday cognition research, have been lacking.
The meta-theoretical model proposed in this study primarily aims to first, provide a
philosophical foundation for this study and other similar studies, compatible with the theory of
everyday cognition and second, to enhance the methodology of everyday cognitive research.
Congruent with the proposed paradigm, the study aims to uncover underlying structures of the
phenomenon of inquiry which represent the researcher's perspective. While it does not claim to
provide a reflection of the truth, it does attempt to provide a useful perspective.
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Congruent with the critical hermeneutical approach, the study has an emancipatory intention.
Through the use of a specific discourse around everyday knowledge, the study aims to alter the
often derogatory perceptions of this field of study and to bring it into the mainstream
psychological inquiry. Gergen (1982) provides a pertinent motivation for the emancipatory aim
of social theory from a hermeneutic perspective. He purports that if one accepts the argument
for a socially constituted order, and grants a functional link between the linguistic practices of
the culture and its other patterns of conduct, then alterations in linguistic practices have
implications for the social order. In this way social psychological theory acquires a role as
‘change agent’ in social life.
Rosenberg (1988) adds to the above by promoting a reflexive theory, which he describes as
social science that has a moral dimension. Reflexive theory does not merely describe the way
the world is, but provides positive guidance about the way the world ought to be. It prescribes
the direction in which action should take place. Critical theorists hold that the claim of social
science is not just intelligibility of human actions but also enlightenment as to their true
meanings and emancipation from false beliefs about the nature of society and their morally
unacceptable effects on people. This emancipation is seen as twofold in the study. It is directed
at opening new horizons of research and practice for researchers and practitioners. It is also
aimed at the emancipation of the participants involved in the study.
CHAPTER 6.
THE STUDY
1. Introduction
Considering the shortage of research on everyday cognition and appropriate methods to
investigate everyday cognition, the study had two broad goals. first, to investigate the
knowledge and practice of everyday problem solving of a group of young community activists
from disadvantaged communities in a rural area of South Africa; and second, to develop a
method for the investigation of group problem solving in an everyday cognition framework.
The development of the method presents a particular challenge to the presentation of the study.
The method was developed to be appropriate to the task of interpreting everyday knowledge
of problem solving and everyday group problem solving procedures and therefore, particularly
at the level of data analysis, deviates significantly from standard analytical techniques used in
psychology. For this reason considerable detail of the research design and the specific steps
taken in the collection and analysis of data are given. These, however, need to be read in
conjunction with the preceding chapters, which provide the theoretical and meta-theoretical
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underpinnings of the study. In the current chapter the aim is to operationalise both of the above
theoretical considerations into an appropriate and effective method for the study.
2. Aims of the study
The study had the following aims:
- to interpret the indigenous conceptual, procedural and epistemological knowledge of the
concepts problem and problem solving of young adults from disadvantaged communities
in South Africa;
- to interpret the group problem solving procedure of the same target group. This included
focusing on the mediating role provided by the group process in the problem solving
event;
- to interpret the interrelation between the indigenous conceptual, procedural and
epistemological knowledge of problem solving and the group problem solving procedure
uncovered in the study;
- to explicate the methodology used for the investigation of the above aims.
Congruent with an everyday cognition approach, problem solving is, for the purpose of this
study, broadly defined as the approach and strategies used in a situation in which one or more
goals need to be achieved and where it is not immediately clear which steps to take to achieve
those goals (Hartley, 1989). Problem solving is deliberately loosely defined in order to allow
indigenous concepts and ‘ways of doing’ to emerge during the interpretation phase of the
study.
Conceptual knowledge refers to the mental representation the participants have of the concept
problem and problem solving (Hatano, 1982). Procedural knowledge refers to the problem
solving process and implies a ‘knowing how’, or the knowledge of the steps required to attain
a goal (Byrne, 1992). Epistemological knowledge refers to the underlying assumptions and
beliefs of the participants about intelligence, abilities and knowing, which influence problem
solving (Dweck, 1983).
3. Framing assumptions
The following principles underpin the study:
(i) Triangulation across different kinds of data, data collection techniques and data
analysis techniques.
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Triangulation is a metaphor derived from navigation. It refers to the investigation of several
sources in order establish a common conclusion (Bromley, 1986). In research methodology
triangulation can refer to combining different sources of data as well as combining different
methods of data collection and data analysis. Triangulation is geared at improving the validity
of the constructs and results of a study by relying on different sets of data and on different
research techniques. In this study triangulation of data sources was achieved by collecting data
of group interactions and group discussions as well as information from individuals.
Triangulation of data collection techniques was achieved by conducting interviews as well as
video-taping. Triangulation of the interpretive-analytic process was achieved by using
grounded theory techniques and the reading guide method.
(ii) A combination of creative interpretation and methodological rigour
Congruent with a hermeneutic approach, the interpretation of texts was the main activity of
this study. In order to enhance validity the interpretive process combined creative moments of
interpretation with methodological rigour. This was operationalised in the study by using the
coding technique of the grounded theory approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), the reading guide
method (Mergendollar, 1989) and the capturing and analysing of the coded elements of the
data in a computer data base which was specifically developed to assist in examining the
linkages between the coded elements (Data Perfect 2.3, Word Perfect Corporation, 1993).
(iii) Progressive interpretation-
The data analysis involved a multi-staged process of progressively more in-depth
interpretation. In this process, each level of analysis provided the data for the next interpretive
stage. The use of the grounded theory technique of coding enabled the construction of the
different analytical stages for the interpretation of the participants' indigenous knowledge of
problem solving. The development and use of consecutive reading guides and the computer
data base provided the means for a multi-staged interpretation process for the group problem
solving procedures. Sections 6.3 and 7.3 of this chapter elaborate on this multi-staged process.
(iv) Explication of the method
The explication of an appropriate method for the study of everyday group problem solving was
attempted by spelling out in detail the different steps in the research procedure and by
contextualising this in the meta-theory adopted in the study. This rigorous description of the
research procedure also served to enhance validity, in the sense that it improved
communicability and allowed for scrutiny.
76
(v) Negotiated interpretation
The search for negotiated interpretations of research data was another procedure used to
enhance validity. This was attempted by having the crucial interpretative processes replicated
by a second researcher as well as by the researcher herself. The interpretive data and the
successive steps in the research process were also reflected upon with colleagues involved in
the ECDAFF development programme.
(vi) Action as the unit of analysis
Everyday group problem solving inter-actions of the participants provided the units of analysis
for part of the study. Actions are considered to be goal-directed and include affective,
cognitive and conative dimensions. The adoption of social action as the unit of analysis is
congruent with an everyday cognition approach, in which the unit encapsulates the person-
environment (culture) dialectic. This assumption is dealt with in detail in Chapter 4, Sections
5.1.1. and 5.1.2.
(vii) Participation
Congruent with the principles of empowerment, the participants in the research were
considered as partners in a dialogue, rather than as research subjects (Sampson, 1977). Their
perceptions and reflections on the research issues were considered as an integral part of the
research.
4. An overview of the research design
The research design encompasses three main components.
A An investigation into the research participants' indigenous conceptual, procedural and
epistemological knowledge of the concepts problem and problem solving.
B An investigation of the group problem solving procedure, used by the participants.
C An interpretation of the interrelation between the indigenous conceptual, procedural
and epistemological knowledge of problem solving and the group problem solving
procedures uncovered in the study.
Components A & B required a separate process of data collection, analysis and interpretation.
Component C involved the integration of the results of Components A and B. A schematic
representation of the research process involved in the first two components of the research
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design is presented in Figure 2. Further on in the chapter a detailed explanation of each
component is provided.
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PHASE 1: DATA COLLECTION
The following sets of data were used:
* individual interviews with six workshop participants before the first workshop
* individual interviews with six workshop participants after each of the four workshops
* fourteen individual interviews (with an additional sample)
* video tapes of two group discussions with workshop participants
PHASE 2: PREPARATION OF THE DATA FOR INTERPRETATION
STEP 1: Transcription of video tapes and interviews
PHASE 3: INTERPRETATION OF THE PARTICIPANTS' CONCEPTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONCEPTS PROBLEM AND PROBLEM SOLVING.
STAGE 1: Interpretive analysis of each separate individual interview and group discussion
STEP 1: Reading of transcripts
STEP 2: Creative brainstorm of the data
STEP 3: Coding of categories with reference to conceptual and procedural knowledge of the
concepts problem and problem solving
STEP 4: Identification of properties and dimensions of the coded categories
STEP 5: Identification of inter-relations between coded categories
This process resulted in a first level of interpretive data (Level 1). This consists of a series of coded
categories.
STAGE 2: Integration of Level 1 interpretive data for each of the four sets of data into four series of
theoretical diagrams
STEP 1: Comparison and integration of codes with reference to the participants' conceptual
knowledge of the concepts problem and problem solving and the participants' procedural
knowledge of problem solving within each of the four sets of data.
This process resulted in a second level of interpretive data (Level 2). This consists of four series of
theoretical diagrams.
STAGE 3: Integration of Level 2 interpretive data into one series of integrative diagrams
STEP 1: Comparison and integration of the theoretical diagrams of the four sets of data.
This process resulted in a third level of interpretive data (Level 3). This consists of one series of integrative
theoretical diagrams.
PHASE 4: CONTEXTUALISATION OF THE INTERPRETIVE RESULTS WITHIN THE LITERATURE
STAGE 1: Contextualising the interpretive data
STEP 1: Comparison of the Level 3 interpretive data with the literature on everyday problem
solving.
This process resulted in a fourth level of interpretive data (Level 4). This consists of contextualised Level 3
data.
STAGE 2: Interpretation of epistemic assumptions of the participants about the concepts problem
and problem solving.
STEP 1: Integration of Level 4 interpretive data with literature on epistemologies.
This process resulted in a fifth level of interpretive data (Level 5). This consists of contextualised Level 4
data.
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Figure 2A. Schematic representation of the research design: conceptual, procedural
and epistemological knowledge of the concepts problem and problem
solving
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PHASE 1: DATA COLLECTION
The following set of data was used:
* video tapes of ten problem solving workshops
PHASE 2: PREPARATION OF THE DATA FOR INTERPRETATION
STEP 1: Transcription of video tapes
STEP 2: Translation of the video tapes
PHASE 3: INTERPRETATION OF THE GROUP PROBLEM SOLVING PROCESS OF THE
WORKSHOPS
STAGE 1: Interpretive analysis of each separate workshop using a first reading guide
STEP 1: Reading of the transcripts
STEP 2: Identifying the units of analysis: inter-actions
STEP 3: Creative brainstorm of the inter-actions
STEP 4: Conceptualising of reading guide 1
STEP 5: Refining of reading guide 1
STEP 6: Refining the units of analysis: operations
STEP 7: Applying the reading guide to the operations using a computer database programme
This process resulted in a first level of interpretive data (Level 1). This consists of ten transcripts of
analysed data.
STAGE 2: Quantitative analysis of Level 1 interpretive data
STEP 1: Quantitative summaries of Level 1 interpretive data
STEP 2: Graphic representation of Level 1 interpretive data
This process resulted in a second level of interpretive data (Level 2). This consists of a series of tables and
graphs and their interpretations
STAGE 3: Interpretation of Level 2 interpretive data using a second reading guide
STEP 1: Interpretation of the data pertaining to the notion ‘structure’
STEP 2: Interpretation of the data pertaining to the notion ‘strategy’
STEP 3: Interpretation of the data pertaining to the notion ‘role’
This process resulted in a third level of interpretive data (Level 3).
PHASE 4: CONTEXTUALISATION OF THE INTERPRETIVE RESULTS WITHIN THE LITERATURE
STEP 1: Integration of Level 3 interpretive data with the literature on everyday problem solving
This process resulted in a fourth level of interpretive data (Level 4). This consists of contextualised Level 3 data.
Figure 2B. Schematic representation of the research design: group problem solving
procedure
5. Sample
The majority of the data collected for Components A and B of the research design formed an
integral part of a development course run by the Eastern Cape Development And Funding
Forum (ECDAFF) during February 1993 (for more contextual information on ECDAFF and
the course, see Chapter 3). The data were collected over a period of five weeks, during which
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a group of fourteen participants conducted weekly problem solving workshops, and during
which weekly individual interviews were held with some of the participants. Interviews were
subsequently held with an additional sample of fourteen people.
5.1. Profile of workshop participants
The fourteen participants, who took part in the workshops, were inhabitants of townships
(residential areas reserved for black people during the Apartheid era) of small rural towns in
the Eastern Cape Province, South Africa. All were involved in community development work
in their communities and belonged to a Local Development and Funding Forum, the local
affiliate to the regional ECDAFF (see Chapter 3 for more information on the context). All
were nominated by their communities to represent them at the course. There were thirteen
Xhosa first language speakers and one Afrikaans first language speaker. All had a good
command of spoken English. With the exception of two participants, all can be considered as
young adults being under the age of thirty at the time of data collection. Except for three
participants all had obtained a Standard 10 educational qualification, which means they had
completed their secondary education. The profile of the workshop participants is presented in
Table 1.
Table 1. Profile of workshop participants
NAME AGE GENDER EDUCATION
Ayanda 23 M Std 10
Buyiswa 23 F Std 10
Funeka 28 F Std 9
James 55 M Std 8
Khaya 23 F Std 10
Lulama 22 F Std 10
Matthew 23 M Std 10
Sindiswa 25 F Std 10
Sipho 23 M Std 8
Sizwe 36 M Std 10
Thami 22 M Std 10
Theo 20 M Std 10
Theodora 22 F Std 10
Thozie 25 M Std 10
This sample was used for the collection of data for Components A and B of the study.
5.2. Profile of additional participants
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Fourteen additional participants were identified by the researcher through her local network of
development work. The research purpose was discussed with each prospective participant as
well as with the organisation or project she or he belonged to and co-operation was elicited.
All contacted persons showed interest and willingness to participate. The fourteen additional
participants complemented the profile of the initial sample. Although they did not belong to a
LODAFF, all additional participants were connected to community development organisations
in their area. All were inhabitants of townships attached to small towns in the Eastern Cape.
Thirteen were Xhosa first language speakers and one was Afrikaans speaking. All had a good
command of spoken English. All had a similar education background. The ages of the
additional participants were somewhat higher than the initial group, four were over the age of
30 at the time of data collection. The profile of the additional participants is presented in Table
2.
Table 2. Profile of additional participants
NAME AGE GENDER EDUCATION
Belinda 39 F Std 7
Danielle 23 F Std 10
David 33 M Std 10
Jack 21 M Std 10
Mncedisi 26 M Std 10
Mzwake 24 M Std 10
Nancy 26 F Std 10
Nkosana 34 F Std 7
Pelia 29 F Std 10
Shakes 24 M Std 10
Priscilla 26 F Std 10
Sizwe 2 37 M Std 10
Sydney 29 M Std 9
Zingisile 28 M Std 10
This total sample was used for Component A of the study.
6. Component A of the research design: Conceptual, procedural and epistemological
knowledge
6.1. Aim of Component A
The aim of Component A of the research design was to gain insight into the conceptual,
procedural and epistemological knowledge of the notions of problem and problem solving of
the research participants and to develop a suitable methodology to do so.
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6.2. Data collection: Component A
Several steps were undertaken in the data collection. These follow.
(i) Individual interviews with workshop participants
From the group of fourteen workshop participants, six volunteers were selected for purpose of
collecting individual interview data on conceptual, procedural and epistemological knowledge.
They were interviewed, using a structured interview schedule (see Appendix 1). An initial
interview with each of the six participants took place before the first workshop. An additional
four interviews with each of the six participants was planned to take place after each of the
following five workshop. No interviews were held after workshop five because of lack of
availability of the participants. A different interview schedule (see Appendix 2) was used for
the four additional interviews. Because of unavailability of some of the participants for some of
the subsequent four interviews, other workshop participants were interviewed instead. In the
light of the grounded theory approach used in this research this change in procedure did not
endanger the validity. A list of the interviews conducted is presented in Table 3.
Table 3. Interviews conducted
NAME INTERVIEWS
1 2 3 4 5
Ayanda x x x x x
James x x
Khaya x
Lulama x x x x
Matthew x x x x
Sipho x x
Sizwe x x x
Thami x
Theo x x x x
Theodora x x x x
An interpretive analysis, using a grounded interpretative approach, was conducted on the
above interview data (see Section 6.3 on data analysis).
(ii) Interviews with an additional sample of fourteen people
In line with a grounded interpretive approach, additional interviews were subsequently
conducted with the additional sample of fourteen participants (see Table 2) in order to verify
and enrich the interpretive data obtained from the initial workshop participants. The same
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interview schedule as for the initial interviews was used, with the exception of one additional
question:" Is there a difference between individual and group problem solving?"
All interviews (44 in total) were conducted by the researcher in English. The answers were
written down verbatim. No tape recorder was used.
(iii) Group discussions
The fourteen workshop participants were divided into two sub-groups. Each group held a
discussion on what the concepts problem and problem solving meant to them. One of the
groups was joined by Linda, an ECDAFF training staff member. The group discussions, which
were held partly in English, partly in Xhosa,were video taped and translated where necessary.
Both were transcribed. This was done jointly by the researcher and a Xhosa speaking colleague
from ECDAFF. The transcripts formed the raw data for the group discussion analysis.
(iv) Informal discussions
Data that ensued from informal discussions with the workshop participants throughout the data
collection process were noted.
6.3. Data analysis: Component A
The data of the individual interviews and the group discussions were analysed, using an
interpretive approach. What follows is: first, a brief explanation of the underlying logic of the
interpretive-analytic approach used in the data analysis of Component A; second, the practical
interpretive steps taken in the analysis; and third, a justification for the interpretive-analytical
process. A series of appendices is provided to illustrate and clarify the different steps taken in
the process.
 6.3.1. Underlying logic of the interpretive-analytic process
The interpretive approach used for this part of the study is inspired by the interpretive
grounded theory approach (Addison, 1988). The interpretive grounded theory is essentially a
bottom up approach to the conceptual analysis of qualitative data (Pidgeon, Turner &
Blockley, 1991).
The grounded theory approach was initially developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967) as a
means for systematic discovery of theory from the data of social research and was mainly
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intended for sociological research. It has since developed into a general methodological
approach that can be used for the study of diverse phenomena in a variety of disciplines
(Strauss & Corbin, 1994). The approach has also been adapted to fit a more interpretive
paradigm (Strauss & Corbin, 1994). Across its diverse applications and interpretations, the
core of the grounded theory approach remains its characteristic methodological procedures and
techniques. These are coding, constant comparison, theoretical and integrative diagramming,
memo-ing and theoretical sampling.
The current study makes use of the grounded theory techniques of coding, constant
comparison, memo-ing and integrative theoretical diagramming (Strauss, 1987) in order to
conduct a detailed, systematic and intense analysis of the data.
A brief explanation of the grounded theory processes of coding, constant comparison and
compilation of integrative theoretical diagrams is provided.
Coding is the allocation of a conceptual label to a category of fragments of data. The initial
coding is done by scrutinising the data very closely, line by line, or even word by word. The
researcher breaks down and conceptualises observations, sentences, ideas and events into
categories. The following questions are asked about each fragment of data: What are they?
what do they represent? The initial coding is influenced by conjunctive experiential data
(Strauss, 1987). This is everyday practical knowledge, as well as the knowledge of technical
and literature which the analyst brings into the inquiry.
Coding is based on a concept-indicator model (Strauss, 1987). The indicators are facts,
behavioral acts or events embodied in the texts that form the data of the research. Through the
method of constant comparison, indicators are examined comparatively by the analyst. By
making comparison of indicator to indicator, the analyst is forced into confronting similarities,
differences and degrees of consistency of meaning amongst them. Indicators that reveal an
underlying uniformity are then coded into a conceptual category. They become indicators of
that particular category. Once a conceptual code is generated, the indicators to the conceptual
code are sharpened to achieve their best fit of data. This occurs through re-visiting the data,
applying the previously generated codes.
An important process in constructing conceptual categories is developing them in terms of
their properties and dimensions. Properties and dimensions are attributes or characteristics of a
phenomenon. Each category has several general properties and each property varies over a
dimensional continuum. An example from the current study can clarify this. The coded
category ‘problem solving attitude’ has the property ‘flexibility’ and a dimension of that
86
property is the ‘degree of flexibility’; Flexibility can be dimensionalised as ‘high or low’. The
dimensional profile represents the specific property of a category under a given set of
conditions. Each indicator of the property ‘flexibility’ can be dimensionalised. Dimensionalising
can be done according to dimensions such as degree, extent, frequency, intensity and duration.
Properties and dimensions are important to recognise and systematically develop because they
form the basis for identifying and developing relationships between categories and sub-
categories.
Coding has the following characteristics:
- it follows upon and leads to generative questions;
- it fractures the data, thus freeing the researcher from description and forcing
interpretation to higher levels of abstraction;
- it moves towards the discovery of a core category or categories and so moves toward
ultimate integration of the entire analysis as well as yielding the desired conceptual
density.
In the initial stages of the analytic process, the coded categories are provisional. Through a
process of continuous comparison of the coded categories with additional data, the categories
obtain gradually more theoretical saturation until a well grounded theory is obtained.
The constant comparative method of the grounded theory approach involves the continuous
questioning of gaps, omissions, inconsistencies and ‘not-yet’ understandings. As a result, the
initial coding is frequently interrupted in order to write a theoretical memo which allows for
the recording of these questions. This leads quickly to accumulated memos and moves the
analyst further from the data and into a more analytical realm. It also leads to further sampling
of new data, or revisiting existing data, in order to find answers. The comparative method is
reflected in the analytical process employed in this study, through a continuous revisiting of the
exiting data (see different steps discussed in Section 6.3.2.). The constant comparison
continues until the researcher is satisfied that the coded categories are theoretically saturated
(Strauss, 1987).
The final stage in the process is the writing of theoretical and integrative diagrams. Theoretical
diagramming involves the presentation of the coded categories (and their dimensionalised
properties) and their accompanying theoretical memo’s in a diagram format. This aims at
elucidating the interrelations between the various categories (see Appendix 12 for examples of
theoretical diagrams). The compilation of integrative diagrams involves the integration of all
the researcher’s separate cumulative analyses. There should not be one integrative diagram but
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a succession of them throughout the research process, until a satisfactory diagram is produced,
which represents the conceptual analysis of the research topic. (Strauss, 1987).
6.3.2. The interpretive analytical process
In Section 4, Figure 2A, an overview of the research design was sketched. In the current
section a further elaboration of Phase 3 of Component A is provided congruent with the
underlying logic provided in the previous section. The consecutive stages, and steps within
each stage, as well as the levels of interpretive data obtained at the end of each stage are
explained. An example of the execution of each of the steps is provided in appendices for
clarificatory purpose.
STAGE 1: Interpretive analysis of each separate individual interview and group
discussion
Step 1: The transcript was read and re-read to enhance familiarity with its content.
Step 2: The transcript was subjected to a detailed creative brainstorming session, during which
various possible meanings of each word or, in certain instances clusters of words, were
gleaned and written down. In Appendix 3 an example of the brainstorming exercise for
one interview is provided. The context in which words were used, the researcher’s
conjunctive experiential knowledge, a thesaurus and data from informal discussions with
participants in the workshops, were used in this process. It must be noted that the
researcher is familiar with the particular use of the English language of the participants
(which has a strong local flavour) and took this into account while brainstorming the
interviews. This brainstorming process was intended to prepare the analyst’s mind for a
meaningful coding session.
Step 3: Prepared by the brainstorm data, categories and sub-categories with relevance to
conceptual and procedural knowledge of the notions problem and problem solving were
gleaned. In other words, categories with reference to an understanding of the concepts of
problem and problem solving as well as an understanding of the procedure of problem
solving were gleaned. These categories were coded (provided with a conceptual label)
and the indicators (words and sentences in the data) they referred to, were noted. The
indicators were subsequently compared in order to refine or adjust the coded categories
(see Appendix 4 for the results of Step 3).
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Step 4: The brainstorm data in conjunction with the coded categories obtained in Step 3 were
revisited in order to identify properties. These ‘property categories’ were obtained
through a process of scrutinising the data with the following questions in mind: who,
where, how, what effect, which conditions, when, why? These categories were
subsequently coded (provided with a conceptual label)and, in conjunction with the
brainstorm data, subsequently revisited in order to determine their dimensions.
Dimensionalising was done by establishing the extent, frequency, intensity and duration
of the property categories. The indicators were subsequently compared in order to refine
or adjust the coded categories (see Appendix 5 for an example of the result of Step 4).
Step 5: The categories and sub-categories obtained from Step 3 and Step 4 were revisited in
conjunction with the brainstorm data in order to establish the inter-relations between
them. (see Appendix 6 for an example of the results of Step 5).
Throughout this stage questions about the data arose, which were noted in theoretical memos
and used to enhance the process of constant comparison (see Appendix 7 for an example of a
theoretical memo).
The result of Stage 1 was a first level of interpretive data. This Level 1 consists of a series of
coded categories, sub-categories and their interrelations with relevance to conceptual and
procedural knowledge of the notions problem and problem solving for each individual
interview and group discussion separately.
STAGE 2: Integration of Level 1 interpretive data into theoretical diagrams for each of
the four sets of data
In this stage the Level 1 interpretive data was pooled into theoretical diagrams for each of the
four sets of data (see Figure 2A, Phase 1 for a description of the four sets of data).
Step 1: Within each set of data, the codes (initial categories/ properties/ dimensions) of each of
the individual sources of data (Level 1 data) were compared with each other and with
each other’s indicators. This was aimed at integrating the codes from the different
interviews and discussions and at the same time refining them. Subsequently, for each set
of data a series of three theoretical diagrams, consisting of the obtained (refined and
integrated) codes and their interrelations was compiled. These three diagrams referred
respectively to the conceptual knowledge of the concept problem, the concept problem
solving and the procedural knowledge of problem solving. Within each set of data, the
theoretical diagrams were subsequently applied to the brainstorm data that had been
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generated within that set of data during Stage 1, Step 1 of the interpretive process in
order to assess their appropriateness.
Note: The above process of brainstorming, coding, memo-ing and diagramming was duplicated
by a second researcher for the first set of data (individual interviews with six workshop
participants before the first workshop) and subsequently discussed between the two
researchers until consensus was achieved. The establishment of inter-subjective consensus was
intended to enhance validity. Duplication of the interpretation process for the first set of data
was considered sufficient, as it was presumed that this would establish a pattern of
interpretation for the researcher which she could apply to the rest of the data.
Stage 2 resulted in a second level of interpretive data. Level 2 consists of four series of
theoretical diagrams These are presented in Appendix 12. One series of theoretical diagrams
refers to the individual interviews with workshop participants before the workshops; one series
to the interviews with the workshop participants after the various workshops; one series to the
interviews with the additional sample and one for the two group discussions. Each series of
theoretical diagrams consists of three diagrams, one for the participants’ concept of problem,
one for their concept of problem solving and one for their procedural knowledge of problem
solving.
STAGE 3: Integration of Level 2 interpretive data into one series of integrative
diagrams
In this third stage the Level 2 interpretive data was integrated into one series of integrative
diagrams, which reflects the perceptions of all participants in the study.
Step 1: The theoretical diagrams produced during Stage 2, Step 1 were re-read and compared
with each other with the aim of refining the codes for the participants’ understanding of
the notions problem and problem solving and their understanding of the problem solving.
procedure The result of this process was the construction of one series of integrative
theoretical diagrams of coded categories. These diagrams were subsequently applied to
all the brainstorm data of all the transcripts in order to assess their ‘fit to the data’ and
their interpretive value. This process led to several re-worked versions and refinements
of the initial integrative theoretical diagrams until the researcher was satisfied that
theoretical saturation was obtained.
Stage 3 resulted in Level 3 interpretive data. Level 3 consists of one series of three integrative
theoretical diagrams. The integrative diagrams are presented in Chapter 7, Section 2.3. Figures
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6 and 7 refer to the participants’ conceptual knowledge of respectively the notion problem, and
problem solving. Figure 8 refers to the participants’ procedural knowledge of problem solving.
6.3.3. Justification of the interpretive analytical process
It is argued that the interpretive grounded theory technique, used in the above analytical
process, fitted the theoretical and meta-theoretical paradigm chosen for this study several
reasons.
- It relied on text as the basis for discourse analysis, which is in accordance with Ricoeur’s
ideas.
- It relied on the assumption that behaviour and knowledge can only be understood in
context and that research participants are purposive agents.
- It relied on the principle of the hermeneutical circle Elements of the data (words and
clusters of words) were interpreted in their relation to the whole (interview) and in turn
the whole was made up by the interpretation of its sub components and their
interrelations.
- It assumed that the researcher approached the research topic with a specific fore
structure, while at the same time the emphasis of the inquiry was upon the creative task
of uncovering meaning from data rather than utilising the data to test hypotheses
generated by a specific prior theory.
- It allowed for the ‘surplus meaning’ of the concepts problem and problem solving to be
uncovered. The meaning discovered through the interpretive process encompassed more
than the intention of any one of the interviewees.
- It allowed for a qualitative integration of the analysis of the different sources of data,
resulting in the construction of an integrated model of everyday problem solving.
- It ensured validity through the principle of theoretical saturation. In the grounded theory
approach theoretical saturation and by implication a valid interpretation of the data is
achieved if new data does not create new core categories and if the constant comparative
method does not throw up new codes. This complies with the notion of validity through
methodological rigour as proposed in the paradigm for this study. The multiple cycles of
analysis and the application of the constant comparison technique in this study ensured
theoretical saturation of the concepts problem and problems solving.
7. Component B of the research design: Group problem solving procedure
7.1. Aim of Component B
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The aim of Component B of the research design was to gain insight into the group problem
solving procedure of the participants. This included focusing on problem solving strategies
employed in the problem solving process, the structure of the problem solving process and the
role played by the various participants in the process.
7.2. Data collection: Component B
The researcher ran five problem solving workshops. Each workshop focused on a different
problem. The group of fourteen workshop participants (see Table 1) was divided into two
equal groups, which independently but simultaneously worked on the five problems. As a
result ten ‘workshop data units’ were obtained. Dividing the group into two smaller groups
aimed at ensuring sufficient participation of all participants in the problem solving process.
7.2.1. Problem solving workshops
The problems used in the problem solving workshops are presented in Appendix 8 They were
constructed in accordance with the following criteria.
- They fitted into an everyday cognition framework. They were complex and multi-
dimensional problems (Willis & Shaie, 1993) in which a certain amount of domain
specific knowledge was required to solve them (Eysenck & Keane, 1990). They were
contextualised in a specific physical and interpersonal context and attitudes and beliefs
were necessarily important aspects of the solution of the problem (Strohm Kitchener,
1983; Willis and Shaie, 1993).
- They were ill-structured problems. This implies that they allowed for two or more
complementary conceptualisations and potentially valid solutions, which could vary in
quality. The permitted operations in the problem solving process were relatively
unspecified and there was no clear criteria to validate the solution (Galotti, 1989).
- They related to real-life community development issues experienced by the participants.
These real-life simulations were developed by the researcher, based on her own
involvement with the participants’ communities, in consultation with colleagues involved
in ECDAFF development work. All problem situations related to the function of a
LODAFF in a community (see Chapter 3, Section 3 for more information on LODAFF).
All workshop participants where active in a LODAFF in their own communities and it
was assumed that they would therefore be able to identify with the problem situations.
Although the problems were constructed with the aim of providing enough familiarity to
the participants, so that their domain specific knowledge could be called upon, they were
carefully designed to provide enough novelty in order to enhance the necessity for
problem solving behaviour and group mediation in the problem solving process. Three of
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the workshops (Workshops 1, 3 and 4) involved a choice between various options. The
remaining two workshops involved the need for a mathematical calculation and the
designing a plan (Workshops 2 and 5).
At the start of each workshop, the researcher introduced the problem to the whole group of
fourteen participants. The problem was written down on newsprint for ongoing reference by
the participants and clarification was provided when necessary. No discussion was held on how
to solve the problem. The groups were provided with newsprint on which they were required
to note their results. Immediately after the introduction of the problem the group was divided
into the two smaller groups (of seven) who were requested to deal with the problem. It must
be noted that not all participants were available for all the workshops and that the composition
of the groups was not always identical. The composition of the two groups for each of the
workshops is provided in Table 4.
Table 4. Group composition of the workshops
Problem 1 2 3 4 5
Group A B A B A B A B A B
Ayanda x x x x x
Buyiswa x x x x
Funeka x x x x x
James x x x x x
Khaya x x x x
Lulama x x x
Matthew x x x x x
Sindiswa x x
Sipho x x x x x
Sizwe x x x
Thami x x x x
Theo x x x x
Theodora x x x x x
Thozie x x x x x
Linda1 x x
Hilde1 x x x x x
1 Linda, who is a colleague of the researcher from ECDAFF, and Hilde, the researcher herself
had a small input in the groups. Linda provided support for the group process in Workshop 1A
as a participant and provided an explanatory input in Workshop 5B. Hilde provided some
explanatory and group supportive assistance, when approached by a group.
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After each workshop session, a rapporteur from each group provided a short report back in a
plenary session. An opportunity was provided for participants to ask questions about the report
back.
The workshops, which lasted between thirty and forty minutes each, were video-recorded. The
plenary sessions were also video-taped and a summary written down on newsprint. These
plenary sessions did not form part of the formal data used in the data analysis. However, where
appropriate, it was used as corroborating information in the interpretive process.
The formal data collection process resulted in ten video-taped workshop sessions, two groups
each conducting five different workshops. The video sessions were partly in Xhosa and partly
in English. This was due to the nature of the participants’ use of the two languages. In their
everyday conversations the participants spontaneously alternate English and Xhosa. The fact
that one of the participants was an Afrikaans first language speaker, whose Xhosa was not as
fluent as the others, encouraged the use of English in the group in which she participated.
The video tapes were translated by two independent translators (Xhosa first language speakers
with a good knowledge of English). The transcribing was done by the researcher
simultaneously with the first translation. The simultaneous transcription and translation (which
implied a joint viewing of the tapes by translator and transcriber) enabled the researcher to
make notes on the non-verbal behaviour that accompanied the group interactions. The non-
verbal behaviour was not considered formal data for the interpretive process of this research, it
was used however, to assist subsequent interpretation of the formal data where necessary.
Where inconsistencies were revealed between the two translators the first and second
translator were asked to re-translate the relevant sections. In most instances this resulted in an
agreement between both. In the few instances where no common translation could be obtained
the assistance of a third person was called upon. During the second and third translations, the
researcher made the necessary amendments to the transcripts. As stipulated before, a large
proportion of the tapes were in English for which no translation was necessary.
7.3. Data analysis: Component B
The video taped data of the problem solving workshops were analysed using a layered
interpretive approach. What follows is: first, a brief explanation of the underlying logic of the
interpretive approach; second, a motivation for the identification of the unit of analysis chosen
for this part of the study; third, the practical interpretive steps taken in the analysis; and fourth,
a justification for the interpretive-analytical process.
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7.3.1. The underlying logic of the interpretive-analytical process
In order to contextualise the practical interpretive steps used in Component B within the broad
research paradigm of this study, some notes on the underlying logic of the interpretive-
analytical process are necessary.
(i) Videos as interpretive data
The researcher opted for the use of video material for Component B of the research design.
Craig (1988) argues the importance of video recordings for the extraction of meaning.
According to Craig (1988) video recording remains available for the analyst to return to and
therefore records the event or object of interpretation in a medium well suited to an analysis
aimed at capturing the meaning of an event. According to Craig (1988) by fixing an event or
events on a video-recording, the analyst preserves from life that which is usually fleeting to the
causal observer. In this way, the imposition of meaning on events can be prolonged for a later
stage in the analysis. At the same time the video tape affords one the opportunity to reverse
time so that actions separated in time or not occurring chronologically may be compared with
one another. A stream of actions recorded on video, therefore, allows the piecing together of
bits of information in a manner similar to the construction of a puzzle (Craig, 1988, 96). In this
study, the video material enabled the researcher to capture the meaning of the data by
combining verbal and non-verbal data of the videos into the text. It also allowed the researcher
to revisit the raw data in order to enhance the interpretive process.
(ii) A multi-layered process of interpretation
The interpretive-analytical process was of a multi-layered nature. This allowed for a deep
interpretation and the uncovering of underlying structure. The first stage of interpretive-
analysis aimed at unraveling the texts into their basic units of analysis for purpose of enhancing
the emergence of meaning from the data (see Figure 2B, Phase 3, Stage 1) The second and
third stage of interpretation aimed at an integrative interpretive process (see Figure 2B, Phase
3, Stages 2 and 3).
The second and third stages of the interpretive process contain similarities with what Geertz
(1973) calls ‘applying of a thick description’, and which refers to the application of a coherent
story to the different bits of data. Craig (1988), based on Geertz’s ideas, argues that data must
reveal the potential story that the analyst, in the process of analysis, must construct in its
fullness. The analyst draws on theory and data and the relation between these - part to whole -
in order to construct a coherent account. It is an interpretive-explanatory process in that it
95
involves the explanation on the basis of a co-ordination of the different bits of data into
patterns of behaviour. This means explicating the generative mechanisms for patterns in
behaviour. The thick description relates to why the actions were performed from the actor’s
point of view and simultaneously provide underlying functional structures or generative
mechanisms which produce action and which are culturally influenced. This refers back to
Ricoeur’s notion of ‘surplus meaning’.
(iii) The reading guide method
The reading guide method was used for the interpretation of the video transcripts. A reading
guide method (Mergendollar, 1989) of textual interpretation aims at extricating those features
of texts which clarify the meaning of a text. It is a grounded hermeneutical tool (Addison,
1992) based on the assumption that an interpretive process is a reflective process of engaging
with data guided by successively revised and better formulated questions (Mergendollar,
1989). It involves generating a set of questions through which the data are read. As a result it
brings an order to and facilitates the exploration of the data.
The analytical process of Component B of this study made use of two consecutive reading
guides. The first reading guide (see Appendix 9) was constructed using a grounded theory
approach, the second reading guide was determined more by the research question and the
researcher’s fore-structure. Both reading guides were inspired by the notions of mediated
action (see Chapter 4, Section 5.1.2.2.) and mediational means (see Chapter 4, Section
5.1.2.1).
The reading guide method was considered appropriate for the multi-layered approach to the
analysis in the sense that the results of the first reading guide provided the data for a more in-
depth interpretation at the level of the second reading guide. An intermediate step separated
the application of the first and the second reading guide (see Figure 2B, Phase 3, Stage 2 ).
This step re-arranged the results of the first reading guide application, by summarising and
graphically representing them. The aim of this was to re-arrange the data in order to enable the
further meaningful interpretation through the application of the second reading guide.
7.3.2. The units of analysis
The ideas of Harre and Secord (1972) on the analysis of social actions and the ideas of
Leont’ev (1981) inspired the definition of the units of analysis of this study. A layered
framework of different units of analysis was constructed.
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(i) Workshop
The group problem solving workshop was considered the broadest unit of analysis. The
workshop unit corresponds with Harre and Secord’s notion of episode, which is any sequence
of happening in which human beings engage, which has some principle of unity and which has
a beginning and an end. The workshop complied with this definition since it was a time limited
event with a specific focus, namely solving the problem.
(ii) Inter-action
Each workshop unit was divided into inter-actions. These are comparable to Leont’ev’s
(1981) actions, which he defines as systems of co-ordination in the service of goals which
represent intermediate steps in satisfying the motive (to solve the problem). In the workshop,
an inter-action is an utterance of a workshop participant delimited by an previous utterance of
a different participant and a subsequent utterance of a different participant. This inter-action
also comprises non verbal behaviour that corresponds with the verbal utterance. The term
inter-action was adopted rather than the term action in order to emphasise the inter-active
aspect of the unit.
(iii) Operation
Operations are akin to Leon’tev’s notion of perati n, which he defines as the means whereby
an action is carried out under specified constraints. An operation was identified within an inter-
action as a part of the participant’s whole utterance with a specific meaning, separate from the
rest of the utterance of that inter-action. The meaning was identified in terms of how it related
to other inter-actions and to the workshop as a whole. The identification of the operations
were the result of an interpretive process and as a result did not take place at the onset of the
analytical process, but at a later stage, when sufficient interpretive data was available.
It is argued that this layered framework of units of analysis provides for an interpretive context
conducive to a structural analysis. It emphasises the need for a simultaneously taking into
account of all layers throughout the process for the construction of meaning.
7.3.3. The interpretive-analytical process
In the current section a further elaboration of Phase 3 of research Component B is provided,
congruent with the underlying logic provided in the previous section. The consecutive stages,
and steps within each stage, as well as the levels of interpretive data obtained at the end of
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each stage are explained in this section. Where it is deemed appropriate examples of the steps
are provided in appendices and figures for clarificatory purposes.
STAGE 1: Interpretive analysis of each separate workshop using a reading guide
Step 1: In this step the focus was on the workshop as a unit of analysis. For each workshop,
the transcript was read and re-read to enhance familiarity with the content. At various
stages during this process the videos were revisited in order to get a better understanding
of the context in which certain extracts of the conversation were embedded.
Step 2: Each transcript was sub-divided into inter-action units (see Section 7.3.2.(ii) for a
definition of inter-action). Each inter-action was numbered and allocated the name of the
participant who produced the inter-action. It needs to be noted however, that although in
general each inter-action could be identified with one participant, in few instances, one
inter-action involved two participants. This was the case when the utterance of one
participant was accompanied by a recording on paper of that utterance by another
participant.
Step 3: Each inter-action (in conjunction with re-viewing the tapes) was subjected to a
creative brainstorming session during which the following questions were posed and
provisionally answered: How does it relate to the problem? Does it reflect personal
experience and beliefs ? How does it relate to the previous and the subsequent inter-
actions and how does it relate to the workshop? Whom in the group is it directed at?
What is its function? What is its impact? What emotions does it carry? Is this a meta-
cognitive input? Any additional reflections of the researcher on the data were also noted
(see Appendix 10 for the results of Step 3).
Step 4: The brainstorm data on the inter-actions generated in Step 3, in conjunction with the
inter-actions themselves, provided the basis for the development of the reading guide.
The guide was compiled using the grounded interpretive approach discussed in Section
6.3.2. Stage 1, Step 3. From the brainstorm data, categories with relevance to the
meaning of the inter-actions within the context of the workshop were gleaned and coded.
An example of this coding process is given in Figure 3. This Figure contains an extract of
the brainstorm data of the inter-actions of Workshop 1B which are in the process of
being coded. The codes are indicated in bold face text in brackets behind the brainstorm
data.
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· Inter-action 1: brainstorm
· Repeats the question/brings question to the group (repetiti n) (inform)
· Opens the group discussion (invite) (initiates)
· Importance to know problem structure (fa s) (content)
· Sets the task for the group (overall task-oriented function)
· Stresses the group spirit (overall group-related item)
· Asks to make the problem clearer to authority/person who poses the problem (inquire)
(question) (response to previous input)
· Inter-action 2: brainstorm
· Negative response to previous input (rejects) (response to previous input)
· Group member denies others the chance of having it clarified (own needs) (opinions)
· Understands the question and therefore expects others to understand/or sees it as sufficient
if one participant understands (clarify)
· Has something to say that he is not sure about (mum les)
Figure 3. Example of the coding process of interactions
The coded categories provided the items for the reading guide. Initially various possible
reading guides, based on different interpretations and arrangements of the coded
categories emerged. During this process some of the coded categories were identified to
be sub-categories of others. Each provisional guide was applied to the inter-actions of
the workshops with the aim of testing its suitability.-suitability in the sense of its
meaningfulness within an everyday cognitive framework as well as the closest fit to the
data. As a result of this process a draft of the final version of the reading guide was
obtained.
Step 5: The first draft was applied to all the inter-actions of all the workshops in order to
verify its validity. During this process, several revisions were done in order to obtain a
‘best fit’ with the data. Some categories and sub-categories were re-coded, some sub-
categories were deleted, added or moved across to another category. After each
amendment, the guide was re-applied to all the inter-actions.
The final reading guide provided the structure for the analysis of the inter-actions and
included three questions. These questions related to three different characteristics of the
inter-actions. The questions were: What is the immediate inter-active function of the
inter-action towards the preceding inter-actions?; What is the cognitive-affective content
of the inter-action?; and what is the underlying function of the inter-action towards the
workshop as a whole? Thus each inter-action could be examined with reference to three
elements: Immediate Inter-active function, Cognitive-Affective content and Underlying
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Function. Each of these three elements could be broken down into a number of forms
(see Table 5).
Table 5. Elements and their forms
Immediate Inter- Cognitive-Affective Underlying
Function
active Function (IF) Content (C) (UF)
clarify example amplifying
comment fact compromise
inform inference consensus u
inquire interpretation consensus a
invite opinion contribution
justify reflection group
offer repetition memory
query own ideas
reject own needs
request participation
seek task
suggest
support
record
dictate
Full details of the different forms of the elements are given in Appendix 9.
Step 6: During the application of the reading guide to the inter-actions it was found that some
inter-actions could be read in function of more than one form of each of the elements of
the reading guide. This elucidated the need to sub-divide inter-actions into smaller units
of analysis. These were defined as operations. An example to illustrate this is given in
Figure 4. This Figure shows how one inter-action of Workshop 1B is sub-divided into its
constituent operations. Note that each operation is identified by a number that indicates
the inter-action and the operation within that inter-action.
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Interaction 37:
Thami: I agree (to Theo) We have been given a choice between two workshops so we
must decide, as LODAFF people we must decide for our community which should be the
first one. As we are discussing here it is the RDP, the RDP should be the first workshop.
IF: SUPPORT C: OPINION UF
:
TASK
CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS A
Interaction 37 was sub-divided into operations 37.1, 37.2, 37.4
Operation 37.1
Thami: I agree (To Theo).
IF: SUPPORT C: OPINION UF
:
TASK
Operation 37.2
Thami: We have been given a choice between two workshops so we must decide, as
LODAFF people we must decide for our community which should be the first one.
IF: CLARIFY C: REPETITION UF
:
CONSENSUS U
Operation 37.3
Thami: As we are discussing here,
IF: COMMENT C: REFLECTION UF
:
TASK
Operation 37.4
Thami: it is the RDP, the RDP should be the first workshop.
IF: SUGGEST C: REPETITION UF
:
CONSENSUS A
Figure 4. Illustration of the sub-division of an inter-action into its constituent operations
The process of identifying and analysing operations coincided with providing each
operation (where appropriate) with a reference number. This reference number indicated
to which other operations the operation was linked. In Appendix 9 a full explanation of
the referencing of the operations is provided and in Appendix 11 an example of the
referencing is shown.
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Step 7: The analysis of all the operations of all the workshops, using the reading guide, was
captured in a relational database computer program (DataPerfect 2.3, WordPerfect
Corporation, 1993). This was done to allow subsequent manipulation of the data for
further interpretation. The database was set up with related data tables (referred to as
panels by DataPerfect), which contained the specific components of the data set as
determined by the reading guide. The tables are as follows: Workshop; Participants;
Interaction; Operation; Immediate Inter-active Function; Cognitive-Affective Content;
Underlying Function. The relational structure of these tables is shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5. Diagram showing the relational structure of the data base
The interpretive process of Stage 1 resulted in a first level of interpretive data. This Level 1
interpretive data consists of the results of the computerised application of the reading guide to
all operations of all workshops. Appendix 11 provides an example of the result of Step 7.
STAGE 2: Quantitative analyses of Level 1 interpretive data
Level 1 interpretive data was subjected to various further analyses. These consisted of the
production of quantitative analyses and graphical representations and their interpretations. The
database (see Stage 1, Step 7) was used to generate output of two kinds: first, output of
database contents sorted on various parameters; and second, quantitative analyses of data. The
outputs were made with the ‘report’ facility in DataPerfect, and sent to disk so that the
resultant reports could be manipulated and analysed further with a spreadsheet program (Excel
7.0a, Microsoft Corporation, 1996). The spreadsheet was used to generate charts of workshop
data in a graphical format.
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Step 1: The following quantitative analyses of operations within each individual workshop and
across all workshops were produced:
- quantitative analyses of the frequencies of the different forms of the Immediate
Inter-active function, the Cognitive-Affective Content and the Underlying
Function. This data is presented in Appendix 13;
- quantitative analyses of the frequencies of the various combinations of the different
forms of the Immediate Inter-active Function and the forms of the Cognitive-
Affective Content; the various combinations of the different forms of the
Immediate Inter-active Function and the forms of the Underlying Function.; the
various combinations of the different forms of the Cognitive-Affective Content and
the forms of the Underlying Function. This data is presented in Appendix 14.
These quantitative summaries were interpreted.
Step 2: The following graphical representations of the analyses of operations for each
individual workshop were produced:
- graphical representations of the chronology of the operations, analysed in terms of
their Immediate Inter-active Function, Cognitive-affective Content and Underlying
Function. This data is presented in Chapter 8, Section 3.1;
- graphical representations of the links between operations in terms of their
cognitive-affective content (an example of this data is presented in Appendix 15);
- graphical representations of the number of operations contributed by the
participants towards the workshop, analysed in terms of their Immediate Inter-
active function, their Cognitive-Affective Content and their Underlying Function.
This data is presented in Appendix 16.
These graphical representations were interpreted.
The interpretive process of Stage 2 resulted in a second level of interpretive data. This Level 2
interpretive data consists of a series of tables and graphs and their interpretations. This data is
presented in Chapter 8 and its accompanying appendices.
STAGE 3: Interpretation of Level 2 interpretive data using a second reading guide
The interpretive process of this stage made use of Level 2 data in conjunction with Level 1
data, the brainstorm data and the raw workshop data.
A second reading guide which consisted of three items, respectively pertaining to the notions
structure, strategy and role was used.
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Step 1: This step attempted to answer Question 1 of the reading guide: "What can the data
reveal with respect to the notion Structure" ? For the purpose of this study the notion
‘structure’ refers to the way in which the problem solving process is constructed. This
includes issues of chronology as well as the nature of the links between the various
operations throughout the workshop.
Step 2: This step attempted to answer Question 2 of the reading guide:" What can the data
reveal with respect to the notion Strategy?" For the purpose of this study the notion
‘strategy’ refers to the approaches, methods and techniques used by the participants in
the problem solving process.
Step 3: This step attempted to answer Question 3 of the reading guide: "What can the data
reveal with respect to the notion R le ?" For the purpose of this study the notion ‘role’
refers to different functions fulfilled by the participants in the problem solving process.
This stage resulted in Level 3 interpretive data. This data consisted of interpretations regarding
the notions structure, strategy and role. This data is presented in Chapter 8, Section 4.
7.3.4. Justification of the interpretive-analytical process
It is argued that the layered interpretive approach and the reading guide technique, used in the
above analytical process, fitted the paradigm chosen for this study for the following reasons.
- It relied on text as the basis for discourse analysis, which is in accordance with Ricoeur’s
ideas.
- The unit of analysis was activity, which is in accordance with an everyday cognitive
framework.
- The brainstorming and the subsequently developed reading guide included questions
which reflect the application of an everyday cognition framework in which a cognitive
act is defined in terms of its interpersonal, contextualised, goal-directed, affective and
conative characteristics (Guberman & Greenfield, 1991; Willis & Shaie, 1993).
- The analytical process was of a multi-layered nature, enabling a progressively more in-
depth interpretation.
- The combination of creative interpretation (i.e. The brainstorm and the development of
the reading guides) and methodological rigour (adherence to pre-determined steps and
re-arrangement of data by means of quantitative summaries and graphic representations)
is in accordance with the framing assumptions of the study.
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- It relied on the principle of the hermeneutical circle. Elements of the data (operations)
were interpreted in their relation to the whole (workshop) and in turn the whole was
made up by the interpretation of its sub components and their interrelations.
- It assumed that the researcher approached the research topic with a specific fore
structure, while at the same time the emphasis of the inquiry was upon the creative task
of uncovering the meaning of the participants’ problem solving procedure.
- It allowed for the ‘surplus meaning’ of the group problem solving process to be
uncovered. The meaning discovered through the interpretive process (in particular the
application of the second reading guide) encompassed more than the intention of any one
of the participants and it revealed the underlying structure of the inter-actions.
- The use of a computer data base enhanced the rigorous application of the analytical-
interpretative process and the transparency of the interpretive process. As a result it
enhanced the validity of the analysis.
8. Component C of the research design: An integration of indigenous knowledge and
practice of group problem solving
A last phase in the interpretive analysis of the data involved the integration of all the previous
interpretive-analytical phases of Components A and B of the research design with the existing
literature on everyday cognition. Through a cross-reading of the interpretations on conceptual,
procedural and epistemological knowledge of problem solving with the interpretations of the
group problem solving process, the researcher aimed at completing a full picture of the
indigenous conceptualisation of problem solving and group problem solving procedures among
the research participants. The results of this process are presented in Chapter 9.
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CHAPTER 7.
CONCEPTUAL, PROCEDURAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL
KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONCEPTS PROBLEM AND PROBLEM
SOLVING
1. Introduction
This chapter presents the results of the inquiry into the participants’ conceptual, procedural
and epistemological knowledge of the concepts problem and problem solving.
2. Levels of interpretive data
The interpretive approach used in this study and the specific interpretive-analytical procedure
applied to the data were discussed in detail in Chapter 6 Section 6.3. It is important to remind
the reader that in the paradigm proposed for this study (see Chapter 6) it was argued that
creative interpretation and enforcing methodological rigour should be regarded as
complementary actions in the analytical process. In this chapter the notion of rigour refers to
the pre-determined phases in the examination of the data. The notion of interpretation refers to
the creative moments which form the substance of the steps in the analysis. This section
presents the different levels of interpretive data that resulted from the interpretive-analytical
process.
2.1. First level of interpretive data: The codes
The first level (Level 1) of interpretive data consists of 46 individual scripts of interpretive data
relating to the participants’ perception of the concepts problem and problem solving and their
understanding of the procedure of problem solving. These were obtained from the analysis of
the following four sets of data:
- individual interviews with six workshop participants before the first workshop (six
scripts);
- individual interviews with six workshop participants after each of the four workshop (24
scripts);
- two group discussions (two scripts);
- individual interviews with the additional sample of fourteen participants (fourteen
scripts).
 
The interpretive data for each of those 46 individual scripts contains:
- the initial brainstorm data (see Appendix 3 for an example);
- the coded categories (see Appendix 4 for an example);
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- the identified properties and dimensions of the coded categories (see Appendix 5 for an
example);
- the identified relationships between the coded categories (see Appendix 6 for an
example).
 
The amount of data obtained at this level is too cumbersome to be presented in the thesis in its
totality. The examples presented in Appendices 3, 4, 5 and 6 are deemed sufficient for the
reader’s comprehension of the process.
2.2. Second level of interpretive data: Theoretical diagrams
The second level (Level 2) of interpretive data consists of four series of theoretical diagrams,
which are the result of integrating the interpretive data with reference to the conceptual
knowledge of the notions problem and problem solving and the procedural knowledge of
problem solving for each of the four different sets of data. At this level of interpretation,
therefore there are twelve theoretical diagrams. Three diagrams for each of the four sets of
data. These theoretical diagrams are presented in Appendix 12.
2.3. Third level of interpretive data: Integrative diagrams
The third level of interpretive data (Level 3) consists of a series of three integrated theoretical
diagrams, which consolidated all the interpretive data contained in the previous levels of
interpretation as well as the theoretical memo’s which were compiled throughout the
interpretive process. These diagrams represent the participants’ local conceptual and
procedural knowledge of the concepts problem and problem solving.
2.3.1. Conceptual knowledge of the concept problem
The integrated theoretical diagram of the conceptual knowledge of the concept problem is
presented in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. Integrated theoretical diagram of the conceptual knowledge of the concept
problem 
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Various interpretations can be gleaned from Figure 6.
· The participants made a distinction between the characteristics of a problem experienced
by an individual (individual problem) and a problem experienced in a group (group
problem) In the subsequent discussion the notions ‘individual problem’ and ‘group
problem’ will be used to refer to a problem experienced respectively by an individual or a
group. The participants’ distinction between a group and an individual problem is partly
due to the nature of the data collection process. Participants were asked to define a
problem (in general terms) as well as to describe the problem experienced in their group
during the research.
· The participants employed a tacit typology of problems, based on the problem bearer’s
(one who experiences the problem) perception of the different possible causes of a
problem. There are three types of individual problems and there is one type of group
problem.
· Problems were always situated within a social sphere of life and each type of problem
could be situated in any of the different spheres.
· Problems were acknowledged to have a psychological effect on the problem bearer as
well as on the society at large.
2.3.2. Conceptual knowledge of the concept problem solving
The integrated theoretical diagram of the conceptual knowledge of the concept problem
solving is
presented in Figure 7.
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Figure 7. Integrated theoretical diagram of the conceptual knowledge of the concept
problem solving
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Various interpretations can be gleaned from Figure 7.
· Problem solving was perceived as an action process including various possible role
players. A distinction was made between those involved in the problem and the
outsider(s). Those involved are the problem causer (the individual who displays
unacceptable behaviour) and the affected. Within the category of affected, a distinction
was made between direct and indirectly affected. The directly affected party refers to the
person to whom the unacceptable behaviour is directed or to the person who has an
unfulfilled need. The indirectly involved are those who experience unpleasant
consequences as a result of their relation with the directly affected party.
· The outsider is a person who is not involved in the problem, but who is called upon to
assist with the problem solving process. The outsider can be an ‘advice giver’, an
‘empathiser’ or a mediator. The ‘advice giving’ and ‘empathising’ role can be fulfilled by
the same person.
· In group problem solving all the group members are simultaneously causers and affected.
Sometimes a group member emerges as a leader and takes the role of outside mediator.
This is, however, not always the case and depends on the nature of the group, such as
the presence of a person with leadership qualities.
· Problem solving was considered to be a process that consists of various chronological
stages. In the case of an individual problem, the problem solving process involves phases
in which the problem bearer may act on her own and phases in which there may be
interaction between the problem bearer and some or all of the other role players. When
and how much individual and joint action occurs depends on the type of problem and the
individual capacity (resources and attitudes) of the problem bearer. The participants
believed that the more difficult the problem is perceived to be by the problem bearer the
more interactive (need for outside help) the problem solving process will be.
· In the case of a group problem, the problem solving process was considered to involve
all the group members throughout the process.
· The problem solving process makes use of resources. A distinction was made between
human resources that are located within the role players and external resources that are
consulted by the role players. An outside adviser may be chosen for her experience and
expertise in problem solving, her position of authority in a community organisation
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and/or her qualifications. Qualifications as a teacher, social work and/or minister of
religion were considered important for problem solving. An advisor may also be chosen
for her expertise in common sense reasoning, information gathering and for possessing
specialised knowledge. An outside mediator is chosen for her expertise in negotiation
and conflict management.
· Several attitudes were considered to be necessary for successful problem solving. These
are to be displayed by all role players. An outside ‘empathiser’ is chosen for her ability to
empathise with the problem bearer. This role player is often a friend of the problem
bearer. An outside mediator is chosen for her display of attitudes of impartiality and
fairness.
· All those involved in problem solving experience certain emotions during the process. All
role players may experience any one or a combination of these emotions.
· The participants believed that problem solving can either be successful or it can fail. A
problem solving process succeeds if the role players make a concerted effort and if
resources and attitudes are applied appropriately and effectively. When a problem is
successfully solved, it has several positive results for the role players and for the society
at large. Problem solving fails if the role players are not serious and honest about the
endeavour. If the problem solving process fails, the problem and the effects of the
problem will become progressively worse.
2.3.3. Procedural knowledge of problem solving
The integrated theoretical diagram of the procedural knowledge of problem solving is given in
Figure 8. Figure 8 consists of two parts, one dealing with the stages in the problem solving
process (Figure 8A) and the other with the actions involved in the problem solving process
(Figure 8B).
Several interpretations can be gleaned from Figures 8A and 8B.
(i) The problem solving process (Figure 8A)
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· The participants identified several chronological steps in the problem solving process. A
distinction was made between the steps in the process of solving an individual problem
and a group problem.
· In both processes, however, identifying the problem, which implied acknowledging that
an impediment is experienced, was considered of importance. The main emphasis was on
analysing the problem and selecting a solution. As a result a more detailed description of
these steps was obtained.
· Both the analysis and solutions were defined in terms of their social context.
· In both processes a distinction was made between planning the solution and
implementing it.
· The main difference between the two processes is in the ‘solution finding’ step. Where in
the problem solving process for an individual problem the focus is on selecting an
existing solution, in the process of solving a group problem the focus is on finding a
group consensus.
114
STAGES IN THE PROBLEM SOLVING PROCESS
I. Identifying the problem
II. Analysing the problem:
INDIVIDUAL
PROBLEM
A. Tracing the history/chronology of the problem
B. Contextualising
1. Identifying the role players
2. Identifying viewpoints of role players
III. Identifying and classifying the type of problem POSSIBLE
SOLUTIONS
IV. Matching and selecting the solution congruent with
the problem
* Eliciting advice
V. Planning the implementation of the solution * Avoiding the
problem
VI. Implementing the plan * Redefining the
problem
* Changing
behaviour of the
problem causer
* Compromising
STAGES IN THE PROBLEM SOLVING PROCESS
I. Identifying the problem
GROUP II. Analysing the problem
A. Sharing different viewpoints on the nature of the
problem
PROBLEM III. Deciding on the solution
A. Compiling suggestions for the solution of the
problem
B. Compiling arguments for and against the
suggested solutions
C. Reaching consensus
IV. Planning the implementation of the solution
V. Implementing the plan
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Figure 8A. Integrated theoretical diagram of the procedural knowledge of problem
solving process
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Figure 8B. Integrated theoretical diagram of the procedural knowledge of the problem
solving process
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(ii) Problem solving actions (Figure 8B)
· A distinction was made between the actions in the process of solving an individual
problem and those in solving a group problem. However, the majority of the actions in
both processes are of an inter-active nature and the main focus is on listening, observing
and talking; and on various ways of talking such as suggesting or clarifying.
· A second distinction was made between the actions of the different role players in the
problem solving process. In the individual and the group problem solving process there is
a particular role player endowed with the task of mediating.
3. Fourth level of interpretive data: Contextualised data
In the previous sections of this chapter the results of various successive steps in the
interpretive-analytical process were discussed. The end result of this process consisted of the
integrative theoretical diagrams provided in Section 2 of this chapter, which present the
participants’ conceptual and procedural knowledge of the notions problems and problem
solving. The fourth phase in the interpretive analysis involves a further interpretation of this
interpretive data within a context composed of the raw interview data, the theoretical memo’s
and the ‘everyday cognition’ framework discussed in Chapter 4. A return to the notion of
hermeneutical circle (see Chapter 5) is necessary to provide a motivation for this phase in the
analysis. The hermeneutical circle contends that parts (bits of data) can only be interpreted
within a whole (context). It is argued that combining the raw data, interpretive data and theory
provides an alternative (to the previous interpretation phases) and rich context for
interpretation and as a result is conducive to new, complementary and/or alternative
interpretive insights. It is believed that this phase in the interpretive process, which approaches
the data from a different angle (against a different contextual background), enhances the
validity of the interpretation of the participants’ notions of problem and problem solving. What
follows are the results of this interpretive phase.
3.1. The social dimension of problems
The participants considered a problem as primarily inter-relational rather than intra-individual.
There is ample evidence in the research data to substantiate this statement.
· Individual problems were perceived in terms of an unacceptable or deficient relationship
between the individual and society. Group problems were conceived as a disagreement
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or the experience of a dilemma between the members of the group. Quotes from the
interview data clearly illustrate this perception.
- (A problem is). “between two people, within an individual or maybe two or more
people have wronged you” (workshop).
- (A problem is). “they fire you without notice and they abuse your rights” (Theo).
- “Problems in yourself, like behaviour and attitude” (Matthew).
- “I may have a problem that I cannot look after my family because I am
unemployed. I may have a problem with my neighbours who are always drunk.
Problems always involve other people” (Sizwe).
- “The problem was to choose. We argued about that” (Lulama).
- “Mixing with people may be a problem. If you discuss with people from different
ideological backgrounds and you differ about something” (Pelia).
Hartley’s (1989) survey on people’s perception of everyday problems provides similar
results to those obtained in this study. The survey participants mostly identified problems
as difficult inter-personal problems.
· The participants situated problems in different social spheres of life, such as the family,
workplace and social organisation. This is illustrated by the following quotes.
- “Some are family problems. It could be not getting help from your parents, like not
getting money for school, or not having a job. It can be society, political,
something that you do not like about it” (Nancy).
- “There are inside problems, these are home problems and outside problems such as
township problems and organisational problems. There are also love
problems”(Olifant).
 
· The participants provided detailed descriptions of the different types of role players
involved in problems. There is a distinction between problem causer, affected and
indirectly affected. This is illustrated by the quotes that follow.
- “The person that lead to the problem”(workshop).
- “People around you can cause the problem for you or it can be in yourself”
(Nancy).
- “The person involved (means causes) and other people who are affected”
(workshop).
- “a problem between two people.. both sides of the involved” (Jack).
- “the person with whom you have a problem” (Sizwe).
 
· The participants considered the effects of a problem to have individual (for the problem
bearer) as well as social implications. The following quotes illustrate this.
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- “If there are no problems then everybody is happy and you are happy” (Sydney).
- (why do you solve problems?) “For the benefit of the community, because
otherwise you stay with it and it bothers you” (David).
- “You cannot live with a problem. Everybody wants the problem to be solved”
(Mncedisi).
3.2. The affective component of problems
From the data it is clear that a problem was not perceived as an intellectual exercise in a
vacuum, separate from the problem bearer. To the contrary, all participants stressed the
personal relevance and the pervasive emotional impact on the problem bearer as key
components of their concept of problem. The importance of personal relevance of everyday
problems is addressed by several everyday cognition theorists such as Chapman (1993), Galloti
(1989), Sebby & Papini (1991). Meacham & Emont (1989, p.9) poignantly contend that “The
essence of a problem is the having it”.
Several quotes from the interview data illustrate the importance of the affective component of
problems for the participants. The importance of the personal relevance as well as the
emotional effect of the experience of a problem are emphasised.
- “A problem is something somebody has” (Sizwe).
- “Something that one finds oneself confronted with” (Olifant).
- “A problem is a thing you cannot live with” (Priscilla).
- “Something that frustrates you that puts you in a corner. Problems can lead to suicide”
(Nancy).
- “Something that hurts inside” (Lulama).
- “Something you cannot cope with. It irritates” (workshop).
3.3. Problems are conceived as ill-structured
In Chapter 4, Section 4.1. several characteristics of ill-structured problems, based on research
of ‘everyday cognition’ theorists, were described. Some of those characteristics correspond
with the knowledge of the participants.
3.3.1. Desired end-states are unspecified
Galotti (1989) and Strohm Kitchener (1983) argue that in ill-structured problems the desired
end states are left relatively unspecified. The participants’ tacit knowledge of the concept
problem reveals a similar conjecture. They identified the desired state in very broad and general
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terms as fulfillment of a need or restoration of personal and social equilibrium, rather than in
problem-specific terms. The following quotes serve to illustrate this point.
- “People want things right” (Matthew).
- “To feel comfortable” (Sizwe).
- “Because you cannot have a better life with a problem” (Theo).
- “So that everybody is happy” (Theodora).
- “Because they want their lives to be better. They want to move easily in what they are
doing. It enables them to move safely” (Olifant).
3.3.2. Problems are dialectic in nature
Another description of ill-structured problems that corresponds with the participants’ tacit
knowledge of the concept problem is that by Strohm Kitchener (1983) based on Churchman’s
model of Inquiry Systems (IS) (see Chapter 4, Section 4.1). She argues that ill-structured
problems are typical for dialectical IS. In ‘dialectical problems’ individuals on opposing sides
define the problem in different ways, based on different assumptions, and marshal the same
evidence in support of their perspectives. A solution or synthesis lies in re-framing both or
several perspectives into a more general model of the problem.
There is evidence in the interviews that corroborates this perception of the concept problem.
The participants laid a major emphasis on the problem definition. This involves the
identification and integration of the different perspectives of those involved. The following
quotes illustrate this.
- “We looked at it from different sides”(Danielle).
- “You listen to both sides. What do people think the problem is? Bring them together and
let them say their view and then I say my view. They often find it is a misunderstanding”
(Sydney).
3.4. Problem solving is an inter-active process
Interpretation of the data revealed that problem solving was predominantly conceived as an
inter-personal process. This notion of inter-personal process fits very well with the idea of
mediated action as described in the proposed framework for the study of everyday cognition in
Chapter 4. The participants considered the process of problem solving to take part, first on a
social plane and second, on an individual plane. Problem identification and generating of
solutions was seen as a social activity that is subsequently internalised by the problem
bearer(s). This is in contrast to the mainstream cognitive contention that problem solving is
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predominantly an internal process. The following interpretations gleaned from the data provide
evidence for the participants’ perception of problem solving as an inter-personal process.
· With regards to an individual problem, asking for help and advice from outsiders was
regarded as a key feature of problem solving. The following quotes illustrate this.
- “You go and get advice from others” (Nkosana).
- “Problem solving is consulting” (Workshop).
- “Casting the net wider till a solution is found, even if the other cannot solve my
problem they can talk to more people” (Lulama).
- “Talking about it” (Sizwe).
- “You must go to somebody and tell him. Maybe he has no means to help you, but
he can make suggestions. You have to speak it out” (Lulama).
 
· The participants stressed the importance of dialogue between all people involved in the
problem in order to achieve a satisfactory solution to a problem. The following quotes
illustrate this.
- “Co-operation between the person involved and other people who are affected”
(workshop).
- “Trying to bring two groups involved together in trying to find a solution”
(workshop).
- “Bringing the affected and the involved together” (workshop).
 
· With reference to group problem solving, the participants emphasised the importance of
the participation and contribution of all group members in reaching a solution. The
following quotes illustrate this.
- “Problem solving is participating. The whole group” (James).
- “Collective thinking” (Theo).
- “Working together” (Belinda).
· With reference to group problem solving the participants emphasised joint problem
identification by all those involved. The following quotes illustrate this.
-  “In the group all decide what the problem is” (Olifant).
- “Everybody saw it was true.. we all thought the same” (Lulama).
 
· The participants considered attitudes conducive to effective problem solving to be mainly
of an inter-personal nature. Hartley (1989) obtained similar results in his research. He
found that problem solving skills and attitudes are defined by lay persons in terms of
social competency.
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· The participants identified the specific actions involved in a problem solving process as
predominantly of an inter-personal nature. They particularly emphasised the importance
of argumentation and motivation in problem solving. The following quotes illustrate this.
- “I like problem solving. I like the verbal war between the two sides” (Theo).
- “You have to talk with others, you must try to convince them and not to upset
them, that is difficult” (Belinda).
- “You have to give arguments, reasoning, you have to communicate your
reasoning” (Lulama).
- “You just have to use your brain and not just say things at random, you must
motivate what you say. We need to find the motive behind what we said”
(Matthew).
 
In Chapter 4, Section 4.2 argumentation was described as an important characteristic of
everyday problem solving. The ideas of Chapman (1993) were elaborated on. Of particular
importance is his argument, that it is precisely the reliance on argumentation that makes
everyday problem solving different from problem solving defined in the traditional sense (as an
internal cognitive process that follow the rules of logic). The importance and impact of
argumentation on the nature of the problem solving process will be further discussed in
Chapter 8 in the discussion of the results of the workshop analysis.
 
3.5. Problem solving is a conative and emotive process
Congruent with the assumption of most everyday cognition theorists, the participants defined
problem solving in terms of conative, cognitive and affective attributes, rather than exclusively
in cognitive terms. In fact, the conative aspect in problem solving was considered the most
important. The following quotes from the interview data illustrates this.
- “To sit down and work on it. It is a chance to do your best. Problem solving depends on
dedication. If I am lazy it will be difficult, if I am not lazy it will be easy” (Matthew).
- “You must take things serious. You must not take things lightly” (Ayanda).
- “You need to be disciplined” (Mncedisi).
 
3.6. The importance of identifying the problem in problem solving
Analogous with the findings of Sternberg, Wagner and Okagaki (1993) the research
participants stressed the importance of a detailed description of the problem for successful
problem solving. The general assumption is that once a problem is clearly defined, a suitable
solution can be selected and executed. Defining a problem involves tracing its history and
contextualising it with reference to those involved and their perceptions of the problem. The
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crucial role of identifying the problem, including contextualising and tracing the history, is
illustrated by the following quotes.
- “You identify the problem. You look at the situation, at the environment” (Olifant).
- “If you understand the problem it (problem solving) is easy” (Theo).
- “You identify the type of problem and take the solution which seem suited to the
problem. You look at exactly what is needed” (Ayanda).
- “How did it (the problem) come about, you analyse it” (Sydney).
- “You need to assess the environment where the problem is before you can go down to
the roots”(Zingisile).
- “I start by going back to try and see what is the actual problem and who is involved.
Then we must discuss all together and put everything on the table and then we can have
a solution” (Pelia).
3.7. Problem solving is a process of applying existing problem-specific solutions
In the previous section it was contended that the participants place more emphasis on problem
identification than on the development of problem solving strategies. Very little data referred
to the elucidation of general problem solving strategies. The assumption appeared to be that
there are ‘problem-specific, already developed’ solutions for each problem.
It can further be gleaned from the data that the participants considered the selection of a
solution appropriate to the identified problem as a process that almost ‘automatically’ ensued
from an efficient problem identification. The following quotes from the interview data illustrate
this.
- (Problem solving) “is easy provided you know the channels to solve the problem. If you
do not know the problem it is difficult” (Sizwe).
- (In problem solving ) “you look exactly at what is needed. You tackle it straightforward.
You identify the different type of problems and take the solution which seems to be
suited to the problem. That is all” (Matthew).
4. Fifth level of interpretive data: Epistemic assumptions
The stated intention of this chapter is to describe the conceptual, procedural and
epistemological knowledge of the research participants. So far only the first two aspects have
been directly dealt with. Delaying the focus on epistemological knowledge was deemed
necessary because it refers to a predominantly tacit knowledge and could therefore not easily
be gleaned directly from the raw data. It is argued that at this final phase of the analysis,
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sufficient interpretation has taken place to provide a suitable context for gleaning the
participants’ epistemic assumptions underlying their concepts of problem and problem solving.
In Chapter 4, Section 5.2.1 the ideas of Markus and Kitayama (1991) on the influence of an
inter-dependent view of the self on problem solving were discussed. They argued that people
with an inter-dependent self view aim to: feel connected with the social context; be flexible;
promote other’s goals; read others’ minds, maintain harmony with social context and desire to
succeed in inter-dependent relationships and statuses. Markus and Kitayama argue that the
inter-dependent self view is mostly associated with non-western people.
Verster (1986) refers to a concept similar to that of the inter-dependent view of the self when
he talks about the Nguni term ‘Ubuntu’. Freely translated it means ‘humaneness’. It refers to
the pursuit of harmony and solidarity of the group. Verster argues that Ubuntu would seem to
represent an important value in traditional African value systems and might account for the
consistency observed in indigenous conceptions of competence throughout sub-Saharan
Africa.
Interpretation of the research data reveals that the participants’ epistemic assumptions with
reference to problem solving are firmly embedded in the philosophy of Ubuntu. Several
epistemic assumptions and their influence on problem solving can be identified:
4.1 Social harmony is the criteria for good thinking and acting
The central characteristic of ‘Ubuntu’ is the notion of social harmony. This notion very
strongly influences the participants’ perception of the concepts of problem and problem
solving. This is illustrated by the following insights.
· The participants emphasised the importance of contextualising problems in their social
context. They emphasised the need to define those involved in the problem, their
viewpoints and to develop an accurate description of the history of the problem (see
Section 3.6).
· The participants emphasised the importance of a negotiated solution, which is
satisfactory to all involved (see Section 3.4.).
· People with good social skills are considered competent problem solvers (see Section
3.4.).
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4.2 Truth is socially constructed
Congruent with Ubuntu, and the aim of social harmony, the participants assume that truth is a
social construct. According to the participants, truth cannot be defined in absolute and
objective terms, but needs to be considered as relative. Knowledge does not exist outside those
who define it and should be beneficial to those who define it. It is argued that the participants’
emphasis on joint problem identification by all those involved, is derived form these
assumptions about truth. The notion of socially constructed truth implies that truth is
determined through a process of argumentation and motivation leading to consensus. This is
strongly reflected in the research data. The participants emphasise the need for hearing
different arguments and points of view in establishing the truth and the need for motivations
when people make truth claims (see Section 3.4).
4.3. Knowledge and expertise are acquired through ‘real life’ social experience
Congruent with the inter-dependent self view, the participants consider knowledge and
expertise to be derived from experiences in real-life social interactions. Only those with real life
experience in problem solving situations are regarded as experts on problem solving in these
situations. The following quotes from the interview data capture this assumption poignantly.
- “People who solve problems are people who have come across the problem before,
experts on it. Not an imitation, something is real if it is practical, not theorising”
(Matthew).
- “The one (who solves problems) who has experience, the one who had the problem
before; experience of the past and the present, of life in general and of specific things”
(Theo).
- “People who had experience with such as problem. They can say how they dealt with it”
(Sizwe).
- “It is difficult if you have not experienced it before. I like problem solving, it gives you
experience, you can solve the same problems again” (Theodora).
 
The notion of problem solving expertise, acquired through experience implies the importance
of cultural and social context in everyday problem solving. The problem solver requires
knowledge (experience) of (socio-culturally defined) concepts, values and problem solving
procedures and resources related to the (socio-culturally defined) problem.
In Chapter 4, the importance of culture in problem solving and in particular the notion of
cultural models or schemata was discussed. Glaser (1987) argues that schemata are prototypes
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in memory of frequently experienced situations which individuals use to integrate and interpret
situations. There seems to be a close fit between the participants’ concept of ‘experientially-
acquired-solutions’ as presented in this section and cultural schemata. Borrowing the essence
of Glaser’s definition, the participants’ perception of problem solving can be described as ‘the
application of prototypes in memory of previously experienced situations of identifying and
classifying problems and matching them with solutions’.
The participants’ concept of experts being people who have developed cultural schemata to
deal with particular problems through experience is congruent with the literature on expert
problem solving. Bryson, Bereiter, Scardamalia & Joram (1991) argue that experts have
accumulated problem schemata, which assists them in recognising a situation as an instance of
some problem type and then apply previously learned procedures appropriate to the problem
type. Experts appear to solve complex - though familiar- problems by making strategic use of
extensive and well-structured domain knowledge, rather than relying on effortful problem
solving procedures.
5. Changing assumptions in a process of rapid social change
As stated in Section 4, the participants’ thinking and acting is significantly influenced by the
traditional African philosophy of ‘Ubuntu’. However, the research data reveals evidence of
emerging assumptions and concepts which deviate from the traditional ‘Ubuntu’ philosophy.
This is not surprising, considering the characteristics of the research participants. They are
young adults who live in a country in which traditional life has been seriously disrupted
through political domination backed by an ideology of racial consciousness and which recently
has gone trough a very rapid transition from Apartheid to a system of democracy. This process
of rapid social change has an impact on the participants’ epistemic assumptions and their
concepts of problem solving. The following quote very poignantly illustrates the participants’
ambivalent position between the traditional and the ‘new ways of doing’.
“In the past in black culture we did not have such a thing as problem solving strategies.
We just sat down and discussed with relatives. These days there are newly developed
strategies for problem solving, they have come about because of technology. With the
new problem solving strategy you can do it alone or with two or with a large group. The
new strategy involves definition, prioritising needs, evaluation and conclusion. I am not
really sure what all the different parts are. Because of the new way of solving problems
the same problem solving strategy is used for all problems, those at the workplace, at
school, in general. With the traditional way of solving problems there is no exact
formula, here are no specific steps, all can have a general input” (Sizwe 2).
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The quote shows that Sizwe realises the influence of two paradigms on his concept of problem
solving. Namely the traditional and the new. Not all the participants referred as explicitly to the
influence of different world views on their perceptions and beliefs. However several signs of
ambivalence between the two could be gleaned from the data:
5.1. Consensus through a process of discussion or through a process of voting
Throughout the discussion in Section 3 there has been ample evidence for the participants’
belief in the importance of argumentation and motivation for the establishment of consensus in
problem solving. However, the changing socio-political environment in which the participants
found themselves, influenced them to experiment with alternative ways of decision making in
problem solving. In the data relating to group problem solving the notion of voting tentatively
appeared as an alternative to reaching consensus through argumentation. The fact that the
dynamics of voting were a dominant theme of popular consciousness at the time of the
research may serve as an explanation for this. NGO’s throughout the country had launched a
massive voters education programme in anticipation of the first democratic elections.
However, a great amount of ambivalence and uncertainty was displayed concerning this ‘new
approach’ to reaching consensus. Overall the need for motivation and argumentation remained
of primary importance for reaching a satisfactory consensus. The following quotes illustrate the
emergence of and the ambivalence towards the notion of voting.
- “It ( the problem solving process) was difficult because of the voting, two people were
not happy. We had to give in” (Theodora).
- “Everybody had been asked individually who she/he chooses and then motivate the
answer. At the end we voted. The majority voted for number five. It (the problem
solving process) was difficult. There were four against one. I had no chance to speak. All
the others came up with ideas. The decision must be shown by a majority, but with facts
(refers to motivations)” (Theo).
5.2. Reliance on ‘real life’ social experience or reliance on formal training
Throughout the discussion in Section 3 there is ample evidence that the participants consider
‘real life’ experience as the basis for acquiring knowledge about problem solving and the
development of expertise. Some of the participants acknowledged the possible impact of
training as a formal activity disembedded from everyday life on the development of problem
solving expertise. However, when they did so, they invariably still emphasised the importance
of ‘real life’ experience. The following quotes illustrate the emergent acknowledgment of
training as a source for expertise.
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- “I like problem solving, I am used to it. I went on a course as para-legal. The more I
solve problems the more I want to solve problems” (Sizwe).
- “Those who have been exposed to the new methodology (solve problems); university
people, trained people, organisations” (Sizwe 2).
 
5.3. Problem solving as a social or an individual process
Congruent with the emerging belief in the individual’s capacity to develop expertise through
formal training, the perception of problem solving as a social process moves to one of an
individual intra-personal process. It changes from being perceived as a social encounter, that is
context specific, to a mechanistic process of applying rules (see quote of Sizwe in the
introduction of Section 5.) However, although the individual’s capacity to solve problems on
her own was mentioned by some of the participants, invariably they returned to the need to
engage others, especially if the problems are considered difficult. The following quotes
illustrate the emerging notion of individual problem solving.
- “There are problems for which you only need brains to solve them” (Ayanda).
- “I can look for the cause on my own, I can take advice, I can look in the books. I believe
I can do it myself. If it is very difficult I will get support” (Matthew).
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CHAPTER 8.
GROUP PROBLEM SOLVING PROCEDURE
1. Introduction
This chapter presents the results of the inquiry into the participants’ group problem solving
procedure. It presents the different levels of interpretive data that resulted from the interpretive
process described in Chapter 6, Section 7.3.
2. Description of the interpretive procedure
The interpretive approach used in this study and the specific interpretive-analytical procedure
applied to the data were discussed in detail in Chapter 6, Section 7.3. As was argued in Section
2 of Chapter 7, the analysis of the data should be regarded as a complementary process of
creative interpretation and methodological rigour.
2.1. Generation of Level 1 data
The generation of Level 1 interpretive data consisted of compiling ten scripts of interpretive
data. Each script included:
- the transcribed and translated workshop data, divided up into inter-actions and each
inter-action further divided up (where appropriate) into operations;
- the interpretation of each operation in terms of the applied reading guide. This reading
guide enabled the analysis of each operation in terms of its Immediate Interactive
Function, its Cognitive-Affective Content and its Underlying Function. The reading
guide is provided in Appendix 9.
The amount of data obtained at this level is too cumbersome to be presented in the thesis in its
totality. An example is given in Appendix 11 to help the reader comprehend the process.
2.2. Generation of Level 2 data
The generation of Level 2 interpretive data consisted of first, generating tables and diagrams
presenting different types of analysis of Level 1 data and second, interpreting these diagrams
and tables. The tables and diagrams should not be regarded as statistical data, but should be
viewed as quantified data. They are a re-arrangement of Level 1 data in order to provide a new
context (additional to the raw data and the Level 1 data) for a deeper interpretation of the data.
As such, Level 2 data should be seen as a first step towards integrating the Level 1 interpretive
data in preparation for the application of the second reading guide, which provides a second
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step towards integrating the interpretive data. This argument is congruent with the idea of the
hermeneutical circle discussed in Chapter 5 and the arguments of Geertz on applying thick
description (see Chapter 6, Section 7.3.1.). Employing the quantitative analyses in the sense
argued for in this thesis, implies that only those aspects of the quantified data which are
considered valuable for the further interpretive stages of the research are interpreted. As a
result the interpretation of each table and diagram is not necessarily exhaustive. It also implies
that the quantitative analysis is not interpreted in the traditional sense of providing ‘hard facts’,
but is used to guide the interpreter in discovering broad trends and underlying structures in the
data. The latter argument re-emphasises the necessity to read the quantified data in conjunction
with Level 1 and the raw workshop data. This again is congruent with the notion of
hermeneutical circle.
Before presenting and discussing the results of the analyses, two issues are explained: first, an
explanation of the different types of analysis is provided; and second, the types of tables and
graphical representation used in these analyses and as tools of presentation are explained.
For purpose of convenience the terms for the three elements of the operations: Immediate
Inter-active function, Cognitive-Affective Content and Underlying Function will be abbreviated
respectively as IF, C and UF throughout the discussions that follow.
2.2.1. Types of analyses
The following types of analysis were conducted:
(i) Frequency of the forms of IF, C and UF
Quantitative analyses for each workshop separately and a summary analysis across all
workshops of the operations in terms of the frequency of the different forms of the elements
IF, C and UF.
These summaries are presented in Tables 1-11 in Appendix 13. Each table consists of three
blocks, respectively referring to each of the three elements of the operation. The first column
of each block shows the different forms of the element. The second column shows the number
of operations having that form, the third column shows the percentage of operations having
that particular form.
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(ii) Frequency of the combinations of the forms of IF, C and UF
Quantitative analyses for each workshop separately and a summary analysis across all
workshops of all operations in terms of the frequency of the various combinations of the
different forms of the elements IF and C; the different forms of the elements C and UF and the
different forms of the elements IF and UF.
These summaries are presented in Tables 1-11. in Appendix 14. Each table consists of three
blocks, respectively referring to each of the three elements of the operation. The first column
of each block shows the different combinations of the forms of the element. The second
column shows the number of the particular combination, the third column shows the
percentage of operations having that combination of forms.
(iii) Workshop structure
Colour coded graphical representations of the structure of each workshop. These colour-coded
graphical representations for each of the workshops separately are presented in Figures 9 -18
in Section 3 of this chapter.
Each figure shows the consecutive operations of the workshop, represented by a series of bars
divided into cells. The bar on the left consists of two columns. Cells in the column on the left
contain the operation number, cells in the column on the right contain the name of the
participant who provided the operation. The second, third and fourth bar, consist of a single
column with cells containing respectively the corresponding IF, C and UF form for the
operation. The bars are annotated by descriptions of the various stages in the workshop. Each
stage consists of one or more operations and is numbered consecutively. These stages were the
result of an interpretation of the graphical representation itself in conjunction with the raw
data. A stage is regarded as a section of the workshop that can be separated from other
sections as a result of its content. Each stage is defined in terms of the issue, or cluster of
issues, that is dealt with.
(iv) Linkages in terms of the element C
Graphical representations of the links between the operations of each workshop in terms of the
element C. The links are identified with respect to inferences, examples, interpretations,
repetitions and facts (derived from the given problem structure). These forms of C signify a
carrying over of the content (or parts of the content) from one operation (or several
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operations) into another. For each of these forms the link to the operation it refers to is
indicated. In certain exceptional cases the links are not indicated. These cases refer to:
interpretations and inferences made about the problem solving process as a whole; facts that
refer to the task process; and issues that are based on personal background knowledge of the
participants. In these circumstances a direct link could not be identified. Possible links with
respect to opinions and reflections are not identified. It is argued that these bring new
information to a previous content and do not carry through the previous content. An example
of this graphical representation is presented in Figure 1 in Appendix 15.
The figure shows the consecutive operations of the workshop, represented by a bar consisting
of three columns divided into cells. Cells in the column on the left contain the operation
number; cells in the middle column contain the name of the participant who provided the
operation, and the column on the right indicates the analysis of the operations in terms of their
Cognitive-Affective Content.
The links between the operations are indicated by lines connecting the linked operations. A link
between two operations is represented by a line that connects the ‘referring operation’ to the
operation it refers to and ends there with an arrowhead. Where such links form a series of
consecutive linkages the node between those links is indicated by a dot. In such cases the
arrowhead is drawn at the initial operation in the link series. By following the dots one can
identify a string of consecutive linkages. A reference to the problem structure (the problem
which was provided to the participants on newsprint) is indicated by a grey colouring of the
operation number cell. A reference to the paper, on which the participants took notes during
the workshop process, is indicated by a yellow colouring of the operation number cell. An
operation can have a link to several previous operations, or simultaneously to a previous
operation and to the problem structure
(v) Contributions of the participants
Graphical representations indicating the number of operations contributed by the participants
to each of the workshops, analysed in terms of the forms of IF, C and UF. These
representations are presented in Figures 1-10 in Appendix 16.
Each figures contains three bar charts, with the participants represented by the bars and the
number of operations contributed forming the vertical axis. Charts 1, 2 and 3 each represent
the total number of operations contributed by each participant analysed respectively in terms of
the IF, C and UF forms. The bars in Chart 2 differ in size from Chart 1 and 3 since not all
operations have a content.
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3. Level 2 interpretive data
This section provides the results of the quantitative analyses, the graphical representations and
their interpretations for each of the workshops. The interpretations of the quantitative
summaries of the workshops (see type (i) and (ii) analyses described above) will be dealt with
in this section in the form of one interpretive summary for all the workshops. The quantitative
summary tables are presented in Appendices 13 and 14. The colour coded diagrams of the
workshop structure (see type (iii) analysis described above) and their interpretations will be
presented in this section and dealt with for each workshop separately. The graphical
representations of the links between the operations of each workshop (see type (iv) analysis
described above) will not be presented in the thesis, since they are considered to be a
preparatory step towards identifying consecutive links. However, an example of this type of
diagram is presented in Appendix 15 to enable the reader to comprehend its significance. The
major consecutive linkages for each of the workshops are extracted from these consecutive
linkage diagrams and redrawn to show the pattern of linkages. These are presented in Figures
1-10 in Appendix 17. The interpretations of these diagrams is presented in this section and
dealt with for each workshop separately. The graphical representations indicating the
contributions of the participants for each of the workshops (see type (v) analysis described
above) will be dealt with in the same way as the quantitative summaries. An interpretive
summary will be provided in the text while the bar charts for each of the workshops are
presented in Figures 1-10 in Appendix 16.
The presentation of the results as described above was determined by its usefulness for the next
step in the interpretive process and by the need to be concise.
To enable the reader to fully grasp the interpretation of the diagrams and tables that are dealt
with in the next section (and its accompanying appendices), it is deemed important to provide a
short summary of the problems that were the topic for each of the workshops at the beginning
of the analysis of each of the workshops. A full description of the different problems can be
found in Appendix 8.
3.1. Interpretation of the structure and the consecutive linkages for each of the
workshops
3.1.1. Workshop 1A
The problem for Workshop 1A involved a choice between two options. As part of the problem
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structure five facts were provided which could be used in order to decide between the two
options.
(i) Workshop structure
The workshop structure is presented in Figure 9. A simultaneous reading of the raw data, the
problem description and Figure 9 enabled the following insights concerning the workshop
structure.
· Stages 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9 deal with various motivations in favour of Option 1. The
motivations in Stage 1 are based on Fact 1 and on personal background knowledge. In
Stage 3 the motivation is based on Facts 3 and 5 and on personal background
knowledge. In Stage 5 the motivation is build on Fact 3 and on personal background
knowledge. In Stage 7 personal background knowledge is used and in Stage 9 the
motivation is build on Fact 3, inferences from Fact 5 and on the participants’
background knowledge. Stages 3, 5, 7 and 9 also serve to build group support for
Option 1. Stage 11 serves to reach a final consensus.
 
· Discussions on the conceptual aspects of the problem solving process are interspersed
with discussions on task issues (Stages 2, 4, 6, 8, 10).
 
· There is no disagreement in the workshop. The workshop reflects a process of
alternating creative contributions (suggestions, justifications) with building a common
understanding (clarifications) and group consensus (support). In the beginning of the
workshop a lot of facts from the problem structure are brought into the workshop.
Towards the end of the workshop inferences derived from the facts, repetitions and
opinions are more prominent. These aim at strengthening the common understanding
and the consensus.
 
· The stages in the beginning of the workshop are shorter than those towards the end of
the workshop.
 
· The workshop is dominated by one person (Sizwe) supported by the others. The
workshop starts with a suggestion from Sizwe and the first half of the workshop is
mainly allocated to Sizwe’s ideas. Only towards the middle of the workshop is
participation from others elicited.
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· The process of recording is considered an important element of the workshop and
forms the content of two stages of the workshop.
Figure 9. Graphical representation of the structure of Workshop 1A
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(ii) Consecutive Linkages
Simultaneous reading of the graphical representation of the linkages, Figure 9 and the raw
workshop data provided several insights.
· There are several referrals back to the problem structure and later on in the workshop
to the newsprint used to make notes.
 
· There are several short consecutive links. These refer to repetitions for purpose of
explaining a concept or for amplifying an idea.
 
· There are nine relatively extensive consecutive linkages. These refer to the choice of
Option 1 and the various motivations for that option. These are presented in Figure 1 in
Appendix. 17
Several inferences can be drawn from the figure.
· Six linkages are introduced by Sizwe. The majority of his ideas are based on personal
background knowledge. Three linkages are introduced by Matthew. Two of these are
based on facts contained in the given problem structure.
 
· The linkages relating to the various motivations for Option 1 are generally introduced
at an early stage (Stages 1 and 3) in the workshop and run parallel throughout the
workshop.
 
· The linkages largely consist of repetitions. Most of the repetitions are provided by the
person who introduced the initial idea, some are, however, provided by the other
participants. This implies that the linkages serve to amplify a person’s ideas as well as
to build group support and common understanding.
 
· Referral back to the facts of the problem structure in the first half of the workshop is
considered important by the participants.
 
· The paper on which the participants take notes is used as a tool in the discussion. It is
argued that it serves as evidence for what has been agreed in the group. This explains
the importance allocated by the participants to the process of recording of ideas during
the workshop.
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3.1.2. Workshop 1B
The problem for Workshop 1B was the same as for Workshop 1A
(i) Workshop Structure
The workshop structure is presented in Figure 10. A simultaneous reading of the raw data, the
problem description and Figure 10 enabled the following insights concerning the workshop
structure.
· There are fourteen stages in the workshop. Stages 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13 and 14 deal
with the conceptual content of the problem solving process. In Stage 6 a motivation
based on the participants’ background knowledge is used in motivation of Option 2. In
Stage 7 and 3 motivations respectively based on Fact 3 and Fact 5 of the given problem
structure and one based on personal background knowledge are used in motivation of
Option 1. In Stage 8 Option 1 is rejected and Fact 4 is used in motivation of Option 2. In
Stage 9 personal background knowledge is used to motivate for Option 1. In Stage 12
Facts 1, 3 and 5 are used to motivate for Option 1 and personal background knowledge
is used to motivate for Option 2. Stage 13 serves to reach a compromise. This
compromise involves considering Option 2 after Option 1 has been fulfilled.
· The stages dealing with the conceptual issues of the debate are interspersed with stages
that deal with task and group issues (Stages 1, 3, 5, 10 and 11).
· A fairly extensive discussion (Stages 1, 3 and 5) is allocated to reaching a common
understanding of the problem and the problem solving process.
· Stages 10 and 11 aim at diverting the discussion away from an immediate clash between
opinions to the less confrontational issue of jointly discussing what the task involves.
Figure 10. Graphical representation of the structure of Workshop 1B
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· The workshop reflects a debate between two parties. One party is represented by one
participant (Theo), the other party is represented by the other participants with Thami
as the leader. A compromise is reached and reinforced towards the end of the
workshop (Stages 13 and 14).
 
· The stages in the beginning of the workshop are shorter than later on in the workshop.
 
· When the discussion revolves around the task process all the participants are involved.
 
· Creative contributions are always embedded in attempts to reach common
understanding and agreement.
 
· Although there is debate, the frequency of direct rejections and opposition is relatively
low. The strategy used involves promoting one’s ideas rather than rejecting the ideas of
other’s.
 
· There is a fair amount of new content (opinions, inferences and interpretations)
towards the end of the workshop. This is needed to reach a common understanding of
the suggested compromise.
 
· The debate intensifies as the workshop unfolds. There are a relatively high number of
‘own ideas’ immediately before the compromise is reached.
 
· As the debate intensifies, personal background knowledge, rather than facts contained
in the given problem structure is relied upon.
 
· A wide variety of Inter-Active Functions and Cognitive-Affective content is used in
Stages 6 and 7 where the different options to solve the problem are presented,
motivated for and agreed upon.
 
(ii) Consecutive Linkages
Simultaneous reading of the graphical representation of the linkages, Figure 10 and the raw
workshop data provided several insights.
· Throughout the workshop there are links back to facts contained in the problem
structure.
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· The newsprint on which notes are taken is not used as a reference during the workshop.
It is argued that because there was debate till the last stages of the workshop, the
newsprint could not be used as a document reflecting group consensus.
· There are several short consecutive links. These links consist of repetitions and serve to
reinforce the ideas which formed the content of the initial operation in the link.
· There are six relatively extensive consecutive linkages. These refer to Options 1 and 2
and motivations for each of these options and to the problem solving process. These are
presented in Figure 2 in Appendix 17.
Several inferences can be drawn from the figure.
· The two choices in the workshop are introduced early in the workshop and carried
through till the end of the workshop.
· Only two justifications for the choices are embraced by the group and carried through
while the others are not built on in the discussion. These justifications are Fact 1 and an
opinion build on personal background knowledge.
· The consecutive link related to the choice of Option 2 involves Theo only.
· Theo’s only justification for his choice is based on personal background knowledge.
Theo’s justification is repeated by Ayanda and James. These repetitions serve a
supportive purpose. This implies that although Theo’s choice is not supported by the
others they do support the content of his justification.
· The justification for the option introduced by Thami is a fact contained in the problem
structure. It is provided by Theo and repeated by the others. This implies that although
Theo does not approve of Thami’s choice, he does acknowledge the value of the
justification.
· The two inferences from the figure made above, imply that participants may support the
justification for an option without adhering to that option. Even when a participant does
not really agree with the ideas of another participant, she may still initially support the
ideas in order to come to a common understanding.
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· Several consecutive links stop with a recording. This implies that recording serves as a
sign to the group that the issue is closed.
· Discussions on the problem solving process are repeated throughout the workshop. A
common understanding is shaped through repetitions and interpretation.
3.1.3. Workshop 2A
The problem for Workshop 2A involved drawing an inference from given facts (Aspect 1 of
the problem) and providing a plan of action (Aspect 2 of the problem).
(i) Workshop Structure
The structure of the workshop is presented in Figure 11. A simultaneous reading of the raw
data, the problem description and Figure 11 enabled the following insights concerning the
workshop structure.
· The workshop has fifteen stages. Stages 1, 6, 10 deal with building a common
understanding of the content of the problem structure. Stages 4, 9, 10 and 12 deal with
building a common understanding on the problem solving process. Stages 2, 3, 5, 7, 8,
11, 13, 14 and 15 deal with suggestions for the solution of the problem.
· A large part of the workshop deals with building a common understanding of the content
of the problem structure. This takes place at various intervals throughout the workshop.
Large parts of this discussion (Stage 10) are not essential to the solution of the posed
problem and are based on personal background knowledge of the participants. This
personal knowledge is, however, integrated with the data provided in the problem
structure.
Figure 11. Graphical representation of the structure of Workshop 2A
144
· Aspect 1 of the problem is dealt with in Stages 2 and 3 of the workshop. The solution is
suggested by one participant and accepted by the others. One participant disagrees with
the outcome, but this rejection is ignored. At a much later stage (Stage 11) this issue is
re-opened for discussion and resolved.
· In Stage 5, a suggestion to solve Aspect 2 of the problem is introduced but not
discussed. It is taken up again at the end of the workshop in Stages 14 and 15. In these
stages, disagreement with the suggestion is voiced and a compromise is reached.
· Large parts of the workshop are allocated to task issues and building of a common
understanding. There are very few new creative contributions towards the solution of the
problem in the second half of the workshop.
· Stages dealing with conceptual issues also contain some task issues.
· The issue of how to record is dealt with at several stages.
· The discussion in Stage 11 which involves a disagreement on a suggestion to solve the
problem changes into a discussion on task and group issues (Stage 12).
· New stages are often introduced by a suggestion (which brings new a conceptual idea) or
by requests and comments (which shift the discussion to task issues)
· There is debate at the very end of the workshop. Reaching of a compromise occurs at the
second but last operation.
(ii ) Consecutive Linkages
Simultaneous reading of the graphical representation of the linkages, Figure 11 and the raw
workshop data provided several insights.
· During the first half of the workshop there are a fairly large number of links back to the
problem structure.
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· Throughout the workshop, but especially during the last quarter of the workshop there
are referrals back to the newsprint used by the participants to record the outcome of their
discussion.
· There are several short consecutive links. These concern repetitions in order to support a
particular idea or piece of information, or to clarify an issue. These links refer to
conceptual issues as well as to task issues.
· There are eight relatively extensive consecutive linkages. These are presented in Figure 3
in Appendix 17.
Several inferences can be drawn from the figure.
· Linkage (a), which deals with Aspect 1 of the problem structure is the most elaborate
linkage.
· Most linkages involve all participants. All participants are involved in starting
consecutive linkages.
· The second aspect of the problem is not dealt with in much depth. There are no extensive
consecutive linkages dealing with it.
· Linkages (c), (d) and (e) show that different aspects of the same discussion run parallel in
the workshop.
· The majority of the linkages consist of repetitions
3.1.4. Workshop 2B
The problem for Workshop 2B was the same as for the Workshop 2A.
(i)  Workshop Structure
The structure of the workshop is presented in Figure 12.
Figure 12. Graphical representation of the structure of Workshop 2B
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A simultaneous reading of the raw data, the problem description and Figure 12 enabled the
following insights concerning the workshop structure.
· The workshop consists of twenty stages. Stages 2, 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17 and
18 deal with suggestions for the solution of the problem. Stages 1, 6, 13 and 19 deal with
building a common understanding of the problem structure and the available information.
Stages 3, 5, 7 and 8 relate to the problem solving process. Stage 20 serves to reach final
consensus.
· The stages dealing with suggestions to solve Aspect 2 of the problem have a similar
structure. They start with an invitation to provide suggestions, then a suggestion is
provided followed by building a common understanding of that suggestion and providing
support for it.
· The stages dealing with building a common understanding of the problem structure and
the available information are spread throughout the workshop.
· The stages dealing with the problem solving task, process and the group interactions are
located in the beginning of the workshop. This indicates that the rules for the task are set
at the beginning of the workshop.
· The different stages are fairly short. A lot of different issues are dealt with and none are
discussed in detail.
(ii)  Consecutive Linkages
Simultaneous reading of the graphical representation of the linkages, Figure 12 and the raw
workshop data provided several insights.
· There are a large number of links back to the problem structure throughout the
workshop
· In the middle of the workshop and towards the end there are referrals back to the
newsprint used by the participants to record the outcome of the discussion.
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· There are several parts in the workshop in which there are dense consecutive links
(linkages in close succession).
· There are several short consecutive links. These concern repetitions in order to support a
particular idea or piece of information, or to clarify an issue. These links refer to
conceptual and task issues.
· There are six relatively extensive consecutive linkages. These are presented in Figure 4 in
Appendix 17.
Several inferences can be drawn from the figure.
· The majority of the consecutive linkages start with an inference or information from the
given problem structure. A large percentage of the inferences made in the consecutive
links are based on a combination of previous inputs and the problem structure.
· Most linkages involve all participants.
· The majority of the linkages start with an opinion or inference from Matthew.
· Consecutive linkage (a) is long and complex. It involves a large number of inferences and
there are several referrals to the newsprint. This implies that the solution to Aspect 1 of
the problem is dealt with in depth.
· Consecutive linkage (b) is relatively extensive and involves a large number of
interpretations, which implies that clarifying the problem structure is dealt with in depth.
· The consecutive linkages for the various suggestions towards the problem solution are
relatively short and are situated in one particular part of the workshop. They mainly
consist of repetitions. This implies that they were not revisited once the initial discussion
was closed.
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3.1.5. Workshop 3A
The problem for workshop 3A involved making a choice between six options. Some
information on each of the options was provided.
(i) Workshop Structure
The workshop structure is presented in Figure 13. A simultaneous reading of the raw data, the
problem description and Figure 13 enabled the following insights concerning the workshop
structure.
· The workshop contains sixteen stages. Stages 3, 5, 7 and 11 deal with task issues. Stages
1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15 deal with choices of Options 1,2,3,4,5 and 6 of the
problem structure and motivations in favour and/or against these options. These
motivations are all based on the information contained in the problem structure. Stage 11
serves to invite the group to reach consensus on Option 5 but the group is not ready to
reach consensus. In Stage 14 consensus is attempted in the form of a compromise. The
compromise consists of a combination of Option 5 and 2. Stage 16 serves to establish
final consensus. This involves choosing Option 5.
· The stages in the beginning of the workshop are shorter than those at the end.
· Reaching consensus happens in stages. It was introduced in Stage 11, then revisited in
Stage 14 and finalised in Stage 16.
· Option 5, which was introduced at the very beginning of the workshop is eventually
accepted by the group as the solution to the problem.
· Invitations are used as cues for changing the topic of discussion.
· In the first ten stages there is no real debate in the group. Each option is considered for
its merits and its pitfalls by the group. The justifications serve to build a common picture
of the different options and to explore the content of the problem structure. In Stages 11,
12 and 13 there is debate about the options and different participants try to impose their
own ideas.
Figure 13. Graphical representation of the structure of Workshop 3A
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(ii) Consecutive Linkages
Simultaneous reading of the graphical representation of the linkages, Figure 13 and the raw
workshop data provided several insights.
· There are a large number of links back to the problem structure throughout the
workshop.
· There are several short linkages and a few longer ones. These linkages refer to: first, the
choices of the different options and motivations in favour and against these options; and
second, to task related issues. The linkages relating to most of the options are very short
and confined to one particular stage. This implies that the discussion and the motivations
used in the debate relied on bringing in lots of different ideas, rather than repeating
content. The relatively extensive consecutive linkages relate to Option 5. Three major
consecutive linkages are presented in Figure 5, Appendix 17.
Several inferences can be drawn from the figure.
· There are few long consecutive linkages
· Linkages for Options 5 and 1 are the only ones that re-appear in the discussion at various
stages in the workshop. The linkage relating to Option 5 is introduced at the initial stage
of the workshop and subsequently lays dormant during the first half of the workshop. It
is revisited in the second half of the workshop.
· Most participants are present in most of the linkages. They repeat each others ideas. This
implies that they are all involved in motivating in favour and against the various options.
The process resembles building a common understanding of the problem structure rather
than a debate between different parties. Theo is the only participant who insists on
Option 5. He is very prominent in the linkages related to Option 5.
· The only long motivation for an option is based on facts provided in the problem
structure.
3.1.6. Workshop 3B
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The problem for Workshop 3B was the same as for Workshop 3A.
(i) Workshop Structure
The workshop structure is presented in Figure 14. A simultaneous reading of the raw data, the
problem description and Figure 14 enabled the following insights concerning the workshop
structure.
· The workshop has eighteen stages. Stages 5, 9 and 16 deal with group and task issues.
Stage 1 deals with building an understanding of the problem structure and Stages 2, 3, 4,
6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 17 deal with conceptual issues. Stage 18 serves to
establish final consensus.
· Stages 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 10 are very similar. They each involve an invitation to consider
one of the six options of the problem structure, support and rejections of the option,
motivations for each position and building a common understanding of the motivations.
The motivations are based on the available data. Stages 8, 11, 13 concern a revisiting of
Options 2 and 5 for further discussion. Stage 12 is an interpretive summary of the
preceding discussion on the options.
· Stage 14 aims at reaching a compromise by avoiding a choice between the Options 2 and
5. Stage 15 involves a discussion of that compromise and a support for Option 5. The
rejection of the compromise in Stage 17 is based on a discrepancy between what is
suggested as a compromise and the facts of the problem structure.
· In Stage 16, disagreement about the support for Option 5 is discussed disguised as a
criticism about the attitudes of the group members.
· Discussion on an issue is often abruptly terminated with a request or invitation to move
to a different issue. This implies that the group prefers to deal with all the different issues
‘superficially’ before revisiting them for further discussion.
· The stages at the end of the workshop are shorter than in the beginning. The more
heated the debate the quicker there is a shift from one issue to the next. When the
participants attempt to impose their ideas against the group consensus the process is
diverted by a request to consider another issue.
Figure 14. Graphical representation of the structure of Workshop 3B
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· Reaching consensus on the problem solution develops in stages. It starts with narrowing
down the choices between two options in Stage 12, subsequently a further discussion of
these two options leads to the suggestion of a compromise. The compromise is
discussed, re-iterated further on in the workshop and finally an overall agreement is
reached.
· There are more inferences, interpretations and facts at the beginning of the workshop and
more repetitions and opinions towards the end of the workshop.
(ii) Consecutive Linkages
Simultaneous reading of the graphical representation of the linkages, Figure 14 and the raw
workshop data provided several insights.
· There are a large number of links back to the problem structure throughout the
workshop
· There are several short linkages and a few longer ones. These linkages refer to the
different options provided in the problem structure and motivations in favour and against
these options. Most of the linkages relating to motivations are very short and are
contained with one stage. There is one short linkage on a task related issue. It concerns a
request to proceed with the problem solving task. Seven relatively extensive linkages are
presented in Figure 6 in Appendix 17
Several inferences can be drawn from the figure.
· The most extensive consecutive linkages are those relating to the Options 2 and 5. These
linkages are spread over several stages throughout the workshop.
· Theodora, Lulama and Khaya are prominent in the linkage relating to the choice of
Option 2 and the linkage rejecting Option 5. Matthew, Thami and James are prominent in
the linkages relating to the choice of Option 5. The division of the participants in
different linkages is indicative of a strong debate.
· The linkages involve a relatively high number of interpretations.
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· The fact that the linkages relating to most of the options are short and confined to a
short period in the workshop implies that the discussion and the motivations used in the
debate relied on bringing in lots of different ideas rather than repeating similar ideas.
· Khaya and James are prominent in the compromise linkage. It is argued that Khaya is
well placed to bring the compromise to the workshop since she was first more prominent
in the linkage in favour of Option 2 and towards the end of the workshop moved to the
linkage on Option 5.
3.1.7. Workshop 4A
The problem for Workshop 4A involved making a choice between five options. Information
was provided which could assist with making the choice.
(i)  Workshop Structure
The structure of the workshop is presented in Figure 15. A simultaneous reading of the raw
data, the problem description and Figure 15 enabled the following insights concerning the
workshop structure.
· The workshop contains sixteen stages. Stages 1 and 3 deal with building a common
understanding of the problem structure and coming to an agreement on the problem
solving task. This process involved disagreement between Sizwe and the other
participants which was not satisfactorily resolved. Stage 4 involves a further attempt to
come to a common understanding of the problem solving task.
· Stages 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15 deal with the choice of Option 4 as the solution
to the problem, motivations in favour of the choice and building of a common
understanding and group support for the choice of Option 4. Stages 6, 12 and 15 include
debate about the content and specific meaning of the motivations made in favour of
Option 4.
· Stages 7 and 8 involve disagreement about what and how ideas need to be recorded.
This leads to negative group dynamics. Stage 11 relates to an inquiry about the task
process from an outsider. This input was not responded to.
Figure 15. Graphical representation of the structure of Workshop 4A
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· Only one of the options provided in the problem structure is dealt with. The other
options are not considered.
· There is a certain routine in the workshop. The stages including the different motivations
have a similar structure. They start with an invitation to provide ideas, subsequently a
contribution is made and a common understanding and group support is build.
· When the debate intensifies the discussion turns to group issues.
· The process of building the final consensus is very short.
· Recording the ideas is considered as an important issue. It is done regularly after each
new issues has been discussed.
· The information provided is not used. Sizwe builds the context for the problem solving
process from his personal background knowledge.
(ii)  Consecutive Linkages
Simultaneous reading of the graphical representation of the linkages, Figure 15 and the raw
workshop data provided several insights.
· There are several links back to the problem structure in the beginning of the workshop.
· There are several short and long linkages. These linkages refer to: first, clarifications of
the problem structure and the information available; second, to one of the options
provided in the problem structure and motivations in favour of that option; and third, to
task related issues. Six relatively extensive consecutive linkages are presented in Figure 7
in Appendix 17.
Several inferences can be drawn from the figure.
· The linkages motivating for Option 4 involve a relatively large number of interpretations
and inferences from the problem structure. Motivation based on interpretations of the
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problem structure imply that understanding the problem is an important part of the
problem solution. Motivating involves clarifying the existing situation and building a
common understanding.
· All participants are involved in most of the linkages through repetitions and
interpretations. They jointly build a common understanding. Sizwe provides most of the
initial interpretations as the basis for building the common understanding. The other
participants play a supportive and clarificatory role.
· The linkage representing the choice is long and runs throughout the workshop. This
implies that the group participants have a need to re-enforce their choice as a group.
· The linkage relating to the motivations and simultaneous building of common
understanding of the problem structure are complex webs of inter-linkages. This provides
evidence for the participants’ consideration of the complex nature and the embeddedness
of the problem structure.
· The linkages that start with an interpretation span over a longer period than those
introduced by an opinion. This implies that interpretation and building of common
understanding is a process that develops in stages and is revisited whereas opinions are
dealt with and, if not challenged, are not revisited.
· Different interpretations of the same concepts is the basis for debate between Thami and
Sizwe.
3.1.8. Workshop 4B
The problem for Workshop 4B was the same as for Workshop 4A.
(i) Workshop Structure
The workshop structure is presented in Figure 16.
Figure 16. Graphical representation of the structure of Workshop 4B
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A simultaneous reading of the raw data, the problem description and Figure 16 enabled the
following insights concerning the workshop structure.
· The workshop contains twenty stages. Stages 2, 6, 9 and 11 deal with building a
common understanding of the available data in the problem structure (specifically Option
1). Stages 1, 3, 5, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14 and 15 deal with issues of the problem solving task
and group interaction. Stages 4, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 deal with the choice of and
motivations in favour of Option 4. These stages include building of a common
understanding of the motivations. Stage 7 refers to the suggestion of a compromise
which involves including Option 4 in Option 1. This compromise is restated in Stage 13.
In Stage 20 the suggestion for the compromise is reinforced.
· The stages in the beginning of the workshop are shorter than those later in the workshop.
· Recording plays an important role in building common understanding of the problem
structure and in the final acceptance of ideas by the group.
· There is no real disagreement in the group, but there is a lot of discussion on the problem
solving procedure. This discussion is repeated in several stages of the workshop.
· A potential disagreement between participants over the choice of option is pre-empted
by the suggestion of a compromise.
· The participants make full use of the available data. The majority of the workshop is
allocated to reaching a common understanding of the available data and finding the right
method to manipulate it in order to solve the problem. The participants use personal
background knowledge to make sense of the available data.
· The last third of the workshop is allocated to discussing motivations for the choice of
Option 1. There is a lot of clarifying. This implies a overlap in motivating and building a
common understanding.
(ii) Consecutive Linkages
Simultaneous reading of the graphical representation of the linkages, Figure 16 and the raw
workshop data provided several insights.
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· There are several links back to the problem structure in the middle of the workshop.
· There are several short and long linkages. These linkages refer to: first, clarifications of
the problem structure and the available information; second, to two of the options
provided in the problem structure, motivations for these options and clarifications of
these motivations; and third, to task related issues. The short links which represent
repetitions with the aim of emphasising an idea or a task issue will not be further
discussed. Ten relatively extensive consecutive linkages are presented in Figure 8 in
Appendix 17
Several inferences can be drawn from the figure.
· The linkage relating to the method used in the problem solving process is extensive and
runs throughout the workshop. The method was novel to the participants, as it was
introduced in the ECDAFF course they were attending at the time. It is argued that this
necessitates a large effort to build a common understanding since there is no common
background knowledge available. This explains the use of a lot of repetitions, inferences
and interpretations.
· Several of the linkages consist of a complex web of interpretations and inferences. This
reflects the complexity of the process of building a common understanding and the
participants’ grasp of the embeddedness of the different elements of the problem
structure.
· Examples (taken from personal background knowledge) play a role in clarifying ideas
and issues.
· The participants use a combination of data from the problem structure and personal
background knowledge and opinions in their motivations.
· The linkages that start with an interpretation span over a longer period than those
introduced by an opinion. This implies that interpretation and building of common
understanding is a process that develops in stages and is revisited. whereas opinions are
dealt with and, if not challenged, do not need revisiting.
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· All participants are involved in most of the linkages through repetitions and
interpretations.
· Ayanda is prominent in the linkages on the problem solving process.
3.1.9. Workshop 5A
The problem for Workshop 5A involved two aspects. Aspect 1 involved providing a plan of
action. Aspect 2 involved drawing an inference from given facts.
(i)  Workshop Structure
The structure of the workshop is presented in Figure 17. A simultaneous reading of the raw
data, the problem description and Figure 17 enabled the following insights concerning the
workshop structure.
· The workshop consists of thirteen stages. Stages 2, 3, 4, 5, 8 and 12 relate to conceptual
issues of solving the problem. Stages 1, 6, 7, 9, 11 and 13 relate to the problem solving
task.
· Several stages relate to debate on recording issues. It is in the process of recording,
which signifies an ultimate consensus, that disagreements lead to clashes between the
participants.
· There is a large amount of debate in the workshop concerning the task process and the
conceptual issues. All the conceptual stages include building a common understanding of
what is suggested. This building of a common understanding often involves debate.
· There is confusion about the content of the problem structure. This leads to debate in the
group about the problem solving task. The multitude of stages allocated to building a
common understanding is evidence for the importance allocated to a thorough
knowledge of the problem structure. A combination of personal background knowledge
and facts from the problem structure are used in the process of building a common
understanding.
Figure 17. Graphical representation of the structure of Workshop 5A
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· There is little attempt to reach a final group consensus at the end of the workshop.
· Disagreement is often presented as a difference in understanding.
· Disagreement on the solution of Aspect 1 of the problem (which was reached early in the
workshop) is re-addressed at the end of the workshop.
(ii)  Consecutive Linkages
Simultaneous reading of the graphical representation of the linkages, Figure 17 and the raw
workshop data provided several insights.
· There are several links back to the problem structure throughout the workshop. At the
end of the workshop, the newsprint is used in the discussion for reference purpose.
· There are several short and long linkages. These linkages refer to: first, clarifications of
the problem structure and the available information; second, to two of the options
provided in the problem structure; third, to motivations for the choices and clarifications
of these motivations; and fourth, to task related issues. The short links which represent
repetitions with the aim of emphasising an idea or a task issue will not be further
discussed. Three relatively extensive consecutive linkages are presented in Figure 9 in
Appendix 17
Several inferences can be made from the diagram.
· Building a common understanding is very important. The common context is created by
Sizwe. He introduces most of the consecutive linkages with inferences and
interpretations from the problem structure.
· Only three participants are prevalent in the consecutive linkages.
· The problem context is repeated often. There is a need to reinforce the same ideas in
order to develop a common understanding.
· The consecutive linkage web (a) provides evidence for the complexity of the process
involved in solving the problem.
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· Consecutive linkage (c) provides evidence for the use of recording as a means to ratify
consensus of the conceptual content and agreement on it. The various interpretations
represent the participants’ interpretations of the implications of different ways of
recording ideas.
3.1.10. Workshop 5B
The problem for Workshop 5B was the same as for Workshop 5A.
(i)  Workshop Structure
The structure of the workshop is presented in Figure 18. A simultaneous reading of the raw
data, the problem description and Figure 18 enabled the following insights concerning the
workshop structure.
· The workshop consists of twelve stages. Stages 1 and 12 deal with group conduct rules.
Stages 4, 7, 9 and 11 deal with discussions of the problem solving task. Stages 2, 3, 6
and 12 deal with building an understanding of the problem structure and the available
data. Stages 3, 5, 6, 8, 10 and 12 deal with the conceptual ideas used to solve the
problem.
· There are long periods in the workshop allocated to building an understanding of the
problem structure. These are spread over the whole workshop.
· The different suggestions to solve Aspect 1 of the problem are separated in different
stages. Once discussed, they are not revisited further on in the workshop. These stages
involve the provision of a contribution, the building of a common understanding of the
contribution and the building of group support.
· The stages dealing with task issues are spread throughout the workshop. They ensure a
continued common perception of the process.
Figure 18. Graphical representation of the structure of Workshop 5B
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· When difficulties arise in comprehending the available data the discussion turns to group
and task issues.
· There are several discussions on what and how to record. Recording is regarded as a
final agreement. Presentation of ideas is regarded as important.
(ii) Consecutive Linkages
Simultaneous reading of the graphical representations of the linkages, Figure 18 and the raw
workshop data provided several insights.
· There are several links back to the problem structure, especially in the first half of the
workshop. In the second half of the workshop the newsprint is used to summarise and
build common understanding of the ideas that have been generated during the problem
solving process.
· There are several short and long linkages. These linkages refer to: first, clarifications of
the problem structure and the available information; second, to the suggestions for the
solution of Aspects 1 and 2 of the problem.; third, motivations for the suggestions and
clarifications of these motivations; and fourth, task related issues. The short links which
represent repetitions with the aim of emphasising an idea or a task issue will not be
further discussed. Seven extensive consecutive linkages are presented in Figure 10 in
Appendix 17
Several inferences can be drawn from the figure.
· Inferences drawn from the various aspects of the problem structure are repeated
throughout the workshop to strengthen a common understanding.
· The web of linked consecutive linkages indicate the complex nature of the problem
solving process.
· The solution to the problem is anchored in the process of building a common
understanding.
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· Most of the ideas introduced and discussed in the beginning of the workshop are
repeated further on in the workshop.
· Matthew is responsible for most of the initiation of the linkages. He provides most of the
facts, inferences and interpretations. Theodora, Khaya and Funeka are involved in the
repetitions.
3.2. Interpretation of the quantitative summaries
This section deals with the interpretation of the quantitative analyses of the different forms of
the three elements contained in the reading guide. Before the different aspects of the analyses
are dealt with some comments are made about the application of the reading guide to the data.
- It was difficult to maintain mutual exclusiveness between the forms of the underlying
function: group issues, task issues and own needs.
- Justifications often included a clarificatory aspect
- Building a common understanding of the conceptual issues included an aspect of building
group agreement.
- Task related issues included an aspect of building a common understanding.
- Contributions, which introduced new conceptual data in direct function of solving the
problem, included an aspect of building a common understanding.
It is argued that the above insights should not be regarded as shortcomings of the reading
guide, but should be incorporated as valuable tools for interpretation in the next stage of the
interpretive process. This argument is congruent with the hermeneutic approach adhered to in
this study (see Chapter 5). This approach acknowledges the value of developing the questions
posed to the data during the research process. It argues that an important part of the research
process is to discover increasingly better questions and through this, better ways of articulating
the phenomena under study (Kelly & Van Vlaenderen, 1996).
3.2.1. Frequencies of the different forms of the elements IF, C and UF
Appendix 13 provides the tables for the quantitative summaries of the operations of all
workshops in terms of the different forms of each of the three elements (Table 1); and the
quantitative summaries of the operations in terms of the different forms of each of the three
elements for each workshop separately (Tables 2-11).
3.2.1.1. Frequencies of the forms of the IF
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The following general trends can be gleaned from Appendix 13, Table 1, Block A.
· Suggesting and supporting are the most frequent forms of the Immediate Inter-active
Function of the operations. Suggesting consists of proposing conceptual content to the
group for acceptance. Supporting involves indicating approval of other operations.
· Justifying, clarifying, commenting and requesting are the second most frequent forms of
the Immediate Inter-active Function of the operations. Justifying consists of providing
arguments in favour of a position or grounds for a claim. Clarifying consists of making
the meaning of conceptual content intelligible to others. Commenting refers to making
statements about the problem solving process and requesting involves asking others to
do something towards the problem solving task.
· Informing and inquiring are the third most frequent forms of the Immediate Inter-active
Function of the operations. Informing involves providing new conceptual facts. Inquiring
consists of seeking clarifications.
· Inviting, recording and rejecting are the fourth most frequent forms of the Immediate-
Interactive Function. Inviting consists of soliciting conceptual content from others.
Recording involves making a written record of ideas of the participants and rejecting
refers to indicating an unfavourable opinion about certain conceptual content or an
aspect of the problem solving process.
· The participants make infrequent use of the forms dictating, offering, querying and
seeking. Offering refers to suggesting to render a service to the group, querying is
indicating to others a doubt in the worthiness or truthfulness of conceptual content or
aspects of the problem solving process. Seeking refers to soliciting support from others.
Examination of Blocks A of Tables 2-11 reveals some discrepancies in the frequencies of the
different forms of the Immediate Inter-active Function across the different workshops. The
following insights can be gleaned from the tables.
· The majority of workshops have a moderate to high percentage of clarifications.
Workshop 1B however, has a low frequency of clarifications and Workshop 5B a very
high frequency.
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· The majority of workshops have a moderate or high frequency of comments and
requests. However, Workshop 2A has a very high frequency and Workshop 2B a very
low frequency of comments. Workshop 3A has a low frequency of requests.
· The frequency of dictating ranges from moderate to non existent.
· The frequencies of informing, inquiring, inviting, seeking, recording and rejecting are
moderate to low in all workshops except in the following cases: Workshop 4B has a very
high frequency of informing and Workshop 4A has a high frequency of inquiries;
Workshop 3A has a high frequency of invitations; Workshops 3A and 3B did not involve
recording; Workshop 1A did not have rejections.
· The frequencies of justifications differ significantly across the workshops. Workshop 1A
has an extremely high percentage and Workshop 2A has a low percentage The other
workshops range from very high to moderate.
· The frequencies of offers and queries range from low to non existent except for
Workshop 3B, which has a moderate frequency of queries.
· The frequencies of suggesting and supporting range from moderate to very high.
3.2.1.2. Frequencies of the forms of the C
Some general trends can be gleaned from of Appendix 13, Table 1, Block B.
· Repetition is the most frequent form of the Cognitive-Affective content of the
operations. Repetitions are re-occurrences of previously introduced conceptual content.
· Opinion is the second most frequent form of the Cognitive-Affective content of the
operations. Opinions are personal beliefs, desires and feelings.
· Facts, inferences and interpretations are the third most frequent forms of the Cognitive-
Affective content of the operations. Facts refer to information provided in the problem
structure or information based on the participants’ personal background knowledge.
Inferences are conclusions drawn from premises and interpretations are specific ways of
understanding the meaning of conceptual content.
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· The participants make infrequent use of reflections and examples. Reflections are
verbalisation of an occurring cognitive, emotive or behavioural process. Examples are
illustrations of a general rule.
Examination of Blocks B of Tables 2-11 reveals some discrepancies in the frequencies of the
different forms of the Cognitive Affective content of the different workshops. The Following
insights can be gleaned from the tables.
· The frequency of facts, interpretations and inferences range from high to low.
· The frequency of repetitions is extremely high for all workshops except for Worksho
3B.
3.2.1.3. Frequencies of the forms of the UF
Some general trends can be gleaned from Appendix 13, Table 1, Block C.
· Building of a common understanding (consensus u) is the most frequent form of the
Underlying Function of the operations.
· Discussing issues related to the problem solving task and process is the second most
frequent form of the Underlying Function of the operations.
· Building of agreement in the group (consensus a) is the third most frequent form of the
Underlying Function of the operations.
· Providing the essential conceptual contributions for the solution of the problem and
committing conceptual content to memory are the fourth most frequent forms of the
Underlying Function of the operations.
· Own ideas are the fifth most frequent form of the Underlying Function of the operations.
Own ideas refers to the promotion of a participant’s ideas against the group consensus.
· Amplifying, compromising, dealing with group dynamics, promoting own needs against
the group needs and encouraging participation are infrequent forms of the Underlying
Function of the operations. Amplifying refers to the strengthening of the participant’s
172
ideas to enhance its acceptance by the group. Compromising refers to a reconciliation of
clashing inputs. Encouraging participation refers to the encouragement of conceptual
contributions towards the solution of the problem
Examination of Blocks C of Tables 2-11 reveals some discrepancies in the frequencies of the
different forms of the Underlying Function of the different workshops. The following insights
can be gleaned from the tables.
· Amplifications have a low frequency across the workshops with the exception of
Workshop 1A, in which amplifications have a high frequency and Workshop 3B, which
has a moderate frequency.
· Reaching consensus is high to extremely high in frequency across all workshops, except
for Workshop 5A, which has a low frequency.
· Reaching a common understanding has a very high or extremely high frequency except
for Workshop 2B, which has a high frequency.
· The provision of creative contributions ranges from very high to low.
· Group issues are low in frequency for all workshops, except Workshop 1B, for which
the frequency is moderate.
· The frequencies of attempts to commit ideas to memory, to push own ideas and needs
and to elicit participation range from non existent to high.
· Task related issues range from a high frequency to an extremely high frequency across
the different workshops.
3.2.2. Frequencies of the various combinations of the different forms of the elements IF,
C and UF
Appendix 14 provides the tables for first, the quantitative summary of the operations across all
workshops and second, summaries for each workshop separately.
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3.2.2.1. Frequencies of the combinations of the different forms of IF and C
In the interpretive process that follows attention will be given to those elements of the
Immediate Inter-active Function which are deemed important for the following stage in the
interpretive process.
Several insights can be derived from Appendix 14, Tables 1-11, Blocks A.
· The forms of the Cognitive-Affective Content most frequently associated with
supporting in all the workshops are opinions and repetitions.
· The forms of the Cognitive-Affective Content most frequently associated with clarifying
in all the workshops are repetitions, interpretations and inferences. Workshop 1B
frequently employs all of these forms of content and also frequently uses examples.
Workshops 3B and 4B frequently employ inferences and interpretations. Workshops 4A
and 5B frequently use repetitions and interpretations Workshops 1A, 2A, 2B, 3A and 5A
rely mainly on one of these form.
· The forms of the Cognitive-Affective Content most frequently associated with comments
consists of opinions and reflections. Workshops 1B, 2B and 3A also use a high frequency
of repetitions when they comment.
· A large range of forms of the Cognitive-Affective Content are associated with justifying.
Across the different workshops the forms of the cognitive-affective content frequently
associated with justifying differ. Workshops 1A and 4B use repetitions and opinions
frequently to justify. Workshop 1B uses facts and opinions frequently. Workshop 2A
only uses repetitions frequently, Workshops 2B frequently uses repetitions facts and
inferences. Workshop 3A frequently uses facts, interpretations, inferences, opinions and
repetitions. Workshop 3B frequently uses interpretations, opinions and repetitions.
Workshop 4A frequently uses opinions and interpretations. Workshop 5A frequently
uses opinions, inferences and interpretations and Workshop 5B uses a high frequency of
inferences, opinions and repetitions.
· The forms of the Cognitive-Affective Content frequently associated with rejecting are:
opinions, inferences, interpretations and repetitions. The majority of the workshops
mainly use opinions to reject. Workshop 1B frequently uses repetitions, and Workshops
2A and 2B frequently use respectively inferences and interpretations.
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· The forms of the cognitive-affective content frequently associated with suggesting are
opinions and repetitions. Workshops 2A, 2B and 5A also frequently use inferences.
3.2.2.2. Frequencies of the combinations of the different forms of the IF and the UF
Several insights can be derived from consultation of Appendix 14, Tables 1-1, Blocks B.
· Across the workshops clarifying, inquiring and informing are frequently used to reach a
common understanding.
· Comments are predominantly used to deal with task issues in all workshops.
· Rejections are frequently used to impose ideas against the group consensus in all
workshops.
· Supporting is predominantly used to reach group consensus in all workshops
· Seeking approval serves mainly to reach consensus and a common understanding in all
workshops.
· Querying frequently serves to enhance a common understanding and to impose ideas
against the group consensus in all workshops.
· In Workshops 2A, 2B, 5A and 5B, justifications are mainly used to enhance a common
understanding or impose ideas amongst the participants. In the other workshops (those
which dealt with a problem involving making a choice), justifications mainly form the
direct contributions towards the problem solution.
· Suggesting mainly aims at providing direct contributions towards the problem solution.
In some of the workshops it frequently aims at: Reaching a common understanding
(Workshops 2A, 4A, 5B), reaching group consensus (Workshops 1B, 3A) or to impose
ideas (Workshop 5A) against the group consensus.
3.2.2.3. Frequencies of the combinations of the different forms of the C and the UF
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Several insights can be drawn from consultation of Appendix 14, Tables 1-11, Blocks C.
· Facts are predominantly used to reach a common understanding. In Workshops 1B and
3A, however, facts provide the main content for contributions.
· Interpretations are predominantly used to reach a common understanding. In Workshop
3A, however, interpretations are frequently used in contributions. In Workshops 3B and
5A interpretations frequently serve to impose own ideas.
· Across all workshops, inferences mainly provide the content for contributions and
attempts to reach a common understanding.
· Reflections are predominantly used for task and group related issues in all workshops.
· Opinions are mainly used in attempts to reach consensus, in creative contributions
towards the problem solution and in task related issues. In Workshop 5A opinions are
also frequently used to impose ideas against the group consensus.
· Repetitions are most frequently used in attempts to reach a common understanding, to
reach group consensus and in order to commit ideas to memory. In Workshop 1A
repetitions are frequently used to amplify ideas, in Workshop 1B repetitions are
frequently used in task issues and in Workshop 3B repetitions are frequently used to
push own ideas.
3.3. Interpretation of the contributions of the individual participants to the workshops
This section deals with the interpretation of the bar charts representing the operations
contributed by the different participants for each of the workshops. The operations are
analysed in terms of the form of respectively their Immediate Inter-active Function, their
Cognitive-Affective Content and their Underlying Function. The bar charts for each of the
workshops are contained in Appendix 16, Figures 1-10.
Congruent with the proposed everyday cognition framework of this thesis, the inputs of the
participants are not interpreted in terms of personality traits or individual cognitive abilities.
They are interpreted in terms of their significance for the problem solving process.
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Simultaneous reading of the bar charts, the figures representing the structure of the workshops
(Figures 9-18), the consecutive linkage diagrams (Figures 1-10 in Appendix 17) and Level 1
interpretive data enabled several insights to emerge.
3.3.1. Different types of workshops in terms of the role distributions
The workshops can be divided into three categories. Category 1 consists of workshops 2A and
3A and is characterised by a fairly even distribution of the operations of the workshop amongst
the various participants. Category 2 consists of workshops 2B and 5A and is characterised by a
less even distribution of the operations. One participant shows a high frequency of operations,
others a moderate frequency and few have a low frequency. Category 3 refers to those
workshops which have a very distinct differential in the frequency of operations between the
one with the high frequency and those with a lower frequency. This category refers to
workshops 1A, 1B, 3B, 4A, 4B, 5B.
In Category 1 workshops, no distinct differences can be found between the participants in
terms of the analysis of their operations with reference to the forms the of Immediate Inter-
active Function, the Cognitive-Affective Content and the Underlying Function. In Categories 2
and 3 several broad trends can be established:
· The participant with the high frequency of operations (the active participant) contributes
a multiplicity of forms of the underlying function. She provides a relatively high
percentage of operations that relate to task issues, to building a common understanding,
to building group consensus and to providing creative contributions towards the problem
solution. She ensures participation of the group participants in the process. The active
participant provides generally large inter-actions consisting of several operations and is
active throughout the various stages of the workshop. In workshops that are high in
attempts to impose ideas and needs against the group consensus, this person claims a
relatively large amounts of these attempts. The active participant initiates a relatively
high number of the consecutive linkages.
· One participant, or in certain cases two participants, are predominantly concerned with
building a common understanding of the creative inputs provided by the ‘active’
participant. This person is particularly active during stages of building understanding and
provides a relatively high amount of the interpretations in the linkages.
· One participant has a similar profile to the ‘active’ participant in terms of the different
forms of the underlying function. Her input, however, is smaller. This participant
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provides the inputs necessary to engage the ‘active’ person in debate in the workshop.
She is usually active throughout the workshop, but often increases activity towards the
second half of the workshop. She initiates a relatively high number of linkages.
· One or two participants deal predominantly with task related issues. Two types can be
distinguished. First, there is the participant who guides the problem solving process by
commenting on requirements of the process and by requesting elements of the task to be
fulfilled. Second, there is the participant who fulfills a service rendering task in the
problem solving process. She does this by recording and by inquiring about the needs of
the recording process. In some of the workshops these two types are combined in one
participant. The ‘task-related’ participant is mainly active in the stages that deal with task
and group issues and with building a common understanding of the problem structure.
This participant initiates linkages, mainly consisting of repetitions, relating to task issue.
· In some of the workshops, a participant is predominantly active in promoting group
consensus. This participant is active mainly in the consensus building stages and usually
has very small inter-actions, consisting of one operation only. This participant provides a
relatively high number of repetitions in the consecutive linkages.
· Several participants have a small input, which do not show any specific focus with
respect to the forms of the underlying function.
· All participants provide a relatively high percentage of operations that aim at building a
common understanding.
3.3.2. Different approaches used by the participants
Several approaches and techniques were identified.
· Most participants use a variety of forms of the Immediate Inter-active Function. The
frequency of the forms used depends to a certain degree on the type of problem that was
presented in the workshops and on the group dynamics of the workshop.
· Three approaches, or styles, can be distinguished with respect to the Immediate Inter-
active Function. There is a ‘supportive style’, which involves the employment of a large
frequency of supportive statements. There is a ‘probing’ style, which refers to the
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employment of a relatively high frequency of requests, inquiries, invitations and seeking
approval and there is a ‘providing’ style, which involves the employment of a relatively
high frequency of suggestions, informing, clarifications and justifications. Intermediate
forms of these three approaches are prevalent.
· Most participants use a variety of forms of the Cognitive-Affective Content. However a
distinction can be made between a more ‘interpretive cognitive’ approach, which relies
on the use of inferences, interpretations and facts and an ‘affective’ approach, which
relies on the use of opinions and repetitions.
· A distinction can be made between a predominant reliance on personal background
knowledge and a predominant reliance on facts contained in the provided problem
structure.
4. Third and fourth level of interpretive data: The notions of structure, strategy and role
In the previous sections of this chapter the results of Stages 1 and 2 of the interpretive process
towards uncovering group problem solving procedures were discussed. Stage 1 employed a
first reading guide which fractured the workshop data into small meaningful units of analysis.
This provided the framework for creative interpretation. Stage 2 employed tables and graphs in
order to initiate the integrative process of combining Stage 1 interpretations into a coherent
description of group problem solving procedures. The third stage of the interpretive process
completes this integrative interpretive process. Stage 3 employed a second reading guide in
order to condense the data of the previous stages into a meaningful description of the group
problem solving procedure used by the participants of the study. This reading guide focuses on
three elements of the procedure: structure, strategy and role. Structure refers to the way in
which the problem solving process is constructed. Strategy refers to the approaches, methods
and techniques used by the participants in the problem solving process. Role refers to the
functions fulfilled by the participants in the problem solving process.
This section presents the third level of interpretive data which is the result of the application of
the second reading guide on Level 2 interpretive data and the raw workshop data (see Chapter
6, Section 7.3.3, Stage 3). This Level 3 data is contextualised in the everyday cognition
literature.
It needs to be stressed that the aim was to uncover underlying structures of the problem
solving procedure common to all workshops. Scribner (1986) argues aptly that practical
179
thinking is marked by flexibility and that the same problem can be solved in different ways
fitted to the occasion. As a result formal models of problem solving fail to account for the
variability in the everyday problem solving events. The discussion that follows does not aim to
provide such formal model, but attempts to capture the commonalties that underlie the
different problem solving processes that were studied, while preserving the opportunity for
flexibility.
4.1. Group problem solving as a process of building a common understanding
The core issue of the group problem solving processes, in which the participants took part
during the workshops, is the joint building of a common understanding. The structure of the
problem solving process, the strategies used in the process and the roles fulfilled by the
participants provide evidence for this argument.
4.1.1. A structure conducive to enhancing common understanding
The problem solving process consisted of different stages. These are parts of the process
delineated by their focus on a particular aspect or cluster of aspects of the problem solving
event. Three different aspects could be identified. These are: the problem structure, the
problem solving process and the creative contributions towards the problem solution.
Stages relating to the problem structure involved a joint ascertaining of the different elements
of the problem, building an understanding of the content of these elements and establishing the
network of inter-relations between the various elements.
Stages dealing with creative contributions towards the problem solution involved the provision
of suggestions, clarifications and justifications of these suggestions and support for the
suggestions.
Stages dealing with meta-cognitive considerations of the group problem solving task related to
issues such as, deciding on the choice of methods, establishing group conduct rules, assessment
of progress of the problem solving process, changing problem solving requirements and dealing
with negative group dynamics.
The three categories of stages alternated throughout the problem solving process. This ensured
a parallel process of re-affirming and consolidating common understanding of the three
different aspects throughout the process. As a result, effective dialectical enriching between the
categories was possible. For instance, enhanced common insight into the requirements of the
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problem solving task assisted in building a deeper understanding of the problem structure and
vice versa. Also, a better understanding of the problem structure enhanced the attempts to
solve the problem.
The stages which aimed at building a common understanding of the problem structure and
those relating to building consensus about the problem solving task were prevalent in the
beginning of the process, but occurred throughout the workshop. Issues introduced in the early
stages were re-visited towards the middle and the late stages of the process. These stages were
relatively long and encompassed argumentation between the participants based on different
interpretations of the problem structure and the task with the aim of enhancing common
understanding. Towards the end of the process the problem and the problem solving task were
repeated again in order to assess if they had been dealt with appropriately.
The stages dealing with problem solving attempts unfolded in three alternative ways. One
alternative was that the stage dealt exhaustively and satisfactorily with a particular component
of the solution to the problem.; satisfactorily in the sense that a common understanding and
consensus was reached amongst the group. In such event the component was not returned to
later in the process. This was the case when the component was considered of minor
importance to the solution of the problem. These type of stages were relatively short and
tightly structured containing suggestions, building a common understanding of the suggestions
and building agreement about the value of the suggestion.
In the second alternative, the stage failed to deal satisfactorily with the issue under discussion
and led to disagreement in the group. In such case it was abruptly abandoned in order to avoid
escalation of negative group interactions and confusion. The discussion was diverted towards a
different component of the problem solving attempt or to the meta-cognitive aspects of the
problem solving task. At a later stage the issue was returned to in order to attain a satisfactory
resolution.
A third alternative was, when the stage dealt satisfactorily with a component of the problem,
but the issue was revisited at a later stage for further discussion. This latter situation refers to a
core issue of the problem solving attempt. In this case the issue was revisited because of it was
deemed to be important by the participants. Further discussion aimed at deepening the
common understanding and consensus. Stages dealing with the core conceptual issues were
often introduced early on in the process and repeated several times.
4.1.2. Strategies conducive to enhancing common understanding
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The paragraphs that follow deal with the strategies used by the participants to nh nce
common understanding.
4.1.2.1. Understanding of the problem structure
Several strategies were used to enhance the understanding of the problem structure.
(i) Repetition
Repetition was a frequently used strategy to enhance common understanding of the problem
structure The participants repeated the problem structure at different strategic points in the
problem solving process; strategic in the sense that it could influence the development of the
problem solving process. This ensured continued common understanding of the problem and
assisted the problem solving process. Often one or two group members were assigned the task
of ‘bringing the problem back’ into the group discussion.
(ii) Building a common framework
Participants invested considerable effort into building a common framework for interpreting
the problem structure. This was deemed particularly important when the problem structure
provided little background information. The participants drew upon their personal knowledge
to contextualise the problem structure in such a manner that it provided a concrete, meaningful
and identifiable image to all. According to Willis and Shaie (1986) this is a common
characteristic of everyday problem solving strategies.
Very often the participants constructed the context in great detail. This process of
contextualising typically commenced by drawing upon one participant’s personal background
knowledge, which was subsequently built on by others in order to produce a shared product.
Quotes from the workshop data illustrate the use of the participants’ background knowledge.
- “What is the problem of your (specific) community Funeka?” (Matthew).
- “Is there a library where you live James?” (Khaya).
- “In places like Hofmeyer there are ..” (Khaya).
- “Just like Orient theater or Standard in East London” (Theo).
- “There are schools who have got 5 (classrooms). There are schools who have got 6
classes. Where I live we have got 6. Standard 1 can be in 1 class and sub a and sub b can
be in 1 class, 3 and 4 can be combined” (counts on her fingers) (Sindiswa).
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Resnick (1991) emphasises the importance of common background knowledge in facilitating
problem solving. She argues that a shared background influences the strategies used in problem
solving to a large extent.
(iii) Redefining the problem
 
In their endeavour to enhance common understanding, the process of contextualising the
problem structure in communal background knowledge often led to a redefinition of the
problem structure into a form that was more familiar and more congruent with the epistemic
values of the participants. Meacham and Emont (1989) and Scribner (1986) reported similarly
on the practice of redefining problems in everyday problem solving. The participants often
changed the problem of ‘choosing between two mutually exclusive options’ into a problem of
‘finding a solution that satisfied all people involved in the problem structure as well as in the
group’. It is argued that providing a familiar background for the problem structure encourages
a desire to congruently familiarise the problem structure per se.
In certain groups two clashing approaches occurred. Some participants adhered to the problem
as presented in the problem structure and tried to encourage common understanding by
repeating the problem throughout the process. Other participants preferred to redefine the
problem in their attempt to encourage common understanding. As a result two, albeit different,
attempts to enhance common understanding led to confusion. This type of confusion was an
important source of disagreement in the group. The following extract from the workshop data
illustrates this confusion.
- “It makes sense we choose the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).
The RDP includes the Transitional Local Government (TLG), it can accommodate the
TLG. The municipality and the youth can join the RDP workshop and what they discuss
and the aim of the workshop will also include the TLG (Theo).
“The workshop has two issues, RDP and TLG?” (looks confused) (Thami).
“We have an advantage because maybe we can get funds” (Ayanda).
“Listen we are still at an advantage, the business man will only fund us if we run a
workshop on the RDP. So if we run on both we may not get the funds” (Thami).
4.1.2.2. Understanding of the problem solution
In order to build a common understanding of suggestions to solve different aspects of the
problem structure, strategies similar to those described above in relation to building a common
understanding of the problem structure were employed.
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(i) Contextualising
The participants contextualised their suggestions in personal background knowledge in order
to enhance common understanding. The following quotes from the workshop data illustrate the
gradual integration of the background knowledge of the different participants.
- “I have a problem with this.., the support needed by the mayor” (Thami).
- “What does the mayor want?” (Thozie).
- “No its is needed, the mayor is needed” (Sindiswa).
- “Where I come from we have projects, we started by doing a research and then started
the projects without going to the mayor” (James).
- “Areas are different” (Sindiswa).
- “It depends on the place we are talking about” (Funeka).
- “We have organisations like SANCO in other areas that keep the people informed. In
some places there are situations like that” (Sipho).
(ii) Joint action
The joint manner in which suggestions to solve the problem were dealt with by the group also
served to build a common understanding. A creative contribution towards the problem solution
was usually followed by clarifications, justifications and the provision of support. Most
participants provided ‘building blocks’ in this process alternatively as ‘clarifier’, ‘justifier’ or
‘supporter’. As a result the process was shared amongst the group rather than usurped by the
one who provided the creative contribution. This enhanced the building of a shared vision.
(iii) Repetition
The participants’ frequent use of repetitions also served to build a common understanding of
creative contributions. Each creative contribution was embedded in repetitions, which manifest
aim was to indicate group support for the contribution, but indirectly served to familiarise the
group with the new idea. Very often the repetition would involve a rephrasing of the same
content. This aimed at enhancing the clarificatory effect.
(iv) Recording
Recording the data fulfilled a role in enhancing the common comprehension of attempts to
solve the problem. At regular intervals recorded data was revisited. This aimed at ‘taking
stock’ of the progress of the problem solving process, but implicitly also provided a ‘check’ for
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the sustained common understanding of the contributions that had been made. Frequently,
reading the recorded data opened up a process of new interpretations and clarifications, which
transcended previous levels of common understanding. The following extract form the
workshop data illustrates the use of the recorded data as a means of enhancing common
understanding.
- “We should have 6465” (Sizwe).
- “Erase this and write the right thing” (Thozie) (Thami corrects on the newsprint).
- “You should write total here (shows a place o the newsprint). The total is 6465”
(Sizwe).
- “This is not accounting” (Lulama).
- “We have only one bank account, one account. That is what we have done, we have
accounted here” (points at the paper) (Sizwe).
- “The two projects have a separate account. That is what we have done (refers to the
writing on the newsprint), we have this account this side and the other the other side, but
we have only one bank” (Lulama).
Recording the data also served as an aid to collective reasoning and by implication collective
understanding, particularly in the workshops that involved the need for arithmetic inferences.
Calculations were often made on the newsprint and added to or corrected by different
participants. The newsprint provided an anchor for the development of the joint inferential
process.
4.1.2.3. Understanding of the problem solving task
Building of a common understanding of the problem solving process involved a retrospective
approach. Very often the requirements of the problem solving process were relatively briefly
introduced in the beginning of the workshop. Rather than engaging in extensive planning of the
different steps of the process, practical requests were made with regards to the immediate
concrete needs of the process. At later stages in the process meta-cognitive comments and
queries about, interpretations of, and reflections on the process that had already unfolded
followed. It is argued that discussing the concrete process as it had unfolded within the group
was more conducive to building a common understanding than attempting to create a common
vision of an abstract plan at the beginning of the workshop. The following extracts show the
use of practical requests to guide the problem solving process.
- “Why do we not start with this question. Will they give us the funds” (Theodora).
- “You can just write here “yes” and the we will show the reason” (Theodora).
- “Shall we start with statistics?” (Ayanda).
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The following extracts show the reflective nature of some of the meta-cognitive comments
about the problem solving process.
- “I have already written down what you are explaining to them” (Theodora).
- “That means you want us to vote” (Sipho).
- “Do we really have to choose only one point?” (Ayanda).
- “We have written so little points” (Thami).
4.1.3. Specific roles conducive to enhancing common understanding
All participants were active in the process of enhancing a common understanding of the
different aspects of the problem solving process. However, in most of the workshops, the
common understanding was further enhanced by specific roles played by particular
participants.
 One or two participants fulfilled the role of clarifying the problem structure and the conceptual
suggestions towards the problem solution. This was done mainly by providing interpretations
and repetitions of the problem structure and of creative conceptual input.
One or two participants fulfilled the role of ensuring a sustained common understanding of the
problem solving process. They fulfilled this role by introducing new, or by repeating and
clarifying previously introduced, problem solving issues at regular intervals in the process in
order to ensure that its requirements were met. They also reflected on the research process in
order alert the group on how the task had evolved.
4.2. Group problem solving as a process of building group consensus
It was argued in the previous section that group problem solving is a process of building a
common understanding. It is contended that this process is inextricably connected to a process
of building consensus. The processes of enhancing comprehension and consensus develop
concurrently and dialectically. The structure of the problem solving process, the problem
solving strategies and the roles fulfilled by the participants in the problem solving process,
while being geared at attaining a common understanding also, serve to reach group consensus.
4.2.1. A structure conducive to enhancing group consensus
The structure of the workshop, described in the previous section, was conducive to the
building of consensus. Each stage of the problem solving process included the provision of
group support. This was provided by repetitions or opinions of approval by the different
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participants. Consensus building applied to the stages relating to the problem structure, the
problem solving process and the attempts to solve the problem. Consensus building was
ongoing and the final consensus was reached through a progressive process of consensus
building on the different elements of the solution. As a result there was no need to dwell on
reaching agreement at the end of the process.
4.2.2. Strategies conducive to enhancing group consensus
What follows are the different strategies used to reach and sustain group consensus
(i)  Recording
Recording of results of the group discussions was a very important aspect of the consensus
building process. Large sections of the process were allocated to discussions about what to
record and how to record it. Recording assisted to refine the agreement that was established
verbally into a statement that accurately reflected the consensus. Although written agreements
were sometimes reconsidered for further analysis, they reflected a stronger sense of group
consensus than verbal agreements.
 
(ii)  Participation
Participation of all participants was elicited in an attempt to avoid neglect of the opinions or
needs of any one participant.
(iii) Argumentation
Argumentation was very important in reaching a consensus on the solution to the problem,
especially in the workshops that involved making a choice. In many of the workshops two
participants (the ‘leader’) and another participant (a ‘sparring partner’) fulfilled the roles of
two opposing parties in order to facilitate debate. The argumentation style employed by the
participants was conducive to reaching consensus rather than developing dissent. First,
arguments were rarely identified with a specific person. They were instead considered as
entities detached from the participants who used them. This implied that rejection of an
argument was not connected to rejection of a participant’s opinion. It is argued that the latter
often instigates conflict within a group. Second, the rejection of a position did not necessarily
lead to the rejection of the arguments in favour of that position. An argument of a previous
speaker was usually acknowledged by a participant as valuable before another (opposing)
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argument was introduced. Often participants would support arguments for a position which
they did not favour. This implied a respect for the position of participants whose opinions
differed from them. Third, rejections and queries were used relatively infrequently by the
participants. Their approach involved stating their own positions or indicating a lack of
understanding of others’ positions rather than rejecting positions..
(iv) Avoidance of conflict
In their attempt to reach and sustain consensus, a considerable effort was made to avoid open
conflict. Conflict for purpose of this thesis is defined as negative group dynamics. Several
strategies were employed to that end.
· When discussion between participants was perceived as endangering consensus, the
focus of the conversation was abruptly changed to a less confrontational issue. The
potentially ‘conflict inducing issue’ was re-introduced at a later stage, when the climate
was more conducive to discuss it, due to an enhanced common understanding or a
stronger consensus base.
· The participants’ practice of redefining the problem structure (which was discussed in
the previous section) provides further evidence for their desire to maintain consensus and
avoid conflict. This re-definition was considered more important than retaining the
problem structure. The following quotes illustrate attempts to satisfy all group members
by changing the problem structure.
- “She can be an additional member, she is not chased away” (James) (This quote
illustrates an attempt to embrace two options rather than choosing one).
- “And in the community center you can still get a clinic, in the same building”
(Theo) (This quote illustrates an attempt to combining two options instead of
choosing one).
 
· When disagreement on conceptual issues was not prevented through either of the
strategies discussed above, the participants dealt with the issue at a meta-cognitive level.
By discussing the problem structure and the nature of the problem solving task they
attempted to diffuse conflict on the conceptual issue.
- “It must be written as it (the different arguments) is. It will depend on what we all
agree on between the TLC and the RDP” (James). This quote comes after repeated
opposing arguments.
188
-  “Just like when we were looking at number 5 lets look at them (other options) this
way and then try to differentiate” (Thozie). This quote comes after a disagreement
on the choice of an option.
 
· When discussion at meta-cognitive level did not suffice to avoid escalation of conflict, an
appeal was made to the group participants to restore consensus. This appeal called upon
their culturally defined rules of conduct for group interactions. This includes calling for
an outside mediator. The following quotes illustrate the participants’ appeal for
avoidance of escalation of conflict.
- “Let us not make things difficult for us. Let us focus on right and wrong and put
them together” (James). This quote comes after a disagreement on whose opinion
to record.
- “and we should be disciplined” (Thami).
- “Can you help in the debate (to the researcher)? some say RDP and others say
TLC, what do we do, so that we can..” (brings hands together) (Theo).
 
· The majority of disagreements revolved around the technical aspects of the problem
solving task. In particular around how and what to record. It is hypothesised that
because recording as an aspect of group problem solving processes, is a relatively new
practice amongst the participants and as a result involves less common experience, more
insecurity and consequently more potential for disagreement. The fact that recording
data was considered as reaching firm group consensus and the fact that it needed to be
presented to people outside the group also added stress to the process of recording.
4.2.3. Specific roles conducive to enhancing group consensus
All participants were active in the process of reaching group consensus. However, in most of
the workshops the common understanding was further enhanced by specific roles played by
particular participants.
The leadership role (see Section 3.3.) was important in the creation of group consensus. This
leadership involved providing a strong direction for the development of the problem solving
process, by contributing a large amount of the conceptual ideas, constructing the framework
for the interpretation of the problem structure and providing the meta-cognitive inputs on the
problem solving process. The leader minimised the development of disconsent by providing a
‘homogenous’ climate based on his needs and views.
189
In some of the workshops one or two participants particularly focused on enhancing group
consensus. This was done by providing support for the contributions of the group participants
and by repeating the contributions that were made in the group.
4.3. Group problem solving as mediated action
It has been argued in the previous sections that a joint building of group consensus and
collective understanding were the two underlying principles of the group problem solving
process. It was contended that the structure of the problem solving process built by the
participants, the strategies used in the process and the roles taken by the participants, were
congruent with these principles.
It is further contended that the structure of the problem solving process, the strategies and the
roles employed by the participants, can be considered as cultural mediators (see Chapter 4,
Section 5.1.2.2.) in a process of mediated action, in which the individual and the group process
were dialectically linked (Cole, 1991; Wertsch, 1995). It is argued that individual contributions
and group dynamics were both essential for the problem solving process and had an enriching
effect on each other. This is congruent with the argument of Resnick (1991),that the social
context in problem solving is an integral part of the activity. In the discussion that follows
evidence will be presented for this argument.
(i) Structure as a mediational means
It is maintained that the participants had a common implicit knowledge of how to construct the
structure of the problem solving process (see Section 4.1.). This knowledge is culturally based
and provided the participants with a meaningful framework within which they made their
contributions. This common background knowledge of the participants can appropriately be
described using d’Andrade’s (1990) notion of cultural models. Such models are cognitive
schemata that are inter-subjectively shared. They are conceptual abstractions that serve as the
basis for information processing
The structure of the problem solving process consisted of a spiral of consecutive stages with
alternating foci on the three different aspects of the problem solving process (problem
structure, problem solving task and problem solving attempt). This spiral allowed the
differential insights of participants in each of these aspects to build on each other, resulting in
an increased level of understanding of each participant, while simultaneously enhancing the
process of reaching a solution.
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A finer analysis of the structure of the problem solving process divides each stage up into
several inter-actions (see structure of the workshops discussed in Section 3.1), each of which
fulfilled a different function. Some interactions were clarificatory in nature, others aimed to
justify, while others queried. Each stage consisted of a ‘ladder’ of interactions, which fulfilled a
similar function to the ‘spiral of stages’. It allowed each participant to provide a small
contribution, congruent with her available knowledge at the moment. This contribution
provided a step of the ladder to be used by the other participants, congruent with their
available knowledge at that moment. The ladder was simultaneously constructed and used by
the participants in a synchronous process of learning and contributing to the problem solution.
This notion of a ladder is akin to Vygotsky’s (1978) notion of proximal development, in the
sense that it provides a structure for joint activity in a context of participants who show
differentials in expertise at various stages in the process. It is argued that without the ladder,
the participants would have been hampered in solving the problem. On the other hand, the
ladder would have been dysfunctional without the creative contributions of the participants. A
well build, solid ladder is essential for the solution of the problem and emancipatory for the
participants.
(ii) Strategies as mediational means
The strategies used by the participants in the problem solving process (see Sections 4.1.2 and
4.2.2.) provided another mediational means. An example will be used to illustrate this.
It was argued in Section 4.1.1., that participants contextualise the problem structure in
common background knowledge in order to enhance common understanding. The personal
background knowledge of one of the participants was used as a starting point for this process.
This participant provided a first step towards common understanding. Through clarifications
and inquiries by other participants, insights into this specific personal background knowledge
was enhanced and merged with the problem structure and background knowledge of the other
participants. This provided a learning experience for those who were provided with that
specific knowledge, but also for the participant who volunteered the knowledge, since she
experienced the merging of her specific knowledge with that of the problem structure of the
group. Both parties in this process, the ‘knowledge provider’ and the ‘knowledge
manipulators’, mediated each others learning. In turn this learning process pushed the group
closer to the problem solution. The broader cultural background needs to be added as a further
aspect of the mediation process. The dialectical interaction between the two parties was made
possible because of a sufficient common background knowledge between all the participants.
This knowledge not only refers to conceptual knowledge about the content of the problem
structure but also to the procedural knowledge of how to provide the personal background
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knowledge to the participants and how to manipulate that knowledge. Insufficient common
background knowledge could have severed the spiral of learning.
(iii) Tools as mediational means
The participants’ use of certain tools in the problem solving process (see Section 4.1.2.2.)
provided another mediational means. An example will be used to illustrate this.
The participants used newsprint to record the different aspects of the problem solution at
various stages throughout the problem solving process. The newsprint served  to gather
contributions of the various participants in order to have them ratified by the group. It also
served to build a full picture of the problem solution by visualising the different steps towards
that solution. The use of newsprint in the problem solving process corresponds with
Vygotsky’s notion of mediational tools (1962). Vygotsky argues that mediational tools assist
in the interface between the social and the individual. It is argued that the newsprint provided
first a social ‘place’ (to bring individual creative contributions) and second an individual ‘place’
for each of the participants to enhance their understanding of the problem solution. This
enhanced individual understanding in turn assisted the further development of the group
problem solving process, because the participants were in a better position to provide new
contributions. It was noted earlier in this chapter that a certain degree of conflict was
experienced with respect to the ‘recording process’. It was hypothesised that this was due to
the fact that the technique of recording was quite new to the participants. It can be argued that
a lack of common, culturally embedded, procedural knowledge was responsible for the
sometimes inefficient ‘mediating capacity’ of the ‘recording tool’.
(iv) Roles and rules as mediational means
A further mediator in the problem solving process was provided by the roles and rules used in
the problem solving process. These were strongly influenced by the participants’ epistemic
values. The importance of a shared value system for the shaping of problem solving activity has
been emphasised by Gauvain (1995). She argues that cultural values prescribe appropriate
ways of participating in cognitive activity.
The shared belief amongst the participants in the value of obtaining and sustaining consensus
provided the participants with roles and rules for group interactions. These roles and rules are
simultaneously constraining and emancipating (Bhaskar, 1979). They constrained participants
by providing limitations on what was ‘culturally acceptable’ in the problem solving process.
They were emancipatory because they provided tools with which the participants could
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influence the group in an acceptable manner (Grice, 1975). The creation (and acceptance by
the group) of the leadership role (see Section 4.2) serves as an example of this argument. The
existence of a leadership role was constraining in the sense that some participants felt they
could not present opinions that opposed the ideas of the leader. It was emancipating in the
sense that it provided a shared, accepted way in which the problem solution could be reached.
The participants felt comfortable in the group because everybody adhered to the rules.
The rules of argumentation serve as another example of the importance of cultural rules as
mediators in the group process. The construction of an ‘opposition’ between the leadership
role and the ‘sparring’ partner role provided the basis for an acceptable argumentation style for
the group, which would not endanger the underlying group consensus.
The above discussion corresponds with the everyday cognition theory on mediated action
presented in Chapter 4. However, to date, most of the everyday cognition literature has
focused on ‘vertical’ interactions in relation to mediated action. This involves the application of
cultural tools by a more ‘advanced’ person to teach a less ‘advanced’ person. Typically, it
concerns the parent-child dyad. This thesis has added to the theory of mediated action by
adopting a ‘horizontal’ interaction focus. It is argued that many social interactions involve
individuals with comparable capabilities and that mediation in such interactions differs from
vertical interactions. However, it is acknowledged, in agreement with Hatano and Inagaki
(1991), that this does not mean that horizontal relationships exclude the possibility that some
members are more capable than others at any given moment. It means that roles among
members are changeable in the interaction process.
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CHAPTER 9.
GROUP PROBLEM SOLVING: AN INTEGRATION OF INDIGENOUS
KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICAL PROCEDURE
1. Introduction
In Chapter 7 the results of the inquiry into the participants’ indigenous conceptual, procedural
and epistemological knowledge of the concepts problem and problem solving were discussed.
In Chapter 8 the results of the inquiry into the group problem solving procedure, employed by 
the participants, was reported on. This chapter aims to fulfill the third aim of the empirical
study: to interpret the interrelationship between the participants’ local knowledge of problem
solving and the procedure they adopted in a group problem solving situation.
Scrutiny of the two previous chapters reveals a close correspondence between the participants’
knowledge, their epistemic values and their actions. A similar image of problem solving
emerged from the inquiry into the participants’ knowledge of problem solving and from
analysing their group problem solving activity. This is akin to the ideas of Belenky et l.
(1986), Dweck (1983), Goodnow, (1980) and Strohm Kitchener (1983) on the use of
epistemic assumptions as a framework for practice. They contend that individuals and groups
use their epistemic knowledge (see Chapter 4, Section 5.2.1.) to define and choose acceptable
strategies for problem solving.
In the discussion that follows the congruency and the dialectical interrelation between the
participants’ actions and their conceptual, procedural and epistemic knowledge, will be dealt
with.
2. Congruency between knowledge and action
Several aspects of the participants’ epistemic values and their accompanying conceptual and
procedural knowledge about the concepts problem and problem solving were reflected in their
actions during the problem solving workshops.
(i) Social harmony
Reaching a state of social harmony was an epistemic value underlying the participants’ notion
of problem solving. Attempting to reach consensus amongst those who are involved in the
problem solving process and those for whom the solution is sought, was considered important
(see Chapter 7, Section 4). The problem solving activity of the participants provided ample
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evidence of attempts to reach consensus. First, problem solutions often took the form of a
compromise in order to accommodate all group members and all people contained in the
problem structure. Second, the structure of the problem solving process emphasised the need
for regular demonstrations of group support. Third, the group problem solving strategies were
geared towards enhancing and sustaining consensus or to avert and minimise conflict when it
arose (see Chapter 8, Section 4.2). Argumentation was an important strategy in reaching
solutions. The rules of argumentation adhered to by the group were geared towards reaching
and sustaining consensus (see Chapter 8, Section 4.2.). Fourth, several implicit rules of
conduct conducive to maintaining harmony were adhered to by the group.
(ii) The social construction of knowledge
The participants’ epistemic knowledge of problem solving revealed a belief in the social
construction of truth. Congruent with this epistemic, they indicated an appreciation of a
thorough, joint analysis of the problem structure (see Chapter 7, Section 4). This was reflected
in the problem solving procedure of the participants. Large parts of the problem solving
processes were allocated to, and several strategies aimed at, reaching and sustaining a shared
understanding of the problem structure (see Chapter 8, Section 4.1.).
The participants emphasised the importance of a ‘shared’ problem identification. In practice
this was reflected in their strategies of ‘contextualisation in common background knowledge’
(see Chapter 8, Section 4.1) and a progressive building of understanding through combining
clarifications, provided by the different participants.
Similar to their emphasis on joint problem identification, the participants’ local knowledge
revealed a belief in the importance of a joint building of the solution. This was viewed as a
process in which all the participants engaged jointly in providing suggestions, arguments in
favour and against those suggestion, and reaching consensus. This knowledge was very
accurately transferred into their problem solving procedure. Analysis of the problem solving
processes revealed that the stages relating to attempts to solve the problem consisted of
suggestions, clarifications, justification and attempts to reach consensus. All participants were
involved in providing the building blocks of the arguments.
(iii) Procedural knowledge and procedure
The participants’ procedural knowledge reflected the importance attached to structure in the
problem solving process. They distinguished stages allocated to respectively identifying and
analysing the problem, deciding on a solution and planning and implementing the solution. The
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problem solving activity of the participants revealed a similar structure. However, the
chronology was less rigid. Stages of problem analysis and attempts at solutions alternated with
each other in a gradual process of building consensus.
The participants identified certain actions required in the problem solving process. Several of
these independently emerged from the creative brainstorm session on the workshop data. This
reveals a close fit between the knowledge and practice of the actions involved in group
problem solving. Actions which were identified in both knowledge and practice were: listening,
talking, suggesting, clarifying, compromising, motivating, opposing, convincing, confirming,
arguing, eliminating, mediating. Congruent with their knowledge, the role of a leader was to
encourage participation, give direction and integrate viewpoints.
(iv) Problem ‘specificness’
The participants’ knowledge and practice of group problem solving reflected a merging of
problem identification and problem solution and a downplay of the importance of general
formal problem solving methods (see Chapter 7, Section 3.7). The ideas of Hiebert (1986) on
the interaction between conceptual and procedural knowledge can assist in interpreting the
insignificance of standard problem solving procedures. Hiebert argues that conceptual
knowledge of a problem provides tools for the development of procedures for problem solving.
Hiebert argues that problems are solved by building mental representations (models) of the
problem and then dealing with these representations to select appropriate procedures. The
ideas of d’Andrade (1990) on cultural models provides a similar argument.
For the participants, the conceptual knowledge (based on their epistemological knowledge) of
a problem includes: the perception of a socially constructed definition of a problem; the
perception of a socio-culturally embeddedness of a problem, which implies that each problem
is in a way unique; and the perception of  the need for practical experience and motivation for
succesful problem solving (see Chapter 7). These perceptions are incongruent with the
application of general formal problem solving procedures. They are, however, in accordance
with the procedure used by the participants, which relies on contextualising the problem in
common familiar background knowledge in an attempt to understand the ‘context’ and the
‘specificness’ of the problem, and which subsequently embarks on a process of emphatic
negotiation to reach consensus on a solution to the problem.
3. Meta-cognitive speech
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The influence of the participants’ knowledge of problem solving on their problem solving
activity was not completely implicit. The workshop data provides evidence of the use of meta-
cognitive discourse on the problem solving process. At times the participants deemed it
necessary to vocalise their epistemic knowledge of good problem solving to influence the
problem solving process. To this end, they made comments and requests about the problem
solving task and the group process. The following quotes illustrate the importance attached by
the participants to: reaching a common understanding; the execution of a leadership role and
the adherence to rules of group conduct.
The following quotes reflect the importance attached to reaching a shared understanding.
- “We must discuss” (Theo).
- “If you do not erase that number you will confuse us” (Khaya).
- “You seem to be lost” (Matthew).
- “She seems to be puzzled” (Matthew).
- “Khaya you said you understand it? ” (Funeka).
- “Tell me in your own words what is happening, because I can hear Matthew but I do not
understand him” (Matthew).
The following quotes reflect the execution of a leadership role
- “I will give a direction” (Theo).
- “I like the group to be short and precise. Even if they are three, they are good points”
(Thami).
- “Are we going to summarise” (Thozie).
- “We have passed question 1” (Theo).
The following quotes relate to group conduct rules.
- “Let us not beat about the bush” (Sizwe).
- “and we should be disciplined” (Thami).
- “It all depends on us” (James).
- “This is not done” (Sindiswa).
The meta-cognitive comments were most frequent in relation to the process of recording. This
can be explained by the fact that recording was a relatively new element in the problem solving
procedure of the participants and therefore a thorough common understanding had not yet
developed. There was a need to build a common understanding and more chance of
disagreement or misunderstanding.
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4. Dialectical interaction between epistemic values, procedural knowledge and
procedure
It was argued that the compatibility between knowledge and activity was derived from the
participants’ reliance on epistemic values in their problem solving procedure. It is further
contended that the participants’ epistemic values are equally influenced by their problem
solving practice. In the discussion that follows two example are provided to illustrate the
dialectical interaction between knowledge and practice in the group problem solving process.
4.1. The importance of social harmony
It was argued in Chapter 7, Section 4 that the concepts of social harmony and inter-dependent
self view are pervasive in the culture of the participants.
The notion of social harmony was strongly reflected in the participants’ epistemic knowledge
of problem solving. The notions of conflict and disequilibrium were considered critical for the
definition of a problem, and numerous references were made to the importance of consensus
and satisfaction of all involved in the problem solving process. In the previous section the
congruence between the knowledge and activity of the participants regarding the notion of
consensus has already been dealt with. Some further discussion is, however, deemed relevant.
The inter-dependence of the participants was particularly apparent in their argumentation style.
There is ample evidence for this: first, when a new argument was introduced or when an
argument was opposed it was usually preceded by some form of positive acknowledgment of
the previous argument; second, arguments often  included aspects or parts of previous
arguments; third, suggestions and arguments were embedded in repetitions and clarifications
made by different participants. This aimed at building a common understanding, but it
simultaneously transformed the argument from being associated with one participant to being a
shared one, one that is owned and used by the group in order to solve the problem, rather than
for maintaining opposition between participants. The fact that arguments were regarded as
separate from the intentions of the initial utterer of the argument (see Chapter 8, Section 4.2)
and could be used by different participants, serves as further evidence for the importance of
maintaining an underlying harmony and inter dependence.
When the participants employ these culturally embedded strategies of argumentation, they have
a high probability of being successful in their problem solving attempt, because the strategies
are appropriate to the context and they are shared by the group. Whenever the strategies lead
to success, they re-enforce the faith of the participants in their effectiveness and in the values
and rules that support them. As a result, the possibility that these strategies will be chosen
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again in the future will be enhanced. This spiral of mutual influence enhances the problem
solving skills as well as the epistemic, conceptual and procedural knowledge underlying the
skill.
4.2. Problem identification as a social construct
It was argued previously in this chapter that participants placed great emphasis on identifying
and analysing the problem structure. It involved accessing the interpretations of the problem of
all the people involved in the problem. This was reflected in the structure of, and strategies
employed in, the problem solving activity. Participants jointly built a picture of the problem.
This picture was based on the creative contributions of the individuals but superseded the
individual interpretations (see Chapter 8, Sections 4.1 and 4.3 ). This joint picture enriched
each individual participant’s understanding of  the problem. As a result, the participants were
in a better position to solve the problem. It is argued that repeated experiencing of individual
enrichment and subsequent successful joint solving of the problem leads to an enhanced skill in
problem identification and a strengthened belief in the importance of joint problem
identification.
5. Changing assumptions and practice in a process of rapid social change
In Chapter 7, Section 4.1. it was stated that the participants’ knowledge was predominantly
steeped in a traditional African philosophy of ‘Ubuntu’. It was also argued that there is
evidence of emerging knowledge which deviates from this traditional knowledge. It is not
surprising then, taking into account the congruency and dialectical interrelation between
knowledge and activity, that there is evidence in the research data for the emergence of
disparity in the problem solving strategies and rules of the participants.
Several theorists emphasise the progressive change in people’s knowledge and practice
(Bhaskar, 1979; Valsiner & Leung, 1994 and Wertsch, 1995). They argue that although
individuals appropriate cultural tools in order to effectively function in their everyday lives,
they also contribute to the change in that culture. Culture is a shared system of knowledge and
tools that humans create, sustain and re-create.
A gradual change in knowledge and practices is natural and enables individuals to adapt to
changing conditions. However, in Chapter 7 it was argued that the changes in the participants’
knowledge were due to the situation of rapid social change the participants found themselves
in. It is contended that in a process of accelerated change, the expedient dialectic between the
environment and the individual is vulnerable and could be damaged, leading to ineffective
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practice and knowledge. Major differences between the participants’ problem solving
strategies, t epistemological and procedural knowledge, as a result of differential adaptation to
the changes in the environment, could lead to conflict and to a breakdown in the group
problem solving process. Moreover, such breakdown would be difficult to overcome since the
common epistemic framework, needed to reach consensus, would be disrupted.
Although the problem solving procedure adhered to by the participants was sufficiently alike
and predominantly concomitant with the traditional African philosophy, some differences in
approach emerged.
(i) Tension between the traditional and the emerging ways of reaching consensus.
 
Some participants were in favour of voting, others preferred a process of argumentation until
everybody was satisfied.
Analysis of the role distributions in the different problem solving processes revealed that some
groups preferred a process guided by a traditional authoritative leadership, in which the leader
provided the a majority of conceptual inputs and guided the task and the group process. Other
groups preferred more equality in the role division, without strong leadership.
(ii) Tension in argumentation style.
The traditionally accepted argumentation style involved acknowledgments of each others
arguments and indirect ways of opposing others through asking for clarifications and through
making alternative suggestions. The emerging style used direct rejections and queries.
(iii) Tension between different approaches to obtaining the truth and achieving the
‘right’ solution.
Although the reliance on background knowledge and personal experience, and the reliance on
the facts provided in the problem structure, generally complemented each other, at times they
were incompatible. An example illustrates this. In one of the workshops there was a clash
between two approaches. The one approach involved abandoning the choice of one option in
order to choose two options(with the aim to satisfy the needs of all participants). The other
approach dismissed this as unacceptable, because the problem that was presented to the group
involved choosing one option, not two.
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(iv) Tension between the collective approach and the more individually oriented
approach
 
In some of the workshops one participant made a series of inferences on a piece of paper
before presenting it to the group. This individual thought process was in contrast to the
traditional approach of combining small contributions of different people into one shared
thought process. This led to confusion in the group and requests for clarifications. The result
of the individual cognitive effort had to be repeatedly explained to the rest of the group.
(v) Tension between the traditional ‘organic’ approach to the problem solving task and
a more formal methodological approach.
 
The traditional approach involved immersion in the problem identification and argumentation,
firmly anchored in the problem context. The emerging approach involved the adoption of a
more formal analysis of the problem data and the compilation of a problem solving strategy.
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CHAPTER 10.
CONCLUSION: THE AIMS REVISITED
1. Introduction
The inquiry that constitutes the subject of this thesis was driven by several motives and aspired
to achieve particular goals. It is appropriate in this concluding chapter to revisit the various
aims that were set for the research and to evaluate the extent to which they have been fulfilled.
Before embarking on this process it needs to be emphasised that the different goals, although
relating to different aspects of the research, are inter-linked. As a result achievements and
shortcomings with reference to one goal has repercussions for the others.
2. An empirical investigation into the indigenous knowledge and practice of problem
solving of a group of community activists in South African
The empirical component of the study had a three fold aim. First, it intended to uncover the
indigenous knowledge of the concepts problem and problem solving of the participants of the
study. Second, it intended to uncover the group problem solving procedures employed by
these participants and third, it aimed at uncovering the interrelation between the participants’
knowledge and their procedure with reference to group problem solving.
Chapters 7, 8 and 9 report on the findings of this inquiry. In Chapter 7 the conceptual,
procedural and epistemological knowledge of the concepts problem and problem solving of the
participants was discussed. A problem was defined in terms of an impediment to satisfactory
participation in society and the perception of lack of consensus. Four different types of causes
of a problem were identified and the effect of a problem was defined in terms of unhappiness
and disruption of harmony. Problem solving was considered by the participants as an emotive,
cognitive and action process, involving particular role players and aimed at overcoming a
problem. This process had a certain structure, involved attitudes and actions and relied on
particular resources. Successful problem solving was considered to result in restoration of
social equilibrium and a feeling of satisfaction. A further interpretation of the participants’
knowledge of problem solving revealed that problem solving was considered to be essentially a
social, interactive process and that problem identification was considered more important than
the development of problem solving strategies. It was also revealed that the principal epistemic
values underlying the procedural and conceptual knowledge of the participants were: first, a
valuing of social harmony; second, a joint construction of truth; and third, a valuing of
knowledge that is derived from experience.
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In Chapter 8 the group problem solving procedure of the participants was discussed. Group
problem solving consisted of a process of developing a common understanding and group
consensus. The strategies employed in the process, the roles played by the participants, the
rules adhered to by the participants and the structure underlying the process were all
instrumental to achieving these aims.
In Chapter 9, the interrelation between the participants’ indigenous knowledge about problem
solving and their problem solving procedure was discussed. A close fit between knowledge and
action was revealed. It was argued that this relationship between knowledge and practice is
dialectical and dynamic and that due to the rapid social change in which the participants found
themselves new knowledge and practices were emerging.
It is argued that the research has succeeded in its aim of obtaining insights into the participants’
knowledge and procedures of problem solving. It is believed that the interpretive data on the
problem solving procedure is especially valuable, since the investigation of local thought
processes between peers has been a particularly neglected area.
It is, however, argued that the research results should neither be considered as final nor as
reflecting a general truth. Congruent with the interpretive paradigm adopted in this study, it is
contended that: first, research findings are not the end of a process towards finding a truth but
provide a basis for developing new and better questions for further research; and second, the
research findings are one particular reflection of reality, based on the dialectical interaction
between the researcher’s fore-structure and the research data. The reader is, therefore, urged
to regard the research findings as a temporary horizon of understanding and to incorporate
these in the ongoing scientific debate on everyday problem solving.
Besides the more conventional aims of the empirical component of the research, the study had
additional ambitions.
3. A contribution to an ‘everyday cognition’ approach
In Chapter 4 it was stated that the study aimed to contribute to the theory and practice of the
study of everyday cognition. To this end a framework for everyday cognition research, based
on a survey of the existing everyday cognition literature, was constructed. The framework was
build on the notion of mediated action, which is a core-concept in ‘everyday cognition’
literature. Mediated action (Wertsch, 1995) refers to the dialectical interaction between the
individual and her surroundings, mediated by cultural means, consisting of models, beliefs and
goals. This framework was used as a basis for the empirical research. It determined the nature
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of the units of analysis and the components of the different reading guides, which directed the
interpretation. Secondly it was used as a framework for the interpretation of the final level of
interpretive data. As such the empirical research was firmly embedded in an everyday cognition
approach, thereby enriching its theoretical and practical base. The use of the framework
provided the following main advances.
- It enabled the explication of the participants’ everyday problem solving practice.
- It enabled the explication of the dialectics between culture, group and individual.
- It enabled the explication of the nature of mediated action amongst peers.
- It enabled the explication of the dialectics between conceptual, procedural and epistemic
knowledge and activity.
- It captured the nature of the tensions created by the process of rapid social change in
which the participants found themselves.
4. A methodological contribution
In Chapter 5 it was stated that the study aimed at developing an appropriate philosophical
paradigm for the study of everyday knowledge. Chapter 6 intended to develop a method
appropriate to the study of everyday cognition. The realisation of the above two aims needs to
be evaluated jointly.
The method, used in the study, does not correspond to any established method as such. It
consisted of an eclectic combination of techniques, grounded within a combination of realist
and hermeneutical approaches (Schwandt, 1994). A methodological paradigm based on these
two approaches guided the process of discovering meaning in the research data and of
uncovering underlying structures.
The reading guide technique (Mergendollar, 1989) and the techniques of coding and constant
comparison (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) were employed congruent with the principles of the
methodological paradigm developed for the study (see Chapters 5 and 6). The main
philosophical principles that guided the research were Ricoeur’s (1976) notion of structural
analysis of texts, the notion of the hermeneutical circle (Taylor, 1994) and the notion of
discovering underlying structures (Bhaskar, 1979).
Due to the innovative nature of the research method, the research process developed in an
exploratory fashion. This implied that the research process was continuously shaped and re-
shaped during the research process.
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It is argued that the method used in the research provided several contributions to the field of
interpretive methodology. The most important of these are mentioned below.
- The study demonstrated the effective use of quantitative data in the interpretive process,
providing it with rigour and enhancing its validity.
- The study showed that realist and interpretive principles can be combined to create a
process of uncovering underlying structures.
- The study demonstrated the process of progressively deeper interpretation through
alternate phases of interpretation and formulating new questions.
- The study demonstrated the effectiveness of an eclectic use of techniques embedded in
a framework of paradigmatic principles.
- The study combined creative interpretation and methodological rigour.
Although the method was considered useful in its attempt to fulfill the aims of the study, the
particular combination of method, research topic and the practical constraints provided by the
research context contained some tensions. The following tensions were experienced.
- The analytical process relied on texts derived from interviews and group discussions of
the participants. Part of this data was provided by the participants in English, which is
their second language and part of it was provided in Xhosa (their first language) and
subsequently translated into English in preparation for analysis. It can be argued that the
use of a language that is not a mother tongue and the process of translation may have
caused some of the essence of the local knowledge to be lost.
- It may be argued that interview data for the uncovering of local indigenous knowledge
can not be regarded as exhaustive and that additional data gathering through techniques
such as participant observation or the analysis of proverbs relating to problem solving
could provide important complementary insights.
- Although the problems used in the problem solving workshops were carefully gleaned
from the participants’ everyday experiences and were ratified by the ECDAFF personnel,
they were still one step removed from the participants’ everyday life situation and
imposed an artificial component to the problem solving situation. This may have had an
influence on the problem solving behaviour of the participants, especially on their
motivations to solve the problem. However, they participated actively in the workshops,
using the cultural tools they possess, in their attempt to solve the problems.
- There was an ongoing tension between the attempts at creative interpretations and at
maintaining rigour. In the compilation of the reading guide the process of developing
categories and imposing these categories on the data (which created rigour) provided a
continuous danger of reducing the richness of the data and of losing meaning. The same
criticism applies to the presentation of the data in tables and graphs. This presentation of
data provided a context for deeper interpretation, but it may at the same time have
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introduced a reductionist thrust. It is acknowledged that this tension between
creativeness and rigour is inherent in the scientific interpretation process, however, it
needs to be kept in balance.
5. An innovative combination between meta-theory, theory and method
It is argued that the main contribution of this study is its combination of an interpretive
paradigm, an ‘everyday cognition’ approach and a method based on grounded theory
techniques and the reading guide technique. The research design based on an integration of
these three components was effective in uncovering indigenous knowledge and processes. It
provided methodological tools that differ from those of the mainstream cognitive psychologist
and allowed for a creative interpretive process that revealed the underlying structures and
principles of the participants’ knowledge and practice of everyday problem solving. Because
the method consists of the application of techniques with a strong paradigmatic grounding, its
is considered flexible and adaptable to other studies within the field of everyday cognition.
6. The emancipatory intentions of the study
The study aimed at emancipation of different kinds
6.1. Research on local knowledge
It was stated in Chapter 2 that by contributing to the relatively small body of scientific
psychological data in the realm of local knowledge, the study aims to attract more interest into
this area of research and to provide it with a status equal to the more conventional cognitive
psychological research. It is hoped that the study results and the particular care taken in
describing the interpretive methodology, used in the study, will provide researchers with the
necessary tools to evaluate the findings and will provoke the interest of a significant scientific
audience.
6.2. Empowerment of local people
It was stated in Chapter 2 that the research aims at empowering the participants through
making their tacit knowledge explicit to them and by encouraging them to use this knowledge
in their interactions with development agents. At this stage, this aim has not been reached and
it is understood that this will be very difficult to accomplish. The process that unfolded
between the initial gathering of data and the resulting interpretive data has been long and
complex and has been exclusively appropriated by the researcher. The participants were not
206
involved in the different stages of the conversion from the raw data to the deepest level of
interpretation. It is, therefore, doubtful that the participants will be able to identify with the
research findings as ‘something that belongs to them’. This assumption is based on similar
experiences in the researcher’s development work. When raw research data was taken away
from local people for analysis and interpretation, before being brought back to them in a
‘scientific’ form, it was disowned, because it had become unrecognizable. However, in order to
honour the resolve made in the beginning of the research process and despite reservations,
attempts will be made to return the interpretive data to the participants.
6.3. Improvement of training methodologies
Another stated aim of the study, is to provide useful insights to development workers and adult
educators, especially those who work with people from rural areas in South Africa and the
trainers in ECDAFF. In Chapter 3, it was argued that the current study arose from a
dissatisfaction with the researcher’s practical development work. There was a lack of
congruency between the adult education methodologies, used in training sessions, and the
trainees’ (local people) strategies of processing the cognitive content provided during the
training. At this stage the aim of influencing adult education methodology has not been
fulfilled. However, the researcher is confident that the insights provided by the current study
can be effectively distributed amongst those who can benefit from it in their development
work. In particular, the insights obtained from the study on the tensions created by rapid social
change can provide a significant contribution to improved training. It is, however, important to
re-emphasise that the results of the research are transient, not only because they are subject to
improvement through further research, but also because the participants’ procedures and
knowledge are dynamic in nature. Therefore, the practical application of the results of the
research will need to be accompanied by ongoing research and reflection.
6.4. Changing the discourse on everyday cognition
Congruent with the aim of promoting an ‘everyday cognition’ approach, the study of local
process and the empowerment of local people, the research intends to influence the discourse
on everyday cognition. It aims to alter the often derogatory perceptions of everyday
knowledge and everyday cognitive processes amongst social scientists. In order to achieve this
aim, two strategies were used.
First, the researcher acknowledged the influence and importance of her fore-structure on the
interpretive process. This included some pre-conceived ideas about everyday knowledge, due
to her training in the traditional cognitive approach. Having recognised this fore-structure,
207
attempts were made to capture the participants’ knowledge and cognitive processes within
their framework rather than in a rigid traditional cognitive framework. Several means were
used to this end.
- The researcher worked for several years in the communities of the participants in order
to obtain a thorough understanding of the local culture.
- The process of data collection was jointly determined by the researcher and the
participants.
- The problems used in the problem solving workshops were carefully gleaned from the
participants’ everyday life.
- The interpretive process of the different components of the empirical research
commenced with a creative brainstorm session, allowing the ‘data to talk to the
researcher’.
- The researcher consciously manipulated her fore-structure in the research process.
- The principle of the hermeneutical circle was honoured. The interpretive process
involved a repeated return to the raw data (provided by the participants) as part of the
contextual framework for interpretation. This ensured that interpretation remained firmly
connected to the world of the participants.
Second, attempts were made to use an appropriate language to describe the emerging
knowledge. A conscious effort was made to describe the participants’ everyday cognition in
affirmative terms rather than with traditional ethnocentric terms such as illogical,
unsophisticated, or undifferentiated.
Evaluation of this attempt at emancipatory discourse is difficult at this stage. Acceptance and
adoption of a changed discourse amongst scientists in a specific discipline is a slow and semi-
conscious process. The attempt made in this study can only hope to provide a small
contribution to this process.
From the concluding remarks in the sections above, it is clear that the study cannot be
considered as a final product. Some of its aims have not been fulfilled, its methodology can be
improved, and its results are provisional. It is therefore appropriate to end this conclusion with
the resolve to continue the process that was started in this study and to invite others to join in
this endeavour.
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TYPOLOGY OF PROBLEMS:
TYPE 1:
Unacceptable behaviour/attitude/
viewpoints of the problem bearer herself
SPHERES OF LIFE EFFECT
TYPE 2:
Unacceptable behaviour/attitude/
viewpoint of other(s) towards the
problem bearer
INDIVIDUAL PROBLEM:
An individual has a problem
when she experiences an
impediment to her satisfactory
participation in society
On problem bearer:
* a pervasive feeling of
frustration, isolation and
apprehension of all those
that experience the problem
* possible physical and
psychological damage to the
problem bearer(s).
TYPE 3:
Perception of an unfulfilled need/desire.
This can be:
* Material
* Non-material:
GROUP PROBLEM:
A group experiences a problem
when its members perceive
disagreement/confusion in the
group
On society:
* disruption of the smooth
functioning of society
· Knowledge
· Skills
· Opportunity
· Capacity
Problems can be experienced
TYPE 4:
The group's experience of:
* Dilemma
* Lack of knowledge/confusion
* Inability to achieve a goal
* in the family
* in the workplace
* in social groups/organisations
* in the community at large
Figure 6. Integrated theoretical diagram of the conceptual knowledge of the concept problem
Problem solving is an emotive, cognitive and action process, requiring effort and concentration by the people involved, aimed at
overcoming a problem. This requires certain attitudes, actions and the use of resources.
ROLE PLAYERS
The involved:
* Causer
* Affected
· direct
· indirect
The outsider:
* Advisor
* Empathiser
* Mediator
RESOURCES
ATTITUDES * Impartiality
Human Resources of Role
Players:
* Expertise
* Knowledge
* Experience
* Qualification
* Position of authority
* Motivation/dedication
* Social sensitivity
* Fairness
* Concentration
* Discipline
* Being observant
* Flexibility
* Honesty
* Empathy
* Trust
External Resources: PROCESS AFFECT
* Specialised institutions
* Printed matter
There are various chronological stages in the problem
solving process. The various stages in the process of
problem solving can involve individual and/or
interactive actions.
* Anxiety
* Satisfaction
* Challenge
RESULT
SUCCESS FAILURE
 EFFECT  EFFECT
* Restoration of the social equilibrium
* on those involved:
* Problem gets worse.
* Effect of the problem on the problem bearer gets worse
· Relief
· Increased social status
· Gainful experience
· Satisfaction and
fulfillment
Figure 7. Integrated theoretical diagram of the conceptual knowledge of the concept problem solving
INDIVIDUAL
PROBLEM
INVOLVED OUTSIDERS
CAUSER DIRECTLY AFFECTED MEDIATOR ADVISOR EMPATHISER
* Thinking
* Listening
* Talking
* Consulting books
* Arguing
* Compromising
* Observing
* Listening
* Mediating
* Observing
* Listening
* Advising
* Clarifying
* Referring
* Observing
* Listening
* Empathising
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APPENDIX 1. 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR ELICITING CONCEPTUAL, 
PROCEDURAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE 
 
This schedule was used for all initial individual interviews. 
 
PERSONAL DATA: 
1. Name 
2. Date of birth 
3. Gender 
4. Educational level 
5. Other training: 
6. Working experience: 
 
QUESTIONS: 
1. What is a problem? 
2. What is problem solving? 
3. Why do people solve problems? 
4. Who solves problems? 
5. Are there different types of problems, or are all problems the same? 
6. What do you do when you solve a problem? 
7. Is solving a problem easy or difficult? 
8. What do you like and what do you dislike about solving problems? 
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APPENDIX 2. 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR ELICITING CONCEPTUAL, 
PROCEDURAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE 
 
This schedule was used for the individual interviews conducted after each of the problem 
solving workshops. 
 
QUESTIONS: 
1. What was the problem? 
2. Why was it a problem? 
3. How did you try to solve it? 
4. What skills were used? 
5. Was it difficult? 
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APPENDIX 3. 
 EXAMPLE OF A BRAINSTORMING SESSION (COMPONENT A OF 
THE RESEARCH DESIGN) 
 
This appendix contains an example of the results of Phase 3, Stage 1, Step 2 of the 
interpretive analysis of the pre-workshop interview with participant Matthew. The sentences 
in bold are the verbatim answers of the participant to the questions of the interview schedule 
contained in Appendix 1.  
 
A PROBLEM IS A THING THAT I CANNOT BE ABLE TO DO  
PROBLEM: thing, limitation 
A THING: is identifiable, but variable 
I: needs personal involvement 
I CANNOT BE ABLE: condition:/ can be done in principle/ need an ability to do it/ person 
does not have the ability 
TO DO: action/ use of method/ process 
 
I HAVE NO OTHER WAY TO KNOW IT AND I MUST FIND OTHERS TO DO IT 
FOR ME OR MAKE A PLAN TO DO IT 
I HAVE NO: no personally available means to solve the problem 
OTHER WAY: other than interacting/ implies that problem solving always involves others 
KNOW IT: it is knowable/ it can be understood in your mind before applying it/ implying that 
a problem is finite 
NO WAY TO KNOW IT: knowledge limitation. 
I MUST FIND: action/ motivation/ necessary requirement for problem solving 
OTHERS: implies that others know the solution/ that they have the skills/ for them it is not a 
problem/ they differ from me in that they can do it 
DO IT FOR ME:  it implies that there is a well defined method/ they must act/ solving 
problems means handing them over to others/ joint action but passivity 
MAKE A PLAN TO DO IT: preparation before action/ implies that being part of the plan in 
which the solution is presented will give me the ability to learn it and do it myself/ the plan is 
specific for that problem 
 
YOU MUST SIT DOWN AND WORK AND IT IS POSSIBLE TO DEVICE ANOTHER 
MEANS TO DO IT 
YOU MUST: intention/ requirement/ socially accepted way of doing 
SIT DOWN AND WORK: activity/ focused attention/ need to prepare/ need to work together/ 
takes effort and motivation 
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ANOTHER MEANS: can find means when you sit with others  there are procedures that are 
knowable 
POSSIBLE: can happen in certain situations 
 
YOU MUST THINK HARD IF YOU ARE NOT QUALIFIED 
THINK: mental action/ brains 
HARD: difficult/ a lot/ takes a lot of energy/effort 
NOT QUALIFIED: implies that some people are qualified at problem solving, some are not/ 
it seems that you can qualify if you sit with others/experts 
 
IT IS A CHANCE TO DO YOUR BEST 
CHANCE: opportunity/ does not always happen/ one must take advantage of being with 
others to learn ability to solve problems 
DO YOUR BEST: be motivated/ learn to become better through others/ not perfect/ what is 
socially acceptable. 
 
TO WORK ON IT, TO FIND A SOLUTION  
WORK: action/ process/ flow/ motivation 
IT: existing issue/obstacle 
FIND A SOLUTION: condition: there is a solution/set of possibilities/ consequence: find the 
right one 
 
BECAUSE THEY ARE STUMBLING BLOCKS. IF YOU TAKE THE PROBLEMS 
AWAY, LIFE GOES SMOOTHLY. PEOPLE WANT THINGS RIGHT  
STUMBLING BLOCKS: obstacles, interrupt the flow 
TAKE THE PROBLEMS AWAY: undo them, take the obstruction of the flow away, take 
them to somebody else, remove them. You must be able to clearly identify them to be able to 
take them completely away. Implies that you are an actor who can do that, action/take the 
unhappiness away and make the smooth, collective, conventional flow be restored 
PEOPLE WANT THINGS RIGHT: Desire for what society defines as right/ smooth life for 
all, consensus model/ assumes that there is a correct way. 
SMOOTHLY: no interruptions for anybody 
 
PEOPLE WHO SOLVE PROBLEMS ARE PEOPLE WHO HAVE COME ACROSS 
THE PROBLEM BEFORE, EXPERTS ON IT  
HAVE COME ACROSS THE PROBLEM: experience/ have learned solution to this specific 
problem/have done it themselves/ the exact procedure for the particular problem. 
EXPERT ON IT: expert means qualified because of having done it/ having authority/ you can 
be qualified on "it" specific for a particular problem 
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YOU YOURSELVES BY THINKING HARD ABOUT THE COURSE. BY TRYING 
TO WORK HARD ON THE COURSE AND TO AVOID IT 
BY THINKING/WORKING HARD: energy and motivation/ brains 
THINKING ABOUT THE CAUSE: implies that answer is in the problem cause/ once the 
cause is known the exact answer will follow/taxonomy of problems is important 
AND TO AVOID IT: implies that maybe we make our own problems/ active participants/ 
problems are not nice because they need a lot of energy and are maybe unpleasant/ implies 
that we can engage or not engage in a problem/we need to be motivated to engage 
 
DEPENDS ON WHAT KIND OF PROBLEM  
DEPENDS: problem solving process is conditional 
KIND OF PROBLEM: taxonomy 
 
THERE ARE PERSONAL PROBLEMS (LIKE IN YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH 
YOUR WIFE) 
PERSONAL: relating to yourself/ your own life/also implies something social/ inter-actional - 
relationship/ domain of family relationships/maybe personal relates to not seen by society at 
large as compared to work which is publicly visible 
 
THERE ARE WORK RELATED PROBLEMS: 
WORK RELATED: could be bad performance/relation with other workers/also in fact 
personal  
 
PROBLEM IN YOURSELF, LIKE BEHAVIOUR AND ATTITUDE 
YOURSELF: one can be the cause of a problem/ fits with being able to avoid problems - 
active role. 
BEHAVIOUR AND ATTITUDE: relational/ interactive  
 
ALSO PROBLEMS WHEN YOU NEED A THING TO DO SOMETHING AND YOU 
DO NOT HAVE THAT THING 
NEED: desire/motivation/ lack of  
A THING TO DO SOMETHING: absence of a tool, method, means/ context implies that it is 
not skills because that is said later/ implies that there is always a thing in existence but you 
have not got it. 
TO DO: action/activity/process 
THAT THING: implies that a specific tool is required 
 
ALSO LACK OF SKILLS TO DO SOMETHING 
TO DO: action 
LACK: not having/ limitation 
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SKILLS: methods/strategies/ ways of doing things 
 
ALSO LACK OF KNOWLEDGE, IF YOU LIKE TO KNOW A LOT ABOUT A 
CERTAIN THING 
KNOWLEDGE: experience/ intelligence/ information/ awareness/ knowledge is only a 
problem if you want to have it (motivation/need/like to) 
KNOW A LOT ABOUT A CERTAIN THING: have a lot of experience/information 
A CERTAIN THING: can be specified/concrete/delineated 
 
WHEN I SOLVE A PROBLEM I LOOK FOR THE CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM  
LOOK: identify/ can see the whole problem in once/ attention/ perception 
CAUSE: the answer is in the cause/ taxonomy of problem solving according to causes 
 
I  LOOK FOR THE CAUSE ON MY OWN, I CAN TAKE ADVICE, I CAN LOOK IN 
THE BOOKS. 
ON MY OWN: one can have solutions oneself 
TAKE: action 
ADVICE: others who have the solution can help/ need to listen to others 
LOOK IN THE BOOKS: solutions may be written down in books and can be consulted 
 
I THEN TRY TO AVOID THE CAUSE, E.G. I TRY TO CHANGE MY BEHAVIOUR 
IF I HAVE A BEHAVIOUR PROBLEM. 
TRY TO AVOID THE CAUSE: the cause is an obstacle to flow/ try to avoid the obstacle/ 
people have the power to do that/ active in the problem posing and solution/ problems can and 
should be avoided 
TRY: is possible but not guaranteed/ certain degree of difficulty/ motivation is needed and is 
important 
 
PROBLEM SOLVING DEPENDS ON THE DEDICATION. IF I AM LAZY IT WILL 
BE DIFFICULT, IF I AM NOT LAZY IT WILL BE EASY. 
DEDICATION: effort/ intent/ trying hard/ commitment and loyalty/ persistence 
 
I BELIEVE I CAN DO IT MYSELF 
DO: action 
BELIEVE: state of mind 
MYSELF: personal engagement/ self confidence 
 
IF IT IS VERY DIFFICULT I WILL GET SUPPORT 
DIFFICULT: in the context it implies lack of knowledge and know how to solve the problem 
GET: action/ personal engagement 
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SUPPORT: assistance/ learning/ encouragement from others 
 
I CAN GET OTHER IDEAS AND PUT THEM ALL TOGETHER 
ALL TOGETHER: problem solving consists of different parts/ you may know some parts, but 
not all./problem solving is bringing various parts together/ involves some synthesis of 
collective ideas/ building on other people's ideas/ collect and compile 
GET: constructive action/ collecting 
OTHER IDEAS: ideas you do not have yourself 
 
COMMUNICATION SKILLS AND NEGOTIATION SKILLS 
NEGOTIATION SKILLS: argumentation rules/ consensus/ social/ interpersonal 
COMMUNICATION: social/ rules of communication/ dialogue/ understanding/ interaction 
 
YOUR BEHAVIOUR AND ATTITUDE IS IMPORTANT. YOU MUST BE FAIR AND 
REASONABLE AND YOU MUST INCLUDE OTHERS 
This relates to acts and intent and values and interaction with others and how you are seen by 
others and if you fit in  
MUST INCLUDE OTHERS: implies that problems are social 
FAIR: respectable/ honest 
REASONABLE: socially acceptable 
 
I DO NOT LIKE TO BE LAZY WHEN THERE IS A PROBLEM 
DO NOT LIKE: not good,/ not enjoyable/ not want/ try to avoid/ state of mind 
LAZY: not doing much/ not trying 
Implies the need to be motivated to solve the problem 
 
NO ONE INVOLVED SHOULD BE LAZY 
NO ONE: means that all need to contribute/ social accountability joint responsibility 
 
I  DO NOT LIKE IT IF PEOPLE ARE NOT REASONABLE  
REASONABLE: socially acceptable 
 
I LIKE TO TALK TO THE EXPERT FOR ADVICE 
I LIKE: it will be helpful. 
REASONABLE: moderate/ listen to reason (which implies others) 
EXPERT and ADVICE: see above 
 
SOMEBODY WHO KNOWS MORE TO GET THE RIGHT STUFF 
WHO KNOWS MORE: more experienced person can help to assist in the problem/ has the 
right answer that can be transferred 
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RIGHT STUFF: appropriate/real/ assumes that there is a correct way 
 
NOT AN IMITATION. SOMETHING IS REAL IF IT IS PRACTICAL, NOT 
THEORISING 
IMITATION: implies that there are solutions that are fake/ theoretical people fake.  
PRACTICAL: means that to know something you must do it in practice/ experience/ not 
abstract
 9
 
APPENDIX 4. 
EXAMPLE OF THE PROCESS OF CODING CATEGORIES  
 
This appendix contains an example of the results of Phase 3, Stage 1, Step 3 of the 
interpretive analysis of the pre-workshop interview with participant Matthew. 
 
CODES RELATING TO THE CONCEPT PROBLEM 
 
CATEGORIES INDICATORS  
  
ENCUMBRANCE ... I cannot be able to do 
 ... I have no other way to know it 
 ... they are stumbling blocks 
  
DESIRED STATE ... people want things right 
 ... life goes smoothly 
  
SOCIALLY UNACCEPTABLE  ... problem in yourself 
BEHAVIOUR ... like behaviour and attitude 
  
DEFICIENCY ... You need a thing to do something and you do not 
have that thing 
 ... lack of skills to do something 
 ... lack of knowledge 
  
MATERIAL DEFICIENCY ... need a thing 
  
NON-MATERIAL DEFICIENCY  ... lack of skills 
 
 
CODES RELATING TO THE CONCEPT PROBLEM SOLVING 
 
CATEGORIES INDICATORS  
  
EFFORT/MOTIVATION ... sit down and work 
 ... think hard 
 ... to work on it 
 ... chance to do your best 
 ... thinking hard about the cause 
 ... trying to work hard 
 ... try 
 ... problem solving depends on dedication 
 ... if I am not lazy 
 ... no one should be lazy 
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ACTION ... find others 
 ... make a plan 
 ... work 
 ... devise means 
 ... to work on it 
 ... take advice 
 ... try to avoid 
 ... change behaviour 
 ... get ideas and put them together 
 ... take problem away 
  
CONCENTRATION ... think hard 
 ... sit down 
 ... to work on it 
  
STRATEGY ... device another means to do it 
 ... make a plan 
 ... take problem away 
 ... avoid the cause 
 ... identify the cause 
 ... get support 
 ... put ideas together 
 ... look in books 
 ... change behaviour 
 ... talk to experts 
 ... get the right stuff 
  
RESOURCES ... qualification 
 ... expertise 
 ... experience  
 ... books 
 ... assistance from others 
 ... support 
 ... ideas 
 ... skills (communication/negotiation) 
  
ATTITUDE ... fairness 
 ... reasonable 
 ... include others 
 ... not lazy 
 ... belief in self 
 ... dedication 
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APPENDIX 5. 
EXAMPLE OF THE PROCESS OF IDENTIFYING PROPERTIES AND 
DIMENSIONS  
 
This appendix contains an example of the results of Phase 3, Stage 1, Step 4 of the 
interpretive analysis of the pre-workshop interview with participant Matthew. 
 
1. IDENTIFICATION OF PROPERTIES 
 
Who solves problems? 
CATEGORIES INDICATORS  
  
EXPERTS  experienced people/ people who have come across 
the problem before/somebody who knows more 
 
PERSON WHO EXPERIENCES 
THE PROBLEM you must sit down and work on it/you must think 
hard/a chance to do your best/you yourselves 
 
PEOPLE WHO ARE CALLED UPON  
TO HELP SOLVING A PROBLEM  I will get support/find others to do it for me 
 
Where do problems occur ? 
CATEGORIES INDICATORS  
There are different domains in which a problem can occur: 
 
AT WORK work related problems 
  
WITHIN A PERSON problem in yourself such as behaviour and attitude 
  
IN THE FAMILY  between you and your wife 
 
What causes a problem?  
CATEGORIES INDICATORS 
UNACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOUR (For indicators see Appendix 4 under categories 
socially unacceptable behaviour 
DEFICIENCY and deficiency 
 
What effects does a problem have? 
CATEGORIES INDICATORS 
STOPS SMOOTH RUNNING OF 
SOCIETY  
you take the problem away and life goes smoothly/ 
people want things right 
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What are the conditions necessary for a problem to occur? 
CATEGORIES INDICATORS 
DESIRED STATE people want things right 
  
BLOCKAGE OF DESIRED STATE something I cannot be able to do/ I have no other 
way to know it/stumbling block 
  
PERCEPTION OF THAT BLOCKAGE  I cannot 
 
How does problem solving take place? 
Problem solving can involve different strategies 
CATEGORIES INDICATORS 
INTERACTING WITH OTHERS  talk to experts/get the right stuff/get support 
  
INTRA-PSYCHIC PROCESS  make a plan/identify the cause/ put ideas 
together/change behaviour 
 
Problem solving has different consecutive steps 
Indicators are the same as categories 
CATEGORIES 
 
LOOK FOR THE CAUSE 
 
TRY TO SOLVE IT YOURSELF 
 
ASK OTHERS FOR ADVICE AND SUPPORT 
 
PLAN THE ACTION 
 
AVOID THE PROBLEM/OR CHANGE BEHAVIOUR 
 
Problem solving involves tapping various resources 
CATEGORIES INDICATORS 
CAPACITIES/ABILITIES negotiation and communication skills/knowledge 
  
EXPERIENCE WITH SIMILAR 
SITUATION BEFORE 
people who have come across the problem  
  
SOCIAL SUPPORT get support 
  
MATERIAL RESOURCES  books 
 
Problem solving involves the application of various attitudes 
Indicators are the same as categories 
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CATEGORIES 
 
DEDICATION 
 
REASONABILITY 
 
FAIRNESS 
 
2. IDENTIFICATION OF DIMENSIONS 
Only some categories could be dimensionalised 
 
− The category EFFORT/MOTIVATION is HIGH in intensity (think hard/ work hard at it/ 
not lazy/ dedication) 
− The category DESIRED STATE is HIGH in intensity (people want things right/ repeated 
use of must) 
− The category ATTITUDE is HIGH in intensity (behaviour and attitude is important) 
− The category ENCUMBRANCE can be high in degree of difficulty or low in degree of 
difficulty 
− The category CAPACITY/ABILITY can be high or low. 
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APPENDIX 6. 
EXAMPLE OF THE PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING RELATIONSHIPS 
BETWEEN CATEGORIES 
 
This appendix contains an example of the results of Phase 3, Stage 1, Step 5 of the 
interpretive analysis of the pre-workshop interview with participant Matthew 
 
IDENTIFICATION OF INTER-RELATIONS BETWEEN CODED CATEGORIES 
Words printed in capitals are categories identified in the previous steps of the interpretive 
process. 
 
− If ENCUMBRANCE is big then there is a need for INTERACTION WITH OTHERS 
− If ENCUMBRANCE is small the problem solving can happen INTRA-PSYCHIC 
− If CAPACITY/ABILITY is low then there is need for INTERACTION WITH OTHERS 
− INTERACTION WITH OTHERS still implies the needs for INTRA-PSYCHIC ACTION 
− If CAPACITY/ABILITY is high then problem solving can happen INTRA-PSYCHIC 
− ENCUMBRANCE implies a DESIRED STATE and PERCEPTION OF BLOCKAGE by 
the one who has the problem. 
− Effect of PROBLEM SOLVING is undoing the blockage and re-establishing the 
DESIRED STATE 
− Problem solving is an ACTION that involves STRATEGIES, relies on RESOURCES and 
ATTITUDES and requires a lot of EFFORT  
− THE PROBLEM SOLVING STRATEGY required depends on the kind of 
ENCUMBRANCE, be it DEFICIENCY OR SOCIALLY UNACCEPTABLE 
BEHAVIOUR 
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APPENDIX 7. 
EXAMPLE OF A THEORETICAL MEMO 
 
This appendix contains an example of a theoretical memo which is the result of Phase 3 Stage 
1, Steps 3, 4 and 5 of the interpretive process of the pre-workshop interview with participant 
Matthew. 
 
COMMENTS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN SUBSEQUENT 
INTERPRETATIONS: 
− The encumbered desired state seems to be socially defined. 
− There are many different ways of solving a problem. Maybe there is a particular way for 
each particular problem. 
− A problem can manifest itself in different domains: work domain/ interpersonal relations/ 
attitudes. It would seem that problems always have a social dimension. 
− It seems as if problem solving involves a personal responsibility of the one who has a 
problem and help from others. 
− It would seem that there are different stages in problem solving. First the thinking and 
planning and then the action.  
− There may well be different sub-categories within the categories  strategy, resource and 
attitudes. 
− Important comment made about real solutions and imitation solutions. This implies that 
not all solutions are proper. It also emphasises the importance of experience with 
particular problems for problem solving expertise. 
− There seems to be easy and difficult problems. The easy ones you solve yourself, using 
own brain. The difficult ones you ask others. Try and find out what is meant by using 
brains. Difficult problem is one for which you do not know the solution. 
− A problem is something that is felt by the person who has the problem. It bothers her. 
− Find out more about how advice is given and received. How is the individual's 
responsibility and the help of others integrated in order to solve the problem. 
− Explore the problem solving attitudes. 
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APPENDIX 8. 
PROBLEM SOLVING WORKSHOPS 
 
Problem for Workshops 1A and 1B 
 
You as a LODAFF committee have funds available to run one workshop with your 
community.  Some members in the community have indicated an interest in a workshop on 
the function of the Reconstruction and Development Programme, others on a workshop on the 
function and structure of the Transitional Local Government. Neither of these workshops 
have been done in your community. You have to decide which workshop to run. 
 
You have the following information. 
− A women's group (50 women) in your community has asked the LODAFF to run a 
workshop on the RDP because they feel that it will help them to get funds for their 
projects. 
− A youth group (60 young man) has asked the LODAFF to run a workshop on the TLG, 
because they feel it will prepare them for the new local government. 
− Somebody from the regional government has indicated to the LODAFF that it wants to 
come and see the potential of your LODAFF to be involved in the RDP. 
− The local municipality in town had approached the LODAFF the previous week to find 
out how far the community had progressed with discussing and educating the people on 
the TLG. 
− A businessman in town has indicated that he will sponsor the catering for the workshop if 
the workshop is dealing with the RDP. 
 
Problem for Workshops 2A and 2B 
 
Several mothers in your community had approached you as members of the LODAFF to raise 
funds for the building of a new primary school in the township. You approached the 
Independent Development Trust (IDT) with a request for funds. The IDT informed you that 
they are prepared to provide funds to build a primary school on condition that there are 
currently more than 25 children in the community that are not accommodated in the existing 
primary schools. 
 
The IDT indicated that they want accurate statistics on school-going children, before they will 
make a decision on funding. 
 
You have the following information about your community. 
− There is one primary school which can accommodate 250 children. The school is full. 
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− You have done a needs analysis survey in your community and you have found out that 
there are 100 families in your community. 
− 10 of the 100 families have five children each 
− 80 of the families have three children each 
− the rest of the 100 families have 2 children each 
 
What will you do to convince the IDT to give you the funds? 
 
Problem for Workshops 3A and 3B 
 
The LODAFF has to re-elect its committee. It is decided in a community meeting that there 
should be eight members in the LODAFF committee (seven members, elected from the seven 
community organisations and a chairperson who does not represent a specific organisation).  
 
During that community meeting the seven members are elected, however the community is 
unable to decide on a chair. The  meeting resolves that the newly elected LODAFF committee 
must make the decision as to whom should be chairperson of the new LODAFF. There are six 
possible candidates for the chair. The LODAFF must also motivate to the community why it 
chooses a particular candidate. You are that newly elected LODAFF. 
 
The following is known about the six candidates. 
− Candidate one is an old man who is a good public speaker and who has accounting skills. 
− Candidate two is a young woman who has been on a course on development and who is 
liked by the youth. 
− Candidate three is an old, traditional woman who knows the community well and who can 
tell stories very well. 
− Candidate four is an old man, who has been a member of various community 
organisations and knows the history of the struggle from the many books he has read. 
− Candidate five is a young man, who has recently returned from the city and has 
experience with running workshops and managing projects. 
− Candidate six is an old woman, who has initiated two projects in the community and who 
is very approachable. 
  
Problem for Workshops 4A and 4B 
 
A funding agency wants to make funds available for the construction of a building in your 
community. The funding agency has indicated that it will only fund one building and that this 
building should be the one that is most beneficial for the majority of the community. You as a 
LODAFF committee has to decide which kind of building will serve the community best.   
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There is a choice between: 
− a community centre to house projects; 
− a movie house; 
− a sports complex; 
− a clinic; 
− a church; 
− a shopping mall. 
 
You have recently completed a needs analysis survey in the community and this information 
is available. 
 
Note: Data of a fictitious community needs-analysis survey was provided to the groups. The 
survey contained 100 filled out questionnaires with biographical data as well as data on 
perceived needs. 
 
Problem for Workshops 5A and 5B 
 
You as a LODAFF committee are in charge of two community development projects, a 
sewing project and a brick making project. The projects started in July 1993. Now we are July 
1994 and there is not much money in the bank and the projects are not making much money 
for the moment. One of your LODAFF members has recently been to visit another community 
and has seen that they have a very successful pottery project. You would like to start a pottery 
project yourselves. You have already approached a funder for financial assistance. The funder 
indicates that he would like to see what you have achieved in your sewing and brick making 
project before he makes a decision on providing funds for your pottery project. 
 
What will you do to show your achievements in the brick making and sewing project to 
convince the funder that he should fund you? 
 
The funder also indicates that he requires a financial statement from you for the brick making 
and the sewing project. He wants to know how much money you have left in the bank. 
You have the following information. 
− There is one bank account for all the monies of the sewing and brick making project. But 
the two projects have their own accounting system. 
− When you started your projects you were given: 
− R3000-00 for the sewing project and R2000-00 for the brick making project; 
− During the year you spent R5000-00 in the brick making project for buying 
materials and tools and R4000-00 for the sewing project for buying materials and 
sewing machines; 
− The brick making project sold 1000 bricks and each brick cost R2; 
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− The sewing project sold 90 dresses and each dress costs R35. 
 
How much money is there in the bank? 
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APPENDIX 9. 
READING GUIDE 1 FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE GROUP PROBLEM 
SOLVING PROCESS 
This appendix presents, first explanatory notes on the application of the reading guide and 
second, a description of the content of the reading guide. 
 
1. EXPLANATORY NOTES ON THE APPLICATION OF THE READING GUIDE 
 
Reading guide 1 contains three questions. These relate to three elements of an operation: the 
Immediate Inter-active Function, the Cognitive-Affective Content and the Underlying 
Function.. For each of the three questions several alternative answers are provided. These 
relate to the different forms of each of the elements. 
 
The reading guide uses the symbol R (see content of reading guide). This symbol refers to 
some of the forms of the Cognitive-Affective Content of the operation only. It indicates that 
the content of an operation can be directly linked to an earlier operation. The reference 
number indicating the number of the operation to which it refers, is placed behind the form of 
the Cognitive-Affective Content of the operation which refers to it. A reference number is 
usually a number of an operation. However an operation can also directly link back to the 
given problem (which is presented to the group on newsprint) or it can refer to the paper that 
the group uses to make notes on during the workshop. A reference to the given problem is 
represented by the number 999 and reference to the paper used by the group by the number 
998. 
 
The form of the Immediate Inter-active Function called ‘Record’ is different from the other 
forms because it does not really indicate an inter-action between different participants but is 
in fact an action on behalf of the group. However it was deemed appropriate to include this 
form in the interpretive process. 
 
Some inter-actions could not be understood sufficiently (due to problems during the video-
taping) These were indicated as ‘not coded’. 
 
Some operations did not have a Cognitive-Affective Content. This was indicated by leaving a 
blank space. 
 
2. CONTENT OF THE READING GUIDE  
 
Question 1: What is the Immediate Inter-active Function of the operation? 
 
The Immediate Inter-active Function relates to the surface meaning of the operation The 
answer to this question can take different forms: 
 
TO CLARIFY:  Attempting to make the meaning of conceptual content intelligible to 
others  
 
TO COMMENT:  Making a statement to others about the task/group process (excluding 
rejection/ support/ query/ justify)  
 
TO DICTATE:   Saying out loud conceptual content to other for purpose of recording  
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TO INFORM:  Providing conceptual facts (contained in the given problem or of 
personal experience) to the group 
 
TO INQUIRE:  Seeking clarification from others about certain conceptual data 
(including additional information) or about the task/ group process. 
 
TO INVITE:  Soliciting original conceptual content from other(s) in function of 
solving the problem 
 
TO JUSTIFY:  Providing arguments in favour of a position. Providing grounds for a 
claim/ desire to others 
 
TO OFFER:  Suggesting to render a service to the group 
 
TO QUERY:  Indicating to others a doubt in the worthiness/ truthfulness/ rightness of 
a certain conceptual content or the task/ group process. 
 
TO REJECT:  Indicating to others that one considers certain conceptual content or 
aspects of the task/ group process unfavourably/ unacceptable/ 
untruthful. 
 
TO REQUEST:  Asking (proposing to) others for something to be done with regards to 
the task/ group process. 
 
TO SEEK:  Soliciting agreement/ confirmation of certain conceptual content or 
task/ group process from others (implies that a suggestion or comment 
has been made previously). 
 
TO SUGGEST:  Proposing conceptual content (essential building blocks towards 
solving the problem) to the group for acceptance or rejection 
 
TO SUPPORT:  Indicating to others that one considers certain conceptual content or 
aspects of the task/ group process favourable/ acceptable/ truthful  
 
TO RECORD:  Making a written record of conceptual content   
 
Question 2: What is the Cognitive-Affective Content of the operation? 
 
The answer to this question can take different forms  
 
EXAMPLE:  Illustration of a general rule (for clarifying purpose) (R ) 
 
FACT:  Information contained in the given problem structure and data of 
personal experience  (R ) 
 
INFERENCE:  Conclusion drawn from premises (some premises may be implicit and 
from data not contained in the given problem structure) (R ) 
 
INTERPRETATION:  Specific understanding of the meaning of conceptual content  
(R ) 
 
OPINION:  Personal desire/ feeling/ belief  
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REFLECTION:  Verbalisation of an occurring cognitive - emotive or behavioural 
process 
 
REPETITION:  Re-occurrence of content of previous contributions (R ) 
 
NO CONTENT:  No specific Cognitive-Affective Content 
 
Question 3: What is the Underlying Function of the operation? 
 
The Underlying Function relates to a deeper ,more indirect, meaning than the immediate 
function. It relates to the task and group process as a whole. The answer to this question can 
take different forms  
 
AMPLIFYING:  Strengthening one's own conceptual ideas to enhance acceptance by the 
group 
 
COMPROMISE:  Reconciliation of clashing inputs. Attempt to establish an agreement in 
the group with concessions of the different parties /or ideas involved.  
 
CONSENSUS U: Building of a common understanding of the conceptual content in the 
group 
 
CONSENSUS A:  Building of agreement in the group 
 
CONTRIBUTION:  Provision of the essential conceptual building blocks in direct function 
of the problem solving process.   
 
GROUP:  Dealing with group dynamics 
 
MEMORY:  Commitment of conceptual contents to memory. Recall of conceptual 
content to memory. 
 
OWN IDEAS:  Promotion of the individual's conceptual ideas against the group 
consensus 
 
OWN NEEDS:  Promotion of individual needs and feelings contrary to group needs 
 
PARTICIPATION:  Encouragement of conceptual contributions towards the solution of the 
problem 
 
TASK:  Promotion of the technical aspects of the problem solving task process  
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APPENDIX 10. 
EXAMPLE OF A BRAINSTORM SESSION (COMPONENT B OF THE 
RESEARCH DESIGN) 
 
This appendix contains an example of the results of Phase 3, Stage 1, Step 3 of the 
interpretive analysis of problem solving Workshop 1B. It provides the brainstorm data for all 
inter-actions of Workshop 1B. 
(The bold face texts constitute inter-actions and are numbered as such). 
 
1. Theo: You in your community have been given money to run one workshop 
(Looks at the newsprint with problem that hangs on the wall). We must 
discuss. Can you read it again Hilde? (Looks at Hilde). 
• Repeats the question/ brings question to the group. 
• Opens the group discussion. 
• Importance to know problem structure. 
• Sets the task for the group. 
• Stresses the group spirit. 
• Asks to make the problem clearer to authority/ person who poses the problem. 
 
2. Thami: It is not necessary (Looks down and mumbles). 
• Negative response to previous input. 
• Group member denies others the chance of having it clarified. 
• Understands the question and therefore expects others to understand/or sees it as 
sufficient if one group member understands. 
• Has something to say that he is not sure about (mumbles). 
 
3. James: Which workshop shall we use the RDP or the TLC? (Looks at newsprint). 
• Goes back to input one.  
• Goes back to the provided problem. 
• Asks the group for discussion. 
• Asks the group for a joint agreement. 
 
4. Theo: We must choose the one with the women group. 
• Responds to previous input.  
• Implies a duty for the group to choose a particular alternative. 
• Choice based on needs of a particular group. 
• Choice based on information contained in the problem structure. 
• Authoritarian. Offers no verbal reason but perhaps a common held knowledge/ 
opinion. 
 
5. Sipho: We must at least choose one and we must have a reason to choose that one 
(Looks at the newsprint). If we choose the RDP, we have to know why we 
choose that one (Looks at newsprint). 
• Repeats the task to be done. 
• Follows up on all previous inputs. 
• Emphasises need for motivation. 
• Emphasises the joint task. 
• Repeats previous input. 
 
6. Thami: Is it necessary to write down what we choose? (Response to Ayanda 
showing intentions to write on a provided newsprint). 
• Changes the discussion. 
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• Clarificatory question on group process/ rules. 
• Queries the action of a group member. 
 
7. Theo: We need to have a reason for our choice (Ayanda goes to the newsprint 
during the discussion and underlines the arguments while discussion still 
goes on). 
• Repeats the issue of previous inputs. 
• Emphasis on motivation. 
• Emphasises group task/requirement (we). 
• Study of available information as resource. 
• Individual action. 
• Solution will be in problem structure. 
 
8.Theodora: (Interpreter cannot hear what is said). 
 
9. Ayanda: We must continue (Looks at the group). 
• Does not directly respond to previous statements.  
• Gives direction to the group about the group process. 
• Does not acknowledge Theodora's problem. 
 
10. Sipho: To put the question straight. We say we will choose, let us say we choose 
RDP. We must choose between RDP and TLC. We must say why we choose 
the one. We must say why, we choose one, one (Whole group looks at Sipho. 
Sipho looks at Theodora). 
• Proposition to open discussion. 
• Acts upon previous input. 
• Clarifies the question for the group. 
• Indicates the joint action to be taken. 
• Emphasis the aspect of choice and of argumentation. 
 
11. Theo: I will give a direction. In the information we have three points for the RDP: 
one the women, two somebody from the regional government and three the 
business man. TLC has got two points. I will choose TLC. We run a 
workshop on TLC (Looks and points at the newsprint. All laugh 
embarrassed after the input)). 
• Provides an attempt to solve the problem. 
• Provides people with a direction. 
• Uses arguments in favour of both choices from the problem structure. 
• Indicates a personal choice. 
• Chooses for option with least arguments in favour. 
 
12. Thami: Why do you choose TLC? (Looks at Theo). 
• Asks previous input for justification. 
 
13 Theo: Let us make it as if we are in a LODAFF meeting now. We are in a meeting 
now and we are discussing and we are entitled to choose in that meeting 
(Looks at Thami). 
• Does not acknowledge above input/ avoids direct justification. 
• Gives an input on the group process as response. 
• Makes a proposition to the group. 
• Proposes a simulation. 
• Simulation used in order to make problem more real presumably as method to 
enhance problem solving. 
• ‘Entitled to’ is an epistemological issue. 
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14. Ayanda: We must divide ourselves into two groups for a debate and write points 
(Looks at Theo). 
• Input on group process. 
• Offers another method to solve the problem. 
• Debate as a problem solving method. 
• Compilation of arguments as a problem solving method. 
 
15. Theo: For the RDP we write points and for the TLC we write points. We have a 
problem we have to choose the fruitful points. I will chose TLC. I think we 
can run a workshop on TLC. Firstly the TLC. If the RDP works there must 
be a TLC first. We know the condition (All look at Theo except Thami who 
looks at the newsprint). 
• Clarifies and concretises the previous input. 
• Non aggressive way of argumentation. 
• Acknowledgement that choosing is a problem. 
• Input on problem solving - choosing fruitful points. 
• Gives an argument that is not based in the problem structure. 
• Puts his point as a option. 
• Offers a personal decision. 
 
16. James: Yes, the condition (Repeats/ finishes off the sentence of Theo). 
• Refutes the quick, personal decision of previous input. 
• Indicates the need to look at the context in order to make a decision. 
 
17. Theo: The condition in our locals stands. The main thing is to run a workshop on 
the TLC. 
• Responds to previous input. 
• Provides argument from personal experience/ or gives hypothetical example. 
• Re-iterates own personal decision. 
 
18. Ayanda: Your point is that the RDP cannot work without the establishment of the 
TLC? (Looks at Theo). 
• Interprets previous input. 
• Emphasises that it is a point made by one member, still open for contesting it. 
 
19. James: Yes (Nods in agreement). 
• Supports previous input. 
 
20. Theo: The first thing we say is we want the TLC. The RDP cannot run without the 
TLC (Ayanda writes down on paper. Thami looks at the newsprint). 
• Repeats own input. 
• Concurs with previous input. 
• Broadens own choice to it being a group choice. 
 
21. Thami: Wait, wait, are you talking about the TLC ? (Looks at the newsprint). 
• Calls previous input to order. 
• Indicates that the previous speaker is taking the process too fast. 
• Asks clarificatory question. 
 
22. Ayanda: What you must bear in mind there is a committee that works towards the 
establishment of the RDP (Looks at Theo). 
• Reminds about information important for the problem solution. 
• Relies on personal information/not contained in problem structure. 
• Indicates a flaw in previous speaker's though process. 
• Provides first positive argument for alternative RDP. 
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• Does not concur with choice of TLC. 
• Relates posed problem to broader societal context. 
 
23. James: Steering committee. 
• Re-emphasises concept of previous input/ follows on straight from Ayanda. 
 
24. Ayanda: As we have heard here in the Eastern Cape there is a committee that is 
working towards the implementation of the RDP (Looks at Theo). 
• Invokes common experience/ knowledge. 
• Assumes a common knowledge. 
• Elaboration on own input. 
 
25. Thami: Can I not choose the RDP. According to the information there is only 
money to run one workshop and the business man is going to help with 
money for the catering. 50 women who are also interested in a workshop on 
the RDP. They are going to be financed. They are going to benefit from the 
knowledge to run their own projects. And then after the workshop on the 
RDP we can again look for funds to run a workshop on the TLC. (Looks at 
the newsprint, then at Theo. Theodora also looks at the newsprint, others 
look at Thami). 
• Builds on the path that has been paved by the previous speaker to choose for 
alternative that is different from the one already put forward. 
• Requests permission from the group to make a choice. 
• Asks to choose for the alternative that is different from the one that has been put 
forward. 
• Uses information available in the problem structure to motive for choice. 
• Looks at consequences of choice. 
• Uses two of the three arguments in favour of his choice. 
• Tries to soften the choice and move away from absolute dichotomy. 
• Changes the problem structure. 
 
26. Sipho: (All seem eager to respond after this input). We must choose the RDP 
because the women will gain and it will create job opportunities. 
• Concurs with the choice of previous speaker. 
• Puts pressure (we must) on group to concur with him. 
• Provides an argument that is available in the problem structure. 
• Provides an argument not available in problem structure. 
• Repeats argument of previous speaker. 
 
27. Thami: Wait, wait, if we can ... 
• Tells the previous speaker to stop the process. 
• Attempts to make an input. 
 
28. Ayanda: To summarise, we choose the RDP. If we choose the RDP it will help many 
people in the community through employment (Interrupts Thami. Thami 
looks at the newsprint. Theo gets up and gets some paper to write things 
down. James starts writing. Silence). 
• To summarise. 
• Makes a statement for the group. 
• Broadens the argument of 3 members of the group to a group decision. 
• Tries to come to a consensus. 
• Argument is based on knowledge/expectations outside of what was provided in 
problem structure. 
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29. Theo: No, I still stand on the TLC. Firstly, write down the points for RDP. Firstly 
job creation, the women are interested on how to get funds and regional 
something. (Ayanda writes down). I still stand for TLC. First because of the 
69 youth who asked for a workshop on TLG because they feel it will 
prepare them for a new local government. As it stands now, we need to 
proclaim the issue on TLC and TLG because we need to know how things 
will go with our local government because RDP itself is the money itself that 
will be given to the TLG to improve the situation in our locals. In point 3 it 
is written that the municipality wants to know how far the community has 
progressed with the TLC (Theo looks at James. Theodora looks at Theo). 
• Rejects the attempt to come to common viewpoint. 
• Insists on personal choice. 
• Gives an order to the group. 
• Requests all the arguments for one alternative to be recorded. 
• Uses all the arguments given in the problem structure. 
• Argues his choice. 
• Uses two arguments from the existing problem structure. 
• Uses other arguments from personal knowledge/ community life (not contained in 
the problem structure) - namely that the one depends on the strength of the other. 
• Blends the two types of arguments. 
• Some joint thinking between Thami and Theo. 
 
30. James: (Silence, group members smile and look at each other). The RDP 
reconstruction and development programme desk, (James has drawn 
diagram) which has got a committee in the locals and aside from that they 
have their steering committees and these steering committees are going to 
give back to the TLG (municipality). These committees will give back to 
commissions. These commission will have facilitators and co-ordinators and 
relate to Municipalities. The RDP is very important because it gives back to 
many committees like the LODAFFs. One must not look at that 50 women 
written there as the women of the Women's League but as the have nots 
from the community who can benefit from the funding by the business man 
(All look at James. James looks at Theo and then looks at the newsprint and 
points at it). 
• OK: acknowledges the input of previous speaker. 
• Counters previous argument. 
• Use of graphic representation for explanation to the group. 
• Use of graphic representation as aid for thinking. 
• Argues for one alternative. 
• Provides detailed background knowledge on one of the alternatives. 
• Describes the interconnectedness of the two alternatives. 
• Brings personal information as arguments. 
• Combines personal information with information provided (50 women). 
• Interpretation of given information build on own personal experience. 
• Calls upon the group to think like him/social duty (we must). 
• Uses newsprint for information/ as a resource to support argument. 
 
31. Thami: Are you going for RDP? (Looks at James). 
• Response to previous input. 
• Request to state his choice clearly. 
• Question for clarification. 
 
32. James: I go for RDP and the health desk, I do not known now (Others laugh). 
• Responds to previous input. 
• Answers in the affirmative. 
 28
• States choice. 
• Indicates uncertainty to the group about own thinking process. 
 
33. Theo: Ok.(All talk together and laugh). 
• Acknowledges previous input. 
• Prompt to move forward. 
 
34. Thami: What must we do? (Looks at newsprint. All talk together and laugh). 
• Request to the group to give direction for the group work. 
• Includes himself in the group. 
• Looks for communal agreement. 
 
35. James: It must just be written as it is. It will depend on what we all agree on 
between the TLC and the RDP. The main important thing is the RDP, the 
main important thing (Ayanda writes down on paper). 
• Responds to previous input. 
• Gives an advice on the group process. 
• Not sure/ maybe this means that all the pro's and con's must be written down and 
then decided upon. 
• Repeats his choice. 
• Provides a problem solving strategy. 
 
36. Sipho: (Sipho looks at the paper and puts up his hand and interrupts James). To 
make things easier we must follow the steps we used during the problem 
solving. We must discuss the RDP and put the downfalls before we can put 
the TLC as well.  
• Builds on and clarifies an aspect (written down as it is) of the input of the previous 
speaker. 
• Invokes a common experience to explain a problem solving technique (we used) 
• Provides the group with a problem solving strategy/ discuss one alternative (pro’s 
and con's) and then discuss the other. 
 
37. Thami: I agree (to Theo). We have been given a choice between two workshops so 
we must decide, as LODAFF people we must decide for our community 
which should be the first one. As we are discussing here it is the RDP, the 
RDP should be the first workshop. 
• Procedure for problem solving. 
• Confirms the input of previous speaker. 
• Ignores the previous three inputs. 
• Goes back to beginning of discussion and restates the problem. 
• Tries to bring the discussion back on track. 
• Interprets the discussion. 
• Assumes/ proposes a common decision. 
• Repeats the decision/ emphasis on decision. 
 
38. Theo: We have to choose one, Theodora, choose one. We must write down the 
points about the RDP and then the TLC. (Shows Ayanda how to write 
down. All look at this). 
• Ignores suggestion of previous input. 
• Restates the problem. 
• Repeats part of previous input (we have to choose). 
• Argues that in order to solve the problem, the group should use the problem 
solving method suggested in previous input. 
 
39. Thami: We must write down about the RDP (To Ayanda). 
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• Accepts previous input. 
• Indicates what must be done. 
 
40 Ayanda: We must take points for both. Even when we are presenting it we must 
present both points to the panel. We must say why we chose the other point. 
(To Sipho, Thami looks at newsprint. Theodora and Sipho look at Ayanda). 
• Reconfirms previous inputs. 
• Gives direction to the group about the group process. 
• Indicates to present argument for both choices. 
• Indicates importance of motivation. 
 
41. James: Comrade chair can I be released for 5 minutes (Looks at Ayanda and 
Theo). 
• Asks permission from spontaneous group leader to leave group discussion. 
• Input on group process. 
 
42. Theo: Comrade chair I still do not agree on choosing the RDP. Hilde, the group 
does not seem to be agreeing (All look at Hilde). 
• Dissents from the rest of the group. 
• Insists on his personal choice (see previous inputs). 
• Call for outsider to assist. 
• Belief that authority may have answer. 
 
Ayanda: Do we have to choose only one point? (All look at Hilde). 
• Tries to change the problem structure so that there is no need to choose. 
• Assumes that Hilde has the authority to change the problem structure. 
• Indirect request to adjust problem structure to problem solving culture of group. 
 
44. Theo: Can you help in the debate. Some say RDP and others say TLC, what do we 
do, so that we can... (Brings hands together). 
• Second request (repetition) to intervene in group process. 
• Request for outsider to mediate/guidance. 
• Broadens his position to that of others in the group. 
 
45. Hilde: Can't you do that amongst yourselves, you have a group there? 
• Invites the group to solve the problems between them. 
 
46. Theo: They are all standing on the RDP (Looks at Hilde). 
• Expresses his predicament (being alone in his choice). 
• Looks for support from Hilde. 
 
47. Hilde: What does that say? 
• Throws it back to Theo. 
• Demands analysis of group discussion. 
 
48. Ayanda: Let's go, let's go. 
• Encourages the group to solve the problem. 
 
49. Hilde : Theodora what do you think? 
• Elicits participation. 
 
50. Theodora: I think we should choose the workshop on RDP, because in both of 
our locals there are projects and the people really need to know about 
funding. So the RDP would be useful. We only have money for one 
workshop and number five fills the gap. He will do the catering for the 
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workshop and we also have somebody from the regional government who 
wants to see the potential of our people of the LODAFF, only if we run a 
workshop on the RDP (Looks at Hilde and points to the newsprint. All look 
at the newsprint). 
• Responds to previous call for co-operation. 
• Offers a suggestion for a decision. 
• Uses the three arguments provided in the problem structure. 
• Repetition of arguments used in the discussion before. 
• Asks for agreement of outsider (mediator). 
• Looks for justification. 
 
51. Thami: And what are you saying about the people of the TLC? (Looks at Theo a bit 
worried). 
• Asks a question requesting justification of previous speaker. 
• Addresses a shortcoming in the argumentation above (namely TLC people loose 
out). 
• Is worried about unhappiness of Theo. 
 
52. Theo: I want us to run a workshop on the TLC. If you do not have any skills how 
are you going to implement that RDP.  You want to see the potential of your 
LODAFF to be involved in the RDP. If you can choose TLC I think we will 
gain more on how to prepare ourselves for the local government, the main 
government of our local. You understand? (All look at Theo. Thami also 
looks at the newsprint). 
• Wants to know if input is clear. 
• Responds to previous input. 
• Provides arguments for own choice. 
• Arguments based on personal context (not in the problem structure). 
• Expresses personal desire. 
 
53. Thami: This issue of the workshop on the TLC. I think we should run the workshop 
on the RDP. As you can see the municipality asks for the progress with 
educating the community. We can approach the municipality because we 
have no funds. The local municipality will not have funds to run a 
workshop, perhaps the people from the RDP will be able to help. this is the 
advantage of having funds for running only one workshop. At the moment 
we do not have funds. We run the workshop on the TLC after we run the 
workshop on the RDP. Does it make sense? (Looks at Theo and the 
newsprint. Sipho looks at Thami). 
• Acknowledges input of previous speaker. 
• Implicitly rejects position of previous speaker. 
• Tries to do away with dichotomy. 
• Uses argument in favour of the RDP choice which is contained in the problem 
structure. 
• The argument is a repetition of earlier inputs during the discussion. 
• Asks for the group's understanding/ approval. 
 
54. Theo: It makes sense we choose RDP. the RDP includes the TLC, it can 
accommodate the TLG. The municipality and the youth can join the RDP 
workshop and what they discuss and the aim of the workshop will also 
include the TLC (All look at Theo except Thami. Theo looks at the 
newsprint). 
• Confirms the previous input. 
• Changes his approach/ sudden approval of the RDP where before adamant on 
TLC/ compromise. 
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• Changes the problem structure. 
• Includes the one alternative into the other/ reconciles both alternatives into one. 
 
55. Thami: The workshop has two issues, RDP and TLC ? (To Theo. All look confused). 
• Asks clarificatory question. 
• Tries to asses if it suits Theo's needs. 
 
56. Ayanda: We have an advantage because maybe we can get some funds. 
• Repeats an argument in favour of the decided choice. 
• Also implicit possibility of TLC workshop/ pleasing Theo. 
 
57. Thami: Listen, still we are at a disadvantage. The business man will only fund us if 
we run a workshop on the RDP. So if we run a workshop on both we may 
not get the funds (Interrupts Ayanda and speaks to Theo). 
• Asks attention of the group. 
• Provides a criticism based on careful reading of the information provided. 
• Wants to cut previous speaker short. 
 
58. Ayanda: I want to say there will be no problem... (Interrupts Thami). 
• Wants to be heard - tries to overrule being interrupted. 
 
59. Theo: Who will be rapporteur? 
• Changes subject as result of interruption. 
• Input on group process. 
• Request for volunteer to perform a task. 
 
60. Thami: We must write some points and we should be disciplined. (To Ayanda). 
• Input on group process. 
• Input on desired group behaviour. 
• Input on accepted group method (write down some points). 
• Imposes duty. 
 
61. Ayanda: I want to say, there will be no problem if we take the RDP. There will be 
hope for the community. If we bring development to the people we will be 
reducing inflation for the community. (Thami nods in agreement. Sipho and 
Theodora smile. Ayanda writes down). 
• General positive statement. 
• development to the people implies RDP choice/ implicit confirmation of the RDP 
choice. 
• Argument for choice is a  positive consequence. 
• Bringing final group agreement. 
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 APPENDIX 11. 
EXAMPLE OF THE APPLICATION OF THE FIRST READING GUIDE 
ON THE OPERATIONS OF WORKSHOP 1B 
 
This appendix contains an example of the results of the application of the first reading guide 
to all operations of problem solving Workshop 1B. This is the result of Phase 3, Stage 1, Step 
7 of the interpretive-analytical process of Component B.  The bold face text  represents the 
verbatim text of the participants. The number that occurs after some forms of the cognitive-
affective content is the reference number. 
The following abbreviations are used: 
W: workshop 
I: Inter-action 
O: operation 
P: participant 
IF: Immediate Inter-active Function 
C: Cognitive-Affective Content 
UF: Underlying Function 
 
W: 1B  I: 1  O: 1 P: Theo. 
 
You in your community have been given money to run one workshop (looks at the 
newsprint with problem that hangs on the wall). 
 
IF:  INFORM 
C:   FACT: 999  
UF: CONSENSUS U 
 
W:1B   I:1  O:2  P: Theo 
  
We must discuss. 
 
IF: REQUEST 
C: 
UF: TASK 
 
W:1B  I:1  O:3  P: Theo 
 
Can you read it again Hilde? (Looks at Hilde.) 
 
IF: REQUEST 
C: 
UF: TASK 
 
W:1B  I:2  O:1  P: Thami 
 
It is not necessary (looks down and mumbles). 
 
IF: REJECT 
C: OPINION 
UF: OWN NEEDS 
 
W: 1B  I:3  O:1  P: James 
 
Which workshop shall we use the RDP or the TLC? (Looks at the newsprint.) 
IF: INVITE 
C: 
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UF: PARTICIPATION 
 
W:1B   I:4   O:1  P: Theodora 
 
We must choose the one with the women group. 
 
IF: SUGGEST 
C: OPINION 
UF: CONTRIBUTION 
 
W:1B  I:5  O:1  P: Sipho 
 
We must at least choose one and we must have a reason to choose that one (looks at the 
newsprint). 
 
IF: COMMENT 
C: OPINION 
UF: TASK 
 
W:1B   I:5   O:2  P: Sipho 
 
If we choose the RDP, we have to know why we choose that one (looks at the newsprint). 
 
IF: CLARIFY          
C: EXAMPLE         5 1 
UF: CONSENSUS U 
 
W:1B   I:6   O:1  P: Thami 
 
Is it necessary to write down what we choose? (Response to Ayanda showing intentions 
to write on a provided newsprint.) 
 
IF: QUERY 
C: 
UF: TASK 
 
W:1B   I:7   O:1  P: Theo 
 
We need to have a reason for our choice (Ayanda goes to the newsprint during the 
discussion and underlines the arguments while discussion still goes on). 
 
IF: COMMENT 
C: REPETITION      5 2 
UF: CONSENSUS U 
 
W:1B   I:8   O:1   P: Theodora 
 
(Interpreter cannot hear what is said.) 
 
NOT CODED 
 
 
W:1B   I:9   O:1   P: Ayanda 
 
We must continue (looks at the group). 
 
IF: REQUEST 
C: 
UF: TASK 
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W:1B   I:10   O:1   P: Sipho 
 
To put the question straight. We say we will choose, let us say we choose RDP. We must 
choose between RDP and TLC. We must say why we choose the one. We must say why, 
we choose one, one. (Whole group looks at Sipho. Sipho looks at Theodora.) 
 
IF: COMMENT 
C: REPETITION      5 1 
UF: TASK 
 
W:1B   I:11   O:1   P: Theo 
 
I will give a direction. 
 
IF: OFFER 
C: 
UF: TASK 
 
W:1B   I:11   O:2   P: Theo 
 
In the information we have three points for the RDP: one the women, two somebody 
from the regional government and three the business man. TLC has got two points. 
 
IF: INFORM 
C: FACT            999 
UF: CONSENSUS U 
 
W:1B   I:11   O:3   P: Theo 
 
I will choose TLC. We run a workshop on  TLC. (Looks and points at the newsprint. All 
laugh embarrassed after the input.) 
 
IF: SUGGEST 
C: OPINION 
UF: CONTRIBUTION 
 
W:1B   I:12   O:1   P: Thami 
 
Why do you choose TLC? (Looks at Theo.) 
 
IF: SEEK 
C: 
UF: CONSENSUS U 
 
W:1B   I:13   O:1   P: Theo 
 
Let us make it as if we are in a LODAFF meeting now. We are in a meeting now and we 
are discussing and we are entitled to choose in that meeting (looks at Thami). 
 
IF: REQUEST 
C: REPETITION 10 1 
UF: TASK 
 
W:1B   I:14   O:1   P: Ayanda 
 
We must divide ourselves into two groups for a debate and write points (looks at Theo). 
 
IF: REQUEST 
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C: REPETITION 11 3 
UF: TASK 
 
W:1B   I:15   O:1   P: Theo 
 
For the RDP we write points and for the TLC we write points. 
 
IF: COMMENT 
C: INTERPRETATION 14 1 
UF: TASK 
 
W:1B   I:15   O:2   P: Theo 
 
We have a problem, we have to choose the fruitful points. 
 
IF: COMMENT 
C: REPETITION 15 1 
UF: TASK 
 
W:1B   I:15   O:3   P: Theo 
 
I will chose TLC. I think we can run a workshop on TLC. 
 
IF: SUGGEST 
C: REPETITION  11.3 
UF: AMPLIFYING 
 
W:1B   I:15   O:4   P: Theo 
 
Firstly the TLC. If the RDP works, there must be a TLC first. We know the condition. 
(All look at Theo except Thami who looks at the newsprint.) 
 
IF: JUSTIFY          
C: OPINION 
UF: CONTRIBUTION 
 
W:1B   I:16   O:1   P: James 
 
Yes, the condition (repeats/finishes off the sentence of Theo). 
 
IF: SUPPORT          
C: REPETITION      15 4 
UF: CONSENSUS A 
 
W:1B   I:17   O:1   P: Theo 
 
The condition in our locals stands. The main thing is to run a workshop on the TLC. 
 
IF: SUPPORT          
C: REPETITION      15 3  
UF: AMPLIFYING 
 
W:1B   I:18   O:1   P: Ayanda 
 
Your point is that the RDP cannot work without the establishment of the TLC? (Looks 
at Theo.) 
 
IF: SEEK             
C: INFERENCE       16 1 
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UF: CONSENSUS U 
 
W:1B   I:19   O:1   P: James 
 
Yes (nods in agreement). 
 
IF: SUPPORT          
C: OPINION 
UF: CONSENSUS U 
 
W:1B   I:20   O:1   P: Theo 
 
The first thing we say is we want the TLC. 
 
IF: SUGGEST 
C: REPETITION      17 1 
UF: AMPLIFYING 
 
W:1B   I:20   O:2   P: Theo 
 
The RDP cannot run without the TLC. 
 
IF: JUSTIFY          
C: REPETITION      18 1 
UF: AMPLIFYING 
 
W:1B  I:20   O:3   P: Ayanda 
 
(Ayanda writes down Operation 20.2 on paper. Thami looks at the newsprint.) 
 
IF: RECORD           
C: REPETITION      20 2 
UF: MEMORY 
 
W:1B   I:21   O:1   P: Thami 
 
Wait, wait, 
 
IF: REQUEST 
C: 
UF: OWN NEEDS 
 
W:1B   I:21   O:2   P: Thami 
 
are you talking about the TLC? (Looks at the newsprint.) 
 
IF: INQUIRE 
C: 
UF: CONSENSUS U 
 
W:1B   I:22   O:1   P: Ayanda 
 
What you must bear in mind there is a committee that works towards the  
establishment of the RDP (looks at Theo). 
 
IF: INFORM 
C: FACT 
UF: CONTRIBUTION 
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W:1B   I:23   O:1   P: James 
 
Steering committee. 
 
IF: CLARIFY          
C: INTERPRETATION  22 1 
UF: CONSENSUS U 
 
W:1B   I:24   O:1   P: Ayanda 
 
As we have heard here in the Eastern Cape there is a committee that is working towards 
the implementation of the RDP (looks at Theo). 
 
IF: CLARIFY          
C: REPETITION      22 1 
UF: CONSENSUS U 
 
W:1B   I:25   O:1  P: Thami 
 
Can I not choose the RDP. 
 
IF: SUGGEST 
C: REPETITION 4 1 
UF: CONSENSUS U 
 
W:1B   I:25   O:2   P: Thami 
 
According to the information there is only money to run one workshop and the business 
man is going to help with money for the catering. Fifty women who are also interested in 
a workshop on the RDP. They are going to be financed. They are going to benefit from 
the knowledge to run their own projects. 
 
IF: JUSTIFY          
C: REPETITION      11 2 
UF: CONSENSUS A 
 
W:1B   I:25   O:3   P: Thami 
 
And then after the workshop on the RDP we can again look for funds to run a workshop 
on the TLC. (Looks at the newsprint, then at Theo. Theodora also looks at the 
newsprint, others look at Thami.) 
 
IF: SUGGEST 
C: OPINION 
UF: COMPROMISE 
 
W:1B   I:26   O:1   P: Sipho 
 
(All seem eager to respond after this input.) We must choose the RDP, 
 
IF: SUPPORT          
C: REPETITION      25 1 
UF: CONSENSUS A 
 
W:1B   I:26   O:2   P: Sipho 
 
because the women will gain and it will create job opportunities. 
 
IF: JUSTIFY          
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C: REPETITION      25 2 
UF: CONSENSUS A 
 
W:1B   I:27   O:1   P: Thami 
 
Wait, wait, if we can .. 
 
IF: REQUEST 
C: 
UF: OWN NEEDS 
 
W:1B   I:28   O:1   P: Ayanda 
 
To summarise. 
 
IF: COMMENT 
C: REFLECTION 
UF: TASK 
 
W:1B   I:28   O:2   P: Ayanda 
 
 
We choose the RDP. If we choose the RDP it will help many people in the community 
through employment. (Interrupts Thami. Thami looks at the newsprint. Theo gets up 
and gets some paper to write things down.) 
 
IF: SUGGEST 
C: REPETITION      26 1 
UF: CONSENSUS A 
 
W:1B   I:28   O:3   P: James 
 
(James writes down operation 28.2 on paper. the group is silent.) 
 
IF: RECORD           
C: REPETITION      28 2 
UF: MEMORY 
 
W:1B  I:29   O:1   P: Theo 
 
No, I still stand on the TLC. 
 
IF: REJECT           
C: REPETITION      20 1 
UF: OWN IDEAS 
 
W:1B   I:29   O:2   P: Theo 
 
Firstly, write down on NP the points for RDP. 
 
IF: REQUEST 
C: 
UF: TASK 
 
W:1B   I:29   O:3   P: Theo 
 
Firstly job creation, the women are interested on how to get funds and regional 
something. 
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IF: DICTATE 
C: REPETITION      28 3 
UF: MEMORY 
 
W:1B   I:29   O:4   P: Ayanda 
 
(Ayanda writes down Operation 29.3 on paper.) 
 
IF: RECORD           
C: REPETITION      29 3 
UF: MEMORY 
 
W:1B   I:29   O:5   P: Theo 
 
I still stand for TLC. First because of the 69 youth who asked for a workshop on TLG 
because they feel it will prepare them for a new local government. 
 
 
IF: JUSTIFY          
C: FACT            999 
UF: CONTRIBUTION 
 
W:1B   I:29   O:6   P: Theo 
 
As it stands now, we need to proclaim the issue on TLC and TLG because we need to 
know how things will go with our local government because RDP itself is the money 
itself that will be given to the TLG to improve the situation in our locals. 
 
IF: JUSTIFY          
C: INTERPRETATION  999 
UF: CONTRIBUTION 
 
W:1B   I:29   O:7   P: Theo 
 
In point 3 written that the municipality wants to know how far the community has 
progressed with the TLC. (Theo looks at James. Theodora looks at Theo.) 
 
IF: JUSTIFY          
C: FACT            999 
UF: CONTRIBUTION 
 
W:1B   I:30   O:1   P: James 
 
(Silence, group members smile and look at each other.) The RDP reconstruction and 
development programme desk, (James has drawn diagram) which has got a committee 
in the locals and aside from that they have their steering committees and these steering 
committees are going to give back to commissions. These commissions will have 
facilitators and co-ordinators and relate to municipalities. 
 
IF: JUSTIFY          
C: FACT 
UF: CONTRIBUTION 
 
W:1B   I:30   O:2   P: James 
 
The RDP is very important because it gives back to many committees like the 
LODAFFs. 
 
IF: JUSTIFY          
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C: OPINION 
UF: CONTRIBUTION 
 
W:1B   I:30   O:3   P: James 
 
One must not look at that 50 women written there as the women of the Women's League 
but as the have nots from the community who can benefit from the funding by the 
business man. (All look at James. James looks at Theo and then looks at the newsprint 
and points at it.) 
 
IF: JUSTIFY          
C: INTERPRETATION  999 
UF: CONTRIBUTION 
 
W:1B   I:31   O:1   P: Thami 
 
Are you going for RDP? (Looks at James.) 
 
IF: SEEK 
C: 
UF: CONSENSUS A 
 
W:1B   I:32   O:1   P: James 
 
I go for RDP and the health desk, I do not known now. (Others laugh.) 
 
IF: SUPPORT          
C: REPETITION 28 3 
UF: CONSENSUS A 
 
W:1B   I:33   O:1   P: Theo 
 
Ok....(All talk together and laugh.) 
 
IF: COMMENT 
C: REFLECTION 
UF: TASK 
 
W:1B   I:34   O:1   P: Thami 
 
What must we do? (Looks at newsprint. All talk together and laugh.) 
 
IF: INQUIRE 
C: 
UF: TASK 
 
W:1B   I:35   O:1   P: James 
 
It must just be written as it is. It will depend on what we all agree on between the TLC 
and the RDP. 
 
IF: COMMENT 
C: FACT 
UF: TASK 
 
W:1B   I:35   O:2   P: James 
 
The main important thing is the RDP, the main important thing. 
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IF: SUGGEST 
C: REPETITION      32 1 
UF: AMPLIFYING 
 
W:1B   I:35   O:3   P: Ayanda 
 
(Ayanda writes down Operation 25.2 on paper.) 
 
IF: RECORD           
C: REPETITION      35 2 
UF: MEMORY 
 
W:1B   I:36   O:1   P: Sipho 
 
(Sipho looks at the paper and puts up his hand and interrupts James.) To make things 
easier we must follow the steps we used during the problem solving. We must discuss the 
RDP and put the downfalls before we can put the TLC as well. 
 
IF: COMMENT 
C: OPINION 
UF: TASK 
 
W:1B   I:37   O:1   P: Thami 
 
I agree (to Theo). 
 
IF: SUPPORT          
C: OPINION 
UF: TASK 
 
W:1B   I:37   O:2   P: Thami 
 
We have been given a choice between two workshops so we must decide, as LODAFF 
people we must decide for our community which should be the first one. 
 
IF: COMMENT        
C: REPETITION      10 1 
UF: TASK 
 
W:1B   I:37   O:3   P: Thami 
 
As we are discussing here, 
 
IF: COMMENT 
C: REFLECTION 
UF: TASK 
 
W:1B   I:37   O:4   P: Thami 
 
it is the RDP, the RDP should be the first workshop. 
 
IF: SUGGEST 
C: REPETITION      35 3 
UF: CONSENSUS A 
 
W:1B   I:38   O:1   P: Theo 
 
We have to choose one, Theodora, choose one. 
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IF: COMMENT 
C: REPETITION      37 2 
UF: TASK 
 
W:1B   I:38   O:2   P: Theo 
 
We must write down the points about the RDP and the TLC. (Shows Ayanda how to 
write down. All look at this.) 
 
IF: REQUEST 
C: REPETITION 36 1 
UF: TASK 
 
W:1B   I:39   O:1   P: Thami 
 
We must write down about the RDP (to Ayanda).  
 
IF: REQUEST 
C: 
UF: OWN NEEDS 
 
W:1B   I:40   O:1   P: Ayanda 
 
We must make points for both. 
 
IF: SUPPORT          
C: REPETITION      38 2 
UF: TASK 
 
W:1B   I:40   O:2   P: Ayanda 
 
Even when we are presenting it we must present both points to the panel. We must say 
why we chose the other point. (To Sipho, Thami looks at newsprint. Theodora and Sipho 
look at Ayanda.) 
 
IF: COMMENT 
C: OPINION 
UF: TASK 
 
W:1B   I:41   O:1   P: James 
 
Comrade chair can I be released for 5 minutes? (Looks at Ayanda and Theo.) 
 
IF: REQUEST 
C: 
UF: GROUP 
 
W:1B   I:42   O:1   P: Theo 
 
Comrade chair I still do not agree on choosing the RDP. 
 
IF: REJECT           
C: REPETITION      29 1 
UF: OWN IDEAS 
 
W:1B   I:42   O:2   P: Theo 
 
Hilde, the group does not seem to be agreeing (all look at Hilde). 
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IF: COMMENT 
C: REFLECTION 
UF: GROUP 
 
W:1B   I:43   O:1   P: Ayanda 
 
Do we have to choose only one point? (All look at Hilde.) 
 
IF: INQUIRE 
C: 
UF: TASK 
 
W:1B   I:44   O:1   P: Theo 
 
Can you help in the debate (to Hilde). Some say RDP and others say TLC, what do we 
do, so that we can .. (brings hands together). 
 
IF: REQUEST 
C: 
UF: GROUP 
 
W:1B   I:45   O:1   P: Hilde 
 
Can't you do that amongst yourselves, you have a group there? 
 
IF: REQUEST 
C: 
UF: GROUP 
 
W:1B   I:46   O:1   P: Theo 
 
They are all standing on the RDP (looks at Hilde). 
 
IF: COMMENT 
C: INFERENCE  
UF: OWN NEEDS 
 
W:1B   I:47   O:1   P: Hilde 
 
What does that say? 
 
IF: INQUIRE 
C: 
UF: GROUP 
 
W:1B   I:48   O:1   P: Ayanda 
 
Let's go, let's go. 
 
IF: REQUEST 
C: 
UF: TASK 
 
W:1B   I:49   O:1   P: Hilde 
 
Theodora what do you think? 
 
IF: INVITE 
C: 
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UF: PARTICIPATION 
 
W:1B   I:50   O:1   P: Theodora 
 
I think we should choose the workshop on RDP, 
 
IF: SUGGEST 
C: REPETITION      37 4 
UF: CONSENSUS A 
 
W:1B   I:50   O:2   P: Theodora 
 
because in both of our locals there are projects and the people really need to know about 
funding. So the RDP would be useful. 
 
IF: JUSTIFY          
C: FACT  999 
UF: CONTRIBUTION 
 
W:1B   I:50   O:3   P: Theodora 
 
We only have money for one workshop and number five fills the gap. He will do the 
catering for the workshop and we also have somebody from the regional government 
who wants to see the potential of our people of the LODAFF, only if we run a workshop 
on the RDP. (Looks at Hilde and points at the newsprint. All look at the newsprint.) 
 
IF: JUSTIFY          
C: FACT            999 
UF: CONTRIBUTION 
 
W:1B   I:51   O:1   P: Thami 
 
And what are you saying about the people of the TLC? (Looks at Theo a bit worried.) 
 
IF: INVITE 
C: 
UF: PARTICIPATION 
 
W:1B   I:52   O:1   P: Theo 
 
I want us to run a workshop on the TLC. 
 
IF: SUGGEST 
C: REPETITION      42 1 
UF: OWN IDEAS 
 
W:1B   I:52  O:2   P: Theo 
 
If you do not have any skills how are you going to implement that RDP? You want to see 
the potential of your LODAFF to be involved in the RDP. 
 
IF: QUERY            
C: INFERENCE       999 
UF: OWN IDEAS 
 
W:1B   I:52   O:3   P: Theo 
 
If you can choose TLC I think we will gain more on how to prepare ourselves for the 
local government, the main government of our local. 
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IF: JUSTIFY          
C: OPINION 
UF: CONTRIBUTION 
 
W:1B   I:52   O:4   P: Theo 
 
You understand? (All look at Theo. Thami also looks at the newsprint.) 
 
IF: SEEK 
C: 
UF: CONSENSUS U 
 
W:1B   I:53   O:1   P: Thami 
 
This issue of the workshop on the TLC. I think we should run the workshop on the RDP. 
 
IF: REJECT           
C: REPETITION      50 1 
UF: OWN IDEAS 
 
W:1B   I:53   O:2   P: Thami 
 
As you can see the municipality asks for the progress with educating the community. 
 
IF: INFORM 
C: REPETITION      29 7 
UF: CONSENSUS U 
 
W:1B   I:53   O:3   P: Thami 
 
We can approach the municipality because we have no funds. 
 
IF: SUGGEST 
C: OPINION 
UF: COMPROMISE 
 
W:1B   I:53   O:4   P: Thami 
 
The local municipality will not have funds to run a workshop, perhaps the people from 
the RDP will be able to help. This is the advantage of having funds for the running only 
one workshop. 
 
IF: SUGGEST  
C: OPINION  
UF: COMPROMISE 
 
W:1B   I:53   O:5   P: Thami 
 
At the moment we do not have funds. We run the workshop on the TLC after we run the 
workshop on the RDP. 
 
IF: SUGGEST 
C: REPETITION      25 3 
UF: COMPROMISE 
 
W:1B   I:53   O:6   P: Thami 
 
Does it make sense? (Looks at Theo and the newsprint Sipho looks at Thami.) 
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IF: SEEK 
C: 
UF: CONSENSUS U 
 
W:1B   I:54   O:1   P: Theo 
 
It makes sense we choose RDP. 
 
IF: SUPPORT          
C: REPETITION  53 1 
UF: CONSENSUS A 
 
W:1B   I:54   O:2   P: Theo 
 
The RDP includes the TLC, it can accommodate the TLG. The municipality and the 
youth can join the RDP workshop and what they discuss and the aim of the workshop 
will also include the TLC. (All look at Theo except Thami. Theo looks at the newsprint.) 
 
IF: JUSTIFY          
C: OPINION 
UF: COMPROMISE 
 
W:1B   I:55   O:1   P: Thami 
 
The workshop has two issues, RDP and TLC? (To Theo. All look confused.) 
 
IF: INQUIRE 
C: 
UF: CONSENSUS U 
 
W:1B   I:56   O:1   P: Ayanda 
 
We have an advantage because maybe we can get some funds. 
 
IF: SUGGEST 
C: REPETITION      53 4 
UF: CONSENSUS A 
 
W:1B   I:57   O:1   P: Thami 
 
Listen, Still we are at a disadvantaged. 
 
IF: REJECT           
C: INTERPRETATION  999 
UF: OWN IDEAS 
 
W:1B   I:57   O:2   P: Thami 
 
The business man will only fund us if we run a workshop on the RDP. 
 
IF: JUSTIFY          
C: INTERPRETATION  999 
UF: CONSENSUS U 
 
W:1B   I:57   O:3   P: Thami 
 
So if we run a workshop on both we may not get the funds (interrupts Ayanda and 
speaks to Theo). 
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IF: CLARIFY          
C: INFERENCE       999 
UF: CONSENSUS U 
 
W:1B   I:58   O:1   P: Ayanda 
 
I want to say there will be no problem ... (interrupts Thami). 
 
IF: SUPPORT          
C: REPETITION      54 1 
UF: CONSENSUS A 
 
W:1B  I:59   O:1   P: Theo 
 
Who will be rapporteur? 
 
IF: REQUEST 
C: 
UF: TASK 
 
W:1B   I:60   O:1   P: Thami 
 
We must write some points. 
 
IF: REQUEST 
C: 
UF: TASK 
 
W:1B   I:60   O:2   P: Thami 
 
and we should be disciplined (to Ayanda). 
 
IF: COMMENT 
C: OPINION 
UF: GROUP 
 
W:1B   I:61   O:1   P: Ayanda 
 
I want to say, there will be no problem if we take the RDP. 
 
IF: SUGGEST 
C: OPINION 
UF: CONSENSUS A 
 
W:1B   I:61   O:2   P: Ayanda 
 
There will be hope for the community. If we bring development to the people we will be 
reducing inflation for the community. (Thami nods in agreement. Sipho and Theodora 
smile.) 
 
IF: SUGGEST 
C: OPINION 
UF: CONSENSUS A 
 
W:1B   I:61   O:3   P: Ayanda 
 
(Ayanda writes down operation 61.2 on paper.) 
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IF: RECORD           
C: REPETITION      61 2 
UF: MEMORY 
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APPENDIX 12. 
THEORETICAL DIAGRAMS 
 
This appendix consists of 12 figures, each of which contains one theoretical diagram. Three 
diagrams for each of the four sets of data. To assist the reader examine these diagrams, each 
theoretical diagram is referenced against the data set from which it is derived and the specific 
meta-cognitive aspect which is examined, using the following grid:  
 
The four data sets are : 
Data Set A: Pre-workshop interviews 
Data Set B: Post-workshop interviews 
Data Set C: Group discussions 
Data set D: Additional sample interviews 
 
The three  meta-cognitive aspects are: 
1. Conceptual knowledge of the concept problem  
2. Conceptual knowledge of the concept problem solving 
3. Procedural knowledge of problem solving 
 
Thus for example a diagram entitled Data Set C - 1 refers to Conceptual knowledge of the 
concept problem derived from the Group discussions data.
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  PROBLEM   
  A problem exists when a person experiences an 
impediment to her individual progress in society 
  
     
 
CAUSES  SPHERES OF LIFE  EFFECT 
Problems can be classified according to cause:  Problems can be experienced:  The effect of a problem is: 
 
1. Unacceptable behaviour by the one who has the 
problem 
 ∗ In the family 
∗ At work 
∗ In social groups 
∗ In the community 
 ∗ A pervasive feeling of unhappiness and 
frustration 
∗ A feeling of social isolation 
2. Unacceptable behaviour by others/society 
3. An unfulfilled personal need by the one who 
has the problem: 
∗ Material need 
∗ Non-material need  
• Knowledge 
• Skills 
• Opportunity 
    
 
Figure 1. Theoretical diagram of the Conceptual knowledge of the concept problem / Pre-workshop interviews (Data Set A - 1) 
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PROBLEM SOLVING    ATTITUDES 
Problem solving is an emotive, cognitive and action process, requiring effort and concentration by the people 
involved, aimed to overcome a problem. This process requires certain attitudes, relies on actions and the use of 
resources. 
   ∗ Motivation/dedication  
∗ Social sensitivity/fairness 
   
 
  
ROLE PLAYERS  PROCESS  AFFECT 
1. The person who perceives the problem (that person retains the prime 
responsibility for solving the problem). This can be: 
∗ The person who causes the problem  
∗ The person who suffers from the problem 
 The various stages in the process of problem 
solving can involve individual and/or 
interactive actions. Interactive actions involve 
communication between various role players. 
The more difficult a problem is perceived to 
be the more interactive strategies will be 
 The problem solving process is: 
∗ Enjoyable 
∗ Challenging 
2. Outsiders  may be involved:     
People in the problem bearer's environment who can assist because 
of  
 RESOURCES  EFFECT 
the resources they possess or their attitude towards the problem 
bearer: 
∗ Experts (an expert in problem solving is a person who is qualified 
as a social service practitioner (priest, social  worker, teacher) 
∗ People who empathise (friends /family)  
∗ People with experience 
∗ Mediator 
The intensity of these people's involvement can range from very low 
to very high 
 ∗ Experience/Memory 
∗ Expertise: 
• Knowledge 
• Skills: 
− Social 
− Technical 
− Cognitive 
∗ Material resources: books 
 The effect of the problem 
solving process is: 
∗ Restoration of social 
equilibrium 
∗ Satisfaction of those 
involved 
∗ Gainful experience for those 
who were involved  
Figure 2. Theoretical diagram of the Conceptual knowledge of the concept problem solving / Pre-workshop interviews (Data Set A - 2) 
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  PROBLEM SOLVING PROCEDURE   
   
 
 
 
  
PROCESS  SOLUTIONS  ACTIONS DURING THE PROCESS 
1. Accurately analysing the problem:  
∗ Context: who is involved? 
∗ History: what happened in which order? 
2. Classifying the problem:  
∗ What type of problem is it? / identification 
of the cause  
 ∗ Avoiding the cause of the problem 
∗ Re-defining the problem structure  
∗ Asking advice   
∗ Integrating ideas and opinions of the two 
conflicting parties 
∗ Reaching consensus  
 ∗ Thinking  
∗ Talking  
∗ Listening  
∗ Clarifying  
∗ Mediating  
∗ Providing 
arguments  
∗ Motivating 
3. Identifying the solution 
∗ Selecting the specific solution for the 
identified problem  
4. Planning the implementation  
5. Executing the plan  
(In the case of a problem being caused by a 
person’s perception of a lack of satisfactory 
participation in social life, emotional support 
and/or technical advice from others may be elicited 
at any stage of this process). 
    
 
Figure 3. Theoretical diagram of the Procedural knowledge of problem solving / Pre-workshop interviews (Data Set A - 3) 
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  PROBLEM   
  A problem exists when a group experiences a 
disagreement 
  
   
 
  
CAUSES    EFFECT 
Problems are caused by the group's experiences 
of: 
∗ Lack of knowledge (confusion)/resources 
∗ Dilemma 
∗ Inability to achieve a goal/unfulfilled task 
   A problem causes:  
∗ Feeling of apprehension by the group members  
∗ Experience of frustration 
 
Figure 4. Theoretical diagram of the Conceptual knowledge of the concept problem / Post-Workshop interviews (Data Set B - 1) 
 
  PROBLEM SOLVING   
  Problem solving is a group process by which 
committed members of the group, through joint 
effort, reach a consensus as the result of a  
process of argumentation. 
  
     
 
ROLE PLAYERS  RESOURCES  EFFECT  ATTITUDES 
All members of the group who 
perceive the problem (One member 
of the group may emerge as a 
leader) 
 ∗ Skills 
∗ Evidence: Personal experience 
∗ Leadership 
∗ Information gathering skills 
∗ Authority 
 ∗ Satisfaction of all involved  
∗ Gain by all involved   
∗ Fulfillment of need 
 ∗ Fairness  
 
Figure 5. Theoretical diagram of the Conceptual knowledge of the concept problem solving / Post-Workshop interviews (Data Set B - 2)
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  PROBLEM SOLVING PROCEDURE   
   
 
  
PROCESS    ACTIONS 
1. Identifying the problem 
2. Accurately analysing the problem (involves 
gathering information)  
3. Deciding on the solution to the problem  
∗ Compiling suggestions for the solution of 
the problem   
∗ Compiling arguments for and against the 
suggestions   
∗ Reaching consensus   
4. Implementing the solution 
   During the process the following actions take 
place: 
∗ Suggesting 
∗ Comparing 
∗ Arguing 
∗ Convincing 
∗ Clarifying 
∗ Opposing 
∗ Confirming 
∗ Eliminating 
∗ Prioritising 
∗ Giving direction 
∗ Compromising 
∗ Encouraging participation 
 
Figure 6. Theoretical diagram of the Procedural knowledge of problem solving / Post-Workshop interviews (Data Set B - 3)
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  PROBLEM   
  A problem exists when a person 
experiences/perceives an obstacle to her progress. 
  
   
 
  
CAUSES  SPHERES OF LIFE  EFFECT 
Problems are caused by: 
1.  Unacceptable behaviour by the one who has the 
problem  
2.  Unacceptable behaviour by others/the society  
3.  An unfulfilled personal need/desire by the one 
who has the problem: 
 Problems can be experienced: 
∗ In group/community  
 
 The effect of a problem is:  
∗ An unpleasant feeling  
∗ Social isolation  
∗ Disruption of the social fabric  
∗ Feeling of not being able to cope/irritation 
 
∗ Material  
∗ Non-material  
• Knowledge  
• Skills  
• Opportunity 
    
Figure 7. Theoretical diagram of the Conceptual knowledge of the concept problem / Group discussions (Data Set C - 1)
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  PROBLEM SOLVING   
  Problem solving is an action process by which an 
obstacle is overcome and which restores the social 
flow. This process requires effort and concentration 
by those involved 
  
   
 
  
ROLE PLAYERS  ATTITUDES 
1. The person who perceives the problem (that person retains the prime responsibility for solving the 
problem). This can be: 
 Flexibility 
∗ The one who cause the problem  
∗ The one who is directly victimised  
2. Those who are indirectly victimised  
3. Outsiders may be involved:  
4. People in the problem bearer's environment who can assist because of the resources they possess or their 
attitude towards the problem bearer:  
∗ Experts (an expert in problem solving is a person who is qualified as a social service practitioner (priest, 
social worker, teacher)  
∗ People who empathise (friends /family)  
∗ People with experience  
∗ Mediator  
The intensity of these people's involvement can range from very low to very high. 
  
 
Figure 8. Theoretical diagram of the Conceptual knowledge of the concept problem solving / Group discussions (Data Set C - 2)
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  PROBLEM SOLVING PROCEDURE   
   
 
  
PROCESS  SOLUTIONS  ACTIONS 
1. Identifying the problem  
2. Analysing the cause of the problem  
3. Selecting the right solution 
 ∗ Asking help  
∗ Integrating ideas  
∗ Coming to a consensus  
 
 During the process the following actions take 
place: 
1. By the involved:  
∗ Thinking 
∗ Listening  
∗ Talking  
2. By the mediator:  
∗ Mediation  
 
Figure 9. Theoretical diagram of the Procedural knowledge of problem solving / Group discussions (Data Set C - 3)
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  PROBLEM   
  A person has a problem when she perceives an 
obstacle to her  progress. A group has a problem 
when there is disagreement 
  
    
 
 
TIME FRAME  CAUSES  LIFE SPHERE  EFFECT 
∗ Some problems are long term  
∗ Some problems are short 
term  
∗ Problems get progressively 
worse over time if not solved  
 Problems are caused by: 
1. Unacceptable behaviour by the one who has 
the problem  
2. Unacceptable behaviour by others/the 
society  
(In this situation a problem involves  a 
perpetrator and a victim)  
 Problems can be experienced: 
∗ In the family  
∗ At the workplace  
∗ In social groups/organisations 
∗ In the community 
 The effect of a problem is: 
∗ A pervasive feeling of 
inability to cope/frustration  
∗ A danger to people involved: 
physically and mentally  
∗ Disruption of the social 
fabric. 
  3. An unfulfilled personal need by the one 
who has the problem: 
∗ Material need   
∗ Non-material need:  
• Knowledge  
• Skills  
• Opportunity  
• Capacity  
4. Disagreement in a group due to:  
∗ Clashing viewpoints/needs in a group  
∗ Misunderstanding in a group 
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Figure 10. Theoretical diagram of the Conceptual knowledge of the concept problem / Additional sample interviews (Data Set D - 1)
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PROBLEM SOLVING    RESOURCES 
Problem solving is an emotive, cognitive and action process, requiring effort and concentration by the people 
involved, aimed to overcome a problem. This process requires certain attitudes, relies on the application of 
actions and the use of resources.  
   The following resources may be called upon in solving 
problems:  
∗ Educational qualifications  
    ∗ Experience  
∗ Institutions 
ROLE PLAYERS  ATTITUDES  For group problem solving in particular:  
In individual problem: 
1. Those involved:  
 The problem bearer. This can be: 
∗ The problem causer 
 Problem solving requires the following 
attitudes:  
1. The person who perceives the 
problem:  
∗ Discipline  
 ∗ Skills:  
• Conflict management  
• Negotiation  
• Leadership 
∗ The affected  ∗ Trust   
2. Outsiders may be involved:   ∗ The external party:  AFFECT 
∗ Experts (an expert in problem solving is a person 
who is qualified as a social service practitioner 
(priest, social worker, teacher) 
∗ Friends (who can empathise) 
 ∗ Caring  
∗ Trustworthiness  
∗ Impartiality  
∗ Observant: 
 ∗ Problem solving is experienced as:  
∗ Difficult  
∗ Satisfying  
∗ Requiring a lot of psychic energy 
∗ People with a certain status (as a result of position 
in  
 2. All people involved in problem 
solving  
  
an organisation)  ∗ Honesty   EFFECT 
∗ A neutral third part 
 The intensity of these people's involvement can range 
from very low to very high 
In group problem:  
2. All group members  
Sometimes one group member becomes a group leader
 ∗ Confidence  
∗ Concentration 
∗ Social sensitivity  
∗ Fairness  
∗ Flexibility  
∗ Motivation 
 1. For outsiders who assist with the problem solving  
∗ Increases social acceptability  
2. For the one(s) who perceive(s) the problem:  
∗ Relief  
∗ Satisfaction of need  
3. In general:  
∗ Restoration of social equilibrium 
 
Figure 11. Theoretical diagram of the Conceptual knowledge of the concept problem solving/ Additional sample interviews (Data Set D - 2)
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  PROBLEM SOLVING PROCEDURE   
 
 
    
PROCESS  SOLUTIONS  ACTIONS 
1. Acknowledging/accepting that there is a 
problem  
2. Accurately analysing the problem:  
∗ Contextualisation  
∗ Integrating different viewpoints/  
∗ Tracing the history of the problem  
∗ identifying the role players (victims and 
perpetrators)  
3. Identifying/classifying the type of problem 
(what is its cause)  
4. Selecting the right solution congruent with the 
type of problem  
 Possible solutions are:  
1. By the one who perceives the problem 
∗ Avoiding the problem  
∗ If problem is own bad behaviour: changing 
own behaviour/accepting the blame  
∗ Redefining the problem  
∗ Asking for help  
2. By the group leader  
∗ Eliciting and integrating ideas  
∗ Coming to a consensus  
 Possible actions during the problem solving 
process:  
1. By the one who perceives the problem:  
∗ Intra-psychic  
∗ Thinking  
∗ Interactive:  
∗ Sharing the frustration with others  
2. By the outsiders who are approached for help:  
∗ Referring to others  
∗ Empathising  
∗ Giving advice 
5. Planning the execution of the solution  
6. Implementing the plan 
At any stage of this process the one who perceives 
the problem may seek assistance. If the problem is 
in a group, this process is a joint effort of all 
involved. 
    3. By the neutral third party:  
∗ Mediating  
4. By the group: 
∗ Sharing ideas  
∗ Combining skills  
    ∗ Convincing  
5. By the group leader  
∗ Giving direction  
∗ Co-ordinating  
6. By all involved in problem solving:  
∗ Concretising 
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Figure 12. Theoretical diagram of the Procedural knowledge of problem solving/ Additional sample interviews (Data Set D - 3) 
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APPENDIX 13. 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES OF THE WORKSHOP OPERATIONS IN 
TERMS OF THE FREQUENCY OF: IF/C/UF 
 
This appendix contains 11 Tables. Table 1 shows the quantitative analysis for all operations 
(across all workshops). The next 10 Tables (Tables 2 -11) show the quantitative analyses for 
each of the 10 workshops respectively. 
 
Table 1. The frequency of the different forms of: the Immediate Inter-active Function 
(IF) (Block A); the Cognitive-Affective Content (C) (Block B); the Underlying 
Function (UF) (Block C) for all workshops combined. 
Block A    Block B Block C 
Forms of IF n. %  Forms of C n. % Forms of UF n. % 
CLARIFY 181 9.69  EXAMPLE 21 1.12 AMPLIFYING 64 3.43
COMMENT 187 10.01  FACT 146 7.82 COMPROMISE 13 0.70
DICTATE 57 3.05  INFERENCE 129 6.91 CONSENSUS A 260 13.92
INFORM 129 6.91  INTERPRETATION 141 7.55 CONSENSUS U 475 25.43
INQUIRE 121 6.48  OPINION 368 19.70 CONTRIBUTION 166 8.89
INVITE 91 4.87  REFLECTION 91 4.87 GROUP 51 2.73
JUSTIFY 186 9.96  REPETITION 575 30.67 MEMORY 156 8.35
OFFER 15 0.80  UNCODED 16 0.86 OWN IDEAS 108 5.78
QUERY 48 2.57  NO CONTENT 363 19.54 OWN NEEDS 75 4.02
RECORD 85 4.55  PARTICIPATION 91 4.87
REJECT 81 4.34  TASK 375 20.07
REQUEST 163 8.73  UNCODED 16 0.86
SEEK 48 2.57  
SUGGEST 220 11.78  
SUPPORT 222 11.88  
UNCODED 16 0.86  
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Table 2. The frequency of the different forms of: the Immediate Inter-active Function 
(IF) (Block A); the Cognitive-Affective Content (C) (Block B); the Underlying 
Function (UF) (Block C) for Workshop 1A. 
Block A    Block B Block C 
Forms of IF n. %  Forms of C n. % Forms of UF n. % 
CLARIFY 6 6.82  EXAMPLE 1 1.14 AMPLIFYING 9 10.23
COMMENT 7 7.95  FACT 5 5.68 COMPROMISE 0 0.00
DICTATE 3 3.41  INFERENCE 6 6.82 CONSENSUS A 22 25.00
INFORM 4 4.55  INTERPRETATION 7 7.95 CONSENSUS U 14 15.91
INQUIRE 1 1.14  OPINION 21 23.86 CONTRIBUTION 14 15.91
INVITE 4 4.55  REFLECTION 4 4.55 GROUP 2 2.27
JUSTIFY 26 29.55  REPETITION 30 34.09 MEMORY 6 6.82
OFFER 1 1.14  UNCODED 0 0.00 OWN IDEAS 0 0.00
QUERY 0 0.00  NO CONTENT 14 15.91 OWN NEEDS 2 2.27
RECORD 4 4.55  PARTICIPATION 4 4.55
REJECT 0 0.00  TASK 15 17.05
REQUEST 7 7.95  UNCODED 0 0.00
SEEK 5 5.68  
SUGGEST 5 5.68  
SUPPORT 15 17.05  
UNCODED 0 0.00  
 
Table 3.  The frequency of the different forms of: the Immediate Inter-active Function 
(IF) (Block A); the Cognitive-Affective Content (C) (Block B); the Underlying 
Function (UF) (Block C) for Workshop 1B. 
Block A    Block B Block C 
Forms of IF n. %  Forms of C n. % Forms of UF n. % 
CLARIFY 4 3.67  EXAMPLE 1 0.92 AMPLIFYING 5 4.59
COMMENT 16 14.68  FACT 8 7.34 COMPROMISE 5 4.59
DICTATE 1 0.92  INFERENCE 4 3.67 CONSENSUS A 14 12.84
INFORM 4 3.67  INTERPRETATION 6 5.50 CONSENSUS U 15 13.76
INQUIRE 5 4.59  OPINION 19 17.43 CONTRIBUTION 13 11.93
INVITE 3 2.75  REFLECTION 4 3.67 GROUP 6 5.50
JUSTIFY 15 13.76  REPETITION 37 35.83 MEMORY 6 5.50
OFFER 1 0.92  UNCODED 1 0.92 OWN IDEAS 6 5.50
QUERY 2 1.83  NO CONTENT 29 24.72 OWN NEEDS 5 4.59
RECORD 5 4.59  PARTICIPATION 3 2.75
REJECT 5 4.59  TASK 30 27.52
REQUEST 16 14.68  UNCODED 1 0.92
SEEK 5 4.59  
SUGGEST 17 15.60  
SUPPORT 9 8.26  
UNCODED 1 0.92  
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Table 4.  The frequency of the different forms of: the Immediate Inter-active Function 
(IF) (Block A); the Cognitive-Affective Content (C) (Block B); the Underlying 
Function (UF) (Block C) for Workshop 2A. 
Block A    Block B Block C 
Forms of IF n. %  Forms of C n. % Forms of UF n. % 
CLARIFY 17 7.33  EXAMPLE 2 0.86 AMPLIFYING 1 0.43
COMMENT 38 16.38  FACT 21 9.05 COMPROMISE 1 0.43
DICTATE 8 3.45  INFERENCE 14 6.03 CONSENSUS A 38 16.38
INFORM 16 6.90  INTERPRETATION 6 2.59 CONSENSUS U 65 28.02
INQUIRE 20 8.62  OPINION 49 21.12 CONTRIBUTION 10 4.31
INVITE 2 0.86  REFLECTION 12 5.17 GROUP 8 3.45
JUSTIFY 8 3.45  REPETITION 81 34.91 MEMORY 14 6.03
OFFER 3 1.29  UNCODED 0 0.00 OWN IDEAS 9 3.88
QUERY 7 3.02  NO CONTENT 47 20.26 OWN NEEDS 7 3.02
RECORD 6 2.59  PARTICIPATION 2 0.86
REJECT 10 4.31  TASK 77 33.19
REQUEST 24 10.34  UNCODED 0 0.00
SEEK 5 2.16  
SUGGEST 25 10.78  
SUPPORT 43 18.53  
UNCODED 0 0.00  
 
Table 5.  The frequency of the different forms of: the Immediate Inter-active Function 
(IF) (Block A); the Cognitive-Affective Content (C) (Block B); the Underlying 
Function (UF) (Block C) for Workshop 2B. 
Block A    Block B Block C 
Forms of IF n. %  Forms of C n. % Forms of UF n. % 
CLARIFY 21 12.07  EXAMPLE 3 1.72 AMPLIFYING 8 4.60
COMMENT 8 4.60  FACT 11 6.32 COMPROMISE 0 0.00
DICTATE 11 6.32  INFERENCE 19 10.92 CONSENSUS A 27 15.52
INFORM 6 3.45  INTERPRETATION 13 7.47 CONSENSUS U 43 24.71
INQUIRE 12 6.90  OPINION 28 16.09 CONTRIBUTION 21 12.07
INVITE 12 6.90  REFLECTION 4 2.30 GROUP 4 2.30
JUSTIFY 11 6.32  REPETITION 53 30.46 MEMORY 18 10.34
OFFER 3 1.72  UNCODED 3 1.72 OWN IDEAS 8 4.60
QUERY 0 0.00  NO CONTENT 40 22.99 OWN NEEDS 1 0.57
RECORD 10 5.75  PARTICIPATION 12 6.90
REJECT 5 2.87  TASK 29 16.67
REQUEST 10 5.75  UNCODED 3 1.72
SEEK 5 2.87  
SUGGEST 30 17.24  
SUPPORT 27 15.52  
UNCODED 3 1.72  
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Table 6.  The frequency of the different forms of: the Immediate Inter-active Function 
(IF) (Block A); the Cognitive-Affective Content (C) (Block B); the Underlying 
Function (UF) (Block C) for Workshop 3A 
 
Block A    Block B Block C 
Forms of IF n. %  Forms of C n. % Forms of UF n. % 
CLARIFY 6 5.08  EXAMPLE 0 0.00 AMPLIFYING 5 4.24
COMMENT 11 9.32  FACT 12 10.17 COMPROMISE 1 0.85
DICTATE 0 0.00  INFERENCE 10 8.47 CONSENSUS A 29 24.58
INFORM 3 2.54  INTERPRETATION 8 6.78 CONSENSUS U 18 15.25
INQUIRE 5 4.24  OPINION 30 25.42 CONTRIBUTION 25 21.19
INVITE 14 11.86  REFLECTION 3 2.54 GROUP 1 0.85
JUSTIFY 25 21.19  REPETITION 36 30.51 MEMORY 0 0.00
OFFER 0 0.00  UNCODED 0 0.00 OWN IDEAS 7 5.93
QUERY 4 3.39  NO CONTENT 19 16.10 OWN NEEDS 2 1.69
RECORD 0 0.00  PARTICIPATION 14 11.86
REJECT 4 3.39  TASK 16 13.56
REQUEST 2 1.69  UNCODED 0 0.00
SEEK 7 5.93  
SUGGEST 19 16.10  
SUPPORT 18 15.25  
UNCODED 0 0.00  
 
Table 7.  The frequency of the different forms of: the Immediate Inter-active Function 
(IF) (Block A); the Cognitive-Affective Content (C) (Block B); the Underlying 
Function (UF) (Block C) for Workshop 3B 
 
Block A    Block B Block C 
Forms of IF n. %  Forms of C n. % Forms of UF n. % 
CLARIFY 9 6.43  EXAMPLE 0 0.00 AMPLIFYING 10 7.14
COMMENT 8 5.71  FACT 15 10.71 COMPROMISE 3 2.14
DICTATE 0 0.00  INFERENCE 8 5.71 CONSENSUS A 25 17.86
INFORM 9 6.43  INTERPRETATION 19 13.57 CONSENSUS U 25 17.86
INQUIRE 4 2.86  OPINION 41 29.29 CONTRIBUTION 22 15.71
INVITE 12 8.57  REFLECTION 6 4.29 GROUP 2 1.43
JUSTIFY 29 20.71  REPETITION 28 20.00 MEMORY 0 0.00
OFFER 0 0.00  UNCODED 0 0.00 OWN IDEAS 24 17.14
QUERY 10 7.14  NO CONTENT 23 16.43 OWN NEEDS 2 1.43
RECORD 0 0.00  PARTICIPATION 12 8.57
REJECT 9 6.43  TASK 15 10.71
REQUEST 9 6.43  UNCODED 0 0.00
SEEK 1 0.71  
SUGGEST 24 17.14  
SUPPORT 16 11.43  
UNCODED 0 0.00  
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Table 8.  The frequency of the different forms of: the Immediate Inter-active Function 
(IF) (Block A); the Cognitive-Affective Content (C) (Block B); the Underlying 
Function (UF) (Block C) for Workshop 4A 
 
Block A    Block B Block C 
Forms of IF n. %  Forms of C n. % Forms of UF n. % 
CLARIFY 18 10.11  EXAMPLE 7 3.93 AMPLIFYING 4 2.25
COMMENT 16 8.99  FACT 5 2.81 COMPROMISE 0 0.00
DICTATE 7 3.93  INFERENCE 9 5.06 CONSENSUS A 29 16.29
INFORM 4 2.25  INTERPRETATION 19 10.67 CONSENSUS U 44 24.72
INQUIRE 18 10.11  OPINION 31 17.42 CONTRIBUTION 12 6.74
INVITE 5 2.81  REFLECTION 10 5.62 GROUP 7 3.93
JUSTIFY 24 13.48  REPETITION 57 32.02 MEMORY 18 10.11
OFFER 0 0.00  UNCODED 3 1.69 OWN IDEAS 11 6.18
QUERY 4 2.25  NO CONTENT 37 20.79 OWN NEEDS 12 6.74
RECORD 11 6.18  PARTICIPATION 5 2.81
REJECT 7 3.93  TASK 33 18.54
REQUEST 17 9.55  UNCODED 3 1.69
SEEK 2 1.12  
SUGGEST 13 7.30  
SUPPORT 29 16.29  
UNCODED 3 1.69  
 
Table 9.  The frequency of the different forms of: the Immediate Inter-active Function 
(IF) (Block A); the Cognitive-Affective Content (C) (Block B); the Underlying 
Function (UF) (Block C) for Workshop 4B 
 
Block A    Block B Block C 
Forms of IF n. %  Forms of C n. % Forms of UF n. % 
CLARIFY 34 10.24  EXAMPLE 7 2.11 AMPLIFYING 8 2.41
COMMENT 28 8.43  FACT 46 13.86 COMPROMISE 3 0.90
DICTATE 7 2.11  INFERENCE 26 7.83 CONSENSUS A 40 12.05
INFORM 53 15.96  INTERPRETATION 27 8.13 CONSENSUS U 88 26.51
INQUIRE 18 5.42  OPINION 55 16.57 CONTRIBUTION 26 7.83
INVITE 23 6.93  REFLECTION 17 5.12 GROUP 8 2.41
JUSTIFY 18 5.42  REPETITION 91 27.41 MEMORY 56 16.87
OFFER 5 1.51  UNCODED 3 0.90 OWN IDEAS 3 0.90
QUERY 3 0.90  NO CONTENT 60 18.07 OWN NEEDS 7 2.11
RECORD 30 9.04  PARTICIPATION 23 6.93
REJECT 13 3.92  TASK 67 20.18
REQUEST 30 9.04  UNCODED 3 0.90
SEEK 1 0.30  
SUGGEST 40 12.05  
SUPPORT 26 7.83  
UNCODED 3 0.90  
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Table 10.  The frequency of the different forms of: the Immediate Inter-active Function 
(IF) (Block A); the Cognitive-Affective Content (C) (Block B); the Underlying 
Function (UF) (Block C) for Workshop 5A. 
Block A    Block B Block C 
Forms of IF n. %  Forms of C n. % Forms of UF n. % 
CLARIFY 22 9.61  EXAMPLE 0 0.00 AMPLIFYING 8 3.49
COMMENT 31 13.54  FACT 13 5.68 COMPROMISE 0 0.00
DICTATE 12 5.24  INFERENCE 18 7.86 CONSENSUS A 7 3.06
INFORM 10 4.37  INTERPRETATION 14 6.11 CONSENSUS U 53 23.14
INQUIRE 19 8.30  OPINION 50 21.83 CONTRIBUTION 11 4.40
INVITE 5 2.18  REFLECTION 16 6.99 GROUP 8 3.49
JUSTIFY 13 5.68  REPETITION 60 26.20 MEMORY 24 10.48
OFFER 1 0.44  UNCODED 2 0.87 OWN IDEAS 31 13.54
QUERY 7 3.06  NO CONTENT 56 24.45 OWN NEEDS 28 12.23
RECORD 12 5.24  PARTICIPATION 5 2.18
REJECT 18 7.86  TASK 53 23.14
REQUEST 34 14.85  UNCODED 2 0.87
SEEK 3 1.31  
SUGGEST 25 10.92  
SUPPORT 15 6.55  
UNCODED 2 0.87  
 
Table 11. The frequency of the different forms of: the Immediate Inter-active Function 
(IF) (Block A); the Cognitive-Affective Content (C) (Block B); the Underlying 
Function (UF) (Block C) for Workshop 5B. 
Block A    Block B Block C 
Forms of IF n. %  Forms of C n. % Forms of UF n. % 
CLARIFY 44 17.60  EXAMPLE 0 0.00 AMPLIFYING 6 2.40
COMMENT 24 9.60  FACT 10 4.00 COMPROMISE 0 0.00
DICTATE 8 3.20  INFERENCE 15 6.00 CONSENSUS A 29 11.60
INFORM 20 8.00  INTERPRETATION 22 8.80 CONSENSUS U 110 44.00
INQUIRE 19 7.60  OPINION 44 17.60 CONTRIBUTION 13 5.20
INVITE 11 4.40  REFLECTION 15 6.00 GROUP 5 2.00
JUSTIFY 17 6.80  REPETITION 98 39.20 MEMORY 14 5.60
OFFER 1 0.40  UNCODED 4 1.60 OWN IDEAS 9 3.60
QUERY 11 4.40  NO CONTENT 42 16.80 OWN NEEDS 9 3.60
RECORD 7 2.80  PARTICIPATION 11 4.40
REJECT 10 4.00  TASK 40 16.00
REQUEST 14 5.60  UNCODED 4 1.60
SEEK 14 5.60  
SUGGEST 22 8.80  
SUPPORT 24 9.60  
UNCODED 4 1.60  
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APPENDIX 14. 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES OF THE WORKSHOP OPERATIONS IN 
TERMS OF THE FREQUENCY OF THE VARIOUS COMBINATIONS OF 
THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF: IF/C/UF 
 
This appendix contains 11 Tables. Table 1 shows the quantitative analysis for all operations 
(across all workshops). The next 10 Tables (Tables 2 -11) show the quantitative analyses for 
each of the 10 workshops respectively.
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Table 1.  The frequency of the combinations of the different forms of: the Immediate 
Inter-active Function (IF) and the Cognitive-Affective Content (C) (Block A); 
the Immediate Inter-active Function and the Underlying Function (UF);(Block 
B); the Cognitive-Affective Content and the Underlying Function (Block C) for 
all workshops combined. 
Block A    Block B Block C 
Forms of IF/C n. %  Forms of IF/UF n. %  Forms of C/UF n. % 
CLARIFY/EXAMPLE 8 0.43 CLARIFY/AMPLIFYING 3 0.16 EXAMPLE/CONSENSUS A 8 0.43
CLARIFY/FACT 5 0.27  CLARIFY/CONSENSUS A 3 0.16 EXAMPLE/CONSENSUS U 12 0.64
CLARIFY/INFERENCE 40 2.14  CLARIFY/CONSENSUS U 163 8.73 EXAMPLE/TASK 1 0.05
CLARIFY/INTERPRETATION 55 2.94  CLARIFY/CONTRIBUTION 1 0.05 FACT/AMPLIFYING 1 0.05
CLARIFY/OPINION 8 0.43  CLARIFY/OWN IDEAS 9 0.48 FACT/CONSENSUS A 3 0.16
CLARIFY/REPETITION 65 3.48  CLARIFY/TASK 2 0.11 FACT/CONSENSUS U 79 4.23
COMMENT/FACT 21 1.12  COMMENT/GROUP 27 1.45 FACT/CONTRIBUTION 17 0.91
COMMENT/INFERENCE 1 0.05  COMMENT/OWN NEEDS 21 1.12 FACT/MEMORY 19 1.02
COMMENT/INTERPRETATION 8 0.43  COMMENT/TASK 139 7.44 FACT/OWN IDEAS 3 0.16
COMMENT/OPINION 64 3.43  DICTATE/CONSENSUS A 5 0.27 FACT/TASK 24 1.28
COMMENT/REFLECTION 79 4.23  DICTATE/MEMORY 52 2.78 INFERENCE/AMPLIFYING 1 0.05
COMMENT/REPETITION 14 0.75  INFORM/AMPLIFYING 2 0.11 INFERENCE/COMPROMISE 1 0.05
DICTATE/REPETITION 56 3.00  INFORM/CONSENSUS A 3 0.16 INFERENCE/CONSENSUS A 8 0.43
INFORM/EXAMPLE 1 0.05  INFORM/CONSENSUS U 101 5.41 INFERENCE/CONSENSUS U 59 3.16
INFORM/FACT 90 4.82  INFORM/CONTRIBUTION 2 0.11 INFERENCE/CONTRIBUTION 41 2.19
INFORM/INFERENCE 6 0.32  INFORM/MEMORY 19 1.02 INFERENCE/OWN IDEAS 14 0.75
INFORM/REFLECTION 5 0.27  INFORM/TASK 2 0.11 INFERENCE/OWN NEEDS 1 0.05
INFORM/REPETITION 27 1.45  INQUIRE/AMPLIFYING 1 0.05 INFERENCE/TASK 4 0.21
INQUIRE/INFERENCE 4 0.21  INQUIRE/CONSENSUS A 2 0.11 INTERPRETATION/AMPLIFYING 2 0.11
INQUIRE/INTERPRETATION 2 0.11  INQUIRE/CONSENSUS U 78 4.18 INTERPRETATION/CONSENSUS A 5 0.27
INQUIRE/REPETITION 16 0.86  INQUIRE/GROUP 5 0.27 INTERPRETATION/CONSENSUS U 78 4.18
INVITE/REPETITION 11 0.59  INQUIRE/OWN NEEDS 2 0.11 INTERPRETATION/CONTRIBUTIO 19 1.02
JUSTIFY/EXAMPLE 1 0.05  INQUIRE/TASK 33 1.77 INTERPRETATION/GROUP 3 0.16
JUSTIFY/FACT 24 1.28  INVITE/PARTICIPATION 91 4.87 INTERPRETATION/OWN IDEAS 19 1.02
JUSTIFY/INFERENCE 31 1.66  JUSTIFY/AMPLIFYING 21 1.12 INTERPRETATION/OWN NEEDS 2 0.11
JUSTIFY/INTERPRETATION 29 1.55  JUSTIFY/COMPROMISE 2 0.11 INTERPRETATION/TASK 13 0.70
JUSTIFY/OPINION 48 2.57  JUSTIFY/CONSENSUS A 23 1.23 OPINION/AMPLIFYING 9 0.48
JUSTIFY/REFLECTION 1 0.05  JUSTIFY/CONSENSUS U 37 1.98 OPINION/COMPROMISE 8 0.43
JUSTIFY/REPETITION 52 2.78  JUSTIFY/CONTRIBUTION 67 3.59 OPINION/CONSENSUS A 59 3.16
QUERY/FACT 3 0.16  JUSTIFY/OWN IDEAS 25 1.34 OPINION/CONSENSUS U 35 1.87
QUERY/INFERENCE 4 0.21  JUSTIFY/OWN NEEDS 4 0.21 OPINION/CONTRIBUTION 89 4.82
QUERY/INTERPRETATION 9 0.48  JUSTIFY/TASK 7 0.37 OPINION/GROUP 12 0.64
QUERY/OPINION 11 0.59  OFFER/TASK 15 0.80 OPINION/OWN IDEAS 41 2.19
QUERY/REFLECTION 1 0.05  QUERY/AMPLIFYING 2 0.11 OPINION/OWN NEEDS 34 1.82
QUERY/REPETITION 5 0.27  QUERY/CONSENSUS A 4 0.21 OPINION/TASK 81 4.34
RECORD/REPETITION 85 4.55  QUERY/CONSENSUS U 16 0.86 REFLECTION/CONSENSUS A 2 0.11
REJECT/INFERENCE 6 0.32  QUERY/GROUP 3 0.16 REFLECTION/CONSENSUS U 5 0.27
REJECT/INTERPRETATION 10 0.54  QUERY/OWN IDEAS 14 0.75 REFLECTION/GROUP 18 0.96
REJECT/OPINION 51 2.73  QUERY/OWN NEEDS 1 0.05 REFLECTION/OWN NEEDS 12 0.64
REJECT/REFLECTION 2 0.11  QUERY/TASK 8 0.43 REFLECTION/TASK 54 2.89
REJECT/REPETITION 12 0.64  RECORD/MEMORY 85 4.55 REPETITION/AMPLIFYING 50 2.68
REQUEST/INFERENCE 1 0.05  REJECT/AMPLIFYING 1 0.05 REPETITION/COMPROMISE 4 0.21
REQUEST/INTERPRETATION 2 0.11  REJECT/CONSENSUS A 2 0.11 REPETITION/CONSENSUS A 159 8.51
REQUEST/OPINION 11 0.59  REJECT/CONSENSUS U 3 0.16 REPETITION/CONSENSUS U 128 6.85
REQUEST/REPETITION 25 1.34  REJECT/CONTRIBUTION 3 0.16 REPETITION/GROUP 3 0.16
SEEK/INFERENCE 4 0.21  REJECT/GROUP 4 0.21 REPETITION/MEMORY 136 7.28
SEEK/INTERPRETATION 1 0.05  REJECT/OWN IDEAS 38 2.03 REPETITION/OWN IDEAS 30 1.61
SEEK/REPETITION 12 0.64  REJECT/OWN NEEDS 24 1.28 REPETITION/OWN NEEDS 8 0.43
SUGGEST/EXAMPLE 3 0.16  REJECT/TASK 6 0.32 REPETITION/PARTICIPATION 11 0.59
SUGGEST/INFERENCE 31 1.66  REQUEST/GROUP 11 0.59 REPETITION/TASK 44 2.36
SUGGEST/INTERPRETATION 19 1.02 REQUEST/OWN NEEDS 21 1.12
SUGGEST/OPINION 100 5.35  REQUEST/TASK 131 7.01
SUGGEST/REPETITION 69 3.69  SEEK/CONSENSUS A 23 1.23
SUPPORT/EXAMPLE 8 0.43  SEEK/CONSENSUS U 22 1.18
SUPPORT/FACT 3 0.16  SEEK/TASK 3 0.16
SUPPORT/INFERENCE 1 0.05  SUGGEST/AMPLIFYING 21 1.12
SUPPORT/INTERPRETATION 6 0.32  SUGGEST/COMPROMISE 10 0.54
SUPPORT/OPINION 75 4.02  SUGGEST/CONSENSUS A 33 1.77
SUPPORT/REFLECTION 3 0.16  SUGGEST/CONSENSUS U 44 2.36
SUPPORT/REPETITION 126 6.75  SUGGEST/CONTRIBUTION 93 4.98
SUGGEST/OWN IDEAS 19 1.02
    SUPPORT/AMPLIFYING 13 0.70
    SUPPORT/COMPROMISE 1 0.05
    SUPPORT/CONSENSUS A 162 8.67
    SUPPORT/CONSENSUS U 11 0.59
    SUPPORT/GROUP 1 0.05
    SUPPORT/OWN IDEAS 3 0.16
    SUPPORT/OWN NEEDS 2 0.11
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Table 2.  The frequency of the combinations of the different forms of: the Immediate 
Inter-active Function (IF) and the Cognitive-Affective Content (C) (Block A); 
the Immediate Inter-active Function and the Underlying Function (UF);(Block 
B); the Cognitive-Affective Content and the Underlying Function (Block C) for 
Workshop 1A. 
Block A    Block B Block C 
Forms of IF/C n. % Forms of IF/UF n. % Forms of C/UF n. %
CLARIFY/EXAMPLE 0 0.00 CLARIFY/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 EXAMPLE/CONSENSUS A 1 1.14
CLARIFY/FACT 0 0.00  CLARIFY/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 EXAMPLE/CONSENSUS U 0 0.00
CLARIFY/INFERENCE 1 1.14  CLARIFY/CONSENSUS U 6 6.82 EXAMPLE/TASK 0 0.00
CLARIFY/INTERPRETATION 4 4.55  CLARIFY/CONTRIBUTION 0 0.00 FACT/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
CLARIFY/OPINION 0 0.00  CLARIFY/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00 FACT/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00
CLARIFY/REPETITION 1 1.14  CLARIFY/TASK 0 0.00 FACT/CONSENSUS U 3 3.41
COMMENT/FACT 0 0.00  COMMENT/GROUP 2 2.27 FACT/CONTRIBUTION 2 2.27
COMMENT/INFERENCE 0 0.00  COMMENT/OWN NEEDS 1 1.14 FACT/MEMORY 0 0.00
COMMENT/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  COMMENT/TASK 4 4.55 FACT/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00
COMMENT/OPINION 3 3.41  DICTATE/CONSENSUS A 1 1.14 FACT/TASK 0 0.00
COMMENT/REFLECTION 4 4.55  DICTATE/MEMORY 2 2.27 INFERENCE/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
COMMENT/REPETITION 0 0.00  INFORM/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 INFERENCE/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
DICTATE/REPETITION 3 3.41  INFORM/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 INFERENCE/CONSENSUS A 1 1.14
INFORM/EXAMPLE 0 0.00  INFORM/CONSENSUS U 4 4.55 INFERENCE/CONSENSUS U 2 2.27
INFORM/FACT 3 3.41  INFORM/CONTRIBUTION 0 0.00 INFERENCE/CONTRIBUTION 2 2.27
INFORM/INFERENCE 0 0.00  INFORM/MEMORY 0 0.00 INFERENCE/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00
INFORM/REFLECTION 0 0.00  INFORM/TASK 0 0.00 INFERENCE/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
INFORM/REPETITION 1 1.14  INQUIRE/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 INFERENCE/TASK 1 1.14
INQUIRE/INFERENCE 0 0.00  INQUIRE/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 INTERPRETATION/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
INQUIRE/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  INQUIRE/CONSENSUS U 1 1.14 INTERPRETATION/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00
INQUIRE/REPETITION 0 0.00  INQUIRE/GROUP 0 0.00 INTERPRETATION/CONSENSUS U 5 5.68
INVITE/REPETITION 0 0.00  INQUIRE/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00 INTERPRETATION/CONTRIBUTIO 1 1.14
JUSTIFY/EXAMPLE 0 0.00  INQUIRE/TASK 0 0.00 INTERPRETATION/GROUP 0 0.00
JUSTIFY/FACT 2 2.27  INVITE/PARTICIPATION 4 4.55 INTERPRETATION/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00
JUSTIFY/INFERENCE 3 3.41  JUSTIFY/AMPLIFYING 9 10.23 INTERPRETATION/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
JUSTIFY/INTERPRETATION 2 2.27  JUSTIFY/COMPROMISE 0 0.00 INTERPRETATION/TASK 1 1.14
JUSTIFY/OPINION 6 6.82  JUSTIFY/CONSENSUS A 4 4.55 OPINION/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
JUSTIFY/REFLECTION 0 0.00  JUSTIFY/CONSENSUS U 2 2.27 OPINION/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
JUSTIFY/REPETITION 13 14.77  JUSTIFY/CONTRIBUTION 10 11.36 OPINION/CONSENSUS A 7 7.95
QUERY/FACT 0 0.00  JUSTIFY/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00 OPINION/CONSENSUS U 0 0.00
QUERY/INFERENCE 0 0.00  JUSTIFY/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00 OPINION/CONTRIBUTION 9 10.23
QUERY/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  JUSTIFY/TASK 1 1.14 OPINION/GROUP 2 2.27
QUERY/OPINION 0 0.00  OFFER/TASK 1 1.14 OPINION/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00
QUERY/REFLECTION 0 0.00  QUERY/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 OPINION/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
QUERY/REPETITION 0 0.00  QUERY/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 OPINION/TASK 3 3.41
RECORD/REPETITION 4 4.55  QUERY/CONSENSUS U 0 0.00 REFLECTION/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00
REJECT/INFERENCE 0 0.00  QUERY/GROUP 0 0.00 REFLECTION/CONSENSUS U 0 0.00
REJECT/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  QUERY/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00 REFLECTION/GROUP 0 0.00
REJECT/OPINION 0 0.00  QUERY/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00 REFLECTION/OWN NEEDS 1 1.14
REJECT/REFLECTION 0 0.00  QUERY/TASK 0 0.00 REFLECTION/TASK 3 3.41
REJECT/REPETITION 0 0.00  RECORD/MEMORY 4 4.55 REPETITION/AMPLIFYING 9 10.23
REQUEST/INFERENCE 0 0.00  REJECT/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 REPETITION/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
REQUEST/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  REJECT/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 REPETITION/CONSENSUS A 11 12.50
REQUEST/OPINION 0 0.00  REJECT/CONSENSUS U 0 0.00 REPETITION/CONSENSUS U 2 2.27
REQUEST/REPETITION 2 2.27  REJECT/CONTRIBUTION 0 0.00 REPETITION/GROUP 0 0.00
SEEK/INFERENCE 1 1.14  REJECT/GROUP 0 0.00 REPETITION/MEMORY 6 6.82
SEEK/INTERPRETATION 1 1.14  REJECT/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00 REPETITION/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00
SEEK/REPETITION 0 0.00  REJECT/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00 REPETITION/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
SUGGEST/EXAMPLE 0 0.00  REJECT/TASK 0 0.00 REPETITION/PARTICIPATION 0 0.00
SUGGEST/INFERENCE 1 1.14  REQUEST/GROUP 0 0.00 REPETITION/TASK 2 2.27
SUGGEST/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00 REQUEST/OWN NEEDS 1 1.14
SUGGEST/OPINION 3 3.41  REQUEST/TASK 6 6.82
SUGGEST/REPETITION 1 1.14  SEEK/CONSENSUS A 3 3.41
SUPPORT/EXAMPLE 1 1.14  SEEK/CONSENSUS U 1 1.14
SUPPORT/FACT 0 0.00  SEEK/TASK 1 1.14
SUPPORT/INFERENCE 0 0.00  SUGGEST/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
SUPPORT/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  SUGGEST/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
SUPPORT/OPINION 9 10.23  SUGGEST/CONSENSUS A 1 1.14
SUPPORT/REFLECTION 0 0.00  SUGGEST/CONSENSUS U 0 0.00
SUPPORT/REPETITION 5 5.68  SUGGEST/CONTRIBUTION 4 4.55
SUGGEST/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/CONSENSUS A 13 14.77
    SUPPORT/CONSENSUS U 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/GROUP 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/TASK 2 2.27
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Table 3.  The frequency of the combinations of the different forms of: the Immediate 
Inter-active Function (IF) and the Cognitive-Affective Content (C) (Block A); 
the Immediate Inter-active Function and the Underlying Function (UF);(Block 
B); the Cognitive-Affective Content and the Underlying Function (Block C) for 
Workshop 1B 
 
Block A    Block B Block C 
Forms of IF/C n. % Forms of IF/UF n. % Forms of C/UF n. %
CLARIFY/EXAMPLE 1 0.92 CLARIFY/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 EXAMPLE/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00
CLARIFY/FACT 0 0.00  CLARIFY/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 EXAMPLE/CONSENSUS U 0 0.00
CLARIFY/INFERENCE 1 0.92  CLARIFY/CONSENSUS U 3 2.75 EXAMPLE/TASK 1 0.92
CLARIFY/INTERPRETATION 1 0.92  CLARIFY/CONTRIBUTION 0 0.00 FACT/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
CLARIFY/OPINION 0 0.00  CLARIFY/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00 FACT/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00
CLARIFY/REPETITION 1 0.92  CLARIFY/TASK 1 0.92 FACT/CONSENSUS U 2 1.83
COMMENT/FACT 0 0.00  COMMENT/GROUP 2 1.83 FACT/CONTRIBUTION 6 5.50
COMMENT/INFERENCE 1 0.92  COMMENT/OWN NEEDS 1 0.92 FACT/MEMORY 0 0.00
COMMENT/INTERPRETATION 1 0.92  COMMENT/TASK 13 11.93 FACT/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00
COMMENT/OPINION 5 4.59  DICTATE/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 FACT/TASK 0 0.00
COMMENT/REFLECTION 4 3.67  DICTATE/MEMORY 1 0.92 INFERENCE/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
COMMENT/REPETITION 5 4.59  INFORM/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 INFERENCE/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
DICTATE/REPETITION 1 0.92  INFORM/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 INFERENCE/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00
INFORM/EXAMPLE 0 0.00  INFORM/CONSENSUS U 3 2.75 INFERENCE/CONSENSUS U 2 1.83
INFORM/FACT 3 2.75  INFORM/CONTRIBUTION 1 0.92 INFERENCE/CONTRIBUTION 0 0.00
INFORM/INFERENCE 0 0.00  INFORM/MEMORY 0 0.00 INFERENCE/OWN IDEAS 1 0.92
INFORM/REFLECTION 0 0.00  INFORM/TASK 0 0.00 INFERENCE/OWN NEEDS 1 0.92
INFORM/REPETITION 1 0.92  INQUIRE/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 INFERENCE/TASK 0 0.00
INQUIRE/INFERENCE 0 0.00  INQUIRE/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 INTERPRETATION/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
INQUIRE/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  INQUIRE/CONSENSUS U 2 1.83 INTERPRETATION/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00
INQUIRE/REPETITION 0 0.00  INQUIRE/GROUP 1 0.92 INTERPRETATION/CONSENSUS U 2 1.83
INVITE/REPETITION 0 0.00  INQUIRE/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00 INTERPRETATION/CONTRIBUTIO 2 1.83
JUSTIFY/EXAMPLE 0 0.00  INQUIRE/TASK 2 1.83 INTERPRETATION/GROUP 0 0.00
JUSTIFY/FACT 5 4.59  INVITE/PARTICIPATION 3 2.75 INTERPRETATION/OWN IDEAS 1 0.92
JUSTIFY/INFERENCE 0 0.00  JUSTIFY/AMPLIFYING 1 0.92 INTERPRETATION/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
JUSTIFY/INTERPRETATION 3 2.75  JUSTIFY/COMPROMISE 1 0.92 INTERPRETATION/TASK 1 0.92
JUSTIFY/OPINION 4 3.67  JUSTIFY/CONSENSUS A 2 1.83 OPINION/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
JUSTIFY/REFLECTION 0 0.00  JUSTIFY/CONSENSUS U 1 0.92 OPINION/COMPROMISE 4 3.67
JUSTIFY/REPETITION 3 2.75  JUSTIFY/CONTRIBUTION 10 9.17 OPINION/CONSENSUS A 2 1.83
QUERY/FACT 0 0.00  JUSTIFY/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00 OPINION/CONSENSUS U 1 0.92
QUERY/INFERENCE 1 0.92  JUSTIFY/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00 OPINION/CONTRIBUTION 5 4.59
QUERY/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  JUSTIFY/TASK 0 0.00 OPINION/GROUP 1 0.92
QUERY/OPINION 0 0.00  OFFER/TASK 1 0.92 OPINION/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00
QUERY/REFLECTION 0 0.00  QUERY/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 OPINION/OWN NEEDS 1 0.92
QUERY/REPETITION 0 0.00  QUERY/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 OPINION/TASK 5 4.59
RECORD/REPETITION 5 4.59  QUERY/CONSENSUS U 0 0.00 REFLECTION/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00
REJECT/INFERENCE 0 0.00  QUERY/GROUP 0 0.00 REFLECTION/CONSENSUS U 0 0.00
REJECT/INTERPRETATION 1 0.92  QUERY/OWN IDEAS 1 0.92 REFLECTION/GROUP 1 0.92
REJECT/OPINION 1 0.92  QUERY/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00 REFLECTION/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
REJECT/REFLECTION 0 0.00  QUERY/TASK 1 0.92 REFLECTION/TASK 3 2.75
REJECT/REPETITION 3 2.75  RECORD/MEMORY 5 4.59 REPETITION/AMPLIFYING 5 4.59
REQUEST/INFERENCE 0 0.00  REJECT/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 REPETITION/COMPROMISE 1 0.92
REQUEST/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  REJECT/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 REPETITION/CONSENSUS A 11 10.09
REQUEST/OPINION 0 0.00  REJECT/CONSENSUS U 0 0.00 REPETITION/CONSENSUS U 3 2.75
REQUEST/REPETITION 3 2.75  REJECT/CONTRIBUTION 0 0.00 REPETITION/GROUP 0 0.00
SEEK/INFERENCE 1 0.92  REJECT/GROUP 0 0.00 REPETITION/MEMORY 6 5.50
SEEK/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  REJECT/OWN IDEAS 4 3.67 REPETITION/OWN IDEAS 4 3.67
SEEK/REPETITION 0 0.00  REJECT/OWN NEEDS 1 0.92 REPETITION/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
SUGGEST/EXAMPLE 0 0.00  REJECT/TASK 0 0.00 REPETITION/PARTICIPATION 0 0.00
SUGGEST/INFERENCE 0 0.00  REQUEST/GROUP 3 2.75 REPETITION/TASK 7 6.42
SUGGEST/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00 REQUEST/OWN NEEDS 3 2.75
SUGGEST/OPINION 7 6.42  REQUEST/TASK 10 9.17
SUGGEST/REPETITION 10 9.17  SEEK/CONSENSUS A 1 0.92
SUPPORT/EXAMPLE 0 0.00  SEEK/CONSENSUS U 4 3.67
SUPPORT/FACT 0 0.00  SEEK/TASK 0 0.00
SUPPORT/INFERENCE 0 0.00  SUGGEST/AMPLIFYING 3 2.75
SUPPORT/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  SUGGEST/COMPROMISE 4 3.67
SUPPORT/OPINION 2 1.83  SUGGEST/CONSENSUS A 6 5.50
SUPPORT/REFLECTION 0 0.00  SUGGEST/CONSENSUS U 1 0.92
SUPPORT/REPETITION 7 6.42  SUGGEST/CONTRIBUTION 2 1.83
SUGGEST/OWN IDEAS 1 0.92
    SUPPORT/AMPLIFYING 1 0.92
    SUPPORT/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/CONSENSUS A 5 4.59
    SUPPORT/CONSENSUS U 1 0.92
    SUPPORT/GROUP 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
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Table 4.  The frequency of the combinations of the different forms of: the Immediate 
Inter-active Function (IF) and the Cognitive-Affective Content (C) (Block A); 
the Immediate Inter-active Function and the Underlying Function (UF);(Block 
B); the Cognitive-Affective Content and the Underlying Function (Block C) for 
Workshop 2A. 
Block A    Block B Block C 
Forms of IF/C n. % Forms of IF/UF n. % Forms of C/UF n. %
CLARIFY/EXAMPLE 0 0.00 CLARIFY/AMPLIFYING 1 0.43 EXAMPLE/CONSENSUS A 1 0.43
CLARIFY/FACT 0 0.00  CLARIFY/CONSENSUS A 1 0.43 EXAMPLE/CONSENSUS U 1 0.43
CLARIFY/INFERENCE 2 0.86  CLARIFY/CONSENSUS U 15 6.47 EXAMPLE/TASK 0 0.00
CLARIFY/INTERPRETATION 3 1.29  CLARIFY/CONTRIBUTION 0 0.00 FACT/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
CLARIFY/OPINION 0 0.00  CLARIFY/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00 FACT/CONSENSUS A 1 0.43
CLARIFY/REPETITION 12 5.17  CLARIFY/TASK 0 0.00 FACT/CONSENSUS U 13 5.60
COMMENT/FACT 7 3.02  COMMENT/GROUP 5 2.16 FACT/CONTRIBUTION 0 0.00
COMMENT/INFERENCE 0 0.00  COMMENT/OWN NEEDS 2 0.86 FACT/MEMORY 0 0.00
COMMENT/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  COMMENT/TASK 31 13.36 FACT/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00
COMMENT/OPINION 18 7.76  DICTATE/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 FACT/TASK 7 3.02
COMMENT/REFLECTION 12 5.17  DICTATE/MEMORY 8 3.45 INFERENCE/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
COMMENT/REPETITION 1 0.43  INFORM/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 INFERENCE/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
DICTATE/REPETITION 8 3.45  INFORM/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 INFERENCE/CONSENSUS A 1 0.43
INFORM/EXAMPLE 0 0.00  INFORM/CONSENSUS U 16 6.90 INFERENCE/CONSENSUS U 4 1.72
INFORM/FACT 12 5.17  INFORM/CONTRIBUTION 0 0.00 INFERENCE/CONTRIBUTION 7 3.02
INFORM/INFERENCE 0 0.00  INFORM/MEMORY 0 0.00 INFERENCE/OWN IDEAS 1 0.43
INFORM/REFLECTION 0 0.00  INFORM/TASK 0 0.00 INFERENCE/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
INFORM/REPETITION 4 1.72  INQUIRE/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 INFERENCE/TASK 1 0.43
INQUIRE/INFERENCE 0 0.00  INQUIRE/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 INTERPRETATION/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
INQUIRE/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  INQUIRE/CONSENSUS U 12 5.17 INTERPRETATION/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00
INQUIRE/REPETITION 7 3.02  INQUIRE/GROUP 2 0.86 INTERPRETATION/CONSENSUS U 4 1.72
INVITE/REPETITION 0 0.00  INQUIRE/OWN NEEDS 1 0.43 INTERPRETATION/CONTRIBUTIO 0 0.00
JUSTIFY/EXAMPLE 1 0.43  INQUIRE/TASK 5 2.16 INTERPRETATION/GROUP 0 0.00
JUSTIFY/FACT 0 0.00  INVITE/PARTICIPATION 2 0.86 INTERPRETATION/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00
JUSTIFY/INFERENCE 2 0.86  JUSTIFY/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 INTERPRETATION/OWN NEEDS 1 0.43
JUSTIFY/INTERPRETATION 1 0.43  JUSTIFY/COMPROMISE 0 0.00 INTERPRETATION/TASK 1 0.43
JUSTIFY/OPINION 1 0.43  JUSTIFY/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 OPINION/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
JUSTIFY/REFLECTION 0 0.00  JUSTIFY/CONSENSUS U 4 1.72 OPINION/COMPROMISE 1 0.43
JUSTIFY/REPETITION 3 1.29  JUSTIFY/CONTRIBUTION 1 0.43 OPINION/CONSENSUS A 9 3.88
QUERY/FACT 1 0.43  JUSTIFY/OWN IDEAS 1 0.43 OPINION/CONSENSUS U 7 3.02
QUERY/INFERENCE 0 0.00  JUSTIFY/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00 OPINION/CONTRIBUTION 3 1.29
QUERY/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  JUSTIFY/TASK 2 0.86 OPINION/GROUP 4 1.72
QUERY/OPINION 1 0.43  OFFER/TASK 3 1.29 OPINION/OWN IDEAS 5 2.16
QUERY/REFLECTION 0 0.00  QUERY/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 OPINION/OWN NEEDS 2 0.86
QUERY/REPETITION 0 0.00  QUERY/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 OPINION/TASK 18 7.76
RECORD/REPETITION 6 2.59  QUERY/CONSENSUS U 1 0.43 REFLECTION/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00
REJECT/INFERENCE 3 1.29  QUERY/GROUP 0 0.00 REFLECTION/CONSENSUS U 0 0.00
REJECT/INTERPRETATION 1 0.43  QUERY/OWN IDEAS 2 0.86 REFLECTION/GROUP 1 0.43
REJECT/OPINION 4 1.72  QUERY/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00 REFLECTION/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
REJECT/REFLECTION 0 0.00  QUERY/TASK 4 1.72 REFLECTION/TASK 11 4.74
REJECT/REPETITION 2 0.86  RECORD/MEMORY 6 2.59 REPETITION/AMPLIFYING 1 0.43
REQUEST/INFERENCE 0 0.00  REJECT/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 REPETITION/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
REQUEST/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  REJECT/CONSENSUS A 2 0.86 REPETITION/CONSENSUS A 25 10.78
REQUEST/OPINION 0 0.00  REJECT/CONSENSUS U 0 0.00 REPETITION/CONSENSUS U 28 12.07
REQUEST/REPETITION 3 1.29  REJECT/CONTRIBUTION 1 0.43 REPETITION/GROUP 1 0.43
SEEK/INFERENCE 0 0.00  REJECT/GROUP 1 0.43 REPETITION/MEMORY 14 6.03
SEEK/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  REJECT/OWN IDEAS 5 2.16 REPETITION/OWN IDEAS 2 0.86
SEEK/REPETITION 2 0.86  REJECT/OWN NEEDS 1 0.43 REPETITION/OWN NEEDS 3 1.29
SUGGEST/EXAMPLE 0 0.00  REJECT/TASK 0 0.00 REPETITION/PARTICIPATION 0 0.00
SUGGEST/INFERENCE 7 3.02  REQUEST/GROUP 0 0.00 REPETITION/TASK 7 3.02
SUGGEST/INTERPRETATION 1 0.43 REQUEST/OWN NEEDS 2 0.86
SUGGEST/OPINION 10 4.31  REQUEST/TASK 22 9.48
SUGGEST/REPETITION 7 3.02  SEEK/CONSENSUS A 2 0.86
SUPPORT/EXAMPLE 1 0.43  SEEK/CONSENSUS U 3 1.29
SUPPORT/FACT 1 0.43  SEEK/TASK 0 0.00
SUPPORT/INFERENCE 0 0.00  SUGGEST/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
SUPPORT/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  SUGGEST/COMPROMISE 1 0.43
SUPPORT/OPINION 15 6.47  SUGGEST/CONSENSUS A 3 1.29
SUPPORT/REFLECTION 0 0.00  SUGGEST/CONSENSUS U 12 5.17
SUPPORT/REPETITION 26 11.21  SUGGEST/CONTRIBUTION 8 3.45
SUGGEST/OWN IDEAS 1 0.43
    SUPPORT/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/CONSENSUS A 30 12.93
    SUPPORT/CONSENSUS U 2 0.86
    SUPPORT/GROUP 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/OWN NEEDS 1 0.43
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Table 5.  The frequency of the combinations of the different forms of: the Immediate 
Inter-active Function (IF) and the Cognitive-Affective Content (C) (Block A); 
the Immediate Inter-active Function and the Underlying Function (UF);(Block 
B); the Cognitive-Affective Content and the Underlying Function (Block C) for 
Workshop 2B 
 
Block A    Block B Block C 
Forms of IF/C n. % Forms of IF/UF n. % Forms of C/UF n. %
CLARIFY/EXAMPLE 0 0.00 CLARIFY/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 EXAMPLE/CONSENSUS A 3 1.72
CLARIFY/FACT 1 0.57  CLARIFY/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 EXAMPLE/CONSENSUS U 0 0.00
CLARIFY/INFERENCE 5 2.87  CLARIFY/CONSENSUS U 20 11.49 EXAMPLE/TASK 0 0.00
CLARIFY/INTERPRETATION 8 4.60  CLARIFY/CONTRIBUTION 0 0.00 FACT/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
CLARIFY/OPINION 3 1.72  CLARIFY/OWN IDEAS 1 0.57 FACT/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00
CLARIFY/REPETITION 4 2.30  CLARIFY/TASK 0 0.00 FACT/CONSENSUS U 7 4.02
COMMENT/FACT 2 1.15  COMMENT/GROUP 3 1.72 FACT/CONTRIBUTION 0 0.00
COMMENT/INFERENCE 0 0.00  COMMENT/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00 FACT/MEMORY 0 0.00
COMMENT/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  COMMENT/TASK 5 2.87 FACT/OWN IDEAS 2 1.15
COMMENT/OPINION 1 0.57  DICTATE/CONSENSUS A 3 1.72 FACT/TASK 2 1.15
COMMENT/REFLECTION 3 1.72  DICTATE/MEMORY 8 4.60 INFERENCE/AMPLIFYING 1 0.57
COMMENT/REPETITION 2 1.15  INFORM/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 INFERENCE/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
DICTATE/REPETITION 11 6.32  INFORM/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 INFERENCE/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00
INFORM/EXAMPLE 0 0.00  INFORM/CONSENSUS U 6 3.45 INFERENCE/CONSENSUS U 5 2.87
INFORM/FACT 5 2.87  INFORM/CONTRIBUTION 0 0.00 INFERENCE/CONTRIBUTION 11 6.32
INFORM/INFERENCE 0 0.00  INFORM/MEMORY 0 0.00 INFERENCE/OWN IDEAS 1 0.57
INFORM/REFLECTION 0 0.00  INFORM/TASK 0 0.00 INFERENCE/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
INFORM/REPETITION 1 0.57  INQUIRE/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 INFERENCE/TASK 1 0.57
INQUIRE/INFERENCE 0 0.00  INQUIRE/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 INTERPRETATION/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
INQUIRE/INTERPRETATION 1 0.57  INQUIRE/CONSENSUS U 8 4.60 INTERPRETATION/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00
INQUIRE/REPETITION 0 0.00  INQUIRE/GROUP 0 0.00 INTERPRETATION/CONSENSUS U 11 6.32
INVITE/REPETITION 1 0.57  INQUIRE/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00 INTERPRETATION/CONTRIBUTIO 1 0.57
JUSTIFY/EXAMPLE 0 0.00  INQUIRE/TASK 4 2.30 INTERPRETATION/GROUP 0 0.00
JUSTIFY/FACT 3 1.72  INVITE/PARTICIPATION 12 6.90 INTERPRETATION/OWN IDEAS 1 0.57
JUSTIFY/INFERENCE 3 1.72  JUSTIFY/AMPLIFYING 3 1.72 INTERPRETATION/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
JUSTIFY/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  JUSTIFY/COMPROMISE 0 0.00 INTERPRETATION/TASK 0 0.00
JUSTIFY/OPINION 1 0.57  JUSTIFY/CONSENSUS A 1 0.57 OPINION/AMPLIFYING 1 0.57
JUSTIFY/REFLECTION 0 0.00  JUSTIFY/CONSENSUS U 3 1.72 OPINION/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
JUSTIFY/REPETITION 4 2.30  JUSTIFY/CONTRIBUTION 1 0.57 OPINION/CONSENSUS A 6 3.45
QUERY/FACT 0 0.00  JUSTIFY/OWN IDEAS 2 1.15 OPINION/CONSENSUS U 4 2.30
QUERY/INFERENCE 0 0.00  JUSTIFY/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00 OPINION/CONTRIBUTION 9 5.17
QUERY/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  JUSTIFY/TASK 1 0.57 OPINION/GROUP 0 0.00
QUERY/OPINION 0 0.00  OFFER/TASK 3 1.72 OPINION/OWN IDEAS 2 1.15
QUERY/REFLECTION 0 0.00  QUERY/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 OPINION/OWN NEEDS 1 0.57
QUERY/REPETITION 0 0.00  QUERY/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 OPINION/TASK 5 2.87
RECORD/REPETITION 10 5.75  QUERY/CONSENSUS U 0 0.00 REFLECTION/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00
REJECT/INFERENCE 1 0.57  QUERY/GROUP 0 0.00 REFLECTION/CONSENSUS U 0 0.00
REJECT/INTERPRETATION 2 1.15  QUERY/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00 REFLECTION/GROUP 2 1.15
REJECT/OPINION 2 1.15  QUERY/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00 REFLECTION/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
REJECT/REFLECTION 0 0.00  QUERY/TASK 0 0.00 REFLECTION/TASK 2 1.15
REJECT/REPETITION 0 0.00  RECORD/MEMORY 10 5.75 REPETITION/AMPLIFYING 6 3.45
REQUEST/INFERENCE 0 0.00  REJECT/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 REPETITION/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
REQUEST/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  REJECT/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 REPETITION/CONSENSUS A 16 9.20
REQUEST/OPINION 0 0.00  REJECT/CONSENSUS U 1 0.57 REPETITION/CONSENSUS U 8 4.60
REQUEST/REPETITION 0 0.00  REJECT/CONTRIBUTION 0 0.00 REPETITION/GROUP 1 0.57
SEEK/INFERENCE 0 0.00  REJECT/GROUP 0 0.00 REPETITION/MEMORY 18 10.34
SEEK/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  REJECT/OWN IDEAS 3 1.72 REPETITION/OWN IDEAS 2 1.15
SEEK/REPETITION 0 0.00  REJECT/OWN NEEDS 1 0.57 REPETITION/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
SUGGEST/EXAMPLE 0 0.00  REJECT/TASK 0 0.00 REPETITION/PARTICIPATION 1 0.57
SUGGEST/INFERENCE 10 5.75  REQUEST/GROUP 1 0.57 REPETITION/TASK 1 0.57
SUGGEST/INTERPRETATION 2 1.15 REQUEST/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
SUGGEST/OPINION 11 6.32  REQUEST/TASK 9 5.17
SUGGEST/REPETITION 7 4.02  SEEK/CONSENSUS A 2 1.15
SUPPORT/EXAMPLE 3 1.72  SEEK/CONSENSUS U 1 0.57
SUPPORT/FACT 0 0.00  SEEK/TASK 2 1.15
SUPPORT/INFERENCE 0 0.00  SUGGEST/AMPLIFYING 4 2.30
SUPPORT/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  SUGGEST/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
SUPPORT/OPINION 10 5.75  SUGGEST/CONSENSUS A 2 1.15
SUPPORT/REFLECTION 1 0.57  SUGGEST/CONSENSUS U 3 1.72
SUPPORT/REPETITION 13 7.47  SUGGEST/CONTRIBUTION 20 11.49
SUGGEST/OWN IDEAS 1 0.57
    SUPPORT/AMPLIFYING 1 0.57
    SUPPORT/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/CONSENSUS A 19 10.92
    SUPPORT/CONSENSUS U 1 0.57
    SUPPORT/GROUP 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/OWN IDEAS 1 0.57
    SUPPORT/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
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Table 6.  The frequency of the combinations of the different forms of: the Immediate 
Inter-active Function (IF) and the Cognitive-Affective Content (C) (Block A); 
the Immediate Inter-active Function and the Underlying Function (UF);(Block 
B); the Cognitive-Affective Content and the Underlying Function (Block C) for 
Workshop 3A 
 
Block A    Block B Block C 
Forms of IF/C n. % Forms of IF/UF n. % Forms of C/UF n. %
CLARIFY/EXAMPLE 0 0.00 CLARIFY/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 EXAMPLE/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00
CLARIFY/FACT 1 0.85  CLARIFY/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 EXAMPLE/CONSENSUS U 0 0.00
CLARIFY/INFERENCE 3 2.54  CLARIFY/CONSENSUS U 6 5.08 EXAMPLE/TASK 0 0.00
CLARIFY/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  CLARIFY/CONTRIBUTION 0 0.00 FACT/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
CLARIFY/OPINION 1 0.85  CLARIFY/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00 FACT/CONSENSUS A 1 0.85
CLARIFY/REPETITION 1 0.85  CLARIFY/TASK 0 0.00 FACT/CONSENSUS U 4 3.39
COMMENT/FACT 0 0.00  COMMENT/GROUP 1 0.85 FACT/CONTRIBUTION 7 5.93
COMMENT/INFERENCE 0 0.00  COMMENT/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00 FACT/MEMORY 0 0.00
COMMENT/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  COMMENT/TASK 10 8.47 FACT/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00
COMMENT/OPINION 5 4.24  DICTATE/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 FACT/TASK 0 0.00
COMMENT/REFLECTION 3 2.54  DICTATE/MEMORY 0 0.00 INFERENCE/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
COMMENT/REPETITION 3 2.54  INFORM/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 INFERENCE/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
DICTATE/REPETITION 0 0.00  INFORM/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 INFERENCE/CONSENSUS A 2 1.69
INFORM/EXAMPLE 0 0.00  INFORM/CONSENSUS U 2 1.69 INFERENCE/CONSENSUS U 3 2.54
INFORM/FACT 3 2.54  INFORM/CONTRIBUTION 1 0.85 INFERENCE/CONTRIBUTION 4 3.39
INFORM/INFERENCE 0 0.00  INFORM/MEMORY 0 0.00 INFERENCE/OWN IDEAS 1 0.85
INFORM/REFLECTION 0 0.00  INFORM/TASK 0 0.00 INFERENCE/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
INFORM/REPETITION 0 0.00  INQUIRE/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 INFERENCE/TASK 0 0.00
INQUIRE/INFERENCE 0 0.00  INQUIRE/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 INTERPRETATION/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
INQUIRE/INTERPRETATION 1 0.85  INQUIRE/CONSENSUS U 4 3.39 INTERPRETATION/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00
INQUIRE/REPETITION 0 0.00  INQUIRE/GROUP 0 0.00 INTERPRETATION/CONSENSUS U 1 0.85
INVITE/REPETITION 3 2.54  INQUIRE/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00 INTERPRETATION/CONTRIBUTIO 5 4.24
JUSTIFY/EXAMPLE 0 0.00  INQUIRE/TASK 1 0.85 INTERPRETATION/GROUP 0 0.00
JUSTIFY/FACT 8 6.78  INVITE/PARTICIPATION 14 11.86 INTERPRETATION/OWN IDEAS 1 0.85
JUSTIFY/INFERENCE 4 3.39  JUSTIFY/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 INTERPRETATION/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
JUSTIFY/INTERPRETATION 5 4.24  JUSTIFY/COMPROMISE 0 0.00 INTERPRETATION/TASK 1 0.85
JUSTIFY/OPINION 4 3.39  JUSTIFY/CONSENSUS A 5 4.24 OPINION/AMPLIFYING 1 0.85
JUSTIFY/REFLECTION 0 0.00  JUSTIFY/CONSENSUS U 2 1.69 OPINION/COMPROMISE 1 0.85
JUSTIFY/REPETITION 4 3.39  JUSTIFY/CONTRIBUTION 17 14.41 OPINION/CONSENSUS A 4 3.39
QUERY/FACT 0 0.00  JUSTIFY/OWN IDEAS 1 0.85 OPINION/CONSENSUS U 3 2.54
QUERY/INFERENCE 1 0.85  JUSTIFY/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00 OPINION/CONTRIBUTION 9 7.63
QUERY/INTERPRETATION 1 0.85  JUSTIFY/TASK 0 0.00 OPINION/GROUP 1 0.85
QUERY/OPINION 2 1.69  OFFER/TASK 0 0.00 OPINION/OWN IDEAS 3 2.54
QUERY/REFLECTION 0 0.00  QUERY/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 OPINION/OWN NEEDS 1 0.85
QUERY/REPETITION 0 0.00  QUERY/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 OPINION/TASK 7 5.93
RECORD/REPETITION 0 0.00  QUERY/CONSENSUS U 2 1.69 REFLECTION/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00
REJECT/INFERENCE 0 0.00  QUERY/GROUP 0 0.00 REFLECTION/CONSENSUS U 0 0.00
REJECT/INTERPRETATION 1 0.85  QUERY/OWN IDEAS 2 1.69 REFLECTION/GROUP 0 0.00
REJECT/OPINION 3 2.54  QUERY/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00 REFLECTION/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
REJECT/REFLECTION 0 0.00  QUERY/TASK 0 0.00 REFLECTION/TASK 3 2.54
REJECT/REPETITION 0 0.00  RECORD/MEMORY 0 0.00 REPETITION/AMPLIFYING 4 3.39
REQUEST/INFERENCE 0 0.00  REJECT/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 REPETITION/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
REQUEST/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  REJECT/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 REPETITION/CONSENSUS A 21 17.80
REQUEST/OPINION 0 0.00  REJECT/CONSENSUS U 0 0.00 REPETITION/CONSENSUS U 1 0.85
REQUEST/REPETITION 1 0.85  REJECT/CONTRIBUTION 0 0.00 REPETITION/GROUP 0 0.00
SEEK/INFERENCE 2 1.69  REJECT/GROUP 0 0.00 REPETITION/MEMORY 0 0.00
SEEK/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  REJECT/OWN IDEAS 3 2.54 REPETITION/OWN IDEAS 2 1.69
SEEK/REPETITION 2 1.69  REJECT/OWN NEEDS 1 0.85 REPETITION/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
SUGGEST/EXAMPLE 0 0.00  REJECT/TASK 0 0.00 REPETITION/PARTICIPATION 3 2.54
SUGGEST/INFERENCE 0 0.00  REQUEST/GROUP 0 0.00 REPETITION/TASK 5 4.24
SUGGEST/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00 REQUEST/OWN NEEDS 1 0.85
SUGGEST/OPINION 10 8.47  REQUEST/TASK 1 0.85
SUGGEST/REPETITION 9 7.63  SEEK/CONSENSUS A 5 4.24
SUPPORT/EXAMPLE 0 0.00  SEEK/CONSENSUS U 2 1.69
SUPPORT/FACT 0 0.00  SEEK/TASK 0 0.00
SUPPORT/INFERENCE 0 0.00  SUGGEST/AMPLIFYING 2 1.69
SUPPORT/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  SUGGEST/COMPROMISE 1 0.85
SUPPORT/OPINION 5 4.24  SUGGEST/CONSENSUS A 8 6.78
SUPPORT/REFLECTION 0 0.00  SUGGEST/CONSENSUS U 0 0.00
SUPPORT/REPETITION 13 11.02  SUGGEST/CONTRIBUTION 7 5.93
SUGGEST/OWN IDEAS 1 0.85
    SUPPORT/AMPLIFYING 3 2.54
    SUPPORT/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/CONSENSUS A 11 9.32
    SUPPORT/CONSENSUS U 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/GROUP 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
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Table 7.  The frequency of the combinations of the different forms of: the Immediate 
Inter-active Function (IF) and the Cognitive-Affective Content (C) (Block A); 
the Immediate Inter-active Function and the Underlying Function (UF);(Block 
B); the Cognitive-Affective Content and the Underlying Function (Block C) for 
Workshop 3B 
 
Block A    Block B Block C 
Forms of IF/C n. % Forms of IF/UF n. % Forms of C/UF n. %
CLARIFY/EXAMPLE 0 0.00 CLARIFY/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 EXAMPLE/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00
CLARIFY/FACT 0 0.00  CLARIFY/CONSENSUS A 1 0.71 EXAMPLE/CONSENSUS U 0 0.00
CLARIFY/INFERENCE 4 2.86  CLARIFY/CONSENSUS U 6 4.29 EXAMPLE/TASK 0 0.00
CLARIFY/INTERPRETATION 4 2.86  CLARIFY/CONTRIBUTION 0 0.00 FACT/AMPLIFYING 1 0.71
CLARIFY/OPINION 0 0.00  CLARIFY/OWN IDEAS 2 1.43 FACT/CONSENSUS A 1 0.71
CLARIFY/REPETITION 1 0.71  CLARIFY/TASK 0 0.00 FACT/CONSENSUS U 11 7.86
COMMENT/FACT 0 0.00  COMMENT/GROUP 1 0.71 FACT/CONTRIBUTION 2 1.43
COMMENT/INFERENCE 0 0.00  COMMENT/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00 FACT/MEMORY 0 0.00
COMMENT/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  COMMENT/TASK 7 5.00 FACT/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00
COMMENT/OPINION 2 1.43  DICTATE/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 FACT/TASK 0 0.00
COMMENT/REFLECTION 6 4.29  DICTATE/MEMORY 0 0.00 INFERENCE/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
COMMENT/REPETITION 0 0.00  INFORM/AMPLIFYING 1 0.71 INFERENCE/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
DICTATE/REPETITION 0 0.00  INFORM/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 INFERENCE/CONSENSUS A 2 1.43
INFORM/EXAMPLE 0 0.00  INFORM/CONSENSUS U 8 5.71 INFERENCE/CONSENSUS U 3 2.14
INFORM/FACT 9 6.43  INFORM/CONTRIBUTION 0 0.00 INFERENCE/CONTRIBUTION 1 0.71
INFORM/INFERENCE 0 0.00  INFORM/MEMORY 0 0.00 INFERENCE/OWN IDEAS 2 1.43
INFORM/REFLECTION 0 0.00  INFORM/TASK 0 0.00 INFERENCE/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
INFORM/REPETITION 0 0.00  INQUIRE/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 INFERENCE/TASK 0 0.00
INQUIRE/INFERENCE 0 0.00  INQUIRE/CONSENSUS A 1 0.71 INTERPRETATION/AMPLIFYING 2 1.43
INQUIRE/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  INQUIRE/CONSENSUS U 3 2.14 INTERPRETATION/CONSENSUS A 2 1.43
INQUIRE/REPETITION 0 0.00  INQUIRE/GROUP 0 0.00 INTERPRETATION/CONSENSUS U 5 3.57
INVITE/REPETITION 0 0.00  INQUIRE/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00 INTERPRETATION/CONTRIBUTIO 2 1.43
JUSTIFY/EXAMPLE 0 0.00  INQUIRE/TASK 0 0.00 INTERPRETATION/GROUP 0 0.00
JUSTIFY/FACT 3 2.14  INVITE/PARTICIPATION 12 8.57 INTERPRETATION/OWN IDEAS 8 5.71
JUSTIFY/INFERENCE 3 2.14  JUSTIFY/AMPLIFYING 2 1.43 INTERPRETATION/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
JUSTIFY/INTERPRETATION 7 5.00  JUSTIFY/COMPROMISE 0 0.00 INTERPRETATION/TASK 0 0.00
JUSTIFY/OPINION 10 7.14  JUSTIFY/CONSENSUS A 4 2.86 OPINION/AMPLIFYING 3 2.14
JUSTIFY/REFLECTION 0 0.00  JUSTIFY/CONSENSUS U 3 2.14 OPINION/COMPROMISE 1 0.71
JUSTIFY/REPETITION 6 4.29  JUSTIFY/CONTRIBUTION 11 7.86 OPINION/CONSENSUS A 8 5.71
QUERY/FACT 2 1.43  JUSTIFY/OWN IDEAS 9 6.43 OPINION/CONSENSUS U 1 0.71
QUERY/INFERENCE 0 0.00  JUSTIFY/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00 OPINION/CONTRIBUTION 17 12.14
QUERY/INTERPRETATION 2 1.43  JUSTIFY/TASK 0 0.00 OPINION/GROUP 0 0.00
QUERY/OPINION 4 2.86  OFFER/TASK 0 0.00 OPINION/OWN IDEAS 7 5.00
QUERY/REFLECTION 0 0.00  QUERY/AMPLIFYING 2 1.43 OPINION/OWN NEEDS 2 1.43
QUERY/REPETITION 2 1.43  QUERY/CONSENSUS A 2 1.43 OPINION/TASK 2 1.43
RECORD/REPETITION 0 0.00  QUERY/CONSENSUS U 2 1.43 REFLECTION/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00
REJECT/INFERENCE 0 0.00  QUERY/GROUP 0 0.00 REFLECTION/CONSENSUS U 0 0.00
REJECT/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  QUERY/OWN IDEAS 4 2.86 REFLECTION/GROUP 1 0.71
REJECT/OPINION 6 4.29  QUERY/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00 REFLECTION/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
REJECT/REFLECTION 0 0.00  QUERY/TASK 0 0.00 REFLECTION/TASK 5 3.57
REJECT/REPETITION 3 2.14  RECORD/MEMORY 0 0.00 REPETITION/AMPLIFYING 4 2.86
REQUEST/INFERENCE 0 0.00  REJECT/AMPLIFYING 1 0.71 REPETITION/COMPROMISE 2 1.43
REQUEST/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  REJECT/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 REPETITION/CONSENSUS A 10 7.14
REQUEST/OPINION 0 0.00  REJECT/CONSENSUS U 1 0.71 REPETITION/CONSENSUS U 2 1.43
REQUEST/REPETITION 3 2.14  REJECT/CONTRIBUTION 0 0.00 REPETITION/GROUP 0 0.00
SEEK/INFERENCE 0 0.00  REJECT/GROUP 0 0.00 REPETITION/MEMORY 0 0.00
SEEK/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  REJECT/OWN IDEAS 5 3.57 REPETITION/OWN IDEAS 7 5.00
SEEK/REPETITION 0 0.00  REJECT/OWN NEEDS 2 1.43 REPETITION/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
SUGGEST/EXAMPLE 0 0.00  REJECT/TASK 0 0.00 REPETITION/PARTICIPATION 0 0.00
SUGGEST/INFERENCE 0 0.00  REQUEST/GROUP 1 0.71 REPETITION/TASK 3 2.14
SUGGEST/INTERPRETATION 4 2.86 REQUEST/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
SUGGEST/OPINION 16 11.43  REQUEST/TASK 8 5.71
SUGGEST/REPETITION 4 2.86  SEEK/CONSENSUS A 1 0.71
SUPPORT/EXAMPLE 0 0.00  SEEK/CONSENSUS U 0 0.00
SUPPORT/FACT 1 0.71  SEEK/TASK 0 0.00
SUPPORT/INFERENCE 1 0.71  SUGGEST/AMPLIFYING 4 2.86
SUPPORT/INTERPRETATION 2 1.43  SUGGEST/COMPROMISE 2 1.43
SUPPORT/OPINION 3 2.14  SUGGEST/CONSENSUS A 1 0.71
SUPPORT/REFLECTION 0 0.00  SUGGEST/CONSENSUS U 2 1.43
SUPPORT/REPETITION 9 6.43  SUGGEST/CONTRIBUTION 11 7.86
SUGGEST/OWN IDEAS 4 2.86
    SUPPORT/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/COMPROMISE 1 0.71
    SUPPORT/CONSENSUS A 15 10.71
    SUPPORT/CONSENSUS U 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/GROUP 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
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Table 8.  The frequency of the combinations of the different forms of: the Immediate 
Inter-active Function (IF) and the Cognitive-Affective Content (C) (Block A); 
the Immediate Inter-active Function and the Underlying Function (UF);(Block 
B); the Cognitive-Affective Content and the Underlying Function (Block C) for 
Workshop 4A 
 
Block A    Block B Block C 
Forms of IF/C n. % Forms of IF/UF n. % Forms of C/UF n. %
CLARIFY/EXAMPLE 1 0.56 CLARIFY/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 EXAMPLE/CONSENSUS A 3 1.69
CLARIFY/FACT 0 0.00  CLARIFY/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 EXAMPLE/CONSENSUS U 4 2.25
CLARIFY/INFERENCE 1 0.56  CLARIFY/CONSENSUS U 14 7.87 EXAMPLE/TASK 0 0.00
CLARIFY/INTERPRETATION 7 3.93  CLARIFY/CONTRIBUTION 0 0.00 FACT/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
CLARIFY/OPINION 1 0.56  CLARIFY/OWN IDEAS 3 1.69 FACT/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00
CLARIFY/REPETITION 8 4.49  CLARIFY/TASK 1 0.56 FACT/CONSENSUS U 3 1.69
COMMENT/FACT 1 0.56  COMMENT/GROUP 5 2.81 FACT/CONTRIBUTION 0 0.00
COMMENT/INFERENCE 0 0.00  COMMENT/OWN NEEDS 2 1.12 FACT/MEMORY 0 0.00
COMMENT/INTERPRETATION 2 1.12  COMMENT/TASK 9 5.06 FACT/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00
COMMENT/OPINION 4 2.25  DICTATE/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 FACT/TASK 2 1.12
COMMENT/REFLECTION 9 5.06  DICTATE/MEMORY 7 3.93 INFERENCE/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
COMMENT/REPETITION 0 0.00  INFORM/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 INFERENCE/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
DICTATE/REPETITION 7 3.93  INFORM/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 INFERENCE/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00
INFORM/EXAMPLE 0 0.00  INFORM/CONSENSUS U 3 1.69 INFERENCE/CONSENSUS U 4 2.25
INFORM/FACT 4 2.25  INFORM/CONTRIBUTION 0 0.00 INFERENCE/CONTRIBUTION 2 1.12
INFORM/INFERENCE 0 0.00  INFORM/MEMORY 0 0.00 INFERENCE/OWN IDEAS 3 1.69
INFORM/REFLECTION 0 0.00  INFORM/TASK 1 0.56 INFERENCE/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
INFORM/REPETITION 0 0.00  INQUIRE/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 INFERENCE/TASK 0 0.00
INQUIRE/INFERENCE 1 0.56  INQUIRE/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 INTERPRETATION/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
INQUIRE/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  INQUIRE/CONSENSUS U 11 6.18 INTERPRETATION/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00
INQUIRE/REPETITION 1 0.56  INQUIRE/GROUP 1 0.56 INTERPRETATION/CONSENSUS U 12 6.74
INVITE/REPETITION 1 0.56  INQUIRE/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00 INTERPRETATION/CONTRIBUTIO 3 1.69
JUSTIFY/EXAMPLE 0 0.00  INQUIRE/TASK 6 3.37 INTERPRETATION/GROUP 1 0.56
JUSTIFY/FACT 0 0.00  INVITE/PARTICIPATION 5 2.81 INTERPRETATION/OWN IDEAS 1 0.56
JUSTIFY/INFERENCE 5 2.81  JUSTIFY/AMPLIFYING 2 1.12 INTERPRETATION/OWN NEEDS 1 0.56
JUSTIFY/INTERPRETATION 7 3.93  JUSTIFY/COMPROMISE 0 0.00 INTERPRETATION/TASK 1 0.56
JUSTIFY/OPINION 7 3.93  JUSTIFY/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 OPINION/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
JUSTIFY/REFLECTION 1 0.56  JUSTIFY/CONSENSUS U 5 2.81 OPINION/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
JUSTIFY/REPETITION 4 2.25  JUSTIFY/CONTRIBUTION 10 5.62 OPINION/CONSENSUS A 7 3.93
QUERY/FACT 0 0.00  JUSTIFY/OWN IDEAS 4 2.25 OPINION/CONSENSUS U 3 1.69
QUERY/INFERENCE 1 0.56  JUSTIFY/OWN NEEDS 3 1.69 OPINION/CONTRIBUTION 7 3.93
QUERY/INTERPRETATION 1 0.56  JUSTIFY/TASK 0 0.00 OPINION/GROUP 0 0.00
QUERY/OPINION 0 0.00  OFFER/TASK 0 0.00 OPINION/OWN IDEAS 3 1.69
QUERY/REFLECTION 0 0.00  QUERY/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 OPINION/OWN NEEDS 4 2.25
QUERY/REPETITION 0 0.00  QUERY/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 OPINION/TASK 7 3.93
RECORD/REPETITION 11 6.18  QUERY/CONSENSUS U 2 1.12 REFLECTION/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00
REJECT/INFERENCE 0 0.00  QUERY/GROUP 0 0.00 REFLECTION/CONSENSUS U 0 0.00
REJECT/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  QUERY/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00 REFLECTION/GROUP 4 2.25
REJECT/OPINION 5 2.81  QUERY/OWN NEEDS 1 0.56 REFLECTION/OWN NEEDS 3 1.69
REJECT/REFLECTION 0 0.00  QUERY/TASK 1 0.56 REFLECTION/TASK 3 1.69
REJECT/REPETITION 2 1.12  RECORD/MEMORY 11 6.18 REPETITION/AMPLIFYING 4 2.25
REQUEST/INFERENCE 0 0.00  REJECT/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 REPETITION/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
REQUEST/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  REJECT/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 REPETITION/CONSENSUS A 18 10.11
REQUEST/OPINION 2 1.12  REJECT/CONSENSUS U 0 0.00 REPETITION/CONSENSUS U 8 4.49
REQUEST/REPETITION 2 1.12  REJECT/CONTRIBUTION 0 0.00 REPETITION/GROUP 0 0.00
SEEK/INFERENCE 0 0.00  REJECT/GROUP 0 0.00 REPETITION/MEMORY 18 10.11
SEEK/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  REJECT/OWN IDEAS 3 1.69 REPETITION/OWN IDEAS 4 2.25
SEEK/REPETITION 0 0.00  REJECT/OWN NEEDS 3 1.69 REPETITION/OWN NEEDS 1 0.56
SUGGEST/EXAMPLE 3 1.69  REJECT/TASK 1 0.56 REPETITION/PARTICIPATION 1 0.56
SUGGEST/INFERENCE 1 0.56  REQUEST/GROUP 1 0.56 REPETITION/TASK 3 1.69
SUGGEST/INTERPRETATION 2 1.12 REQUEST/OWN NEEDS 3 1.69
SUGGEST/OPINION 4 2.25  REQUEST/TASK 13 7.30
SUGGEST/REPETITION 3 1.69  SEEK/CONSENSUS A 1 0.56
SUPPORT/EXAMPLE 3 1.69  SEEK/CONSENSUS U 1 0.56
SUPPORT/FACT 0 0.00  SEEK/TASK 0 0.00
SUPPORT/INFERENCE 0 0.00  SUGGEST/AMPLIFYING 1 0.56
SUPPORT/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  SUGGEST/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
SUPPORT/OPINION 8 4.49  SUGGEST/CONSENSUS A 2 1.12
SUPPORT/REFLECTION 0 0.00  SUGGEST/CONSENSUS U 7 3.93
SUPPORT/REPETITION 18 10.11  SUGGEST/CONTRIBUTION 2 1.12
SUGGEST/OWN IDEAS 1 0.56
    SUPPORT/AMPLIFYING 1 0.56
    SUPPORT/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/CONSENSUS A 26 14.61
    SUPPORT/CONSENSUS U 1 0.56
    SUPPORT/GROUP 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
 79
Table 9. The frequency of the combinations of the different forms of: the Immediate 
Inter-active Function (IF) and the Cognitive-Affective Content (C) (Block A); 
the Immediate Inter-active Function and the Underlying Function (UF);(Block 
B); the Cognitive-Affective Content and the Underlying Function (Block C) for 
Workshop 4B 
 
Block A    Block B Block C 
Forms of IF/C n. % Forms of IF/UF n. % Forms of C/UF n. %
CLARIFY/EXAMPLE 6 1.81 CLARIFY/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 EXAMPLE/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00
CLARIFY/FACT 1 0.30  CLARIFY/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 EXAMPLE/CONSENSUS U 7 2.11
CLARIFY/INFERENCE 13 3.92  CLARIFY/CONSENSUS U 33 9.94 EXAMPLE/TASK 0 0.00
CLARIFY/INTERPRETATION 12 3.61  CLARIFY/CONTRIBUTION 1 0.30 FACT/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
CLARIFY/OPINION 0 0.00  CLARIFY/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00 FACT/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00
CLARIFY/REPETITION 2 0.60  CLARIFY/TASK 0 0.00 FACT/CONSENSUS U 20 6.02
COMMENT/FACT 5 1.51  COMMENT/GROUP 3 0.90 FACT/CONTRIBUTION 0 0.00
COMMENT/INFERENCE 0 0.00  COMMENT/OWN NEEDS 1 0.30 FACT/MEMORY 19 5.72
COMMENT/INTERPRETATION 3 0.90  COMMENT/TASK 24 7.23 FACT/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00
COMMENT/OPINION 7 2.11  DICTATE/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 FACT/TASK 7 2.11
COMMENT/REFLECTION 13 3.92  DICTATE/MEMORY 7 2.11 INFERENCE/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
COMMENT/REPETITION 0 0.00  INFORM/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 INFERENCE/COMPROMISE 1 0.30
DICTATE/REPETITION 6 1.81  INFORM/CONSENSUS A 2 0.60 INFERENCE/CONSENSUS A 1 0.30
INFORM/EXAMPLE 1 0.30  INFORM/CONSENSUS U 31 9.34 INFERENCE/CONSENSUS U 20 6.02
INFORM/FACT 39 11.75  INFORM/CONTRIBUTION 0 0.00 INFERENCE/CONTRIBUTION 4 1.20
INFORM/INFERENCE 5 1.51  INFORM/MEMORY 19 5.72 INFERENCE/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00
INFORM/REFLECTION 3 0.90  INFORM/TASK 1 0.30 INFERENCE/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
INFORM/REPETITION 5 1.51  INQUIRE/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 INFERENCE/TASK 0 0.00
INQUIRE/INFERENCE 2 0.60  INQUIRE/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 INTERPRETATION/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
INQUIRE/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  INQUIRE/CONSENSUS U 13 3.92 INTERPRETATION/CONSENSUS A 2 0.60
INQUIRE/REPETITION 1 0.30  INQUIRE/GROUP 0 0.00 INTERPRETATION/CONSENSUS U 15 4.52
INVITE/REPETITION 1 0.30  INQUIRE/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00 INTERPRETATION/CONTRIBUTIO 3 0.90
JUSTIFY/EXAMPLE 0 0.00  INQUIRE/TASK 5 1.51 INTERPRETATION/GROUP 0 0.00
JUSTIFY/FACT 1 0.30  INVITE/PARTICIPATION 23 6.93 INTERPRETATION/OWN IDEAS 1 0.30
JUSTIFY/INFERENCE 2 0.60  JUSTIFY/AMPLIFYING 1 0.30 INTERPRETATION/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
JUSTIFY/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  JUSTIFY/COMPROMISE 1 0.30 INTERPRETATION/TASK 6 1.81
JUSTIFY/OPINION 8 2.41  JUSTIFY/CONSENSUS A 6 1.81 OPINION/AMPLIFYING 2 0.60
JUSTIFY/REFLECTION 0 0.00  JUSTIFY/CONSENSUS U 3 0.90 OPINION/COMPROMISE 1 0.30
JUSTIFY/REPETITION 7 2.11  JUSTIFY/CONTRIBUTION 5 1.51 OPINION/CONSENSUS A 9 2.71
QUERY/FACT 0 0.00  JUSTIFY/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00 OPINION/CONSENSUS U 1 0.30
QUERY/INFERENCE 0 0.00  JUSTIFY/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00 OPINION/CONTRIBUTION 19 5.72
QUERY/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  JUSTIFY/TASK 2 0.60 OPINION/GROUP 3 0.90
QUERY/OPINION 1 0.30  OFFER/TASK 5 1.51 OPINION/OWN IDEAS 2 0.60
QUERY/REFLECTION 0 0.00  QUERY/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 OPINION/OWN NEEDS 5 1.51
QUERY/REPETITION 1 0.30  QUERY/CONSENSUS A 2 0.60 OPINION/TASK 13 3.92
RECORD/REPETITION 30 9.04  QUERY/CONSENSUS U 1 0.30 REFLECTION/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00
REJECT/INFERENCE 1 0.30  QUERY/GROUP 0 0.00 REFLECTION/CONSENSUS U 3 0.90
REJECT/INTERPRETATION 2 0.60  QUERY/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00 REFLECTION/GROUP 3 0.90
REJECT/OPINION 8 2.41  QUERY/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00 REFLECTION/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
REJECT/REFLECTION 1 0.30  QUERY/TASK 0 0.00 REFLECTION/TASK 11 3.31
REJECT/REPETITION 1 0.30  RECORD/MEMORY 30 9.04 REPETITION/AMPLIFYING 6 1.81
REQUEST/INFERENCE 0 0.00  REJECT/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 REPETITION/COMPROMISE 1 0.30
REQUEST/INTERPRETATION 2 0.60  REJECT/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 REPETITION/CONSENSUS A 27 8.13
REQUEST/OPINION 7 2.11  REJECT/CONSENSUS U 0 0.00 REPETITION/CONSENSUS U 9 3.39
REQUEST/REPETITION 6 1.81  REJECT/CONTRIBUTION 1 0.30 REPETITION/GROUP 1 0.30
SEEK/INFERENCE 0 0.00  REJECT/GROUP 3 0.90 REPETITION/MEMORY 36 10.84
SEEK/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  REJECT/OWN IDEAS 3 0.90 REPETITION/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00
SEEK/REPETITION 0 0.00  REJECT/OWN NEEDS 4 1.20 REPETITION/OWN NEEDS 2 0.60
SUGGEST/EXAMPLE 0 0.00  REJECT/TASK 2 0.60 REPETITION/PARTICIPATION 1 0.30
SUGGEST/INFERENCE 3 0.90  REQUEST/GROUP 2 0.60 REPETITION/TASK 6 1.81
SUGGEST/INTERPRETATION 6 1.81 REQUEST/OWN NEEDS 2 0.60
SUGGEST/OPINION 16 4.82  REQUEST/TASK 26 7.83
SUGGEST/REPETITION 15 4.52  SEEK/CONSENSUS A 1 0.30
SUPPORT/EXAMPLE 0 0.00  SEEK/CONSENSUS U 0 0.00
SUPPORT/FACT 0 0.00  SEEK/TASK 0 0.00
SUPPORT/INFERENCE 0 0.00  SUGGEST/AMPLIFYING 4 1.20
SUPPORT/INTERPRETATION 2 0.60  SUGGEST/COMPROMISE 2 0.60
SUPPORT/OPINION 8 2.41  SUGGEST/CONSENSUS A 8 2.41
SUPPORT/REFLECTION 0 0.00  SUGGEST/CONSENSUS U 7 2.11
SUPPORT/REPETITION 16 4.82  SUGGEST/CONTRIBUTION 19 5.72
SUGGEST/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/AMPLIFYING 3 0.90
    SUPPORT/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/CONSENSUS A 21 6.33
    SUPPORT/CONSENSUS U 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/GROUP 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
 80
Table 10.  The frequency of the combinations of the different forms of: the Immediate 
Inter-active Function (IF) and the Cognitive-Affective Content (C) (Block A); 
the Immediate Inter-active Function and the Underlying Function (UF);(Block 
B); the Cognitive-Affective Content and the Underlying Function (Block C) for 
Workshop 5A 
 
Block A    Block B Block C 
Forms of IF/C n. % Forms of IF/UF n. % Forms of C/UF n. %
CLARIFY/EXAMPLE 0 0.00 CLARIFY/AMPLIFYING 2 0.87 EXAMPLE/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00
CLARIFY/FACT 1 0.44  CLARIFY/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 EXAMPLE/CONSENSUS U 0 0.00
CLARIFY/INFERENCE 5 2.18  CLARIFY/CONSENSUS U 17 7.42 EXAMPLE/TASK 0 0.00
CLARIFY/INTERPRETATION 2 0.87  CLARIFY/CONTRIBUTION 0 0.00 FACT/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
CLARIFY/OPINION 3 1.31  CLARIFY/OWN IDEAS 3 1.31 FACT/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00
CLARIFY/REPETITION 11 4.80  CLARIFY/TASK 0 0.00 FACT/CONSENSUS U 8 3.49
COMMENT/FACT 4 1.75  COMMENT/GROUP 3 1.31 FACT/CONTRIBUTION 0 0.00
COMMENT/INFERENCE 0 0.00  COMMENT/OWN NEEDS 10 4.37 FACT/MEMORY 0 0.00
COMMENT/INTERPRETATION 2 0.87  COMMENT/TASK 18 7.86 FACT/OWN IDEAS 1 0.44
COMMENT/OPINION 10 4.37  DICTATE/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 FACT/TASK 4 1.75
COMMENT/REFLECTION 14 6.11  DICTATE/MEMORY 12 5.24 INFERENCE/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
COMMENT/REPETITION 1 0.44  INFORM/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 INFERENCE/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
DICTATE/REPETITION 12 5.24  INFORM/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 INFERENCE/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00
INFORM/EXAMPLE 0 0.00  INFORM/CONSENSUS U 10 4.37 INFERENCE/CONSENSUS U 5 2.18
INFORM/FACT 6 2.62  INFORM/CONTRIBUTION 0 0.00 INFERENCE/CONTRIBUTION 7 3.06
INFORM/INFERENCE 1 0.44  INFORM/MEMORY 0 0.00 INFERENCE/OWN IDEAS 5 2.18
INFORM/REFLECTION 0 0.00  INFORM/TASK 0 0.00 INFERENCE/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
INFORM/REPETITION 3 1.31  INQUIRE/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 INFERENCE/TASK 1 0.44
INQUIRE/INFERENCE 0 0.00  INQUIRE/CONSENSUS A 1 0.44 INTERPRETATION/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
INQUIRE/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  INQUIRE/CONSENSUS U 11 4.80 INTERPRETATION/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00
INQUIRE/REPETITION 1 0.44  INQUIRE/GROUP 1 0.44 INTERPRETATION/CONSENSUS U 5 2.18
INVITE/REPETITION 0 0.00  INQUIRE/OWN NEEDS 1 0.44 INTERPRETATION/CONTRIBUTIO 1 0.44
JUSTIFY/EXAMPLE 0 0.00  INQUIRE/TASK 5 2.18 INTERPRETATION/GROUP 1 0.44
JUSTIFY/FACT 2 0.87  INVITE/PARTICIPATION 5 2.18 INTERPRETATION/OWN IDEAS 5 2.18
JUSTIFY/INFERENCE 2 0.87  JUSTIFY/AMPLIFYING 1 0.44 INTERPRETATION/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
JUSTIFY/INTERPRETATION 3 1.31  JUSTIFY/COMPROMISE 0 0.00 INTERPRETATION/TASK 2 0.87
JUSTIFY/OPINION 3 1.31  JUSTIFY/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 OPINION/AMPLIFYING 1 0.44
JUSTIFY/REFLECTION 0 0.00  JUSTIFY/CONSENSUS U 5 2.18 OPINION/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
JUSTIFY/REPETITION 3 1.31  JUSTIFY/CONTRIBUTION OPINION/CONSENSUS A 2 0.87
QUERY/FACT 0 0.00  JUSTIFY/OWN IDEAS 7 3.06 OPINION/CONSENSUS U 7 3.06
QUERY/INFERENCE 1 0.44  JUSTIFY/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00 OPINION/CONTRIBUTION 2 0.87
QUERY/INTERPRETATION 2 0.87  JUSTIFY/TASK 0 0.00 OPINION/GROUP 1 0.44
QUERY/OPINION 2 0.87  OFFER/TASK 1 0.44 OPINION/OWN IDEAS 13 5.68
QUERY/REFLECTION 1 0.44  QUERY/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 OPINION/OWN NEEDS 15 6.55
QUERY/REPETITION 0 0.00  QUERY/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 OPINION/TASK 9 3.93
RECORD/REPETITION 12 5.24  QUERY/CONSENSUS U 2 0.87 REFLECTION/CONSENSUS A 1 0.44
REJECT/INFERENCE 1 0.44  QUERY/GROUP 2 0.87 REFLECTION/CONSENSUS U 0 0.00
REJECT/INTERPRETATION 3 1.31  QUERY/OWN IDEAS 2 0.87 REFLECTION/GROUP 3 1.31
REJECT/OPINION 14 6.11  QUERY/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00 REFLECTION/OWN NEEDS 5 2.18
REJECT/REFLECTION 0 0.00  QUERY/TASK 1 0.44 REFLECTION/TASK 7 3.06
REJECT/REPETITION 0 0.00  RECORD/MEMORY 12 5.24 REPETITION/AMPLIFYING 7 3.06
REQUEST/INFERENCE 1 0.44  REJECT/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 REPETITION/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
REQUEST/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  REJECT/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 REPETITION/CONSENSUS A 3 1.31
REQUEST/OPINION 2 0.87  REJECT/CONSENSUS U 0 0.00 REPETITION/CONSENSUS U 16 6.99
REQUEST/REPETITION 2 0.87  REJECT/CONTRIBUTION 1 0.44 REPETITION/GROUP 0 0.00
SEEK/INFERENCE 0 0.00  REJECT/GROUP 0 0.00 REPETITION/MEMORY 24 10.48
SEEK/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  REJECT/OWN IDEAS 7 3.06 REPETITION/OWN IDEAS 7 3.06
SEEK/REPETITION 1 0.44  REJECT/OWN NEEDS 9 3.93 REPETITION/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
SUGGEST/EXAMPLE 0 0.00  REJECT/TASK 1 0.44 REPETITION/PARTICIPATION 0 0.00
SUGGEST/INFERENCE 7 3.06  REQUEST/GROUP 2 0.87 REPETITION/TASK 3 1.31
SUGGEST/INTERPRETATION 2 0.87 REQUEST/OWN NEEDS 7 3.06
SUGGEST/OPINION 9 3.93  REQUEST/TASK 25 10.92
SUGGEST/REPETITION 7 3.06  SEEK/CONSENSUS A 1 0.44
SUPPORT/EXAMPLE 0 0.00  SEEK/CONSENSUS U 2 0.87
SUPPORT/FACT 0 0.00  SEEK/TASK 0 0.00
SUPPORT/INFERENCE 0 0.00  SUGGEST/AMPLIFYING 2 0.87
SUPPORT/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  SUGGEST/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
SUPPORT/OPINION 7 3.06  SUGGEST/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00
SUPPORT/REFLECTION 1 0.44  SUGGEST/CONSENSUS U 4 1.75
SUPPORT/REPETITION 7 3.06  SUGGEST/CONTRIBUTION 9 3.93
SUGGEST/OWN IDEAS 10 4.37
    SUPPORT/AMPLIFYING 3 1.31
    SUPPORT/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/CONSENSUS A 5 2.18
    SUPPORT/CONSENSUS U 2 0.87
    SUPPORT/GROUP 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/OWN IDEAS 2 0.87
    SUPPORT/OWN NEEDS 1 0.44
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Table 11. The frequency of the combinations of the different forms of: the Immediate 
Inter-active Function (IF) and the Cognitive-Affective Content (C) (Block A); 
the Immediate Inter-active Function and the Underlying Function (UF);(Block 
B); the Cognitive-Affective Content and the Underlying Function (Block C) for 
Workshop 5B. 
Block A    Block B Block C 
Forms of IF/C n. % Forms of IF/UF n. % Forms of C/UF n. %
CLARIFY/EXAMPLE 0 0.00 CLARIFY/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 EXAMPLE/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00
CLARIFY/FACT 1 0.40  CLARIFY/CONSENSUS A 1 0.40 EXAMPLE/CONSENSUS U 0 0.00
CLARIFY/INFERENCE 5 2.00  CLARIFY/CONSENSUS U 43 17.20 EXAMPLE/TASK 0 0.00
CLARIFY/INTERPRETATION 14 5.60  CLARIFY/CONTRIBUTION 0 0.00 FACT/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
CLARIFY/OPINION 0 0.00  CLARIFY/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00 FACT/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00
CLARIFY/REPETITION 24 9.60  CLARIFY/TASK 0 0.00 FACT/CONSENSUS U 8 3.20
COMMENT/FACT 2 0.80  COMMENT/GROUP 2 0.80 FACT/CONTRIBUTION 0 0.00
COMMENT/INFERENCE 0 0.00  COMMENT/OWN NEEDS 4 1.60 FACT/MEMORY 0 0.00
COMMENT/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  COMMENT/TASK 18 7.20 FACT/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00
COMMENT/OPINION 9 3.60  DICTATE/CONSENSUS A 1 0.40 FACT/TASK 2 0.80
COMMENT/REFLECTION 11 4.40  DICTATE/MEMORY 7 2.80 INFERENCE/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
COMMENT/REPETITION 2 0.80  INFORM/AMPLIFYING 1 0.40 INFERENCE/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
DICTATE/REPETITION 8 3.20  INFORM/CONSENSUS A 1 0.40 INFERENCE/CONSENSUS A 1 0.40
INFORM/EXAMPLE 0 0.00  INFORM/CONSENSUS U 18 7.20 INFERENCE/CONSENSUS U 11 4.40
INFORM/FACT 6 2.40  INFORM/CONTRIBUTION INFERENCE/CONTRIBUTION 3 1.20
INFORM/INFERENCE 0 0.00  INFORM/MEMORY 0 0.00 INFERENCE/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00
INFORM/REFLECTION 2 0.80  INFORM/TASK 0 0.00 INFERENCE/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
INFORM/REPETITION 12 4.80  INQUIRE/AMPLIFYING 1 0.40 INFERENCE/TASK 0 0.00
INQUIRE/INFERENCE 1 0.40  INQUIRE/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 INTERPRETATION/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00
INQUIRE/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  INQUIRE/CONSENSUS U 13 5.20 INTERPRETATION/CONSENSUS A 1 0.40
INQUIRE/REPETITION 6 2.40  INQUIRE/GROUP 0 0.00 INTERPRETATION/CONSENSUS U 18 7.20
INVITE/REPETITION 5 2.00  INQUIRE/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00 INTERPRETATION/CONTRIBUTIO 1 0.40
JUSTIFY/EXAMPLE 0 0.00  INQUIRE/TASK 5 2.00 INTERPRETATION/GROUP 1 0.40
JUSTIFY/FACT 0 0.00  INVITE/PARTICIPATION 11 4.40 INTERPRETATION/OWN IDEAS 1 0.40
JUSTIFY/INFERENCE 7 2.80  JUSTIFY/AMPLIFYING 2 0.80 INTERPRETATION/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
JUSTIFY/INTERPRETATION 1 0.40  JUSTIFY/COMPROMISE 0 0.00 INTERPRETATION/TASK 0 0.00
JUSTIFY/OPINION 4 1.60  JUSTIFY/CONSENSUS A 1 0.40 OPINION/AMPLIFYING 1 0.40
JUSTIFY/REFLECTION 0 0.00  JUSTIFY/CONSENSUS U 9 3.60 OPINION/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
JUSTIFY/REPETITION 5 2.00  JUSTIFY/CONTRIBUTION 2 0.80 OPINION/CONSENSUS A 5 2.00
QUERY/FACT 0 0.00  JUSTIFY/OWN IDEAS 1 0.40 OPINION/CONSENSUS U 8 3.20
QUERY/INFERENCE 0 0.00  JUSTIFY/OWN NEEDS 1 0.40 OPINION/CONTRIBUTION 9 3.60
QUERY/INTERPRETATION 3 1.20  JUSTIFY/TASK 1 0.40 OPINION/GROUP 0 0.00
QUERY/OPINION 1 0.40  OFFER/TASK 1 0.40 OPINION/OWN IDEAS 6 2.40
QUERY/REFLECTION 0 0.00  QUERY/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 OPINION/OWN NEEDS 3 1.20
QUERY/REPETITION 2 0.80  QUERY/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 OPINION/TASK 12 4.80
RECORD/REPETITION 7 2.80  QUERY/CONSENSUS U 6 2.40 REFLECTION/CONSENSUS A 1 0.40
REJECT/INFERENCE 0 0.00  QUERY/GROUP 1 0.40 REFLECTION/CONSENSUS U 2 0.80
REJECT/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  QUERY/OWN IDEAS 3 1.20 REFLECTION/GROUP 3 1.20
REJECT/OPINION 8 3.20  QUERY/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00 REFLECTION/OWN NEEDS 3 1.20
REJECT/REFLECTION 1 0.40  QUERY/TASK 1 0.40 REFLECTION/TASK 6 2.40
REJECT/REPETITION 1 0.40  RECORD/MEMORY 7 2.80 REPETITION/AMPLIFYING 4 1.60
REQUEST/INFERENCE 0 0.00  REJECT/AMPLIFYING 0 0.00 REPETITION/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
REQUEST/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  REJECT/CONSENSUS A 0 0.00 REPETITION/CONSENSUS A 17 6.80
REQUEST/OPINION 0 0.00  REJECT/CONSENSUS U 1 0.40 REPETITION/CONSENSUS U 49 19.60
REQUEST/REPETITION 3 1.20  REJECT/CONTRIBUTION 0 0.00 REPETITION/GROUP 0 0.00
SEEK/INFERENCE 0 0.00  REJECT/GROUP 0 0.00 REPETITION/MEMORY 14 5.60
SEEK/INTERPRETATION 0 0.00  REJECT/OWN IDEAS 5 2.00 REPETITION/OWN IDEAS 2 0.80
SEEK/REPETITION 7 2.80  REJECT/OWN NEEDS 2 0.80 REPETITION/OWN NEEDS 2 0.80
SUGGEST/EXAMPLE 0 0.00  REJECT/TASK 2 0.80 REPETITION/PARTICIPATION 5 2.00
SUGGEST/INFERENCE 2 0.80  REQUEST/GROUP 1 0.40 REPETITION/TASK 5 2.00
SUGGEST/INTERPRETATION 2 0.80 REQUEST/OWN NEEDS 2 0.80
SUGGEST/OPINION 14 5.60  REQUEST/TASK 11 4.40
SUGGEST/REPETITION 4 1.60  SEEK/CONSENSUS A 6 2.40
SUPPORT/EXAMPLE 0 0.00  SEEK/CONSENSUS U 8 3.20
SUPPORT/FACT 1 0.40  SEEK/TASK 0 0.00
SUPPORT/INFERENCE 0 0.00  SUGGEST/AMPLIFYING 1 0.40
SUPPORT/INTERPRETATION 2 0.80  SUGGEST/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
SUPPORT/OPINION 8 3.20  SUGGEST/CONSENSUS A 2 0.80
SUPPORT/REFLECTION 1 0.40  SUGGEST/CONSENSUS U 8 3.20
SUPPORT/REPETITION 12 4.80  SUGGEST/CONTRIBUTION 11 4.40
SUGGEST/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/AMPLIFYING 1 0.40
    SUPPORT/COMPROMISE 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/CONSENSUS A 17 6.80
    SUPPORT/CONSENSUS U 4 1.60
    SUPPORT/GROUP 1 0.40
    SUPPORT/OWN IDEAS 0 0.00
    SUPPORT/OWN NEEDS 0 0.00
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APPENDIX 15. 
GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE LINKS BETWEEN 
OPERATIONS IN TERMS OF THEIR COGNITIVE-AFFECTIVE 
CONTENT 
 
This appendix contains an example of a graphical representation of the links between the 
operations in a workshop in terms of their Cognitive-Affective Content. The example refers to 
Workshop 1A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Graphical representation of the links between operations in terms of their 
Cognitive-Affective Content for Workshop 1A
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APPENDIX 16. 
 GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATIONS OF THE NUMBER OF 
OPERATIONS CONTRIBUTED BY THE PARTICIPANTS, ANALYSED 
IN TERMS OF: IF/C/UF 
 
This appendix contains 10 figures. Figures 1-10 show the graphical representations for each 
of the 10 workshops respectively. 
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Figure 1. Bar Charts of the number of operations contributed by each participant of 
Workshop 1A, analysed in terms of: their Immediate Inter-active Function (IF) 
(Chart A); their Cognitive-Affective Content (C) (Chart B); their Underlying 
Function (UF) (Chart C)
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Figure 2. Bar Charts of the number of operations contributed by each participant of 
Workshop 1B, analysed in terms of: their Immediate Inter-active Function (IF) 
(Chart A); their Cognitive-Affective Content (C) (Chart B); their Underlying 
Function (UF) (Chart C).
 83
 
Figure 3. Bar Charts of the number of operations contributed by each participant of 
Workshop 2A, analysed in terms of: their Immediate Inter-active Function (IF) 
(Chart A); their Cognitive-Affective Content (C) (Chart B); their Underlying 
Function (UF) (Chart C).
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Figure 4. Bar Charts of the number of operations contributed by each participant of 
Workshop 2B, analysed in terms of: their Immediate Inter-active Function (IF) 
(Chart A); their Cognitive-Affective Content (C) (Chart B); their Underlying 
Function (UF) (Chart C).
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Figure 5. Bar Charts of the number of operations contributed by each participant of 
Workshop 3A, analysed in terms of: their Immediate Inter-active Function (IF) 
(Chart A); their Cognitive-Affective Content (C) (Chart B); their Underlying 
Function (UF) (Chart C).
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Figure 6. Bar Charts of the number of operations contributed by each participant of 
Workshop 3B, analysed in terms of: their Immediate Inter-active Function (IF) 
(Chart A); their Cognitive-Affective Content (C) (Chart B); their Underlying 
Function (UF) (Chart C).
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Figure 7. Bar Charts of the number of operations contributed by each participant of 
Workshop 4A, analysed in terms of: their Immediate Inter-active Function (IF) 
(Chart A); their Cognitive-Affective Content (C) (Chart B); their Underlying 
Function (UF) (Chart C).
 88
 
Figure 8. Bar Charts of the number of operations contributed by each participant of 
Workshop 4B, analysed in terms of: their Immediate Inter-active Function (IF) 
(Chart A); their Cognitive-Affective Content (C) (Chart B); their Underlying 
Function (UF) (Chart C).
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Figure 9. Bar Charts of the number of operations contributed by each participant of 
Workshop 5A, analysed in terms of: their Immediate Inter-active Function (IF) 
(Chart A); their Cognitive-Affective Content (C) (Chart B); their Underlying 
Function (UF) (Chart C).
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Figure 10. Bar Charts of the number of operations contributed by each participant of 
Workshop 5B, analysed in terms of: their Immediate Inter-active Function (IF) 
(Chart A); their Cognitive-Affective Content (C) (Chart B); their Underlying 
Function (UF) (Chart C).
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APPENDIX 17. 
GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATIONS OF THE MAJOR CONSECUTIVE 
LINKAGES BETWEEN OPERATIONS IN TERMS OF THEIR 
COGNITIVE-AFFECTIVE CONTENT 
 
This appendix contains 10 figures. Figures 1-10 each consist of a number of diagrams, 
representing the major consecutive linkages for each of the 10 workshops respectively, with 
explanatory notes. These figures are based on interpretation of the linkage diagrams (see 
Appendix 14 for an example). Each diagram consists of a sequence or linked sequences of 
operations, analysed in terms of the participant who provided the operation and in terms of 
the Cognitive-Affective Content of the operation.  
 
A single legend that applies to all 10 figures is provided below.
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Figure 1. Major consecutive linkages of Workshop 1A 
 
Notes 
 
• Consecutive linkage (a) refers to the choice of Option 1 as a solution to the problem. 
• Consecutive linkage (b) refers to the establishment and reinforcement of the final 
agreement on the solution to the problem.  
• Consecutive linkage (d) refers to a motivation for Option 1 based on Fact 5 contained in 
the problem structure.  
• Consecutive linkages (c), (e), (f) and (h) refer to motivations for Option 1, based on 
personal background knowledge of the participants. 
• Consecutive linkage (g) refers to a motivation for Option 1, based on Fact 3 contained 
in the problem structure.  
• Consecutive linkage (i) refers to a motivation for Option 1, based on an inference of 
Fact 5 contained in the problem structure. 
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Figure 2. Major consecutive linkages of Workshop 1B 
 
Notes 
 
• Consecutive linkage (a) refers to the choice of Option 1 as a solution to the problem. 
• Consecutive linkage (b) refers to a motivation for Option 1, which is based on Fact 1 of 
the problem structure.  
• Consecutive linkage (c) refers to the choice of Option 2 as a solution to the problem. 
• Consecutive linkage (d) relates to a motivation for Option 2, which is based on personal 
background knowledge.  
• Consecutive linkage (e) refers to two interrelated aspects of the problem solving task. 
Each of these is represented by one leg of the link.  
• Consecutive linkage (f) refers to the issue of recording.  
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Figure 3. Major consecutive linkages of Workshop 2A 
 
Notes 
 
• Consecutive linkage (a) refers to the solution to Aspect 1 of the problem and consists of 
various legs. These depict the different inferences made in order to solve Aspect 1. The 
newsprint is  made use of in this process.  
• Consecutive linkage (b) refers to the amendment of the solution to Aspect 1 of the 
problem. 
• Consecutive linkages (c), (d) and (e) refer to building a common understanding of the 
content of the problem structure. They refer to three different aspects of the same issue.  
• Consecutive linkage (f) refers to a suggestion to solve Aspect 2 of the problem. The 
newsprint was consulted in this linkage. 
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• Consecutive linkages (g) and (h) refer to task related issues. They both serve to build 
agreement about ending a particular part of the problem solving process and starting a 
new one.  
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Figure 4. Major consecutive linkages of Workshop 2B 
 
Notes 
 
• Consecutive linkage (a) refers to Aspect 1 of the problem and consists of various legs. 
These represent the inferential process leading to the solution to Aspect 1. The linkages 
starting respectively with Operation 7.1. and Operation 6.1. represent conflicting 
inferences.  
• Consecutive linkage (b) refers to the building of a common understanding of the 
information provided in the problem structure. The four different directions of the links 
represent four different aspects of the interpretation.  
• The linkages (c), (d), (e) and (f) refer to different suggestions to solve Aspect 2 of the 
problem. 
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Figure 5. Major consecutive linkages of Workshop 3A 
 
Notes 
 
• Consecutive linkage (a) refers to the choice of Option 5.  
• Consecutive linkage (b) refers to a motivation for Option 5, which is based on the 
information provided in the problem structure.  
• Consecutive linkage (c) refers to the choice of Option 1.   
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Figure 6. Major consecutive linkages of Workshop 3B 
 
Notes 
 
• Consecutive linkages (a), (b) and(c) refer to Option 2 of the problem structure. Linkage 
(a) relates to the choice of Option 2 as the solution to the problem. Linkage (b) refers to a 
motivation in favour of Option 2, based on a fact contained in the problem structure. 
Linkage (c) refers to a motivation against the choice of Option 2, based on an 
interpretation of the data contained in the problem structure . 
• Consecutive linkage (d) refers to Option 5 of the problem structure. It refers to the choice 
of Option 5 as the problem solution and a motivation in favour of Option 5, which is 
based on facts contained in the problem structure.  
• Consecutive linkage (e) represents a motivation against Option 5. It is based on an opinion 
not contained in the problem structure. 
• Consecutive linkage (f) refers to a motivation for Option 6 as a solution to the problem.  
• Consecutive linkage (g) refers to the compromise reached in the group.  
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Figure 7. Major consecutive linkages of Workshop 4A 
 
Notes 
 
• Consecutive linkages (a) refers to the choice of Option 4 as a solution to the problem.  
• Consecutive linkage (b) refers to different aspects of Motivations 1 and 3 for Option 4. It 
consists of several legs, which represent different interpretations of the problem structure. 
• Consecutive linkage (c) refers to Motivation 2 for Option 4. It consists of opinions, 
inferences and interpretation, some of which are incompatible. 
• Consecutive linkage (d) refers to Motivation 4 for Option 4. It is based on a fact contained 
in the problem structure. 
• Consecutive linkage (e) refers to Motivation 5 for Option 4. It represents two 
incompatible interpretations of Sizwe's opinion. 
• Linkage (f) refers to the building of a common understanding of the problem and the way 
to deal with it. 
 100
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Major consecutive linkages of Workshop 4B 
 
Notes 
 
• Consecutive linkage (a) refers to the method used in the problem solving process. 
• Consecutive linkage (b) refers to an explanation of the problem structure. 
• Consecutive linkage (c) refers to the results of the process based on the method explained 
in linkage (a). 
• Consecutive linkages (d), (e), (f), (g) and (h) refer to motivations made in favour of 
Option 1 and to the building of a common understanding of those. 
• Consecutive linkage (i) refers to building a common understanding of Option 4. 
• Consecutive linkage (j) refers to the development of a compromise to the problem 
solution .  
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Figure 9. Major consecutive linkages of Workshop 5A 
 
Notes 
 
• Consecutive linkage (a) is a complex network of different legs, which represent inferences 
and interpretations made in the process of solving Aspect 2 of the problem. It  
simultaneously introduces a suggestion to solve Aspect 1 of the problem. 
• Consecutive linkage (b) refers to an explanation of the problem structure. 
• Consecutive linkage (c) refers to a discussion on the format of recording. 
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Figure 10. Major consecutive linkages of Workshop 5B 
 
Notes 
 
• Consecutive linkage (a) consists of various legs. These include repetitions and inferences 
of the problem structure in order to clarify the problem structure. 
• Consecutive linkage (b) refers to Suggestion 1 to solve Aspect 1 of the problem.   
• Consecutive linkage (c) refers to the solution to Aspect 2 of  the problem. This solution is 
also used as a suggestion to solve Aspect 1. The various legs represent repetitions of 
different elements that are contained in Operation 18.1 and Operation 18.1and which are 
derived from the problem structure. 
• Consecutive linkage (d) represents a suggestion to solve the lack of understanding of  an 
aspect of the problem structure..  
• Consecutive linkage (e) refers to Suggestion 3 for Aspect 1 of the problem.  
• Consecutive linkages (f) and (g) refer to task related issues. Linkage (f) relates to the need 
to find the real problem, linkage (g) refers to the explanation of Aspect 1 of the problem.  
 
 
41.1 Sindiswa SUPPORT EXAMPLE CONSENSUS A
40.1 Matthew SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
39.2 Sizwe SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
39.1 Sizwe JUSTIFY REPETITION AMPLIFYING
38.2 Thozie SEEK CONSENSUS A 11 ESTABLISHMENT OF FINAL
38.1 Thozie CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U GROUP CONSENSUS ON THE
37.1 Sizwe SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION CHOICE OF OPTION 1
36.2 Matthew JUSTIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS A
36.1 Matthew SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
35.1 Thozie SEEK INFERENCE CONSENSUS A
34.2 Sizwe INVITE PARTICIPATION
34.1 Sizwe DICTATE REPETITION CONSENSUS A
33.1 Thozie OFFER TASK
32.3 Sizwe COMMENT OPINION GROUP 10 BUILDING OF A COMMON
32.2 Sizwe COMMENT OPINION TASK UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT
32.1 Sizwe REQUEST TASK AND HOW TO RECORD
31.2 Linda REQUEST TASK
31.1 Linda JUSTIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS A
30.4 Sizwe JUSTIFY REPETITION AMPLIFYING
30.3 Sizwe SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
30.2 Sizwe JUSTIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS A
30.1 Sizwe RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
29.1 Linda SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
28.1 Matthew JUSTIFY REPETITION AMPLIFYING
27.3 Sizwe RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
27.2 Linda DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
27.1 Linda REQUEST REPETITION TASK 9 MOTIVATIONS FOR OPTION 1
26.2 Matthew CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
26.1 Matthew JUSTIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS A GROUP SUPPORT FOR OPTION 1
25.2 Sizwe RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
25.1 Sizwe SUGGEST INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION
24.2 Linda INVITE PARTICIPATION
24.1 Linda INFORM REPETITION CONSENSUS U
23.1 Sizwe SEEK CONSENSUS U
22.1 Linda INVITE PARTICIPATION
21.1 Thozie SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
20.2 Matthew JUSTIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
20.1 Matthew JUSTIFY INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION
19.2 Linda REQUEST TASK
19.1 Linda COMMENT OPINION GROUP 8 BUILDING OF A COMMON
18.3 Sizwe JUSTIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U UNDERSTANDING OF THE
18.2 Sizwe CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U PROBLEM STRUCTURE
18.1 Sizwe INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
17.3 Sizwe RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
17.2 Linda DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
17.1 Linda SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
16.3 Matthew CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
16.2 Matthew JUSTIFY REPETITION AMPLIFYING 7 MOTIVATIONS FOR OPTION 1
16.1 Matthew JUSTIFY REPETITION AMPLIFYING
15.2 Thozie COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
15.1 Thozie SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
14.2 Linda SEEK CONSENSUS A
14.1 Linda INVITE PARTICIPATION
13.2 Sizwe REQUEST OWN NEEDS
13.1 Sizwe COMMENT REFLECTION OWN NEEDS 6 BUILDING OF A COMMON
12.3 Linda REQUEST REPETITION TASK UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT AND
12.2 Linda SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A HOW TO RECORD.
12.1 Linda COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
11.4 Sizwe JUSTIFY REPETITION AMPLIFYING
11.3 Sizwe JUSTIFY REPETITION AMPLIFYING 5 MOTIVATIONS FOR OPTION 1
11.2 Sizwe JUSTIFY OPINION CONTRIBUTION
11.1 Sizwe SUPPORT OPINION TASK 4 BUILDING OF COMMON
10.2 Linda JUSTIFY INFERENCE TASK UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT AND
10.1 Linda REQUEST TASK HOW TO RECORD
9.4 Sizwe JUSTIFY OPINION CONTRIBUTION
9.3 Sizwe SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
9.2 Sizwe INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
9.1 Sizwe SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
8.1 Thozie SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
7.2 Matthew JUSTIFY FACT CONTRIBUTION 3 MOTIVATIONS FOR OPTION 1
7.1 Matthew JUSTIFY OPINION CONTRIBUTION
6.1 Sizwe CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U GROUP SUPPORT FOR OPTION 1
5.1 Thozie SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
4.2 Matthew JUSTIFY REPETITION AMPLIFYING
4.1 Matthew SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS A
. 3.5 Sizwe JUSTIFY FACT CONTRIBUTION
O 3.4 Sizwe JUSTIFY REPETITION AMPLIFYING
N 3.3 Sizwe JUSTIFY OPINION CONTRIBUTION
3.2 Sizwe COMMENT REFLECTION TASK 2 BUILDING OF A COMMON
N 3.1 Sizwe SUPPORT OPINION TASK UNDERSTANDING OF THE
O 2.1 Funeka SEEK INTERPRETATION TASK PROBLEM SOLVING PROCESS
I 1.7 Sizwe JUSTIFY OPINION CONTRIBUTION
T 1.6 Sizwe JUSTIFY INTERPRETATION CONTRIBUTION
A 1.5 Sizwe CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U 1 SUGGESTION TO CHOOSE OPTION 1
R 1.4 Sizwe JUSTIFY OPINION CONTRIBUTION
E 1.3 Sizwe SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION MOTIVATIONS FOR OPTION 1
P 1.2 Sizwe INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
O 1.1 Sizwe INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
PARTICIPANT IMMEDIATE COGNITIVE- UNDERLYING STAGE: NUMBER & DESCRIPTION
INTER-ACTIVE AFFECTIVE FUNCTION
FUNCTION CONTENT
61.3 Ayanda RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
61.2 Ayanda SUGGEST OPINION CONSENSUS A 14 ESTABLISHMENT OF FINAL
61.1 Ayanda SUGGEST OPINION CONSENSUS A GROUP CONSENSUS ON THE
60.2 Thami COMMENT OPINION GROUP CHOICE OF OPTION 1
60.1 Thami REQUEST TASK
59.1 Theo REQUEST TASK
58.1 Ayanda SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
57.3 Thami CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
57.2 Thami JUSTIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
57.1 Thami REJECT INTERPRETATION OWN IDEAS
56.1 Ayanda SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS A 13 RE-STATEMENT AND
55.1 Thami INQUIRE CONSENSUS U ACCEPTANCE OF A
54.2 Theo JUSTIFY OPINION COMPROMISE COMPROMISE
54.1 Theo SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
53.6 Thami SEEK CONSENSUS U
53.5 Thami SUGGEST REPETITION COMPROMISE
53.4 Thami SUGGEST OPINION COMPROMISE
53.3 Thami SUGGEST OPINION COMPROMISE
53.2 Thami INFORM REPETITION CONSENSUS U
53.1 Thami REJECT REPETITION OWN IDEAS
52.4 Theo SEEK CONSENSUS U
52.3 Theo JUSTIFY OPINION CONTRIBUTION 12 RE-STATEMENT OF OPTIONS 1
52.2 Theo QUERY INFERENCE OWN IDEAS AND 2
52.1 Theo SUGGEST REPETITION OWN IDEAS
51.1 Thami INVITE PARTICIPATION MOTIVATIONS FOR OPTIONS 1
50.3 Theodora JUSTIFY FACT CONTRIBUTION AND 2
50.2 Theodora JUSTIFY FACT CONTRIBUTION
50.1 Theodora SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS A
49.1 Hilde INVITE PARTICIPATION
48.1 Ayanda REQUEST TASK
47.1 Hilde INQUIRE GROUP 11 GROUP CONFLICT OVER TWO
46.1 Theo COMMENT INFERENCE OWN NEEDS OPPOSING VIEWS
45.1 Hilde REQUEST GROUP
44.1 Theo REQUEST GROUP ELICITING OF OUTSIDE
43.1 Ayanda INQUIRE TASK MEDIATION
42.2 Theo COMMENT REFLECTION GROUP
42.1 Theo REJECT REPETITION OWN IDEAS
41.1 James REQUEST GROUP
40.2 Ayanda COMMENT OPINION TASK
40.1 Ayanda SUPPORT REPETITION TASK 10 BUILDING OF A COMMON
39.1 Thami REQUEST OWN NEEDS UNDERSTANDING OF THE
38.2 Theo REQUEST REPETITION TASK PROBLEM SOLVING PROCESS
38.1 Theo COMMENT REPETITION TASK
37.4 Thami SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS A RE-STATEMENT OF OPTIONS 1
37.3 Thami COMMENT REFLECTION TASK AND 2
37.2 Thami COMMENT REPETITION TASK
37.1 Thami SUPPORT OPINION TASK
36.1 Sipho COMMENT OPINION TASK
35.3 Ayanda RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
35.2 James SUGGEST REPETITION AMPLIFYING
35.1 James COMMENT OPINION TASK
34.1 Thami INQUIRE TASK
33.1 Theo COMMENT REFLECTION TASK 9 MOTIVATIONS FOR OPTION 1
32.1 James SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
31.1 Thami SEEK CONSENSUS A
30.3 James JUSTIFY INTERPRETATION CONTRIBUTION
30.2 James JUSTIFY OPINION CONTRIBUTION
30.1 James JUSTIFY FACT CONTRIBUTION
29.7 Theo JUSTIFY FACT CONTRIBUTION
29.6 Theo JUSTIFY INTERPRETATION CONTRIBUTION
29.5 Theo JUSTIFY FACT CONTRIBUTION 8 REJECTION OF OPTION 1
29.4 Ayanda RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
29.3 Theo DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY MOTIVATIONS FOR OPTION 2
29.2 Theo REQUEST TASK
29.1 Theo REJECT REPETITION OWN IDEAS
28.3 James RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
28.2 Ayanda SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS A
28.1 Ayanda COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
27.1 Thami REQUEST OWN NEEDS
26.2 Sipho JUSTIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS A
26.1 Sipho SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A 7 MOTIVATIONS FOR OPTION 1
25.3 Thami SUGGEST OPINION COMPROMISE
25.2 Thami JUSTIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS A SUGGESTION OF A COMPROMISE
25.1 Thami SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS U
24.1 Ayanda CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
23.1 James CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
22.1 Ayanda INFORM FACT CONTRIBUTION
21.2 Thami INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
21.1 Thami REQUEST OWN NEEDS
20.3 Ayanda RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
20.2 Theo JUSTIFY REPETITION AMPLIFYING
20.1 Theo SUGGEST REPETITION AMPLIFYING
19.1 James SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS U
18.1 Ayanda SEEK INFERENCE CONSENSUS U 6 MOTIVATIONS FOR OPTION 2
17.1 Theo SUPPORT REPETITION AMPLIFYING
16.1 James SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
15.4 Theo JUSTIFY OPINION CONTRIBUTION
15.3 Theo SUGGEST REPETITION AMPLIFYING
15.2 Theo COMMENT REPETITION TASK 5 BUILDING OF A COMMON
15.1 Theo COMMENT INTERPRETATION TASK UNDERSTANDING OF THE
14.1 Ayanda REQUEST REPETITION TASK PROBLEM SOLVING PROCESS
13.1 Theo REQUEST REPETITION TASK
12.1 Thami SEEK CONSENSUS U SUGGESTION TO CHOOSE
11.3 Theo SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION 4  OPTION 2
11.2 Theo INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
11.1 Theo OFFER TASK
. 10.1 Sipho COMMENT REPETITION TASK
O 9.1 Ayanda REQUEST TASK 3 BUILDING OF A COMMON
N 8.1 Theodora uncoded uncoded uncoded UNDERSTANDING OF THE
7.1 Theo COMMENT REPETITION TASK PROBLEM STRUCTURE
N 6.1 Thami QUERY TASK
O 5.2 Sipho CLARIFY EXAMPLE TASK
I 5.1 Sipho COMMENT OPINION TASK
T 4.1 Theodora SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION 2 SUGGESTION TO CHOOSE 
A 3.1 James INVITE PARTICIPATION OPTION 1
R 2.1 Thami REJECT OPINION OWN NEEDS 1 BUILDING OF A COMMON
E 1.3 Theo REQUEST TASK UNDERSTANDING OF THE
P 1.2 Theo REQUEST TASK PROBLEM STRUCTURE
O 1.1 Theo INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
  PARTICIPANT IMMEDIATE COGNITIVE- UNDERLYING STAGE: NUMBER & DESCRIPTION
INTER-ACTIVE AFFECTIVE FUNCTION
FUNCTION CONTENT
181.1 Sipho SUPPORT EXAMPLE CONSENSUS A 15 ESTABLISHMENT OF
180.1 Funeka SUGGEST OPINION COMPROMISE CONSENSUS ON SUGGESTION
179.1 Sindiswa JUSTIFY OPINION OWN IDEAS 1 TO SOLVE ASPECT 2 OF
178.1 James JUSTIFY EXAMPLE CONSENSUS U THE PROBLEM STRUCTURE.
177.1 Sindiswa REJECT OPINION OWN IDEAS 14 DEBATE ON SUGGESTION 1
176.1 Thozie QUERY OPINION OWN IDEAS TO SOLVE ASPECT 2 OF
175.1 Thami REJECT OPINION OWN IDEAS THE PROBLEM
174.1 Funeka SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A 13 BUILDING OF SUPPORT FOR
173.1 Thami SEEK CONSENSUS A THE SOLUTION TO ASPECT
172.1 James COMMENT OPINION GROUP 1 OF THE PROBLEM.
171.1 Thozie REQUEST REPETITION OWN NEEDS
170.1 Funeka REQUEST OWN NEEDS
169.1 Thami COMMENT OPINION TASK
168.1 Thozie COMMENT OPINION TASK
167.1 Thami COMMENT OPINION TASK
166.1 James REQUEST TASK
165.1 Funeka REQUEST TASK
164.1 Thozie COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
163.1 Funeka COMMENT FACT TASK
162.1 Thami REQUEST TASK 12 DEBATE ON GROUP
161.1 Sindiswa REQUEST TASK INTERACTION
160.1 Sipho COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
159.1 Funeka COMMENT FACT TASK DEBATE ON RECORDING
158.1 Thami REQUEST TASK PROCESS
157.1 James COMMENT REPETITION GROUP
156.3 Sindiswa INQUIRE TASK
156.2 Sindiswa COMMENT REFLECTION GROUP
156.1 Sindiswa SUPPORT REPETITION TASK
155.1 James SUPPORT OPINION TASK
154.2 Thozie COMMENT FACT TASK
154.1 Thozie COMMENT OPINION TASK
153.1 Thami COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
152.1 Sindiswa COMMENT OPINION GROUP
151.1 Funeka SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
150.1 Sindiswa COMMENT OPINION GROUP
149.1 Funeka INQUIRE GROUP
148.1 Thozie SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS A
147.2 Thami SEEK CONSENSUS U
147.1 Thami CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
146.1 Funeka CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U 11 AMENDMENTS TO THE
145.3 Thami CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U SOLUTION TO ASPECT 1 OF
145.2 Thami CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U THE PROBLEM STRUCTURE
145.1 Thami SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
144.1 Sindiswa CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U BUILDING OF A COMMON
143.1 Thami CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U UNDERSTANDING OF THE
142.1 Sindiswa REJECT REPETITION CONSENSUS A AMENDED SOLUTION
141.1 Thami SUGGEST REPETITION OWN IDEAS
140.1 Thozie QUERY OWN IDEAS
139.1 Funeka REJECT INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION
138.1 Thozie REQUEST TASK
137.1 Thami SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS U
136.2 Thozie REQUEST TASK
136.1 Thozie REJECT OPINION OWN IDEAS
135.1 Sindiswa SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
134.2 Sipho INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
134.1 Sipho SUGGEST OPINION CONSENSUS U
133.1 Thami SUGGEST INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
132.1 Sipho COMMENT OPINION OWN NEEDS
131.2 Thami JUSTIFY INFERENCE TASK
131.1 Thami REQUEST TASK
130.1 Sindiswa INVITE PARTICIPATION
129.1 Thozie DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
128.1 Sindiswa DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
127.1 Funeka SUPPORT REPETITION OWN NEEDS
126.1 Thami RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
125.1 Sindiswa REQUEST REPETITION TASK
124.1 Thozie REQUEST TASK
123.1 Sipho INQUIRE REPETITION CONSENSUS U
122.1 Thozie SUPPORT OPINION TASK
121.3 Funeka COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
121.2 Funeka COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
121.1 Funeka COMMENT OPINION TASK
120.1 Thami SUPPORT OPINION TASK
119.1 Thozie REQUEST TASK
118.1 Sindiswa SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
117.1 Thozie SUPPORT FACT CONSENSUS A
116.1 Funeka COMMENT OPINION TASK
115.1 Sindiswa QUERY TASK
114.1 Funeka QUERY TASK
113.1 Sindiswa SUPPORT OPINION TASK
112.2 Thami OFFER TASK
112.1 Thami SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS U 10 BUILDING OF A COMMON
111.1 Sindiswa SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A UNDERSTANDING OF THE
110.2 Thozie SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS U CONTENT OF THE PROBLEM
110.1 Thozie REJECT INFERENCE CONSENSUS A STRUCTURE
109.1 Sindiswa SUGGEST OPINION CONSENSUS U
108.1 Thami SUGGEST OPINION CONSENSUS U BUILDING OF A COMMON
107.1 Thozie REQUEST TASK UNDERSTANDING ON WHAT
106.1 Sipho INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U TO RECORD
105.2 Sindiswa INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
105.1 Sindiswa SEEK REPETITION CONSENSUS A
104.1 Thozie REJECT REPETITION OWN IDEAS
103.1 Thami SEEK REPETITION CONSENSUS U
101.1 Funeka SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
100.1 Sindiswa SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
99.1 Thozie COMMENT OPINION TASK
98.1 Funeka INQUIRE GROUP
97.1 James REJECT OPINION GROUP
96.1 Thami INQUIRE REPETITION CONSENSUS U
95.1 Thozie INFORM REPETITION CONSENSUS U
94.1 Thami INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
93.3 Thozie SUGGEST OPINION CONSENSUS U
93.2 Thozie INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
93.1 Thozie INFORM REPETITION CONSENSUS U
92.1 Sindiswa INQUIRE REPETITION OWN NEEDS
91.1 Funeka COMMENT OPINION TASK
90.1 Thami SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
89.1 Thozie QUERY FACT CONSENSUS U
88.1 Sipho CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS A
87.1 Thozie REQUEST REPETITION TASK
86.2 Sindiswa REQUEST TASK
86.1 Sindiswa INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
85.3 Sipho SUGGEST OPINION CONSENSUS U
85.2 Sipho SUGGEST INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
85.1 Sipho SUGGEST OPINION CONSENSUS U
84.1 Funeka INQUIRE REPETITION CONSENSUS U
83.1 Sindiswa INQUIRE REPETITION CONSENSUS U
82.1 Thozie INQUIRE REPETITION CONSENSUS U
81.1 Sipho INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
80.1 James SUGGEST INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
79.1 Thami INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
78.2 Sindiswa COMMENT OPINION TASK
78.1 Sindiswa COMMENT FACT TASK
77.1 Thozie COMMENT FACT TASK 9 BUILDING OF A COMMON
76.1 Sindiswa SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS A UNDERSTANDING ON HOW TO
75.1 Thami COMMENT OPINION TASK PROCEED WITH THE PROBLEM
74.1 Sindiswa COMMENT FACT TASK SOLVING TASK
73.1 Funeka INQUIRE TASK
72.1 Sindiswa COMMENT OPINION TASK
71.2 Thami RECORD REPETITION MEMORY 8 SUGGESTION 3 TO SOLVE
71.1 Thozie SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A ASPECT 2 OF THE PROBLEM
70.1 Funeka SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION STRUCTURE
69.2 Thozie INVITE PARTICIPATION
69.1 Thozie COMMENT OPINION TASK
68.1 Funeka CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
67.3 Thami RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
67.2 Thozie DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
67.1 Thozie REQUEST TASK
66.2 Sindiswa DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
66.1 Sindiswa REQUEST TASK
65.1 Funeka COMMENT OPINION TASK
64.1 Thozie SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
63.4 Funeka CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
63.3 Funeka CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
63.2 Funeka JUSTIFY INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION 7 SUGGESTION 2 TO SOLVE
63.1 Funeka DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY ASPECT 2 OF THE PROBLEM
62.1 Thami INQUIRE TASK STRUCTURE
61.1 Thozie SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
60.2 Sipho SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
60.1 Sipho INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
59.1 James SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
58.1 Thozie SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
57.1 Sindiswa SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
56.2 Thozie JUSTIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
56.1 Thozie SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
55.3 Sipho SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
55.2 Sipho SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS A
55.1 Sipho INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
54.3 James INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
54.2 James SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
54.1 James CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
53.1 Thozie REQUEST TASK
52.2 Sindiswa INQUIRE TASK
52.1 Sindiswa OFFER TASK 6 PROVISION OF ADDITIONAL
51.1 Thami OFFER TASK INFORMATION ON THE CONTENT
50.1 James SUPPORT REPETITION TASK OF THE PROBLEM STRUCTURE
49.1 Thami REQUEST TASK
48.1 Sindiswa CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U BUILDING OF A COMMON
47.1 James COMMENT REFLECTION TASK UNDERSTANDING OF THE
46.1 Thozie COMMENT REFLECTION TASK INFORMATION
45.2 James REQUEST TASK
45.1 James SUPPORT REPETITION TASK
44.1 Thozie COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
43.1 Hilde INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U SUGGESTION 1 TO SOLVE
42.2 Thozie SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION 5 ASPECT 2 OF THE PROBLEM
42.1 Thozie SUPPORT REPETITION TASK STRUCTURE
41.2 Sindiswa JUSTIFY INTERPRETATION TASK
41.1 Sindiswa SUPPORT OPINION TASK 4 BUILDING OF A COMMON
40.1 Thami QUERY TASK UNDERSTANDING ON HOW TO
39.1 Thozie COMMENT OPINION OWN NEEDS PROCEED WITH THE PROBLEM
38.2 Thami REQUEST TASK SOLVING TASK
38.1 Thami COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
37.1 Thozie INQUIRE TASK
36.1 Funeka SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
35.2 Thozie CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
35.1 Thozie SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
34.1 Thami SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
33.1 Funeka SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
32.1 Sipho DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
31.2 Thami RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
31.1 Thami DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
30.1 Funeka DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
29.1 Thozie INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U 3 GROUP SUPPORT FOR THE 
28.2 Thami RECORD REPETITION MEMORY SOLUTION TO ASPECT 1
28.1 Funeka SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS U
27.1 Sindiswa REJECT INTERPRETATION OWN NEEDS
26.1 Thozie SUPPORT REPETITION TASK
25.1 Thami REQUEST TASK
24.2 Funeka JUSTIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
24.1 Funeka SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
23.1 Sindiswa SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
22.1 Thozie SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
21.1 Sindiswa CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
20.2 Thami JUSTIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
20.1 Thami SUGGEST INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION
19.1 James REJECT INFERENCE OWN IDEAS
18.1 Thozie SUGGEST INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION
17.1 Sindiswa CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
16.1 Thozie SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS U 2 SOLVING ASPECT 1 OF THE
15.1 James COMMENT FACT TASK PROBLEM STRUCTURE
14.1 Thami CLARIFY REPETITION AMPLIFYING
13.2 Thozie INQUIRE REPETITION CONSENSUS U BUILDING OF A COMMON
13.1 Thozie QUERY TASK UNDERSTANDING OF THE
12.3 Thami COMMENT REFLECTION TASK SOLUTION
12.2 Thami RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
12.1 Thami SUGGEST INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION
11.1 Thozie INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
10.1 Thami SUGGEST INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION
9.3 Thozie SEEK CONSENSUS U
. 9.2 Thozie REQUEST TASK
O 9.1 Thozie SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
N 8.1 Sindiswa SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
7.1 Funeka INFORM REPETITION CONSENSUS U
N 6.1 Thozie SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A 1 BUILDING OF A COMMON
O 5.1 James INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U UNDERSTANDING OF THE
I 4.2 Funeka INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U CONTENT OF THE PROBLEM
T 4.1 Funeka INFORM REPETITION CONSENSUS U STRUCTURE
A 3.1 Thozie INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
R 2.2 Sindiswa SUGGEST INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION
E 2.1 Sindiswa COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
P 1.2 Thozie CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
O 1.1 Thozie INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
PARTICIPANT IMMEDIATE COGNITIVE- UNDERLYING STAGE: NUMBER & DESCRIPTION
INTER-ACTIVE AFFECTIVE FUNCTION
FUNCTION CONTENT
124.2 Matthew OFFER TASK  
124.1 Matthew REQUEST TASK
123.1 Theodora REQUEST TASK 20 ESTABLISHMENT OF FINAL
122.1 Theo DICTATE REPETITION CONSENSUS A GROUP CONSENSUS ON THE
121.1 Theodora SUPPORT EXAMPLE CONSENSUS A SOLUTION OF ASPECT 1
120.3 Theo DICTATE REPETITION CONSENSUS A AND 2 OF THE PROBLEM
120.2 Theo OFFER TASK
120.1 Theo SUPPORT OPINION TASK
119.3 Matthew REQUEST TASK
119.2 Matthew SUGGEST OPINION CONSENSUS U
119.1 Matthew SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A 19 BUILDING OF A COMMON
118.1 Theodora SUGGEST INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U UNDERSTANDING OF THE
117.1 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION INFORMATION PROVIDED
116.1 Theodora CLARIFY OPINION CONSENSUS U
115.1 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION
114.1 Matthew SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
113.1 Theodora SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
112.1 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION 18 SUGGESTION 8 TO SOLVE 
111.1 Theodora INVITE PARTICIPATION ASPECT 2 OF THE PROBLEM
110.1 Theo COMMENT OPINION TASK
109.1 Theodora INVITE PARTICIPATION
108.2 Matthew SEEK CONSENSUS A
108.1 Matthew SUPPORT EXAMPLE CONSENSUS A
107.1 Theodora SUPPORT EXAMPLE CONSENSUS A 17 SUGGESTION 7 TO SOLVE
106.1 Theo SUPPORT REPETITION AMPLIFYING ASPECT 2 OF THE PROBLEM
105.1 Theodora SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
104.2 Theo RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
104.1 Theo SUGGEST INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION
103.2 Matthew JUSTIFY FACT CONSENSUS U
103.1 Matthew CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
102.2 Theodora SEEK CONSENSUS U
102.1 Theodora SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
101.2 Matthew SUPPORT REPETITION OWN IDEAS
101.1 Matthew SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A 16 SUGGESTION 6 TO SOLVE 
100.1 Theodora JUSTIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
99.2 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION
99.1 Matthew INFORM REPETITION CONSENSUS U
98.1 Khaya INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
97.1 Theodora SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
96.3 Matthew SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
96.2 Matthew CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
96.1 Matthew INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
95.1 Ayanda SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
94.2 Theodora SEEK CONSENSUS A 15 SUGGESTION 5 TO SOLVE 
94.1 Theodora SUGGEST INTERPRETATION CONTRIBUTION ASPECT 2 OF THE PROBLEM
93.1 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION
92.1 Theo DICTATE REPETITION CONSENSUS A
91.1 Ayanda RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
90.2 Theo RECORD REPETITION MEMORY 14 SUGGESTION 4 TO SOLVE 
90.1 Theo DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY ASPECT 2 OF THE PROBLEM
89.3 Matthew JUSTIFY REPETITION AMPLIFYING
89.2 Matthew JUSTIFY INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION
89.1 Matthew SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS A
88.1 Khaya CLARIFY OPINION OWN IDEAS
87.1 Theodora SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
86.1 Matthew CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
85.1 Theodora CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
84.1 Ayanda SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A 13 BUILDING OF A COMMON
83.1 Matthew CLARIFY FACT CONSENSUS U UNDERSTANDING OF THE
82.1 Khaya INQUIRE CONSENSUS U CONTENT OF THE PROBLEM
81.2 Matthew CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U STRUCTURE
81.1 Matthew REJECT INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
80.1 Khaya CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
79.1 Theo INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
78.1 Theodora INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
77.1 Matthew INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
76.1 Theo uncoded uncoded uncoded
75.1 Khaya uncoded uncoded uncoded 12 SUGGESTION 3 TO SOLVE 
74.2 Matthew JUSTIFY INFERENCE AMPLIFYING ASPECT 2 OF THE PROBLEM
74.1 Matthew SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
73.1 Theo CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
72.1 Khaya CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
71.1 Hilde INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
70.1 Theodora CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
69.1 Khaya SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS U
68.1 Theodora SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
67.2 Theo RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
67.1 Ayanda DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY 11 BUILDING  OF A COMMON
66.2 Theo RECORD REPETITION MEMORY UNDERSTANDING OF THE
66.1 Theodora DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY SOLUTION OF ASPECT 1 OF
65.1 Ayanda SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A THE PROBLEM
64.2 Matthew RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
64.1 Khaya DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
63.1 Theodora JUSTIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
62.1 Khaya uncoded uncoded uncoded
61.1 Theodora INVITE PARTICIPATION
60.1 Matthew SUGGEST REPETITION AMPLIFYING
59.3 Khaya INVITE REPETITION PARTICIPATION
59.2 Khaya JUSTIFY OPINION AMPLIFYING
59.1 Khaya SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
58.2 Ayanda CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
58.1 Ayanda REJECT INTERPRETATION OWN IDEAS 10 SUGGESTION 2 TO SOLVE
57.1 Theo INQUIRE INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U ASPECT 2 OF THE PROBLEM
56.3 Ayanda SUGGEST REPETITION AMPLIFYING
56.2 Ayanda CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
56.1 Ayanda SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
55.2 Theo RECORD REPETITION MEMORY 9 BUILDING OF A COMMON
55.1 Khaya CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U UNDERSTANDING OF
54.1 Theo INQUIRE CONSENSUS U SUGGESTION 1 TO SOLVE
53.1 Matthew SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS A ASPECT 2 OF THE PROBLEM
52.2 Theo RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
52.1 Ayanda DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
51.1 Theo DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY 8 BUILDING OF A COMMON
50.1 Matthew SUPPORT OPINION TASK UNDERSTANDING OF HOW TO
49.2 Theo RECORD REPETITION MEMORY PROCEED WITH THE PROBLEM
49.1 Khaya DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY SOLVING TASK
48.2 Theodora JUSTIFY INFERENCE TASK
47.2 Theodora REQUEST TASK BUILDING OF A COMMON
47.1 Theodora SUPPORT OPINION TASK UNDERSTANDING OF HOW TO
46.1 Buyiswa SEEK TASK RECORD
45.1 Matthew SUPPORT OPINION TASK
44.1 Khaya REQUEST TASK
43.1 Theodora REQUEST TASK
42.1 Matthew SUGGEST REPETITION AMPLIFYING
41.1 Khaya SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION 7 SUGGESTION 1 TO SOLVE
40.1 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION ASPECT 2 OF THE PROBLEM
39.1 Ayanda SUPPORT REFLECTION TASK
38.1 Theodora INQUIRE TASK BUILDING OF A COMMON
37.1 Theo COMMENT REFLECTION TASK UNDERSTANDING OF THE
36.3 Matthew INQUIRE TASK RECORDING PROCESS
36.2 Matthew SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
36.1 Matthew CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U 6 PROVISION OF ADDITIONAL
35.1 Khaya CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U INFORMATION ON THE CONTENT
34.1 Theo INQUIRE CONSENSUS U OF THE PROBLEM STRUCTURE
33.1 Khaya CLARIFY OPINION CONSENSUS U
32.1 Theo INVITE PARTICIPATION BUILDING OF A COMMON
31.1 Theodora REQUEST TASK UNDERSTANDING OF THE
30.1 Matthew INQUIRE TASK INFORMATION
29.1 Hilde INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
28.1 Theodora JUSTIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS A
27.3 Matthew SUGGEST REPETITION OWN IDEAS
27.2 Matthew JUSTIFY FACT OWN IDEAS
27.1 Matthew REJECT OPINION OWN IDEAS
26.1 Theodora SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
25.1 Matthew SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A 5 DEBATE ON THE PROCESS OF
24.1 Theodora SUGGEST OPINION CONSENSUS U ACCESSING ELEMENTS OF THE
23.2 Matthew COMMENT REPETITION TASK PROBLEM STRUCTURE
23.1 Matthew COMMENT FACT TASK
22.1 Theodora INQUIRE TASK
21.1 Theo OFFER TASK
20.1 Khaya COMMENT FACT TASK
19.4 Theo RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
19.3 Theo INVITE PARTICIPATION
19.2 Theo REQUEST TASK
19.1 Theo DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
18.2 Khaya JUSTIFY FACT OWN IDEAS
18.1 Khaya REJECT OPINION OWN NEEDS
17.1 Ayanda SEEK TASK
16.3 Matthew REQUEST TASK
16.2 Matthew SUGGEST INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION 4 COMPLETING THE SOLUTION
16.1 Matthew SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A FOR ASPECT 1 OF THE
15.1 Ayanda SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A PROBLEM
14.2 Matthew SUGGEST INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION
14.1 Matthew SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A BUILDING OF A COMMON
13.1 Ayanda SUGGEST INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION UNDERSTANDING OF THE
12.1 Matthew SUGGEST INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION SOLUTION
11.1 Theo SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
10.1 Ayanda SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A GROUP SUPPORT FOR THE
9.3 Matthew CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U SOLUTION
9.2 Matthew SUGGEST INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION
9.1 Matthew CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
. 8.1 Theodora INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
O 7.2 Khaya SUGGEST INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION
N 7.1 Khaya REJECT INFERENCE OWN IDEAS
6.2 Matthew SUGGEST INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION
N 6.1 Matthew SUGGEST REPETITION AMPLIFYING
O 5.1 Theo COMMENT REPETITION GROUP
I 4.2 Matthew COMMENT REFLECTION GROUP 3 LAYING DOWN RULES FOR THE 
T 4.1 Matthew COMMENT REFLECTION GROUP GROUP INTERACTION
A 3.1 Theodora REQUEST GROUP
R 2.2 Matthew SUGGEST INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION 2 ATTEMPTING TO SOLVE ASPECT 1
E 2.1 Matthew SUGGEST INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION BUILDING OF A COMMON
P 1.2 Khaya CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U 1 UNDERSTANDING OF THE
O 1.1 Khaya INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U PROBLEM STRUCTURE
PARTICIPANT IMMEDIATE COGNITIVE- UNDERLYING STAGE: NUMBER & DESCRIPTION
INTER-ACTIVE AFFECTIVE FUNCTION
FUNCTION CONTENT
74.1 Sipho SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
73.2 Ayanda COMMENT OPINION TASK
73.1 Ayanda CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
72.1 Buyiswa SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS A
71.1 Thozie/Theo SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS A
70.2 Sipho SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS A 16 ESTABLISHMENT OF FINAL
70.1 Sipho INQUIRE INTERPRETATION TASK GROUP CONSENSUS ON THE
69.2 Ayanda INVITE REPETITION PARTICIPATION CHOICE OF OPTION 5
69.1 Ayanda INVITE REPETITION PARTICIPATION
68.1 Sipho SEEK REPETITION CONSENSUS A
67.1 Theo SEEK REPETITION CONSENSUS A
66.1 Thozie QUERY OPINION OWN IDEAS
65.1 Theo SEEK INFERENCE CONSENSUS A
64.3 Funeka JUSTIFY OPINION CONSENSUS U
64.2 Funeka JUSTIFY OPINION CONSENSUS A
64.1 Funeka SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
63.1 Buyiswa SUGGEST OPINION CONSENSUS A
62.1 Sipho SUPPORT REPETITION AMPLIFYING
61.1 Thozie SUPPORT REPETITION AMPLIFYING 15 SUGGESTION TO CHOOSE OPTION 3
60.1 Sipho SUPPORT REPETITION AMPLIFYING
59.2 Thozie SEEK CONSENSUS U MOTIVATIONS FOR AND AGAINST 
59.1 Thozie INFORM FACT CONTRIBUTION OPTION 3
58.3 Sipho SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
58.2 Sipho CLARIFY FACT CONSENSUS U
58.1 Sipho QUERY OPINION CONSENSUS U
57.2 Thozie INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
57.1 Thozie INVITE PARTICIPATION
56.3 Theo JUSTIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS A
56.2 Theo SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
56.1 Theo COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
55.4 Sipho SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
55.3 Sipho SUGGEST OPINION COMPROMISE
55.2 Sipho JUSTIFY OPINION CONTRIBUTION
55.1 Sipho SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
54.1 Theo SUPPORT OPINION TASK
53.1 Funeka COMMENT OPINION GROUP 14 MOTIVATION FOR OPTION 5
52.3 Theo JUSTIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS A
52.2 Theo SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A SUGGESTION OF A COMPROMISE
52.1 Theo COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
51.2 Thozie JUSTIFY INTERPRETATION CONTRIBUTION
51.1 Thozie SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS A
50.4 Funeka JUSTIFY OPINION CONTRIBUTION
50.3 Funeka JUSTIFY INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION
50.2 Funeka JUSTIFY FACT CONSENSUS A
50.1 Funeka SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS A
49.1 Theo SUGGEST REPETITION OWN IDEAS
48.2 Ayanda INVITE PARTICIPATION
48.1 Ayanda CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
47.2 Theo JUSTIFY FACT CONSENSUS U
47.1 Theo REJECT OPINION OWN IDEAS 13 MOTIVATION FOR OPTION 1
46.1 Ayanda QUERY INFERENCE OWN IDEAS
45.1 Thozie SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A REJECTION OF MOTIVATIONS 
44.3 Buyiswa JUSTIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS A IN FAVOUR OF OPTION 1
44.2 Buyiswa JUSTIFY FACT CONTRIBUTION
44.1 Buyiswa SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS A
43.4 Theo JUSTIFY INTERPRETATION CONTRIBUTION
43.3 Theo JUSTIFY REPETITION OWN IDEAS 12 SUGGESTION TO CHOOSE OPTION 4
43.2 Theo SUGGEST OPINION AMPLIFYING
43.1 Theo REJECT OPINION OWN IDEAS INVITATION TO REACH
42.2 Thozie SEEK INFERENCE CONSENSUS A 11 GROUP CONSENSUS ON THE
42.1 Thozie INVITE PARTICIPATION CHOICE OF AN OPTION
41.1 Ayanda SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
40.1 Thozie SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A 10 SUGGESTION TO CHOOSE OPTION 6 
39.3 Sipho JUSTIFY INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION
39.2 Sipho SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION MOTIVATION AGAINST OPTION 6
39.1 Sipho INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
38.1 Ayanda INVITE PARTICIPATION
37.1 Funeka REJECT INTERPRETATION OWN IDEAS
36.1 Buyiswa QUERY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U 9 BUILDING OF A COMMON
35.1 Funeka SEEK CONSENSUS A UNDERSTANDING OF THE
34.1 Thozie CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U CONTENT OF THE PROBLEM
33.1 Ayanda SEEK CONSENSUS U SOLVING STRUCTURE
32.1 Funeka CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
31.1 Ayanda INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
30.1 Theo/Thozie COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
29.6 Sipho JUSTIFY INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION
29.5 Sipho JUSTIFY INTERPRETATION CONTRIBUTION 8 SUGGESTION TO CHOOSE OPTION 2 
29.4 Sipho JUSTIFY INTERPRETATION CONTRIBUTION
29.3 Sipho JUSTIFY FACT CONTRIBUTION MOTIVATION FOR OPTION 6
29.2 Sipho JUSTIFY INTERPRETATION CONTRIBUTION
29.1 Sipho SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
28.1 Thozie INVITE PARTICIPATION
27.1 Theo JUSTIFY FACT CONTRIBUTION
26.1 Thozie INVITE PARTICIPATION
25.1 Funeka SUPPORT REPETITION TASK 7 BUILDING OF A COMMON
24.2 Thozie REQUEST REPETITION TASK UNDERSTANDING OF THE NEXT
24.1 Thozie REJECT OPINION OWN NEEDS STEP IN THE PROBLEM
23.1 Ayanda INVITE PARTICIPATION SOLVING PROCESS
22.1 Theo INVITE PARTICIPATION
21.1 Ayanda SUPPORT OPINION TASK
20.3 Thozie COMMENT OPINION TASK
20.2 Thozie JUSTIFY FACT CONTRIBUTION 6 BUILDING OF SUPPORT FOR 
20.1 Thozie SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS A OPTION 1
19.1 Theo INVITE REPETITION PARTICIPATION
18.1 Ayanda INVITE PARTICIPATION
17.1 Thozie COMMENT REPETITION TASK
16.1 Funeka COMMENT OPINION TASK 5 BUILDING OF A COMMON
15.1 Thozie SUPPORT OPINION TASK UNDERSTANDING OF THE
14.3 Ayanda COMMENT REPETITION TASK PROBLEM SOLVING TASK
14.2 Ayanda JUSTIFY INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION
14.1 Ayanda SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION MOTIVATION AGAINST OPTION 5
13.1 Thozie SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
12.1 Buyiswa SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
11.3 Funeka COMMENT REPETITION TASK
11.2 Funeka JUSTIFY FACT CONTRIBUTION 4 BUILDING OF SUPPORT FOR 
. 11.1 Funeka SUGGEST REPETITION AMPLIFYING OPTION 1
O 10.1 Thozie COMMENT OPINION TASK
N 9.1 Funeka CLARIFY OPINION CONSENSUS U 3 BUILDING OF A COMMON
8.1 Sipho INQUIRE CONSENSUS U UNDERSTANDING OF THE
N 7.1 Funeka INVITE PARTICIPATION PROBLEM STRUCTURE AND THE
O 6.1 Buyiswa INQUIRE CONSENSUS U PROBLEM SOLVING TASK
I 5.2 Funeka INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
T 5.1 Funeka REQUEST OWN NEEDS
A 4.1 Ayanda INVITE PARTICIPATION 2 SUGGESTION TO CHOOSE OPTION 1
R 3.1 Funeka SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
E 2.2 Sipho JUSTIFY FACT CONTRIBUTION 1 SUGGESTION TO CHOOSE OPTION 5
P 2.1 Sipho SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
O 1.1 Buyiswa SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION MOTIVATION FOR OPTION 5
PARTICIPANT IMMEDIATE COGNITIVE- UNDERLYING STAGE: NUMBER & DESCRIPTION
INTER-ACTIVE AFFECTIVE FUNCTION
FUNCTION CONTENT
85.2 Matthew COMMENT OPINION TASK ESTABLISHMENT OF FINAL
85.1 Matthew CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS A 18 GROUP CONSENSUS ON THE
84.1 James/Thami SUGGEST OPINION CONSENSUS A CHOICE OF OPTION 5
83.2 Thami JUSTIFY FACT CONSENSUS U
83.1 Thami REJECT OPINION CONSENSUS U 17 REJECTION OF THE COMPROMISE
82.1 Matthew SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
81.1 James SUGGEST REPETITION COMPROMISE
80.2 Matthew JUSTIFY OPINION OWN IDEAS 16 DISSATISFACTION WITH GROUP 
80.1 Matthew REJECT OPINION OWN NEEDS INTERACTIONS
79.1 Theodora REJECT OPINION OWN NEEDS INTERACTIONS
78.1 Matthew CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
77.1 Khaya/Thami SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
76.1 James SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS U 15 BUILDING OF SUPPORT FOR
75.2 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION OPTION 2
75.1 Matthew REQUEST GROUP
74.1 Theodora SUGGEST REPETITION OWN IDEAS BUILDING OF SUPPORT FOR
73.1 Matthew COMMENT REFLECTION GROUP OPTION 5
72.2 Khaya CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
72.1 Khaya SUPPORT REPETITION COMPROMISE QUERY AND DEFENSE OF
71.2 Matthew SUGGEST INTERPRETATION OWN IDEAS THE COMPROMISE
71.1 Matthew REJECT OPINION OWN IDEAS
70.1 Theodora QUERY INTERPRETATION OWN IDEAS
69.1 Matthew SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
68.2 Khaya SUPPORT INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS A 14 SUGGESTION OF A COMPROMISE
68.1 Khaya SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
67.3 James SUGGEST OPINION COMPROMISE
67.2 James JUSTIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS A
67.1 James SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
66.4 Matthew JUSTIFY REPETITION OWN IDEAS
66.3 Matthew SUGGEST REPETITION OWN IDEAS
66.2 Matthew CLARIFY INTERPRETATION OWN IDEAS
66.1 Matthew QUERY REPETITION OWN IDEAS 13 MOTIVATIONS IN FAVOUR AND 
65.2 Lulama JUSTIFY REPETITION AMPLIFYING AGAINST OPTIONS 2 AND 5
65.1 Lulama SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
64.1 Matthew COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
63.2 Lulama JUSTIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
63.1 Lulama SUGGEST OPINION OWN IDEAS
62.1 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION
61.1 Thami SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION 12 LIMITING CHOICE BETWEEN 
60.3 Matthew INQUIRE CONSENSUS A OPTION 2 AND 5
60.2 Matthew SUGGEST INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U OPTION 2 AND 5
60.1 Matthew COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
59.3 Khaya JUSTIFY REPETITION OWN IDEAS
59.2 Khaya JUSTIFY INTERPRETATION OWN IDEAS 11 SUPPORT FOR OPTION 2 AND 
59.1 Khaya QUERY OPINION OWN IDEAS FURTHER REJECTION OF 
58.3 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION OPTION 5
58.2 Matthew COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
58.1 Matthew CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
57.1 James QUERY REPETITION AMPLIFYING
56.1 Matthew INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
55.1 Thami SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION 10 REJECTION AND DEFENSE
54.1 James INVITE PARTICIPATION OF OPTION 6 INCLUDING
53.1 Matthew INQUIRE CONSENSUS U MOTIVATIONS FOR BOTH
52.2 James JUSTIFY OPINION CONTRIBUTION POSITIONS
52.1 James SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
51.3 Matthew INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
51.2 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION
51.1 Matthew REQUEST REPETITION TASK
50.1 Khaya REQUEST REPETITION TASK 9 REQUEST TO MOVE ON WITH 
49.1 Thami REQUEST REPETITION TASK
48.2 Khaya REQUEST TASK
48.1 Khaya REJECT OPINION OWN IDEAS
47.3 Matthew JUSTIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS A
47.2 Matthew JUSTIFY OPINION CONSENSUS A
47.1 Matthew SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
46.3 Thami JUSTIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
46.2 Thami SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION 8 REJECTION AND DEFENSE OF
46.1 Thami CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U OPTION 5 INCLUDING
45.1 Lulama SUPPORT INFERENCE CONSENSUS A MOTIVATIONS FOR BOTH
44.1 Theodora SUPPORT INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS A POSITIONS
43.2 Khaya JUSTIFY INTERPRETATION CONTRIBUTION
43.1 Khaya SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
42.3 Matthew INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
42.2 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION
42.1 Matthew REQUEST TASK
41.1 James SUGGEST INTERPRETATION AMPLIFYING
40.1 Theodora SUPPORT FACT CONSENSUS A
39.1 James INFORM FACT AMPLIFYING
38.1 Matthew JUSTIFY INFERENCE OWN IDEAS
37.1 Khaya QUERY FACT CONSENSUS U
36.1 Matthew JUSTIFY INFERENCE OWN IDEAS
35.1 Lulama JUSTIFY REPETITION AMPLIFYING 7 REJECTION AND DEFENSE OF
34.3 Matthew SUGGEST OPINION AMPLIFYING OPTION 4 INCLUDING
34.2 Matthew JUSTIFY FACT CONTRIBUTION MOTIVATIONS FOR BOTH
34.1 Matthew QUERY OPINION CONSENSUS A POSITIONS
33.1 Lulama SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
32.2 James JUSTIFY OPINION CONTRIBUTION
32.1 James SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
31.4 Matthew INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
31.3 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION
31.2 Matthew REQUEST TASK
31.1 Matthew COMMENT OPINION TASK
30.1 Theodora QUERY OPINION AMPLIFYING
29.1 Matthew REJECT REPETITION OWN IDEAS
28.2 Theodora SUGGEST OPINION AMPLIFYING
28.1 Theodora REJECT REPETITION AMPLIFYING
27.2 Matthew CLARIFY INTERPRETATION OWN IDEAS 6 REJECTION AND DEFENSE OF
27.1 Matthew QUERY FACT CONSENSUS U OPTION 3 INCLUDING
26.2 Khaya JUSTIFY OPINION CONTRIBUTION MOTIVATIONS FOR BOTH
26.1 Khaya SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A POSITIONS
25.1 James JUSTIFY OPINION CONSENSUS A
24.1 Khaya SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
23.1 Theodora JUSTIFY OPINION CONTRIBUTION
22.1 James SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
21.6 Matthew INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
21.5 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION
21.4 Matthew REQUEST TASK 5 REQUEST TO MOVE ON WITH 
21.3 Matthew REQUEST TASK THE PROBLEM SOLVING TASK
21.2 Matthew JUSTIFY INTERPRETATION OWN IDEAS
21.1 Matthew REJECT REPETITION OWN IDEAS
20.2 Khaya JUSTIFY INTERPRETATION OWN IDEAS
20.1 Khaya REJECT OPINION OWN IDEAS 4 INVITATION TO CONSIDER
19.1 Matthew COMMENT REFLECTION TASK OPTION 5
18.2 Thami JUSTIFY OPINION CONTRIBUTION
18.1 Thami CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U REJECTION AND DEFENSE OF
17.1 Matthew INQUIRE CONSENSUS U OPTION 2
16.2 Thami JUSTIFY INTERPRETATION CONTRIBUTION
16.1 Thami JUSTIFY OPINION OWN IDEAS
15.1 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION
14.1 Thami SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
13.1 Matthew SEEK CONSENSUS A
12.1 Lulama SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
11.1 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION
10.1 Khaya CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
9.1 Matthew INQUIRE CONSENSUS U 3 MOTIVATION FOR AND AGAINST 
8.1 Khaya SUGGEST INTERPRETATION AMPLIFYING OPTION 2
7.1 Matthew QUERY INTERPRETATION OWN IDEAS
. 6.3 Khaya JUSTIFY INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION
O 6.2 Khaya JUSTIFY FACT CONTRIBUTION
N 6.1 Khaya SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
5.3 Matthew INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
N 5.2 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION
O 5.1 Matthew COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
I 4.1 Khaya SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A 2 MOTIVATION FOR AND AGAINST 
T 3.1 Matthew QUERY OPINION CONSENSUS A OPTION 1
A 2.2 Theodora JUSTIFY OPINION CONTRIBUTION
R 2.1 Theodora SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
E 1.3 Matthew INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U BUILDING OF A COMMON
P 1.2 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION UNDERSTANDING OF THE
O 1.1 Matthew INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U 1 PROBLEM STRUCTURE
PARTICIPANT IMMEDIATE COGNITIVE- UNDERLYING STAGE: NUMBER & DESCRIPTION
INTER-ACTIVE AFFECTIVE FUNCTION
FUNCTION CONTENT
136.3 Theodora RECORD REPETITION MEMORY 16 ESTABLISHMENT OF GROUP 
136.2 Thami REQUEST TASK CONSENSUS ON THE 
136.1 Thami SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A ACCEPTANCE OF 
135.1 Thozie SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A MOTIVATION 5 
134.1 Lulama SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
133.1 Sizwe CLARIFY REPETITION OWN IDEAS
132.2 Thami JUSTIFY INFERENCE OWN IDEAS
132.1 Thami SUGGEST OPINION OWN IDEAS
131.1 Thozie SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
130.2 Sizwe JUSTIFY INTERPRETATION OWN IDEAS 15 DEBATE ON MOTIVATION 5
130.1 Sizwe REJECT REPETITION OWN IDEAS FOR OPTION 4
129.1 Thami CLARIFY REPETITION OWN IDEAS
128.2 Theodora RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
128.1 Sizwe DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
127.1 Theodora COMMENT REFLECTION OWN NEEDS
126.1 Sizwe REJECT OPINION OWN NEEDS
125.1 Lulama SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
124.1 Theodora COMMENT OPINION TASK
123.1 Sizwe INQUIRE CONSENSUS U 14 BUILDING OF A COMMON 
122.1 Lulama CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U UNDERSTANDING OF THE 
121.1 Sizwe INQUIRE CONSENSUS U CHOICE OF OPTION 4
120.1 Lulama SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
119.2 Theodora RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
119.1 Sizwe SUPPORT REPETITION AMPLIFYING
118.1 Sipho uncoded uncoded uncoded
117.1 Sizwe CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U 13 MOTIVATION 5 FOR OPTION 4
116.1 Thami QUERY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
115.1 Sizwe SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
114.1 Lulama CLARIFY OPINION CONSENSUS U
113.1 Theodora QUERY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U 12 BUILDING OF A COMMON 
112.2 Sizwe JUSTIFY REPETITION AMPLIFYING UNDERSTANDING OF 
112.1 Sizwe SUGGEST REPETITION AMPLIFYING MOTIVATION 1 FOR OPTION 4
111.1 Lulama CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U  
110.1 Sizwe COMMENT REFLECTION TASK 11 INQUIRY ABOUT THE PROBLEM 
109.1 Hilde INQUIRE TASK SOLVING TASK
108.1 Sizwe SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
107.1 Lulama INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
106.1 Sizwe INQUIRE CONSENSUS U 10 BUILDING OF A COMMON 
105.1 Thami uncoded uncoded uncoded UNDERSTANDING OF OPTION 4
104.1 Lulama SUGGEST INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
103.1 Lulama SUGGEST OPINION CONSENSUS U
102.1 Sizwe SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
101.1 Thami SUPPORT EXAMPLE CONSENSUS A
100.2 Theodora RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
100.1 Sizwe DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
99.1 Thami REQUEST REPETITION TASK
98.1 Lulama SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
97.1 Thami SUGGEST INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U 9 MOTIVATION 4 FOR OPTION 4
96.1 Sizwe JUSTIFY OPINION CONSENSUS U
95.1 Sipho COMMENT OPINION TASK
94.2 Theodora RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
94.1 Sizwe JUSTIFY OPINION CONTRIBUTION
93.1 Theodora SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
92.2 Thami JUSTIFY INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION
92.1 Thami REQUEST TASK
91.1 Sizwe SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
90.1 Sipho SUGGEST EXAMPLE CONSENSUS U
89.1 Thami SUGGEST EXAMPLE CONSENSUS U
88.1 Lulama SUGGEST EXAMPLE CONSENSUS U
87.1 Sizwe INVITE PARTICIPATION
86.1 Buyiswa INQUIRE CONSENSUS U 8 MOTIVATION 3 FOR OPTION 4
85.1 Thami SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
84.2 Sizwe CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U DEBATE ON HOW TO RECORD 
84.1 Sizwe COMMENT REFLECTION GROUP
83.2 Theodora JUSTIFY REFLECTION OWN NEEDS
83.1 Theodora REQUEST OWN NEEDS
82.1 Thami COMMENT OPINION TASK
81.1 Lulama INQUIRE TASK
80.1 Sipho DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
79.1 Thozie INVITE PARTICIPATION
78.1 Thami COMMENT OPINION TASK
77.1 Thozie INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
76.1 Thami DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
75.1 Sizwe INQUIRE TASK
74.1 Theodora COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
73.2 Sizwe DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
73.1 Sizwe REQUEST TASK
72.1 Theodora INQUIRE GROUP
71.1 Sizwe COMMENT REFLECTION OWN NEEDS 7 DEBATE ON HOW TO RECORD
70.1 Theodora REQUEST OWN NEEDS DEBATE ON THE MEANING OF 
69.1 Thozie COMMENT REFLECTION TASK MOTIVATION 2
68.3 Sizwe JUSTIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
68.2 Sizwe JUSTIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U SUGGESTION OF A COMPROMISE 
68.1 Sizwe REJECT OPINION OWN IDEAS REJECTION OF THE SUGGESTED 
67.1 Sipho COMMENT INTERPRETATION GROUP COMPROMISE
66.2 Theodora RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
66.1 Sizwe DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
65.1 Thozie REQUEST TASK
64.1 Sizwe COMMENT REFLECTION GROUP
63.1 Thami COMMENT REFLECTION GROUP
62.1 Thozie REQUEST TASK
61.2 Sizwe JUSTIFY INFERENCE OWN IDEAS
61.1 Sizwe CLARIFY REPETITION OWN IDEAS 6 DISAGREEMENT ON THE MEANING 
60.3 Thami JUSTIFY INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION OF MOTIVATION 2
60.2 Thami JUSTIFY INFERENCE OWN IDEAS
60.1 Thami REJECT OPINION OWN IDEAS
59.3 Sizwe SEEK CONSENSUS U
59.2 Sizwe CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
59.1 Sizwe JUSTIFY OPINION CONTRIBUTION
58.1 Buyiswa SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS A
57.1 Thozie SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
56.2 Sizwe CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
56.1 Sizwe CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
55.1 Thami INQUIRE INFERENCE CONSENSUS U 5 MOTIVATION 2 FOR OPTION 4
54.1 Sizwe CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
53.1 Thami INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
52.1 Thozie SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
51.1 Sizwe CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
50.1 Thozie INQUIRE REPETITION CONSENSUS U
49.1 Lulama INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
48.1 Thozie INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
47.1 Sizwe JUSTIFY OPINION CONTRIBUTION
46.1 Thami COMMENT FACT TASK
45.2 Sizwe QUERY TASK
45.1 Sizwe DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
44.1 Sipho REQUEST TASK
43.1 Thozie SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS U 4 BUILDING OF A COMMON 
42.1 Thami CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U UNDERSTANDING ON HOW TO 
41.1 Thozie INQUIRE TASK PROCEED WITH THE PROBLEM 
40.1 Sipho CLARIFY REPETITION TASK SOLVING TASK
39.1 Thami SUPPORT OPINION TASK
38.1 Sipho COMMENT INTERPRETATION TASK
37.1 Theodora REQUEST TASK
36.1 Sipho uncoded uncoded uncoded
35.1 Sizwe INQUIRE TASK
34.2 Theodora RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
34.1 Sipho JUSTIFY INTERPRETATION CONTRIBUTION
33.2 Theodora RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
33.1 Sizwe JUSTIFY REPETITION AMPLIFYING
32.1 Thami INVITE REPETITION PARTICIPATION
31.1 Lulama SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS A
30.2 Sizwe INVITE PARTICIPATION
30.1 Sizwe REQUEST GROUP
29.1 Thozie REQUEST TASK
28.2 Theodora RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
28.1 Sizwe JUSTIFY INTERPRETATION CONTRIBUTION 3 MOTIVATION 1 FOR OPTION 4
27.1 Theodora SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A BUILDING OF A COMMON 
26.1 Thozie JUSTIFY OPINION CONTRIBUTION UNDERSTANDING OF THE 
25.1 Sizwe SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A PROBLEM STRUCTURE
24.1 Thozie SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
23.2 Sizwe JUSTIFY INTERPRETATION CONTRIBUTION
23.1 Sizwe SUGGEST INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
22.2 Theodora RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
22.1 Sipho JUSTIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
21.3 Theodora RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
21.2 Sizwe INVITE PARTICIPATION
21.1 Sizwe REQUEST TASK
20.1 Sipho SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
19.1 Thozie SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
18.2 Sizwe SEEK CONSENSUS A 2 SUGGESTION TO CHOOSE OPTION 4
18.1 Sizwe SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A GROUP SUPPORT FOR OPTION 4
17.1 Thami JUSTIFY OPINION CONTRIBUTION
16.1 Lulama INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
15.1 Thami SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
14.3 Sizwe CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
14.2 Sizwe REQUEST TASK
14.1 Sizwe SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
13.1 Sipho INFORM FACT TASK
12.1 Lulama SUPPORT EXAMPLE CONSENSUS A
11.1 Thozie SUPPORT EXAMPLE CONSENSUS A
10.1 Theodora JUSTIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
9.1 Lulama REQUEST REPETITION TASK
8.1 Thozie SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A 1 BUILDING OF A COMMON 
7.1 Theodora INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEM 
6.1 Lulama INQUIRE TASK SOLVING STRUCTURE
. 5.5 Sizwe REJECT REPETITION OWN NEEDS
O 5.4 Sizwe CLARIFY EXAMPLE CONSENSUS U DEBATE ON THE PROBLEM 
N 5.3 Sizwe QUERY OWN NEEDS SOLVING TASK
5.2 Sizwe JUSTIFY INTERPRETATION OWN NEEDS
N 5.1 Sizwe REJECT OPINION OWN NEEDS
O 4.1 Sipho COMMENT REFLECTION GROUP
I 3.1 Theodora SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
T 2.2 Lulama REQUEST OPINION TASK
A 2.1 Lulama REJECT OPINION TASK
R 1.4 Sizwe INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
E 1.3 Sizwe JUSTIFY OPINION OWN NEEDS
P 1.2 Sizwe REQUEST OPINION OWN NEEDS
O 1.1 Sizwe CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
PARTICIPANT IMMEDIATE COGNITIVE- UNDERLYING STAGE: NUMBER & DESCRIPTION
INTER-ACTIVE AFFECTIVE FUNCTION
FUNCTION CONTENT
224.1 Matthew OFFER TASK
223.1 James CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
222.1 Matthew COMMENT OPINION TASK
221.2 James SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
221.1 James SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
220.1 Funeka DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
219.1 Theo DICTATE MEMORY 20 ESTABLISHMENT OF FINAL 
218.3 Ayanda JUSTIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS A GROUP CONSENSUS ON 
218.2 Matthew SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS A THE COMPROMISE
218.1 Matthew SUPPORT OPINION AMPLIFYING
217.1 Theo uncoded uncoded uncoded
216.1 Matthew COMMENT FACT TASK
215.1 Funeka SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
214.1 Matthew SUGGEST OPINION CONSENSUS A
213.2 Theo COMMENT OPINION TASK
213.1 Theo COMMENT OPINION TASK
212.1 James INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
211.1 Funeka INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
210.1 Khaya INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
209.1 Funeka INQUIRE INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
208.1 Theo CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
207.1 Funeka INFORM REFLECTION CONSENSUS U
206.1 Khaya CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
205.1 James INQUIRE CONSENSUS U 19 MOTIVATION 5 FOR OPTION 1
204.1 Theo SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
203.1 Matthew SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
202.1 Theo SUGGEST INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
201.2 Matthew RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
201.1 Matthew CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
200.1 Theo CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
199.1 Funeka INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
198.1 Khaya SUGGEST INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
197.1 Theo SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS A
196.3 Matthew RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
196.2 Matthew JUSTIFY OPINION CONSENSUS A
196.1 Matthew SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
195.1 Khaya QUERY REPETITION CONSENSUS A
194.1 Ayanda INFORM REFLECTION CONSENSUS U
193.1 James QUERY OPINION CONSENSUS A
192.1 Funeka INFORM REFLECTION CONSENSUS U
191.1 Theo CLARIFY EXAMPLE CONSENSUS U
190.1 Ayanda CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
189.1 Matthew CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
188.1 Khaya CLARIFY EXAMPLE CONSENSUS U
187.1 Theo INQUIRE CONSENSUS U 18 MOTIVATION 4 FOR OPTION 1
186.2 Matthew RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
186.1 Matthew CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
185.1 Funeka SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
184.1 Matthew REJECT OPINION OWN IDEAS
183.1 Theo CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
182.1 Ayanda INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
181.1 Matthew COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
180.3 Theo SUGGEST INTERPRETATION CONTRIBUTION
180.2 Matthew RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
180.1 Theo SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS A
179.1 Ayanda SUGGEST REPETITION AMPLIFYING
178.1 Theo SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
177.2 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION
177.1 Matthew INQUIRE TASK
176.1 James RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
175.1 Khaya SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
174.2 James SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
174.1 James SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
173.1 Matthew SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
172.1 Theo SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS A
171.1 Matthew DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
170.1 Funeka REQUEST TASK
169.1 Theo DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
168.2 Matthew RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
168.1 Matthew SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A 17 MOTIVATION 3 FOR OPTION 1
167.2 Funeka SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS U
167.1 Funeka CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
166.1 Matthew QUERY CONSENSUS U
165.1 Theo SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
164.1 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION
163.1 Ayanda SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS U
162.2 Khaya COMMENT OPINION OWN NEEDS
162.1 Khaya REJECT OPINION OWN NEEDS
161.1 Theo REQUEST TASK
160.2 Matthew RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
160.1 Matthew SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
159.1 Khaya SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
158.3 Matthew SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
158.2 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION
158.1 Matthew SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
157.1 James SUPPORT INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS A
156.1 Theo SUGGEST INTERPRETATION CONTRIBUTION
155.2 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION
155.1 Matthew SUPPORT INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS A
154.1 Theo SUGGEST REPETITION AMPLIFYING
153.3 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION
153.2 Matthew SUGGEST INTERPRETATION CONTRIBUTION
153.1 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION
152.1 Khaya INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
151.1 Funeka INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U 16 MOTIVATION 2 FOR OPTION 1
150.1 James INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
149.1 Khaya INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
148.1 Theo INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
147.1 Funeka INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
146.1 Khaya INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
145.1 Theo SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
144.2 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION
144.1 Matthew REQUEST GROUP
143.2 Theo RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
143.1 Theo DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
142.1 Khaya REJECT OPINION OWN NEEDS
141.1 James COMMENT REFLECTION GROUP
140.3 Matthew RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
140.2 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION
140.1 Matthew DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY 15 SUGGESTION TO CHOOSE
139.1 Khaya REQUEST OPINION TASK OPTION 1
138.1 Ayanda SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS A MOTIVATION 1 FOR OPTION 1
137.2 Matthew RECORD REPETITION MEMORY BUILDING A COMMON
137.1 Theo DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY UNDERSTANDING ON WHAT TO
136.2 Matthew REQUEST TASK RECORD
136.1 Matthew SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
135.1 Funeka SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
134.1 James REQUEST REPETITION TASK
133.2 Theo CLARIFY EXAMPLE CONSENSUS U
133.1 Theo JUSTIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS A
132.1 Ayanda SUGGEST REPETITION AMPLIFYING
131.1 Theo INVITE PARTICIPATION 14 DEBATE ON THE PROBLEM 
130.2 Ayanda JUSTIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U SOLVING TASK
130.1 Ayanda INFORM FACT TASK
129.1 Theo SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
128.2 Khaya SUGGEST REPETITION COMPROMISE 13 REPETITION OF COMPROMISE
128.1 Khaya REJECT REPETITION GROUP
127.1 Theo INQUIRE TASK
126.1 James REJECT OPINION GROUP 12 DEBATE ON THE PROBLEM 
125.1 Funeka REQUEST OPINION GROUP SOLVING TASK
124.2 Matthew COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
124.1 Matthew REJECT OPINION OWN NEEDS
123.1 Ayanda COMMENT INTERPRETATION TASK
122.1 Matthew REJECT INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION
121.1 Ayanda CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
120.1 Matthew REQUEST OPINION TASK
119.1 Theo CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
118.3 Ayanda RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
118.2 Matthew INFORM FACT MEMORY
118.1 Matthew OFFER TASK
117.1 Theo REJECT INTERPRETATION TASK
116.3 Matthew COMMENT INTERPRETATION TASK
116.2 Ayanda RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
116.1 Matthew INFORM FACT MEMORY
115.2 Ayanda RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
115.1 Khaya INFORM FACT MEMORY
114.2 Ayanda RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
114.1 Funeka INFORM FACT MEMORY
113.2 James COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
113.1 Ayanda INQUIRE TASK
112.2 Ayanda RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
112.1 Matthew INFORM FACT MEMORY
111.1 Ayanda INQUIRE TASK
110.2 Ayanda RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
110.1 Khaya INFORM FACT MEMORY
109.2 Ayanda RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
109.1 Funeka INFORM FACT MEMORY
108.2 Ayanda RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
108.1 Theo REQUEST TASK
107.2 Ayanda RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
107.1 James INFORM FACT MEMORY 11 BUILDING OF A COMMON
106.2 Ayanda RECORD REPETITION MEMORY UNDERSTANDING OF THE
106.1 Theo INFORM FACT MEMORY CONTENT OF THE PROBLEM
105.2 Ayanda RECORD REPETITION MEMORY STRUCTURE AND THE PROBLEM
105.1 Matthew INFORM FACT MEMORY SOLVING PROCESS
104.2 Ayanda RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
104.1 Khaya INFORM FACT MEMORY
103.2 Ayanda RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
103.1 Funeka INFORM FACT MEMORY
102.1 Ayanda INQUIRE TASK
101.2 Ayanda RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
101.1 Theo INFORM FACT MEMORY
100.1 Ayanda REQUEST TASK
99.1 Theo COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
98.1 James SUPPORT REPETITION TASK
97.1 Khaya REJECT REFLECTION TASK
96.1 Funeka COMMENT FACT TASK
95.1 Matthew REQUEST TASK
94.1 Theo REQUEST TASK
93.1 Matthew SUPPORT OPINION TASK
92.2 Ayanda RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
92.1 Theo INFORM FACT MEMORY
91.2 Ayanda RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
91.1 Khaya INFORM FACT MEMORY
90.3 Matthew INFORM FACT MEMORY
90.2 Matthew CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
90.1 Matthew INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
89.1 Funeka CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
88.1 Theo uncoded uncoded uncoded
87.2 Matthew JUSTIFY FACT TASK
87.1 Matthew REQUEST OPINION TASK
86.2 Ayanda RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
86.1 James INFORM FACT MEMORY
85.1 Funeka REQUEST TASK
84.1 Matthew REQUEST REPETITION TASK
83.2 Ayanda RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
83.1 Theo INFORM FACT MEMORY
82.2 Ayanda RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
82.1 James INFORM FACT MEMORY
81.2 Matthew CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
81.1 Matthew REQUEST INTERPRETATION TASK
80.1 Funeka uncoded uncoded uncoded
79.4 Matthew REQUEST TASK 10 BUILDING OF A COMMON
79.3 Matthew COMMENT REFLECTION TASK UNDERSTANDING OF THE
79.2 Matthew JUSTIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS A PROBLEM SOLVING TASK
79.1 Matthew SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
78.3 Ayanda JUSTIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
78.2 Ayanda REQUEST OPINION TASK
78.1 Ayanda SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
77.1 Matthew SEEK CONSENSUS A
76.1 Theo SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
75.2 Funeka SUGGEST INFERENCE COMPROMISE
75.1 Funeka CLARIFY INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION
74.1 Matthew SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A 9 BUILDING OF A COMMON
73.1 Theo SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS A UNDERSTANDING OF THE
72.3 Funeka SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION CONTENT OF THE PROBLEM
72.2 Funeka INVITE PARTICIPATION STRUCTURE
72.1 Funeka CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
71.1 Theo INFORM INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
70.1 Khaya INFORM INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
69.1 Funeka INFORM INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
68.1 Khaya INFORM INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
67.1 Funeka COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
66.2 Matthew CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
66.1 Matthew REQUEST REPETITION TASK
65.2 Theo INFORM INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
65.1 Theo OFFER TASK
64.2 Matthew OFFER TASK
64.1 Matthew REQUEST INTERPRETATION TASK
63.1 Funeka COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
62.2 Matthew REQUEST TASK
62.1 Matthew SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
61.1 Ayanda REQUEST REPETITION OWN NEEDS 8 BUILDING OF A COMMON
60.1 James COMMENT FACT TASK UNDERSTANDING OF THE
59.1 Ayanda REQUEST REPETITION OWN NEEDS PROBLEM SOLVING TASK
58.1 Matthew REJECT INTERPRETATION OWN IDEAS
57.3 Ayanda CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U NEGATIVE GROUP DYNAMICS
57.2 Ayanda JUSTIFY REPETITION TASK
57.1 Ayanda COMMENT OPINION TASK
56.2 Matthew COMMENT FACT TASK
56.1 Matthew INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
55.1 Funeka INVITE PARTICIPATION
54.1 Khaya SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS U
53.3 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION
53.2 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION
53.1 Matthew COMMENT REFLECTION GROUP
52.1 Funeka INVITE PARTICIPATION
51.1 Theo SUGGEST REPETITION AMPLIFYING
50.1 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION
49.2 Theo CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
49.1 Theo SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
48.1 Matthew SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
47.3 Theo CLARIFY EXAMPLE CONSENSUS U
47.2 Theo JUSTIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS A 7 SUGGESTION OF A COMPROMISE
47.1 Theo JUSTIFY OPINION AMPLIFYING
46.5 Matthew RECORD REPETITION MEMORY BUILDING OF A COMMON
46.4 Theo JUSTIFY OPINION COMPROMISE UNDERSTANDING OF THE
46.3 Theo JUSTIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS A COMPROMISE
46.2 Theo JUSTIFY OPINION CONTRIBUTION
46.1 Theo SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
45.3 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION
45.2 Matthew INFORM REPETITION CONSENSUS A
45.1 Matthew COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
44.2 Funeka INFORM EXAMPLE CONSENSUS U
44.1 Funeka INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
43.1 Matthew INQUIRE REPETITION CONSENSUS U
42.1 Funeka INFORM REPETITION CONSENSUS U
41.1 Matthew INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
40.1 Funeka CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
39.1 Khaya CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
38.1 Funeka INFORM REPETITION CONSENSUS U
37.1 Matthew INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
36.1 Funeka INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
35.1 Matthew INQUIRE INFERENCE CONSENSUS U 6 BUILDING OF A COMMON
34.1 Funeka SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A UNDERSTANDING OF OPTION 4
33.1 Matthew CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U OF THE PROBLEM STRUCTURE
32.2 Funeka CLARIFY FACT CONSENSUS U
32.1 Funeka INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
31.2 Matthew REQUEST TASK
31.1 Matthew SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
30.4 Funeka SUPPORT REPETITION AMPLIFYING
30.3 Funeka INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
30.2 Funeka CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
30.1 Funeka INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
29.2 Matthew INVITE REPETITION PARTICIPATION
29.1 Matthew CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
28.1 Funeka INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
27.2 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION
27.1 Matthew COMMENT INTERPRETATION TASK
26.2 Funeka COMMENT OPINION TASK
26.1 Funeka COMMENT OPINION TASK 5 BUILDING OF A COMMON
25.1 Matthew COMMENT REFLECTION TASK UNDERSTANDING OF THE
24.1 Funeka SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS A PROBLEM SOLVING TASK
23.2 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION
23.1 Matthew COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
22.3 James SUPPORT REPETITION AMPLIFYING 4 SUGGESTION TO CHOOSE
22.2 James CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U OPTION 4
22.1 James JUSTIFY OPINION CONTRIBUTION
21.2 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION MOTIVATION 1 FOR OPTION 4
21.1 Matthew INFORM REPETITION CONSENSUS U
20.2 James SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
20.1 James OFFER TASK 3 BUILDING OF A COMMON
19.2 Matthew SUGGEST INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION UNDERSTANDING OF THE
19.1 Matthew REQUEST OPINION TASK PROBLEM SOLVING TASK
18.1 Funeka INVITE PARTICIPATION
17.6 Matthew JUSTIFY OPINION CONTRIBUTION
17.5 Matthew JUSTIFY INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION
17.4 Matthew JUSTIFY OPINION CONTRIBUTION 2 BUILDING OF A COMMON
17.3 Matthew INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U UNDERSTANDING OF OPTION 1
17.2 Matthew SUGGEST INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U OF THE PROBLEM STRUCTURE
17.1 Matthew INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
16.1 James SUGGEST INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
15.4 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION
15.3 Matthew CLARIFY EXAMPLE CONSENSUS U
15.2 Matthew REQUEST REPETITION TASK
15.1 Matthew REQUEST OPINION TASK
14.1 Funeka JUSTIFY OPINION CONSENSUS U
13.3 Matthew REJECT OPINION OWN IDEAS
13.2 Matthew COMMENT REFLECTION GROUP
. 13.1 Matthew REJECT OPINION OWN NEEDS
O 12.1 Theo REQUEST TASK
N 11.1 Ayanda INFORM REPETITION CONSENSUS A 1 BUILDING OF A COMMON
10.1 Theo CLARIFY EXAMPLE CONSENSUS U UNDERSTANDING OF THE
N 9.1 James INQUIRE CONSENSUS U PROBLEM SOLVING PROCESS
O 8.1 Funeka COMMENT FACT TASK
I 7.1 Matthew REJECT OPINION GROUP
T 6.1 James REQUEST TASK
A 5.1 Theo REQUEST TASK
R 4.1 Khaya CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
E 3.1 Theo INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
P 2.1 Matthew INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
O 1.1 Theo INVITE PARTICIPATION
PARTICIPANT IMMEDIATE COGNITIVE- UNDERLYING STAGE: NUMBER & DESCRIPTION
INTER-ACTIVE AFFECTIVE FUNCTION
FUNCTION CONTENT
147.1 Thozie COMMENT OPINION TASK
146.2 Thami RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
146.1 Sipho SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
145.2 Sizwe INVITE PARTICIPATION
145.1 Sizwe CLARIFY REPETITION OWN IDEAS
144.1 Lulama JUSTIFY FACT OWN IDEAS
143.2 Sizwe JUSTIFY INTERPRETATION OWN IDEAS
143.1 Sizwe INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
142.1 Lulama REJECT INTERPRETATION OWN IDEAS
141.5 Thami RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
141.4 Sizwe REQUEST TASK
141.3 Sizwe REJECT OPINION TASK
141.2 Sizwe INFORM REPETITION CONSENSUS U
141.1 Sizwe REQUEST TASK
140.2 Thami RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
140.1 Thozie REQUEST TASK
139.2 Sizwe SUGGEST INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION 13 BUILDING OF A COMMON
139.1 Sizwe REQUEST TASK UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT AND
138.2 Thami OFFER TASK HOW TO RECORD
138.1 Thami COMMENT FACT TASK
137.2 Sizwe REQUEST TASK
137.1 Sizwe REJECT OPINION OWN NEEDS
136.1 Lulama INQUIRE TASK
135.1 Sizwe SUPPORT REPETITION OWN IDEAS
134.2 James QUERY INFERENCE OWN IDEAS
134.1 James COMMENT OPINION TASK
133.2 Sizwe DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
133.1 Sizwe COMMENT OPINION TASK
132.1 Thozie DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
131.6 Thami RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
131.5 Sizwe REQUEST TASK
131.4 Sizwe REQUEST TASK
131.3 Sizwe INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
131.2 Sizwe COMMENT REFLECTION OWN NEEDS
131.1 Sizwe REQUEST INFERENCE TASK
130.1 Thozie SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
129.1 Sizwe SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
128.1 Thozie SUGGEST OPINION CONSENSUS U
127.1 Sizwe SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
126.1 Thozie CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U 12 UNDERSTANDING OF THE
125.1 Sizwe SUGGEST OPINION OWN IDEAS CONTENT OF THE PROBLEM
124.1 Lulama REJECT OPINION OWN IDEAS STRUCTURE
123.2 sizwe REQUEST TASK
123.1 Sizwe CLARIFY OPINION CONSENSUS U
122.3 Lulama SUGGEST OPINION CONSENSUS U
122.2 Lulama INVITE PARTICIPATION
122.1 Lulama INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
121.1 Sizwe uncoded uncoded uncoded
120.2 Thozie JUSTIFY OPINION OWN IDEAS
120.1 Thozie REJECT OPINION OWN IDEAS
119.1 James QUERY OPINION CONSENSUS U
118.1 Sizwe COMMENT REFLECTION TASK 11 DEBATE ON THE PROGRESS OF 
117.1 Lulama REJECT OPINION OWN NEEDS THE PROBLEM SOLVING PROCESS
116.1 Thozie SUPPORT OPINION TASK
115.1 James REJECT OPINION OWN NEEDS
114.1 Thami COMMENT REFLECTION OWN NEEDS
113.1 Sizwe INQUIRE GROUP
112.2 Thami COMMENT OPINION OWN NEEDS
112.1 Thami COMMENT OPINION OWN NEEDS
111.1 Sipho INQUIRE TASK
110.1 Thami CLARIFY REPETITION OWN IDEAS
109.4 Sipho QUERY OPINION OWN IDEAS
109.3 Sipho SUGGEST REPETITION OWN IDEAS
109.2 Sipho REJECT OPINION OWN IDEAS
109.1 Sipho CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
108.3 Thami SUGGEST REPETITION OWN IDEAS
108.2 Thami SUGGEST OPINION OWN IDEAS
108.1 Thami JUSTIFY OPINION OWN IDEAS
107.3 Sipho CLARIFY OPINION CONSENSUS U 10 DEBATE ON THE MEANING OF 
107.2 Sipho SUGGEST INTERPRETATION OWN IDEAS SUGGESTION 2
107.1 Sipho REJECT INTERPRETATION OWN IDEAS
106.1 Thami SUGGEST OPINION OWN IDEAS
105.1 Sipho INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
104.1 Thami COMMENT OPINION OWN NEEDS
103.2 Sipho JUSTIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
103.1 Sipho QUERY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
102.1 Thami COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
101.1 Thozie INQUIRE TASK
100.1 Thami COMMENT FACT TASK
99.1 Lulama DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
98.2 Sizwe DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
98.1 Sizwe REQUEST TASK
97.1 Thami INQUIRE OWN NEEDS
96.1 Sizwe COMMENT REFLECTION GROUP 9 DEBATE ON WHAT TO RECORD
95.1 Thami COMMENT REFLECTION OWN NEEDS
94.1 Sipho QUERY INTERPRETATION GROUP
93.1 Thozie REQUEST GROUP
92.2 Thami COMMENT REFLECTION OWN NEEDS
92.1 Thami COMMENT REFLECTION OWN NEEDS
91.1 Sizwe REQUEST TASK
90.1 Thami SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS U
89.1 Lulama SEEK CONSENSUS U
88.2 Sizwe CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
88.1 Sizwe CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
87.3 Lulama CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
87.2 Lulama CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U 8 SUGGESTION 2 TO SOLVE 
87.1 Lulama CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U ASPECT 1 OF THE PROBLEM
86.1 Sipho SEEK REPETITION CONSENSUS A
85.1 Sizwe CLARIFY REPETITION AMPLIFYING
84.1 Thami INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
83.2 Thami RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
83.1 Sizwe SUGGEST INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION
82.1 Sipho SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
81.1 Thami REJECT OPINION OWN NEEDS
80.1 Thozie INVITE PARTICIPATION
79.1 James REQUEST TASK
78.1 Sizwe COMMENT OPINION GROUP
77.1 Thozie INQUIRE TASK 7 BUILDING OF A COMMON
76.2 Thami COMMENT REFLECTION TASK UNDERSTANDING OF THE
76.1 Thami REQUEST TASK  PROBLEM STRUCTURE AND THE
75.2 Sipho JUSTIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U PROBLEM SOLVING TASK
75.1 Sipho SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
74.1 Thozie SUPPORT REFLECTION CONSENSUS A
73.2 Thami JUSTIFY FACT CONSENSUS U
73.1 Thami INFORM INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
72.1 Thozie INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
71.3 Thami RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
71.2 Lulama COMMENT INTERPRETATION TASK
71.1 Lulama SUPPORT OPINION TASK
70.1 Sizwe COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
69.1 Thami INQUIRE TASK
68.1 Sizwe SUGGEST REPETITION AMPLIFYING
67.1 Thami INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
66.1 THozie REQUEST TASK
65.1 Thami uncoded uncoded uncoded
64.3 Sizwe COMMENT REFLECTION GROUP
64.2 Thami RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
64.1 Sizwe DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
63.1 Thami INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
62.2 Sizwe REQUEST OWN NEEDS
62.1 Sizwe DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
61.3 Thami RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
61.2 Thozie DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
61.1 Thozie REQUEST REPETITION TASK
60.2 Thami COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
60.1 Thami REQUEST OWN NEEDS
59.2 Thozie DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
59.1 Thozie REQUEST TASK
58.5 Sizwe SUGGEST INTERPRETATION CONTRIBUTION
58.4 Sizwe SUGGEST REPETITION OWN IDEAS 6 DEBATE ON WHAT TO RECORD
58.3 Sizwe SUGGEST REPETITION OWN IDEAS
58.2 Sizwe CLARIFY INFERENCE OWN IDEAS
58.1 Sizwe REJECT OPINION OWN NEEDS
57.2 Thami COMMENT FACT TASK
57.1 Thami COMMENT INTERPRETATION TASK
56.2 Thami RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
56.1 Sizwe DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
55.1 Sipho REQUEST TASK
54.1 Thami REQUEST OPINION TASK
53.1 Sipho QUERY REFLECTION GROUP
52.3 Thami RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
52.2 Thami REQUEST OWN NEEDS
52.1 Thami REQUEST GROUP
51.1 Thozie DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
50.2 Thami RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
50.1 Sizwe DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
49.1 Thozie COMMENT REPETITION TASK
48.1 Thami REJECT OPINION OWN NEEDS
47.2 Sizwe COMMENT OPINION OWN NEEDS
47.1 Sizwe REJECT OPINION OWN NEEDS
46.1 Thozie REQUEST TASK
45.1 James INVITE PARTICIPATION
44.2 Thami REQUEST OWN NEEDS
44.1 Thami REJECT OPINION OWN NEEDS
43.1 Sizwe REQUEST OWN NEEDS
42.1 Thozie COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
41.1 Thami COMMENT OPINION OWN NEEDS
40.1 Sizwe COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
39.1 Thami REQUEST TASK
38.2 Sizwe JUSTIFY INFERENCE OWN IDEAS
38.1 Sizwe SUGGEST INFERENCE OWN IDEAS
37.3 Thami JUSTIFY INFERENCE OWN IDEAS
37.2 Thami SEEK CONSENSUS U
37.1 Thami CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
36.1 Sizwe INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
35.1 Thami SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS U
34.1 Lulama CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
33.1 Thami INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
32.1 Lulama CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
31.1 Thami INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
30.1 Lulama CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U 5 SUGGESTION 1 TO SOLVE
29.1 Thami INQUIRE REPETITION CONSENSUS U ASPECT 1 OF THE PROBLEM
28.1 Sizwe CLARIFY OPINION AMPLIFYING
27.1 Thami INQUIRE CONSENSUS A
26.1 Lulama SUGGEST REPETITION AMPLIFYING
25.2 Sizwe SUPPORT REPETITION AMPLIFYING
25.1 Sizwe CLARIFY FACT CONSENSUS U
24.1 Lulama REQUEST REPETITION TASK
23.1 Thami REQUEST TASK
22.4 Sizwe CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
22.3 Sizwe JUSTIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
22.2 Sizwe JUSTIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
22.1 Sizwe SUGGEST OPINION CONSENSUS U
21.1 Lulama REJECT INTERPRETATION OWN IDEAS
20.1 Sizwe INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U 4 QUERY OF ATTEMPT 1
19.2 Lulama INFORM REPETITION CONSENSUS U BUILDING OF A COMMON
19.1 Lulama REJECT OPINION OWN IDEAS UNDERSTANDING OF THE
18.4 Sizwe JUSTIFY REPETITION AMPLIFYING CONTENT OF THE PROBLEM
18.3 Sizwe SUPPORT REPETITION AMPLIFYING STRUCTURE
18.2 Sizwe JUSTIFY OPINION OWN IDEAS
18.1 Sizwe SUPPORT OPINION OWN IDEAS DEFENSE OF ATTEMPT 1
17.1 Thami QUERY TASK
16.1 Sizwe SUPPORT OPINION OWN NEEDS 3 DEBATE ON THE
15.1 Thami COMMENT FACT TASK ACCEPTANCE OF ATTEMPTS
14.2 Sizwe REQUEST OWN NEEDS 1 AND 2 TO SOLVE ASPECT 2
14.1 Sizwe REQUEST OWN NEEDS
13.1 James REJECT INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION
12.1 Sizwe DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
11.2 Thami RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
11.1 Thami REQUEST TASK
10.1 Lulama CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
9.1 Sizwe SUPPORT REPETITION AMPLIFYING
8.1 Lulama SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS U
7.2 Sizwe INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
7.1 Sizwe INFORM REPETITION CONSENSUS U 2 ATTEMPTS 1 AND 2 TO SOLVE 
6.1 Thami INQUIRE CONSENSUS U ASPECT 2 OF THE PROBLEM
. 5.4 Sizwe INVITE PARTICIPATION
O 5.3 Sizwe CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
N 5.2 Sizwe SUGGEST INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION
5.1 Sizwe SUGGEST INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION
N 4.1 Thami COMMENT OPINION TASK
O 3.5 Sizwe SUGGEST INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION
I 3.4 Sizwe INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
T 3.3 Sizwe INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
A 3.2 Sizwe SUGGEST INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION
R 3.1 Sizwe SUGGEST OPINION OWN IDEAS
E 2.2 Thami REQUEST TASK 1 INVITATION TO START THE
P 2.1 Thami REJECT OPINION OWN NEEDS PROBLEM SOLVING PROCESS
O 1.1 Sizwe REQUEST OPINION TASK
PARTICIPANT IMMEDIATE COGNITIVE- UNDERLYING STAGE: NUMBER & DESCRIPTION
INTER-ACTIVE AFFECTIVE FUNCTION
FUNCTION CONTENT
173.3 Theodora COMMENT OPINION TASK
173.2 Theodora REQUEST TASK
173.1 Theodora SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
172.1 Funeka SEEK CONSENSUS U
171.1 Matthew SEEK CONSENSUS A
170.1 Khaya SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
169.2 Funeka OFFER TASK
169.1 Funeka REJECT OPINION OWN IDEAS
168.2 Matthew SEEK REPETITION CONSENSUS A
168.1 Matthew CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
167.1 Theodora CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
166.1 Khaya CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
165.1 Theodora SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
164.2 Matthew CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
164.1 Matthew SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
163.1 Khaya CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
162.1 Theodora INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
161.1 Matthew SUGGEST INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U 12 BUILDING OF A COMMON
160.1 Theodora CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U UNDERSTANDING OF THE
159.1 Khaya QUERY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U PROCESS OF SOLVING ASPECT
158.1 Matthew CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U 2 OF THE PROBLEM
157.1 Khaya CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
156.1 Theodora uncoded uncoded uncoded BUILDING OF A COMMON
155.1 Matthew CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U UNDERSTANDING OF THE
154.1 Khaya REJECT OPINION TASK CONTENT OF THE PROBLEM
153.1 Matthew CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U STRUCTURE
152.1 Funeka REQUEST REPETITION OWN NEEDS
151.1 Ayanda CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U NEGATIVE GROUP DYNAMICS
150.1 Funeka REQUEST TASK
149.1 Khaya SUPPORT REFLECTION GROUP
148.1 Funeka QUERY INTERPRETATION GROUP
147.1 Matthew COMMENT REFLECTION GROUP
146.2 Khaya COMMENT OPINION TASK
146.1 Khaya SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
145.2 Matthew SEEK CONSENSUS A
145.1 Matthew INFORM REPETITION CONSENSUS U
144.1 Khaya QUERY OPINION OWN IDEAS
143.1 Funeka QUERY REPETITION OWN IDEAS
142.1 Ayanda SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
141.1 Matthew CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
140.1 Funeka QUERY CONSENSUS U
139.1 Ayanda SEEK REPETITION CONSENSUS U
138.1 Ayanda INQUIRE AMPLIFYING
137.1 Theodora SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
136.1 Matthew CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
135.1 Khaya SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
134.1 Matthew CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
133.2 Ayanda COMMENT OPINION TASK
133.1 Ayanda SUGGEST OPINION CONSENSUS U
132.1 Khaya CLARIFY FACT CONSENSUS U
131.1 Matthew COMMENT OPINION TASK
130.1 Khaya COMMENT OPINION TASK
129.1 Matthew REQUEST TASK 11 BUILDING OF A COMMON
128.1 Funeka COMMENT FACT TASK UNDERSTANDING OF HOW TO
127.1 Matthew INQUIRE TASK RECORD
126.1 Funeka COMMENT FACT TASK
125.2 Matthew RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
125.1 Matthew INQUIRE TASK
124.1 Ayanda JUSTIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
123.1 Buyiswa INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
122.1 Ayanda COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
121.1 Buyiswa INQUIRE CONSENSUS U 10 SUGGESTION 4 TO SOLVE
120.3 Ayanda CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U ASPECT 1 OF THE PROBLEM
120.2 Ayanda JUSTIFY OPINION AMPLIFYING
120.1 Ayanda SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
119.3 Matthew RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
119.2 Matthew SUGGEST OPINION CONSENSUS U
119.1 Matthew DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
118.1 Ayanda SUPPORT OPINION TASK
117.1 Khaya QUERY TASK
116.1 Ayanda REQUEST REPETITION TASK 9 BUILDING OF A COMMON
115.1 Matthew COMMENT REFLECTION GROUP UNDERSTANDING OF HOW TO
114.1 Theodora INFORM REFLECTION CONSENSUS A RECORD
113.1 Matthew uncoded uncoded uncoded
112.1 Ayanda REQUEST REPETITION TASK
111.1 Funeka DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
110.1 Matthew RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
109.1 Funeka DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
108.1 Khaya DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
107.1 Funeka DICTATE REPETITION CONSENSUS A
106.1 Matthew REQUEST TASK
105.3 Funeka JUSTIFY INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION
105.2 Funeka JUSTIFY REPETITION AMPLIFYING
105.1 Funeka SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A 8 SUGGESTION 3 TO SOLVE
104.1 Khaya JUSTIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS A ASPECT 1 OF THE PROBLEM
103.1 Funeka JUSTIFY INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION
102.1 Khaya SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
101.3 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION
101.2 Matthew INVITE REPETITION PARTICIPATION
101.1 Matthew COMMENT REPETITION TASK
100.1 Theodora INQUIRE REPETITION TASK 7 BUILDING OF A COMMON
99.1 Matthew COMMENT OPINION TASK UNDERSTANDING OF HOW TO
98.2 Khaya INQUIRE REPETITION CONSENSUS U PROCEED WITH THE PROBLEM
98.1 Khaya COMMENT REFLECTION OWN NEEDS SOLVING PROCESS
97.1 Matthew COMMENT OPINION TASK
96.1 Hilde INQUIRE TASK
95.1 Ayanda REQUEST TASK
94.1 Khaya REJECT REPETITION OWN IDEAS
93.1 Funeka INFORM REPETITION CONSENSUS U
92.1 Matthew SUPPORT INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS A
91.1 Khaya QUERY INTERPRETATION OWN IDEAS
90.2 Matthew INFORM REPETITION CONSENSUS U
90.1 Matthew SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
89.1 Khaya SEEK REPETITION CONSENSUS U
88.1 Hilde CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
87.1 Khaya CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
86.1 Matthew INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
85.1 Hilde INFORM REPETITION CONSENSUS U
84.1 Ayanda INQUIRE REPETITION CONSENSUS U
83.1 Khaya COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
82.1 Ayanda INQUIRE REPETITION CONSENSUS U
81.2 Khaya JUSTIFY OPINION CONSENSUS U
81.1 Khaya REJECT OPINION OWN IDEAS
80.1 Ayanda SUPPORT FACT CONSENSUS U
79.2 Matthew SUGGEST OPINION CONSENSUS U
79.1 Matthew COMMENT REPETITION TASK
78.1 Khaya CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
77.1 Funeka CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
76.3 Matthew CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
76.2 Matthew SUGGEST OPINION CONSENSUS U
76.1 Matthew COMMENT REFLECTION OWN NEEDS
75.1 Khaya REJECT OPINION TASK
74.1 Ayanda CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
73.2 Matthew QUERY CONSENSUS U
73.1 Matthew CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
72.1 Khaya CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
71.1 Matthew INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
70.1 Theodora CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS A
69.1 Ayanda CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U 6 SUGGESTION 2 TO SOLVE
68.1 Matthew INQUIRE REPETITION CONSENSUS U ASPECT 1 OF THE PROBLEM
67.1 Theodora CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
66.1 Khaya INQUIRE  CONSENSUS U BUILDING OF A COMMON
65.3 Linda INFORM REPETITION CONSENSUS U UNDERSTANDING OF THE
65.2 Linda COMMENT REFLECTION TASK CONTENT OF THE PROBLEM
65.1 Linda CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U STRUCTURE
64.3 Matthew QUERY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
64.2 Matthew JUSTIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
64.1 Matthew REJECT OPINION OWN IDEAS
63.4 Khaya CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
63.3 Khaya JUSTIFY REPETITION OWN NEEDS
63.2 Khaya JUSTIFY OPINION OWN IDEAS
63.1 Khaya REJECT OPINION OWN NEEDS
62.1 Matthew REQUEST GROUP
61.1 Khaya CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
60.2 Theodora SUGGEST OPINION CONSENSUS U
60.1 Theodora CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
59.1 Ayanda COMMENT REFLECTION OWN NEEDS
58.1 Matthew QUERY CONSENSUS U
57.1 Khaya CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
56.3 Theodora INQUIRE CONSENSUS U
56.2 Theodora INFORM REPETITION CONSENSUS U 6
56.1 Theodora SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
55.1 Matthew SEEK CONSENSUS U
54.2 Theodora CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
54.1 Theodora CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
53.1 Funeka SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS U
52.1 Matthew INQUIRE REPETITION CONSENSUS U
51.2 Theodora INFORM REPETITION CONSENSUS U
51.1 Theodora CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
50.2 Matthew INVITE REPETITION PARTICIPATION
50.1 Matthew SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
49.1 Khaya CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
48.2 Buyiswa SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS A
48.1 Buyiswa SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS U
47.1 Funeka SEEK REPETITION CONSENSUS U
46.1 Khaya SEEK REPETITION CONSENSUS U
45.1 Theodora QUERY CONSENSUS U
44.1 Khaya SEEK REPETITION CONSENSUS U
43.3 Matthew SEEK CONSENSUS A
43.2 Matthew SUGGEST REPETITION AMPLIFYING
43.1 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION
42.1 Theodora uncoded uncoded uncoded
41.1 Ayanda SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
40.2 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION
40.1 Matthew RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
39.1 Ayanda DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
38.1 Funeka DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
37.2 Matthew RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
37.1 Matthew DICTATE REPETITION MEMORY
36.1 Khaya COMMENT REFLECTION TASK 5 SUGGESTION 1 TO SOLVE
35.1 Matthew REQUEST TASK ASPECT 1 OF THE PROBLEM
34.2 Matthew RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
34.1 Ayanda SEEK REPETITION CONSENSUS A
33.1 Matthew SUPPORT INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
32.2 Khaya SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
32.1 Khaya SUPPORT OPINION CONSENSUS A
31.7 Matthew SEEK CONSENSUS A
31.6 Matthew SUPPORT REPETITION AMPLIFYING
31.5 Matthew JUSTIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
31.4 Matthew SUGGEST INTERPRETATION CONTRIBUTION
31.3 Matthew SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
31.2 Matthew INFORM REPETITION AMPLIFYING
31.1 Matthew REJECT OPINION OWN IDEAS
30.1 Buyiswa SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
29.3 Khaya JUSTIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
29.2 Khaya JUSTIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
29.1 Khaya SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
28.1 Matthew SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
27.1 Theodora CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
26.3 Matthew INFORM REPETITION CONSENSUS U
26.2 Matthew SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS U 4 BUILDING OF A COMMON
26.1 Matthew INFORM REFLECTION CONSENSUS U UNDERSTANDING OF THE NEXT
25.1 Funeka INVITE REPETITION PARTICIPATION STEP IN THE PROBLEM
24.1 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION SOLVING PROCESS
23.1 Ayanda INVITE REPETITION PARTICIPATION
22.1 Theodora CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U
21.1 Ayanda SUGGEST REPETITION CONSENSUS A
20.2 Matthew JUSTIFY OPINION TASK
20.1 Matthew COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
19.1 Theodora INQUIRE TASK
18.5 Matthew INVITE REPETITION PARTICIPATION
18.4 Matthew RECORD REPETITION MEMORY
18.3 Matthew REQUEST TASK
18.2 Matthew JUSTIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
18.1 Matthew SUGGEST INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
17.1 Theodora CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
16.4 Matthew INFORM REPETITION CONSENSUS U
16.3 Matthew INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
16.2 Matthew CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
16.1 Matthew INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
15.1 Theodora JUSTIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U
14.1 Matthew REJECT REFLECTION CONSENSUS U
13.3 Theodora SEEK CONSENSUS U 3 SOLVING ASPECT 2 OF THE
13.2 Theodora CLARIFY REPETITION CONSENSUS U PROBLEM
13.1 Theodora SUGGEST INFERENCE CONTRIBUTION
12.1 Ayanda COMMENT OPINION TASK BUILDING OF A COMMON
11.1 Funeka SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A UNDERSTANDING OF THE
10.7 Matthew CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U AVAILABLE DATA
10.6 Matthew INQUIRE INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
10.5 Matthew INFORM REPETITION CONSENSUS U
10.4 Matthew JUSTIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U
10.3 Matthew SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION
10.2 Matthew INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
10.1 Matthew SUPPORT REPETITION CONSENSUS A
9.1 Theodora INFORM REPETITION CONSENSUS U
8.1 Matthew INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
7.5 Theodora SUGGEST OPINION CONTRIBUTION 2 BUILDING OF A COMMON
. 7.4 Theodora CLARIFY INTERPRETATION CONSENSUS U UNDERSTANDING OF THE
O 7.3 Theodora CLARIFY INFERENCE CONSENSUS U PROBLEM STRUCTURE
N 7.2 Theodora INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U  
7.1 Theodora REQUEST TASK
N 6.2 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION
O 6.1 Matthew COMMENT REFLECTION TASK
I 5.1 Ayanda uncoded uncoded uncoded
T 4.1 Theodora REQUEST OWN NEEDS 1 SETTING RULES OF CONDUCT 
A 3.1 Matthew COMMENT OPINION OWN NEEDS FOR THE GROUP
R 2.1 Buyiswa REJECT OPINION OWN NEEDS
E 1.3 Matthew REQUEST TASK
P 1.2 Matthew INVITE PARTICIPATION
O 1.1 Matthew INFORM FACT CONSENSUS U
PARTICIPANT IMMEDIATE COGNITIVE- UNDERLYING STAGE: NUMBER & DESCRIPTION
INTER-ACTIVE AFFECTIVE FUNCTION
FUNCTION CONTENT
41.1 LEGEND
40.1
39.2 Operation Reference
39.1
38.2 Problem Structure
38.1 Newsprint
37.1 Link
36.2 Linkage initial
36.1 Linkage node
35.1
34.2
34.1 Participant
33.1
32.3 Funeka
32.2 Linda
32.1 Matthew
31.2 Sindiswa
31.1 Sizwe
30.4 Thozie
30.3
30.2
30.1 Cognitive-Affective Content
29.1
28.1 Clarify
27.3 Comment
27.2 Dictate
27.1 Inform
26.2 Inquire
26.1 Invite
25.2 Justify
25.1 Offer
24.2 Record
24.1 Request
23.1 Seek
22.1 Suggest
21.1 Support
20.2 no content
20.1
19.2
19.1
18.3
18.2
18.1
17.3
17.2
17.1
16.3
16.2
16.1
15.2
15.1
14.2
14.1
13.2
13.1
12.3
12.2
12.1
11.4
11.3
11.2
11.1
10.2
10.1
9.4
9.3
9.2
9.1
8.1
7.2
7.1
6.1
5.1
4.2
4.1
3.5
3.4
3.3
3.2
3.1
2.1
1.7
1.6
1.5
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.1
Cognitive-affective Content
Participant
Number of Operation
LEGEND
Operation Reference: Participants
 Cognitive-Affective Content
A Ayanda M Matthew
EX Example B Buyiswa Sin Sindiswa
FA Fact F Funeka Sip Sipho
INF Inference H Hilde Siz Sizwe
INT Interpretation J James Tha Thami
OP Opinion K Khaya The Theo
REP Repetition L Linda Thd Theodora
Lu Lulama Tho Thozie
Other Operation References
PS Problem structure
NP Newsprint
IF: inquiry Form of IF
36.2 M REP 41.1 Sin EX
34.1 Siz REP 40.1 M REP
12.2 L REP 39.2 Siz OP
9.3 Siz REP
4.1 M REP
1.3 Siz OP
30.1 Siz REP 21.1 Tho REP
28.1 M REP 20.2 M INF
17.3 Siz REP 7.2 M FA
17.2 L REP PS
17.1 L REP
16.3 M INT
16.2 M REP
16.1 M REP
7.1 M OP
30.4 Siz REP 39.1 Siz REP 25.2 Siz REP
30.2 Siz REP 11.3 Siz REP 25.1 Siz INF
27.3 Siz REP 3.3 Siz OP 24.1 L REP
27.2 L REP 11.4 Siz REP
26.1 M REP 4.2 M REP
9.4 Siz OP 3.5 Siz FA
PS
31.1 L REP 26.2 M REP
3.4 Siz REP 20.1 M INF
1.5 Siz INT PS
1.4 Siz OP
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f) (g)
(i)(h)
58.1 A REP
54.1 The REP
53.1 Tha REP
50.1 Thd REP
37.4 Tha REP
35.3 A REP
35.2 J REP
32.1 J REP 29.4 A REP 52.1 The REP
42.1 The REP
29.1 The REP
28.3 J REP 29.3 The REP 20.1 The REP
17.1 The REP
15.3 The REP
28.2 A REP 26.2 Sip REP 11.3 The OP
26.1 Sip REP 25.2 Tha REP
25.1 Tha REP 11.2 The FA
4.1 Thd OP PS
52.2 The INF 15.2 The REP
20.3 A REP 38.1 The REP 15.1 The INT
20.2 The REP 37.2 Tha REP 14.1 A REP
18.1 A INF 13.1 The REP 7.1 The REP
16.1 J REP 10.1 Sip REP 5.2 Sip EX
15.4 The OP
5.1 Sip OP
40.1 A REP
38.2 The REP
36.1 Sip OP
(b)
(a)
(c)
(d) (e)
(f)
174.1 F REP 151.1 F REP
68.1 F REP 148.1 Tho REP
67.3 Tha REP 142.1 Sin REP
66.2 Sin REP 139.1 F INF
64.1 Tho REP NP
63.4 F REP
63.3 F REP
60.2 Sip REP
58.1 Tho REP
56.2 Tho REP 129.1 Tho REP
35.2 Tho INF 128.1 Sin REP
35.1 Tho REP 126.1 Tha REP
34.1 Tha REP 105.1 Sin REP
33.1 F REP 103.1 Tha REP
32.1 Sip REP 88.1 Sip REP
31.2 Tha REP 85.2 Sip INF
31.1 Tha REP PS
30.1 F REP
28.2 Tha REP
28.1 F REP
123.1 Sip REP
24.2 F REP 24.1 F REP 104.1 Tho REP
22.1 Tho REP 23.1 Sin REP 101.1 F REP
21.1 Sin REP 20.1 Tha INF 100.1 Sin REP
20.2 Tha REP NP 95.1 Tho REP
18.1 Tho INF 93.1 Tho REP
89.1 Tho FA
PS
NP
17.1 Sin INT
16.1 Tho REP
14.1 Tha REP
12.2 Tha REP 92.1 Sin REP
12.1 Tha INF 84.1 F REP
PS 83.1 Sin REP
82.1 Tho REP
81.1 Sip IF: inquiry
118.1 Sin REP 55.2 Sip REP
111.1 Sin REP 45.1 J REP
42.1 Tho REP
41.2 Sin INT
110.1 Tho INF 110.2 Tho REP PS
76.1 Sin REP
71.2 Tha REP
70.1 F OP NP 171.1 Tho REP
156.1 Sin REP
155.1 J OP
(d)
(b)
(c)
(e)
(g)
(h)
(f)
(a)
95.1 A REP
94.1 Thd INT
89.3 M REP 73.1 The REP
89.1 M REP
70.1 Thd INF
69.1 K REP
68.1 Thd REP
67.2 The REP 67.1 A REP
66.2 The REP
66.1 Thd REP
65.1 A REP
72.1 K REP 64.2 M REP
64.1 K REP 28.1 Thd REP
63.1 Thd REP 19.4 The REP
60.1 M REP 19.1 The REP
16.2 M INF
PS
15.1 A REP
14.2 M INF
12.1 M INF
PS
14.1 M REP 11.1 The REP
13.1 A INF 10.1 A REP
9.3 M INF
9.2 M INF
7.2 K INF 9.1 M REP
7.1 K INF 6.2 M INF
PS
6.1 M REP
2.2 M INF 2.1 M INF
PS PS
(a)
87.1 Thd REP 52.2 The REP
86.1 M INT 52.1 A REP
85.1 Thd INT 51.1 The REP
81.2 M INT 49.2 The REP
48.2 Thd INF 49.1 K REP
80.1 K INT 42.1 M REP
55.2 The REP
55.1 K REP 36.2 M OP
53.1 M REP
36.1 M INT 35.1 K INT
29.1 H FA
PS
108.1 M EX 122.1 The REP
106.1 The REP
107.1 The REP
104.2 The REP
104.1 The REP
58.1 A INT 58.2 A INT PS
57.1 The INT
56.3 A REP
56.2 A INT
56.1 A OP 92.1 The REP
91.1 A REP
90.2 The REP
90.1 The REP
89.2 M INF
PS
(b) (c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
73.1 A INF 69.1 A REP
72.1 B REP 56.3 The REP
71.1 Tho/The REP
70.2 Sip REP
68.1 Sip REP 52.3 The REP
67.1 The REP 50.3 F INF 51.2 Tho INT
65.1 The INF PS PS
56.2 The REP
55.1 Sip REP
52.2 The REP
51.1 Tho REP
50.1 F REP
1.1 B OP
44.1 B REP
20.1 Tho REP
11.1 F REP
3.1 F OP
(b)
(c)
(a)
74.1 Thd REP 65.2 Lu REP
12.1 Lu REP 59.3 K REP
6.1 K OP 10.1 K INF
8.1 K INT
7.1 M INT
6.3 K INF
6.2 K FA
PS
66.2 M INT 71.2 M INT 77.1 K/Tha REP
66.1 M REP 68.2 K INT 76.1 J REP
21.2 M INT 67.2 J REP 68.1 K REP
21.1 M REP 66.4 M REP 67.1 J REP
18.1 Tha REP
16.2 Tha INT
PS 66.3 M REP
14.1 Tha OP 47.3 M REP
47.1 M REP
46.3 Tha INT
42.3 M FA
PS
45.1 Lu INF 58.1 M INT 81.1 J REP
44.1 Thd INT 57.1 J REP 72.2 K INT
43.2 K INT 51.3 M FA 72.1 K REP
43.1 K OP PS 67.3 J OP
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f) (g)
 
125.1 Lu REP 134.1 Lu REP
122.1 Lu INT 133.1 Siz REP 131.1 Tho REP
128.2 Thd REP 130.2 Siz INT
120.1 Lu REP 128.1 Siz REP 130.1 Siz REP
111.1 Lu REP
31.1 Lu REP
21.3 Thd REP 117.1 Siz INT 116.1 Tha INF
20.1 Sip REP
19.1 Tho REP
18.1 Siz REP 115.1 Siz OP
15.1 Tha OP
91.1 Siz REP 119.2 Thd REP
90.1 Sip EX 119.1 Siz REP
89.1 Tha EX 113.1 Thd INT
88.1 Lu EX 112.1 Siz REP
84.2 Siz REP 28.2 Thd REP
80.1 Sip REP 28.1 Siz INT
34.1 Sip INT 43.1 Tho REP
42.1 Tha REP
60.3 Tha INF 40.1 Sip REP
45.1 Siz REP 38.1 Sip INT
33.1 Siz REP 25.1 Siz REP 35.1 Siz IF: inquiry
24.1 Tho REP
23.2 Siz INT
PS 23.1 Siz INT
PS
58.1 B REP
68.3 Siz REP
66.2 Thd REP 57.1 Tho REP
66.1 Siz REP 56.2 Siz INF
55.1 Tha INF
68.2 Siz INT 102.1 Siz REP
60.2 Tha INF 61.2 Siz INF 101.1 Tha EX
61.1 Siz REP 100.2 Thd REP
60.1 Tha OP 100.1 Siz REP
54.1 Siz INT 99.1 Tha REP
59.2 Siz INT 94.2 Thd REP
93.1 Thd REP
76.1 Tha REP 92.2 Tha INF
51.1 Siz INT PS
72.1 Thd IF: inquiry 47.1 Siz OP
59.1 Siz OP
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(f)
(e)
223.1 J REP
221.1 J REP
220.1 F REP
218.3 A REP
84.1 M REP 218.2 M REP
81.1 M INT 79.2 M INF 138.1 A REP
66.2 M INF 78.2 A REP 137.1 The REP
136.1 M REP
135.1 F REP
66.1 M REP 134.1 J REP
64.1 M INT 132.1 A REP
59.1 A REP 78.3 A REP
57.3 A INT 58.1 M INT 61.1 A REP
PS 57.2 A REP
11.1 A REP
5.1 The IF: request
15.3 M EX 140.3 M REP
15.2 M REP 10.1 The EX 140.1 M REP
130.2 A REP
119.1 The INF
8.1 F FA NP
PS
158.1 M REP 179.1 A REP
155.1 M INT 157.1 J INT 167.1 F INF
154.1 The REP 156.1 The INT 163.1 A REP
160.2 M REP
158.3 M OP
145.1 The OP 153.2 M INT
143.1 The REP
47.2 The REP
46.2 The OP
191.1 The EX 188.1 K EX 209.1 F INF
190.1 A INT 186.2 M REP
189.1 M INT 183.1 The INT 186.1 M INF 208.1 The INT
184.1 M OP 206.1 K INT
204.1 The REP
172.1 The REP 180.3 The INT 203.1 M OP
49.2 The INT 169.1 The REP 180.2 M REP
49.1 The REP 168.1 M REP 180.1 The REP
48.1 M REP 167.2 F REP 46.3 The REP
17.5 M INF 17.2 M INT 16.1 J INT
54.1 K REP
45.2 M REP
15.4 M IF: invite 24.1 F REP
21.1 M REP
20.2 J OP
(c)
(d)
(b)
(a)
(e)
(f) (g)
(j)
201.2 M REP
201.1 M INF
200.1 The INT
198.1 K INT 40.1 F INT
197.1 The REP 39.1 K INT
133.1 The REP 133.2 The EX 38.1 F REP
128.2 K REP 35.1 M INF 36.1 F FA
75.2 F INF
30.4 F REP 34.1 F REP
30.2 F INF 33.1 M INF
75.1 F INF 47.2 The REP
46.5 M REP
46.4 Theo OP 30.1 F FA 32.1 F FA
(h)
(i)
99.1 Lu REP 135.1 Siz REP 109.3 Sip REP
98.2 Siz REP 61.3 Tha REP 108.3 Tha REP
88.2 Siz REP 87.3 Lu INF 61.2 Tho REP 64.2 Tha REP
59.2 Tho REP 64.1 Siz REP
132.1 Tho REP 58.5 Siz INT 62.1 Siz REP
131.6 Tha REP
87.2 Lu INF 131.1 Siz INF
87.1 Lu REP 88.1 Siz REP 58.4 Siz REP
71.3 Tha REP 50.2 Tha REP 58.2 Siz INF
68.1 Siz REP 50.1 Siz REP 56.2 Tha REP
25.2 Siz REP 56.1 Siz REP
22.1 Siz OP 52.3 Tha REP
38.2 Siz INF 51.1 Tho REP
30.1 Lu REP 37.3 Tha INF
26.1 Lu REP 37.1 Tha REP
22.3 Siz REP 12.1 Siz REP 35.1 Tha REP
11.2 Tha REP 22.4 Siz REP
21.1 Lu INT 10.1 Lu INF 22.2 Siz REP
9.1 Siz REP 5.3 Siz INF
32.1 Lu REP 8.1 Lu REP 5.2 Siz INF
20.1 Siz FA 7.1 Siz REP
PS
PS
34.1 Lu REP
5.1 Siz INF 13.1 J INF
18.4 Siz REP
18.3 Siz REP 3.5 Siz INF
3.2 Siz INF 3.4 Siz FA
PS PS
86.1 Sip REP 145.1 Siz REP
85.1 Siz REP 143.2 Siz INT
58.3 Siz REP
38.1 Siz INF 142.1 Lu INT
PS
141.5 Tha REP
141.4 Siz IF: request
(a)
(b) (c)
167.1 Thd REP 76.3 M INT 165.1 Thd REP 166.1 K REP
70.1 Thd REP
57.1 K REP 161.1 M INT
56.1 Thd REP 54.1 Thd INT
48.2 B REP 40.1 M REP 159.1 K INT
37.2 M REP 39.1 A REP 160.1 Thd REP
37.1 M REP 38.1 F REP 63.3 K REP
34.2 M REP 49.1 K REP 158.1 M REP
141.1 M REP
139.1 A REP
34.1 A REP 47.1 F REP 137.1 Thd REP
31.6 M REP 46.1 K REP 136.1 M REP
31.4 M INT 44.1 K REP
18.4 M REP
18.2 M INF
18.1 M INF
168.2 M REP
153.1 M REP 168.1 M REP
84.1 A REP 78.1 K INF
82.1 A REP 69.1 A INT
68.1 M REP 74.1 A INT
67.1 Thd REP 11.1 F REP
64.3 M REP 10.7 M INT
10.6 M INF
 164.1 M REP 110.1 M REP
163.1 K INT 164.2 M REP 109.1 F REP
135.1 K REP 65.3 L REP 108.1 K REP
134.1 M REP 93.1 F REP
31.5 M REP 67.1 Thd REP 90.2 M REP
60.1 Thd REP 73.1 M REP
28.1 M REP 10.4 M INF 72.1 K REP
27.1 Thd INT 52.1 M REP 56.2 Thd REP
50.2 M REP
26.3 M REP 16.4 M REP
10.5 M REP 10.1 M REP
9.1 Thd REP
16.2 M INF
16.1 M FA
85.1 H REP PS
8.1 M FA 51.2 Thd REP
PS 13.2 Thd REP 17.1 Thd INF
10.2 M FA 16.3 M FA
PS PS
(a)
(b) (c)
125.2 M REP
157.1 K REP 119.3 M REP
155.1 M REP 119.1 M REP
98.2 K REP 111.1 F REP
90.1 M REP 107.1 F REP
89.1 K REP 105.3 F INF 105.1 F REP
88.1 H INT 104.1 K INF
PS 105.2 F REP
103.1 F INF
102.1 K OP
26.2 M REP
22.1 Thd INT 23.1 A REP 101.2 M REP
79.2 M OP
31.2 M REP
21.1 A REP 18.5 M REP
7.4 Thd INT 1.2 M IF: invite
PS
(d) (e)
(f) (g)
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Data 1
Funeka      3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Linda       3 0 2 2 1 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 5 1 0 3 0 0 1 0 2 1 8 0 0 5 1
Matthew     3 2 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 2 1 2 0 9 4 0 5 3
Sindiswa    3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Sizwe       3 3 4 1 3 1 1 14 0 0 4 0 2 1 4 5 0 4 1 5 14 2 12 5 0 5 9
Thozie      3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 4 0 0 2 0 3 1 1 0 0 6 1
Ayanda      4 1 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 3 1 4 2 0 1 1 0 3 1 10 0 0 5 2
Hilde       4 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
James       4 1 1 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 3 0 1 0 2 3 0 4 1 0 2 2
Sipho       4 1 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 3 0 0 2 0
Thami       4 1 3 0 1 3 1 2 0 1 0 3 4 3 6 1 0 0 1 2 6 1 7 0 4 3 8
Theo        4 0 7 1 2 0 0 7 1 1 0 2 7 1 4 2 0 4 2 2 5 2 13 4 1 1 3
Theodora    4 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
Funeka      5 4 8 2 3 4 0 2 0 1 0 1 2 0 3 7 0 3 2 0 7 2 17 0 1 6 10
Hilde       5 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
James       5 1 4 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 2 0 2 4 1 3 2 1 5 1 3 0 0 1 5
Sindiswa    5 4 8 2 1 5 1 2 1 1 0 3 4 1 3 10 0 3 1 4 12 2 15 0 0 10 8
Sipho       5 1 2 1 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 3 1 4 1 0 4 1 6 0 0 5 10
Thami       5 5 6 1 0 4 0 2 2 1 6 1 6 3 7 5 0 0 5 0 8 3 19 1 0 4 14
Thozie      5 2 10 2 5 5 1 1 0 4 0 3 10 1 5 14 0 7 3 1 13 3 21 0 0 12 17
Ayanda      6 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 3 6 0 0 1 3 2 1 8 1 0 5 2
Buyiswa     6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hilde       6 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Khaya       6 7 1 2 1 2 1 2 0 0 0 2 1 0 3 1 0 3 3 2 6 0 6 1 0 0 10
Matthew     6 8 4 0 3 2 6 5 1 0 1 2 3 1 18 9 1 6 12 4 11 2 14 5 0 9 14
Theo        6 1 3 6 1 3 2 0 2 0 8 0 1 0 1 3 0 1 1 1 2 1 18 1 0 4 5
Theodora    6 3 0 1 0 4 3 4 0 0 0 0 5 2 5 8 2 0 2 3 7 0 7 0 0 9 10
Ayanda      7 2 2 0 0 1 7 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 4 0 3 0 4 0 0 1 4
Buyiswa     7 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 0 1 3 0 3 0 0 4 2
Funeka      7 2 3 0 0 1 1 6 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 2 0 2 2 1 7 0 5 1 0 5 4
Sipho       7 1 0 0 1 2 0 8 0 1 0 0 0 1 5 6 0 4 2 4 7 0 7 2 1 6 4
Theo        7 0 2 0 0 0 2 6 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 3 0 2 1 1 4 2 8 1 0 6 1
Theo/Thozie 7 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Thozie      7 1 3 0 2 0 4 2 0 1 0 1 1 2 2 5 0 3 1 1 6 0 8 1 0 6 3
Thozie/Theo 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
James       8 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 7 1 0 1 0 1 7 0 5 3 2 3 1
James/Thami 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
Khaya       8 2 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 2 0 2 2 0 3 6 0 2 2 6 7 0 6 1 1 5 3
Khaya/Thami 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
Lulama      8 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 1 1 2 0 4 2 0 3 1
Matthew     8 5 8 0 8 4 11 8 0 5 0 4 6 1 4 3 0 10 4 7 11 6 8 1 0 10 15
Thami       8 2 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1 1 0 4 0 0 1 1 2 7 0 2 0 0 0 5
Theodora    8 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 0 3 2 0 1 0 2 6 0 2 3 0 2 0
Buyiswa     9 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
Hilde       9 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lulama      9 3 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 4 5 2 1 1 1 5 0 6 0 0 6 9
Sipho       9 1 4 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 3 1 1 4 0 0 1 2
Sizwe       9 12 4 5 1 5 3 14 0 2 0 5 5 2 3 7 1 1 2 12 11 4 21 4 0 7 19
Thami       9 2 4 1 0 2 1 5 0 1 0 1 3 0 4 4 2 1 6 1 9 1 5 0 0 3 6
Theodora    9 0 3 0 1 1 0 2 0 1 11 0 3 0 0 3 0 1 0 2 1 3 14 0 0 3 3
Thozie      9 0 1 0 0 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 9 1 0 0 0 4 1 6 0 0 8 4
Ayanda      10 3 2 0 3 4 0 4 0 0 19 0 4 0 4 1 0 1 1 3 3 1 30 2 0 4 8
Funeka      10 7 6 1 17 3 4 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 4 5 1 14 7 2 5 4 10 1 1 5 25
James       10 2 3 0 5 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 4 5 0 6 0 3 6 2 7 1 0 4 7
Khaya       10 4 1 0 9 1 0 0 0 1 0 4 1 0 4 1 1 7 3 3 6 1 4 0 1 2 11
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Data 1
Matthew     10 9 13 2 11 6 17 6 3 1 9 7 15 1 10 11 1 12 11 9 24 8 25 1 0 15 21
Theo        10 9 3 4 8 2 2 6 1 0 1 1 5 0 14 3 4 6 4 7 11 1 15 3 1 10 15
            11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
James       11 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 1
Lulama      11 7 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 5 1 1 2 2 0 2 3 3 5 0 9 1 0 0 12
Sipho       11 2 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 4 0 2 1 1 4 1 0 0 0 7 6 1 2 0 0 2 6
Sizwe       11 10 9 7 7 3 2 6 0 0 0 4 15 0 14 8 0 6 12 2 16 6 25 7 0 2 17
Thami       11 2 17 0 1 10 0 3 1 1 12 4 10 1 4 1 0 5 2 1 14 7 17 0 0 1 13
Thozie      11 1 3 4 0 3 1 1 0 0 0 1 6 0 1 3 0 0 0 1 5 2 7 0 0 2 3
            12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ayanda      12 4 4 1 0 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 3 2 4 3 0 1 0 4 8 2 10 2 0 3 10
Buyiswa     12 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 1 3
Funeka      12 1 2 4 1 0 1 3 1 3 0 1 2 2 0 3 0 2 2 2 2 0 12 1 0 3 6
Hilde       12 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2
Khaya       12 11 5 1 0 2 0 6 0 4 0 5 0 3 3 5 0 1 5 4 15 4 15 0 0 5 20
Linda       12 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 2
Matthew     12 12 11 2 12 7 9 5 0 3 7 3 6 6 10 8 0 5 5 6 14 7 41 3 0 11 43
Theodora    12 14 1 0 5 4 0 1 0 1 0 0 3 1 3 4 0 1 3 4 3 1 17 0 0 6 23
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Data 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 2 0 0 3 7
3 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 1 4 0 2 1 5
0 0 0 0 0 0 2
1 0 4 0 0 0 7
0 2 0 0 0 1 0
3 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 4
0 1 0 2 4 1 6
6 2 1 4 1 0 12
3 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 2 2 0 2 0 11
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 3 0 1 0 0 7
1 3 2 2 2 1 17
0 0 1 0 1 0 1
3 0 7 2 0 0 18
2 0 2 4 2 1 23
2 0 3 1 0 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 2 3 1 1 2
12 2 1 4 0 6 10
1 1 11 0 0 2 6
3 1 1 0 0 3 8
2 0 0 1 0 7 3
3 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 1 0 1 1 1 3
11 0 0 0 0 0 1
2 0 0 4 0 2 3
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3 0 0 1 1 4 5
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 6 0 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 2 0 14 1 11 12
6 0 0 1 0 0 1
3 0 0 2 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 5
1 2 1 0 0 0 5
6 3 5 6 8 3 7
4 1 1 5 0 1 7
0 1 11 0 4 0 3
1 0 0 0 0 1 5
0 0 19 0 2 0 9
2 1 4 0 0 4 8
4 2 4 0 0 0 6
2 1 4 0 3 0 2
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Data 1
11 4 16 3 2 17 31
8 0 9 0 0 2 11
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 2
0 0 1 5 1 1 4
2 2 0 5 0 0 2
8 4 7 12 10 2 16
0 1 12 6 16 0 18
0 1 4 2 0 1 11
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 1 0 1 1 7
1 0 0 0 1 0 0
2 1 3 2 1 1 4
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3 1 1 5 3 0 7
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
4 3 9 2 2 9 15
2 0 0 0 1 0 5
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1A Funeka 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1.14% 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1.35% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1.20
1A Linda 0 2 2 1 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 5 1 0 3 21.59% 0 0 1 0 2 1 8 16.22% 0 0 5 1 0 1 2 0 0 3 7 50 20.00
1A Matthew 2 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 17.05% 0 1 2 1 2 0 9 20.27% 4 0 5 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 45 18.00
1A Sindiswa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1.14% 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.35% 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1.20
1A Sizwe 3 4 1 3 1 1 14 0 0 4 0 2 1 4 5 48.86% 0 4 1 5 14 2 12 51.35% 5 0 5 9 11 1 4 0 2 1 5 124 49.60
1A Thozie 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 4 10.23% 0 0 2 0 3 1 1 9.46% 0 0 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 25 10.00
1B Ayanda 1 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 3 1 4 2 17.59% 0 1 1 0 3 1 10 20.25% 0 0 5 2 1 0 4 0 0 0 7 54 18.31
1B Hilde 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2.78% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00% 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 6 2.03
1B James 1 1 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 3 11.11% 0 1 0 2 3 0 4 12.66% 1 0 2 2 3 1 1 0 0 1 1 34 11.53
1B Sipho 1 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5.56% 1 0 0 0 2 0 3 7.59% 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 18 6.10
1B Thami 1 3 0 1 3 1 2 0 1 0 3 4 3 6 1 26.85% 0 0 1 2 6 1 7 21.52% 0 4 3 8 0 1 0 2 4 1 6 75 25.42
1B Theo 0 7 1 2 0 0 7 1 1 0 2 7 1 4 2 32.41% 0 4 2 2 4 2 12 32.91% 4 1 1 3 6 2 1 4 1 0 12 96 32.54
1B Theodora 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 3.70% 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 5.06% 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 4.07
2A Funeka 4 8 2 3 4 0 2 0 1 0 1 2 0 3 7 15.95% 0 3 2 0 7 2 17 16.76% 0 1 6 10 3 2 2 0 2 0 11 105 16.18
2A Hilde 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.43% 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.54% 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0.46
2A James 1 4 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 2 0 2 4 7.76% 1 3 2 1 5 1 3 8.65% 0 0 1 5 1 3 0 1 0 0 7 52 8.01
2A Sindiswa 4 8 2 1 5 1 2 1 1 0 3 4 1 3 10 19.83% 0 3 1 4 12 2 15 20.00% 0 0 10 8 1 3 2 2 2 1 17 129 19.88
2A Sipho 1 2 1 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 3 7.76% 1 4 1 0 4 1 6 9.19% 0 0 5 10 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 53 8.17
2A Thami 5 6 1 0 4 0 2 2 1 6 1 6 3 7 5 21.12% 0 0 5 0 8 3 19 18.92% 1 0 4 14 3 0 7 2 0 0 18 133 20.49
2A Thozie 2 10 2 5 5 1 1 0 4 0 3 10 1 5 14 27.16% 0 7 3 1 13 3 21 25.95% 0 0 12 17 2 0 2 4 2 1 23 174 26.81
2B Ayanda 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 3 6 9.36% 0 0 1 3 2 1 8 11.45% 1 0 5 2 2 0 3 1 0 0 2 47 9.94
2B Buyiswa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.58% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0.42
2B Hilde 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.17% 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.76% 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 1.06
2B Khaya 7 1 2 1 2 1 2 0 0 0 2 1 0 3 1 13.45% 0 3 3 2 6 0 6 15.27% 1 0 0 10 3 0 2 3 1 1 2 66 13.95
2B Matthew 8 4 0 3 2 6 5 1 0 1 2 3 1 18 9 36.84% 1 6 12 4 11 2 14 38.17% 5 0 9 14 12 2 1 4 0 6 10 176 37.21
2B Theo 1 3 6 1 3 2 0 2 0 8 0 1 0 1 3 18.13% 0 1 1 1 2 1 18 18.32% 1 0 4 5 1 1 11 0 0 2 6 86 18.18
2B Theodora 2 0 1 0 4 3 4 0 0 0 0 5 2 6 8 20.47% 2 0 2 3 7 0 7 16.03% 0 0 9 10 3 1 1 0 0 3 8 91 19.24
3A Ayanda 2 2 0 0 1 7 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 2 15.25% 0 0 4 0 3 0 4 11.11% 0 0 1 4 3 0 0 1 0 6 3 47 14.03
3A Buyiswa 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 0 7.63% 0 1 0 1 3 0 3 8.08% 0 0 4 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 7.76
3A Funeka 2 3 0 0 1 1 6 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 2 17.80% 0 2 2 1 7 0 5 17.17% 1 0 4 4 5 1 0 1 1 1 3 59 17.61
3A Sipho 1 0 0 1 2 0 8 0 1 0 0 0 1 5 6 21.19% 0 4 2 4 7 0 7 24.24% 2 1 6 4 11 0 0 0 0 0 1 74 22.09
3A Theo 0 2 0 0 0 2 6 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 3 16.10% 0 2 1 1 4 2 8 18.18% 1 0 6 1 2 0 0 4 0 2 3 56 16.72
3A Theo/   Thozie 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.85% 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1.01% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0.90
3A Thozie 1 3 0 2 0 4 2 0 1 0 1 1 2 2 5 20.34% 0 3 1 1 6 0 8 19.19% 1 0 5 3 4 0 0 1 1 4 5 67 20.00
3A Thozie/ Theo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.85% 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1.01% 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0.90
3B James 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 7 1 10.71% 0 1 0 1 7 0 5 11.97% 3 2 3 1 5 0 0 0 0 1 0 44 11.08
3B James/ Thami 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.71% 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.85% 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0.76
3B Khaya 2 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 2 0 2 2 0 3 6 17.14% 0 2 2 6 7 0 6 19.66% 1 1 5 3 6 0 0 6 0 0 2 71 17.88
3B Khaya/ Thami 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.71% 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.85% 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0.76
3B Lulama 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 5.71% 0 0 1 1 2 0 4 6.84% 2 0 3 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 24 6.05
3B Matthew 5 8 0 8 4 11 8 0 5 0 4 6 1 4 3 47.86% 0 10 4 7 11 6 8 39.32% 1 0 10 15 1 2 0 14 1 11 12 180 45.34
3B Thami 2 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1 1 0 4 0 9.29% 0 1 1 2 7 0 2 11.11% 0 0 0 5 6 0 0 1 0 0 1 39 9.82
3B T'dora 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 0 3 2 7.86% 0 1 0 2 6 0 2 9.40% 3 0 2 0 3 0 0 2 1 0 0 33 8.31
4A Buyiswa 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1.14% 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.72% 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 1.02
4A Hilde 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.57% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0.41
4A Lulama 3 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 4 5 11.43% 2 1 1 1 5 0 6 11.59% 0 0 6 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 56 11.48
4A Sipho 1 4 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 6.86% 1 1 0 3 1 1 4 7.97% 0 0 1 2 1 2 1 0 0 0 5 35 7.17
4A Sizwe 12 4 5 1 5 3 14 0 2 0 5 5 2 3 7 38.86% 1 1 2 12 11 4 21 37.68% 4 0 7 19 6 3 5 6 8 3 7 188 38.52
4A Thami 2 4 1 0 2 1 5 0 1 0 1 3 0 4 4 16.00% 2 1 6 1 9 1 5 18.12% 0 0 3 6 4 1 1 5 0 1 7 81 16.60
4A Th'dora 0 3 0 1 1 0 2 0 1 11 0 3 0 0 3 14.29% 0 1 0 2 1 3 14 15.22% 0 0 3 3 0 1 11 0 4 0 3 71 14.55
4A Thozie 0 1 0 0 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 9 10.86% 1 0 0 0 4 1 6 8.70% 0 0 8 4 1 0 0 0 0 1 5 50 10.25
4B Ayanda 3 2 0 3 4 0 4 0 0 19 0 4 0 4 1 13.37% 0 1 1 3 3 1 30 14.50% 2 0 4 8 0 0 19 0 2 0 9 127 13.70
4B Funeka 7 6 1 17 3 4 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 4 5 15.50% 1 14 7 2 5 4 10 15.99% 1 1 5 25 2 1 4 0 0 4 8 145 15.64
4B James 2 3 0 5 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 4 5 8.51% 0 6 0 3 6 2 7 8.92% 1 0 4 7 4 2 4 0 0 0 6 80 8.63
4B Khaya 4 1 0 9 1 0 0 0 1 0 4 1 0 4 1 7.90% 1 7 3 3 6 1 4 9.29% 0 1 2 12 1 1 4 0 3 0 2 77 8.31
4B Matthew 9 13 2 11 6 17 6 3 1 9 7 15 1 10 11 36.78% 1 12 11 9 24 8 25 33.46% 1 0 15 21 11 4 16 3 2 17 31 332 35.81
4B Theo 9 3 4 8 2 2 6 1 0 1 1 5 0 14 3 17.93% 4 6 4 7 11 1 15 17.84% 3 1 10 15 8 0 9 0 0 2 11 166 17.91
5A James 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 3.08% 0 0 2 0 3 0 0 2.96% 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 2 19 3.05
5A Lulama 7 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 5 1 1 2 2 11.01% 0 2 3 3 5 0 9 13.02% 1 0 0 12 0 0 1 5 1 1 4 72 11.56
5A Sipho 2 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 4 0 2 1 1 4 1 8.37% 0 0 0 7 6 1 2 9.47% 0 0 2 6 2 2 0 5 0 0 2 54 8.67
5A Sizwe 10 9 7 7 3 2 6 0 0 0 4 15 0 14 8 37.44% 0 6 11 2 16 6 24 38.46% 7 0 2 18 7 4 7 12 10 2 16 235 37.72
5A Thami 2 17 0 1 10 0 3 1 1 12 4 10 1 4 1 29.52% 0 5 2 1 14 7 17 27.22% 0 0 1 13 0 1 12 6 16 0 18 180 28.89
5A Thozie 1 3 4 0 3 1 1 0 0 0 1 6 0 1 3 10.57% 0 0 0 1 5 2 7 8.88% 0 0 2 3 0 1 4 2 0 1 11 63 10.11
5B Ayanda 4 4 1 0 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 3 2 4 3 10.98% 0 1 0 4 8 2 10 12.25% 2 0 3 10 2 0 1 0 1 1 7 79 11.35
5B Buyiswa 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 2.44% 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 1.96% 0 0 1 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 16 2.30
5B Funeka 1 2 4 1 0 1 3 1 3 0 1 2 2 0 3 9.76% 0 2 2 2 2 0 12 9.80% 1 0 3 6 2 1 3 2 1 1 4 68 9.77
5B Hilde 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.22% 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.98% 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 1.15
5B Khaya 11 5 1 0 2 0 6 0 4 0 5 0 3 3 5 18.29% 0 1 5 4 15 4 14 21.08% 0 0 5 20 3 1 1 5 3 0 7 133 19.11
5B Linda 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.22% 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1.47% 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 9 1.29
5B Matthew 12 11 2 12 7 9 5 0 3 7 3 6 6 10 8 41.06% 0 5 5 7 12 7 42 38.24% 3 0 11 44 3 3 9 2 2 9 15 280 40.23
5B Th'dora 14 1 0 5 4 0 1 0 1 0 0 3 1 3 4 15.04% 0 1 3 4 3 1 17 14.22% 0 0 6 23 2 0 0 0 1 0 5 103 14.80
all 5133 180 187 57 129 121 91 186 15 48 85 81 163 48 221 222 21 146 129 142 366 91 570 64 13 258 475 169 51 156 108 75 90 375 5133  
